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ABSTRACT
The thesis deals with the law relating to preventive 
detention in Pakistan. It is an extraordinary law which 
empowers the executive to deprive citizens of their liberty 
without trial in regular court of law. Legislative powers 
may, under the constitution, be used in the interest of the 
state for reasons connected with defence, security, 
maintenance of public order and internal peace. The 
chapters on fundamental rights in the Constitutions of 1956 
and 1962 place restrictions on these powers. The evolution 
of fundamental rights from the time of the British Raj are 
discussed in detail, and after a general discussion of 
fundamental rights, the thesis deals with the demands made by 
various political parties for their incorporation in the 
Indian constitution to be made by Parliament at Westminster. 
The All Party Report, The Simon Commission Report, The Round 
Table Conference Report and report of The Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on Indian Constitutional reform are dealt with in 
this Chapter I, along with the abrogation of the two 
constitutions of Pakistan. In Chapter II, the history of 
preventive detention has been traced from 1775 with Bengal 
State Prisoners Regulations of 1818 and 1850, the Criminal
2Law Amendment Acts, 1908, 1915, the Sedition Report, 1918, 
the Rowlatt Act, 1919? and the Defence of India Act, 1939*
The necessity for preventive detention is discussed in 
Chapter III; after a general consideration, such provisions 
in England and America in time of war are discussed.
Chapter IV discusses the nature of preventive detention 
laws and the constitutional restrictions on them.
Chapter V discusses judicial review and the jurisdiction 
of the High Courts to set aside detention orders when there is 
any irregularity or the order is made mala fide.
Chapter VI deals with the detaining authority, the nature and 
reasonableness of its satisfaction to pass detention orders. 
The justification of preventive detention is discussed in 
Chapter VII, in which the situation in Pakistan is outlined; 
alternative remedies have been discussed to show how far they 
are inadequate to meet the needs of the country.
The next two chapters deal with the constitutional remedies 
for loss of personal liberty, in which the writ procedure in 
England and Pakistan is discussed in detail, as well as 
Article 2 of Constitution of Pakistan, 1962.
In the last Chapter some conclusions have been drawn 
from the research and some suggestions have been made.
3ACKNOWLSDGIflEST
I am lucky to hare conducted this research under the most 
able, kind and helpful supervision of Prof. Alan G-ledhill, 
M.A. (Cantab), LL.B. (London) I.C.S. (Retd.), Bar-at-Law, 
Professor Emeritus of Oriental laws in the University of 
London, to whom I wish to express my gratitude for his 
affectionate encouragement, and illuminating guidance.
I also feel indebted to Mr. Pheroz K. Irani, formerly 
of School of Oriental and African Studies, who initially 
encouraged me to undertake the exploration of this subject.
I wish to extend my sincere thanks to Mr. Latlf Bawn, 
Advocate, of Supreme Court of Pakistan, and Mr. M.A. ifehtab,
B.Sc. (Hons), LL.B», for their valuable suggestions and 
comments; to M.Y. Mirza, M.Phil. (Lond.) and Mrs.Husrat Altaf, 
N.B.A., for their courteous assistance in reading the script 
and preparing the table of the cases and statutes.
finally many thanks are due to my brothers, in particular 
Man Mushtaq. All, B.A., for their moral and financial support 
and Mrs.Edith Burkin for typing the thesis so expeditiously.
School of Oriental and 
African Studies, 
University of London.
Altaf Hosain Mian
4ABBREVIATIONS
A.C.......... Appeal Cases (Privy Council)*
A.I.R........ All India Reporter.
All E.R. or
A.E.R •• All England Reporter.
All.......... Allahabad.
Art.......... Artie le.
B.L.R. •• • • Burma Law Reports.
Bal.......... Baluchistan.
BsiiiL*R* • • • Bengal Law Reports.
Bom.L.R.. Bombay Law Reporter.
C.C.C........ Canadian Criminal Cases.
C.l.R........ Commonwealth Law Reports. (Australia)
Cal.......... Calcutta.
Ch.D......... Chancery Division.
Cl............... Clause.
Cut. Cuttack.
Cr.P.C....... Criminal Procedure Code •
C. W.R. Calcutta Weekly Rotes.
F.B.......... Pull Bench.
F.C.......... Federal Court.
F.C.R........ Federal Court Reports.
F.C.R..............Frontier Crimes Regulations.
H.L. C.......... House of Lords Cases
Hydr. .. .. Hyderabad.
I.A. .. .. Indian Appeals. (Privy Council).
I.L.R..........  Indian Law Reports.
K.B.D..........  King#s Bench Division.
Kar. .. .. Karachi.
L.J. .. .. Law Journal.
L.R. .. .. Law Reports.
Lah. .. .. Lahore.
M.l.R.......... ftfeirtial Law Regulations.
Ifod. .. .. Kkdras.
Rag. .. .. Ragpur.
P.C. .. .. Privy Council.
P.L.D.......... Pakistan Legal Decisions.
P.L.R.......... Pakistan Law Reports.
P.P.C..........  Pakistan Penal Code.
Pak. .. .. Pakistan.
Pat. .. .. Patna.
Pesh. .. .. Peshawar.
Q.B.D..........  Queen’s Bench Division.
Quet. •. •. Quetta.
Raj. ......  Rajasthan.
S.C..........  Supreme Court.
S.C.j........  Supreme Court Journal.
S.C.N. .. .. Supreme Court Notes.
S.C.R........  Supreme Court Reports.
S.T.......... State Trials.
Sec. *• .. Section.
Stat.........  Statute.
T.L.R........  Times Law Reports.
U.S.......... United States. (Supreme Court).
W.P.......... West Pakistan.
Wall.........  Wallace’s Reports.(Supreme Court).
Wheat........  Wheaton’s Reports. (Supreme Court).
CONTENTS
Page
A b s t r & c t  • • *• •• •• •♦ •• 1
Acknowledgment. .. •• •• •• •• 3
Abbreviations • • .. .. .. .. .. 4
CHAPTER I __  INTRODUCTION............... 10
(1) Fundamental Rights in General. .. 31
(2) Evolution of Fundamental Rights in India 36
(3) The All-Party Report .. .. . ♦ 38
(4) The Simon Commission Report, 1930 •• 39
(5) The 1936 Constitution and Fundamental
Rights in Pakistan • • • • .. 46
(6) The Military Revolution of 1958 .. 54
(7) The Constitution of 1962. . . . .  56
(8) Abrogation of the Constitution of 1962 65
CHAPTER II _____ HISTORY OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION
(1) The Development in India, 1773-1918.. 70
(2) The Sedition Report, 1918 . . . .  78
(3) Preventive Detention, 1919-1939 .. 82
CHAPTER III   THE NECESSITY FOR PREVENTIVE DETENTION
(1) General Considerations.• . . . .  91
(2) Preventive Detention in England • • 99
(3) Preventive Detention in the U«S.A... 112
8Pag*
CHAPTER IV. THE NATURE OP AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RESTRICTIONS ON PREVENTIVE DETENTION LAWS
(1) Definition of Prevent!Ye Detention • « .. 119
(2) Security of the Person*. *. •• .. 133
(3) Due Process of law •• .. .. .. 141
(4) Safeguards as to Arrest and Detention .. 143
(5) The Advisory Board .. .♦ .. ♦. 157
CHAPTER V. ______ JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1) The Jurisdiction of the High Courts.. •• 171
(2) Grounds of Detention and Representation •• 174
(3) Particulars .. *• .. *• •• 185
(4) Delays *« .• «. •. •• *. 192
(5) Vague Grounds .. •• •• •• .. 193
(6) Irrelevant Grounds •• •• •• •• 205
(7) Ifela Pides •. • • .. • • • • 213
CHAPTER VI. ____  THE DETAINING AUTHORITY
(1) Satisfaction •• .. .. .. .. 242
(2) Reasonableness •• .. .. .. .. 248
(3) Communication of Grounds •• •• .. 265
(4) Representation .. .. .. .. .. 272
(5) Discretion to Withhold Pacts.. .. .. 277
(6) language of Grounds .. .. .. .. 281
CHAPTER VII ______ JUSTIFICATION OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION
(1) Grave Emergency .. .. .. .. .. 283
(2) The Situation in Pakistan. •• .. •• 287
(3) Alternative Remedies .. •• .. •• 307
(4) Emergency Powers .. .. .. .. .. 327
CHAPTER VIII ____  CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES FOR LOSS OF
LIBERTY
(1) The Writ Procedure*. .. .. .. .. 330
(2) Habeas Corpus in England.. .. .. •• 340
(3) Habeas Corpus in Indo-Pak sub-continent .. 355
(4) Habeas Corpus in Pakistan •• .. .. 359
(5) Object of Habeas Corpus *. .. •• •• 361
(6) Procedure for Writ of Habeas Corpus •• •• 381
(7) Review and Appeal •. * * .. . • .. 405
CHAPTER IX ______ STATUTORY REMEDIES
(1) Statutory Habeas Corpus .* ». .. .. 407
(2) Article 2 of Constitution of Pakistan,1962 424
CHAPTER X ______ CONCLUSION .................   436
Bibliography .• •. •• •• •• •• •. 485
Table of Cases*. .. •• .. •• .* •• 489
Table of Statutes •• .. .. .• .. •• 501
10
CHAPTER I
Introduction
On the 14th August, 1947, a momentous change took 
place in the history of India, as Pakistan emerged as an 
independent State under the leadership of Quaid-E-Azam 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Soon after the establishment of 
Pakistan, the Constituent Assembly was constituted to frame 
a constitution for the country. Most of the people had 
thought that the ’’Black laws” of the British Raj would 
be repealed and the right to personal liberty, among other 
fundamental rights, for which the people had made sacrifices, 
would be enjoyed by all citizens of Pakistan. But this 
assumption proved to be false; the laws passed during 
the British rule, imposing restrictions on the liberty of 
the person, were retained and no express declaration of 
Fundamental Rights was made; the country was still 
governed by the Government of India Act, 1935, which did 
not guarantee fundamental rights.
The first Constituent Assembly was dissolved on 24th 
October, 1954, after seven years, as it was unable to
(1) Common name given to preventive detention laws during 
struggle for independence.
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provide the country with an acceptable constitution, due 
to lack of agreement between the members. The Second 
Constituent Assembly ultimately gave the country a 
constitution, based on the British Parliamentary system.
This Constitution of 1956 had a declaration of Fundamental 
Rights, enforceable in the Courts, mostly subject to 
reasonable restrictions. The provisions directed to 
protection against arrest and detention permitted the 
legislature to deprive a citizen of his liberty on the 
subjective satisfaction of executive officials without 
trial.
This Constitution of 1956 was abrogated after two and 
a half years. The Martial Law regime, which abrogated this 
constitution, gave the country a new Constitution in 1962, 
which again led to the imposition of Martial Law and 
abrogation of this new constitution. Throughout this 
period the preventive legislation was of course retained, 
for reasons connected with defence, security of the State 
and maintenance of public order. These measures are 
precautionary and not punitive; the detenu is not charged 
with any crime and the object is to prevent the individual 
from acting in a particular manner so as to prevent him 
achieving an object, which may be dangerous to the State 
and its citizens. The justification for such legislation
12
is based on the argument that it was not wise to allow 
people to commit crimes against the state and its citizens
and punish them heavily for it, when the mischief can be
prevented by taking the action against the agitator under 
the powers conferred on the executive by the preventive 
detention laws. Preventive Detention, in its modem form, 
owes its genesis largely to the First World War, when it
was thought that no act or deed could possibly be
permitted that would tend to hamper the successful 
prosecution of the war. Effectiveness lay in prevention 
and not in punishment.
The countries of the world have sought to keep a 
balance between the competing claims of liberty and state 
control in different ways. The Constitution of Pakistan, 
following the example of other democratic countries, 
enacted a list of fundamental rights relating to life, 
liberty, property and other rights of citizens. But it 
allowed power to be given by law to deprive a person of 
his liberty without trial in a regular court, in certain 
circumstances.
It is a controversial question whether we really need 
this sort of legislation in peace time. Opposition parties 
have always maintained that the executive always pleads 
emergencies, real, supposed or imaginary, as the excuse 
for its demands for arbitrary powers. The long habit of
13
not thinking such things wrong gives them a superficial 
appearance of being right. Encroachment on liberties is 
generally resented, but if the repression continues, the 
people get accustomed to it. The opposition thinks that 
the object of preventive detention legislation is to keep 
the ruling party in power; it is abused and followed by 
a demand for absolute power. But the courts are there to 
see that the power is not abused and used only for such 
purposes the Constitution and the laws enacted under 
it contemplate. Pakistan has often been criticised for 
having such legislation during peace time, but, apart from 
Latin America, Belgium, Prance and some communist countries, 
all the territories, which had been British Colonies have 
this sort of legislation during peace time.
I have selected preventive detention as the subject of 
my thesis, not because I approve of such legislation in its 
present form but because it is a matter of special interest 
to the student of law to see how the courts try to keep a 
proper balance between the liberties of the subject on the 
one hand and needs of the state on the other hand. The 
thesis begins with a discussion of the fundamental rights 
in constitutions of 1956 and 1962; it has been held that 
"the very essence of a fundamental right is that it is more 
or less permanent and cannot be changed like the
14
ordinary l a w . T h e  evolution of Fundamental Bights has 
been traced from the time, when the British Government took 
over the administration of India. Reference has been made 
to The All Party Report, 1928, the Simon Commission Report 
(1930), the report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on 
Indian Constitutional Reform (1933-34) to show how demands 
were made for fundamental rights and the way these demands 
were rejected. It was mentioned in the Simon Commission 
Report (1930) that, MWe are aware that such provisions have 
been inserted in many constitutions, notably in those of the 
European States formed after the war. Experience however 
has not shown them to be of any great practical value. 
Abstract declarations are useless, unless there exists the 
will and means to make them effective." Eventually 
however the Government of India Act, 1935, included section 
298, which declared that no person should be subjected to 
disability by reason of race, r eligion, etc., and section 
299 which conferred property rights on the citizens. The 
Fundamental rights in Pakistan and the fate of the two 
Constitutions of Pakistan will be discussed in detail.
The history of Preventive Detention will be traced 
from the East India Company Act, 1778, which was passed by
(1) The State v. Dosso, P.L.D.1958 S.C.533, Munir, C.J.
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the British Parliament and was made applicable to India.
The necessity for Preventive Detention will be discussed in
detail; it was introduced in India by the executive in order
to maintain peace and order, so that liberty could flourish
in an orderly society and to combat subversive movements and
abuse of personal liberty; such legislation has been
retained in our statute books as a matter of evil necessity.
(l)As President Nyerere said,v 7
"While the vast mass of the people give full and active 
support to their country and its government, a handful of 
individuals can still put our nation in jeopardy and reduce 
to ashes the effort of millions. n
!,Personal freedom11 says Denning, "is the freedom of every 
law-abiding citizen to think what he will, to say what he 
will, and to go where he will on his lawful occasions, 
without let or hindrance from any other person.11 ^  It is 
one of the most cherished objects of life and this principle 
is embodied in our constitution that, "Ko person shall be 
deprived of life and liberty save in accordance with law.
The Constitution of Pakistan, 1962, uses the words fin
(1) Chief of State, Tanzania, Speech inaugurating the
University College, Dar-es-Salam, 1964*
(2) Sir Alfred Denning, Freedom under the law, 1949, London.
(3) Right No.l Constitution of Pakistan, 1962.
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accordance with law,f which is a substitute for fdue
process of law,* though the scope is limited. MXaww in
this context has been held to connote comprehensible and
intelligible laws^1  ^and is used in its generic sense as
connoting all that is treated as law in this country,
including even the judicial principles laid down from time
(2 )to time by the Superior Courts.' '
Right Ho.2 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1962, 
embodies the safeguards which are available to a person 
arrested under the ordinary criminal law but an exception 
is made to this right in the case of a person detained 
under a law providing for preventive detention. He is 
given certain other safeguards. The detenu is not 
entitled to have the services of a lawyer, nor can he 
claim to be produced before the nearest magistrate within 
24 hours of his arrest; he can be detained beyond the 
period of 24 hours without the authority of the magistrate. 
On the other hand he has a right to be informed of the 
ground of his detention as soon as may be, and to make
(1) Haji Ghulam Zamin v. Khondhar, P.L.D.1965 Dacca 156.
(2) Government of Pakistan v. Begum Agha Shorish Kashmari, 
P.L.D.69 S.C.14.
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representation against the order of detention to the
authorities. The detenu cannot be detained beyond three
months without the concurrence of Advisory Board.
The term "Preventive Detention" has been in use to
describe detention by order of an authority, empowered by
a statute, on his subjective satisfaction that the person
detained is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to one
or more of the matters described in the statute, such as
national defence or public order. Normally the authority
acts on information supplied by the police or other public
authority without taking any e v i d e n c e . I t  proceeds
upon the principle that a person should be restrained from
doing something which, if free and unfettered, it is
reasonably probable, he would do; it must necessarily
proceed in all cases, to some extent, on suspicion or
( 2)
anticipation as distinct from proof. J
Denning observed in his book that, "Where there is any
conflict between the freedom of the individual and any other
right or interest, then no matter how great or powerful
those others may be, the freedom of the humblest citizen
( 3 )should prevail over it."v y But it is necessary, in times
(1) Alan Grledhill; Pakistan, The Development of its
laws and Constitutions.
(2) Rex v. Halliday 1917 A.C.260.
(3) Sir Alfred Denning, Freedom under the law 1949, London.
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of emergency, political crisis and during normal times in 
the interest of society and to control disruptive elements 
in the society, to detain certain persons, A balance between 
all these conflicting interests is the aim of the law and the 
courts have been empowered to see that the balance is 
maintained and the State does not take undue advantage of it. 
Although the Courts have never looked at the "Preventive 
Detention" with respect and have always criticised it on the 
ground that it derogates from the rule of law, they have 
never declared such legislation ultra vires. What the 
Court has done is to insist on full compliance with the 
safeguards available to the detenu. Whenever there has 
been a slight irregularity in the procedure, the Courts have 
set free the detenu. The constitution of the Advisory 
Board was held to be improper, when an officer, who had 
dealt with the case of detention on behalf of the 
Government, was nominated as a member of the Board by the 
Government, as no one can be judge of his own cause.
All these matters are discussed in detail in the chapter 
on the nature of, and constitutional restrictions on 
preventive detention laws.
(1) Rehmat Ellahi v. Government of West Pakistan,
P.D.D.1965 XahJ12.
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The next chapter deals with judicial review, and 
discusses the cases where the court has acted under the 
constitutional provisions, which enable the court to hear 
complaints of detenu and, when necessary, strike down 
the orders of detention on the ground of irregularity, 
or substantial defect in the executive action. The 
Advisory Board is an advisory body, whose function is to 
advise the Government whether, in its opinion, there is a 
sufficient cause for the detention of a particular person 
beyond three months. It does not make the detention valid, 
if the order is ultra vires the constitution or mala fide.
The detenu has a right to be informed of the grounds 
of his detention to enable him to make representation against 
the order. The detention has been held to be illegal where 
the grounds were either non-existent, vague, irrelevant or 
even if one of the several grounds supplied to the detenu 
be either irrelevant or vague or non-existent. The High 
Court has struck down the order, if the order was mala fide. 
Though the Constitution does not lay down any obligation to 
give *particulars or details* of the grounds and leaves it 
to the discretion of the detaining authority to disclose or 
withhold facts, but a mere recital of the clauses of the 
statute, without giving any particulars, is not sufficient, 
for, without particulars, it is not possible to make a
20
representation, which is the very object of communicating 
the grounds. The particulars are to be furnished without 
unreasonable delay. The chapter dealing with the 
detaining authority is important as it deals with the 
satisfaction of the detaining authority, its nature and 
the right of the detenu to challenge it before the Court.
It discusses questions of fundamental importance; many 
legal battles have been fought over the satisfaction clause 
in the various statutes. The satisfaction of the detaining 
authority may be based on past activities of the detenu, if 
such activity, in the opinion of the detaining authority, 
gives rise to the apprehension of prejudicial conduct in 
the future or his past objectionable activities have a 
relation to the existing situation. The fact that the 
detenu has been in jail since he indulged in activities 
giving rise to such apprehension is in itself, no bar to 
action under the preventive detention law, if the detaining 
authority is satisfied, having regard to the past activities, 
that the intended detenu is likely to indulge in prejudicial 
activities on his release.
Until recently, the Courts of Pakistan have followed the 
view of the majority in Mversidge *s c a s e ^  in preventive
(1) liversidge v* Anderson, 1942 A.C.206.
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detention cases that the "Home Secretary1s satisfaction was 
not subject to review by the court.H If we look at the 
decision of the majority in this case, it is apparent that 
it was decided during World War II and this ruling will hold 
good when there is grave emergency like war, but, during 
peace time, it will not be wise to follow it. In the 
afore mentioned case, the views expressed by the dissenting 
judge, lord Atkin, will hold good; he said in the instant 
case that the Court should not act as a Court of Appeal in 
this matter, but should deal with it in the same way as arrest 
by a police officer empowered to arrest a person reasonably 
suspected of being concerned in the commission of an offence; 
the question for determination would be whether a reasonable 
man, in the circumstances, would have made the arrest.
The Supreme Court of Pakistan in 1967, declined to 
follow the majority in Liversidge1s case and accepted the 
view of Lord Atkin, which other Law Lords had said would be 
applicable to peace time legislation. So in Ghulam Jilani’s 
c a s e ^ \  the Supreme Court of Pakistan considered the question 
of judicial review of detention orders made under the Defence 
of Pakistan Rules (1965) and held, per Cornelius, C.J: 1 That
a mere declaration of executive ’satisfaction1 ,
(1) Grhulam Jilani v. Government of West Pakistan,
P.L.D. 1967 S.C.373.
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is not sufficient to justify detention. The existence of 
‘reasonable grounds,1 though not expressly required by the 
relevant rule, is essential1', for detention on unreasonable 
grounds is prima facie, mala fide. The Court also held 
"It was the function of the judiciary to ascertain the 
existence of reasonable grounds. It is too late to rely 
on the dictum in English case of Liversidge for the purpose 
of investing the detaining authority with complete power to 
be the judge of its own satisfaction." In arriving at this 
conclusion, the court found support in Article 2 of the 
Constitution which requires every citizen to be treated in 
accordance with law and Article 98 which the court construed 
as conferring power on a superior court to examine every 
exercise of executive power and ensure that it was done with 
lawful authority.
It is the right of the detenu to be informed of the
grounds of his detention "as soon as may be" and to make
representation against the order. The words "as soon as
may be" in this context have been interpreted to mean that
the grounds must be served with the least possible delay
and 24 hours has been considered as normally the maximum
(1)
period within which the grounds must be served.v J
(1) Ghulam Ullah Khan v. District Magistrate, P.X.D.1967 
Pesh. 195-
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Keeping in view the c ire tuns tances of each case, the question 
whether this has been done is clearly a matter open to 
judicial review.
The purpose of requiring the detenu to be furnished 
with grounds and particulars is to enable him to make a 
representation against the order of detention and that 
purpose cannot be served unless the detenu knows what 
exactly had moved the Government to deprive him of his 
liberty. The court can order the release of a detenu if 
the grounds of detention are too vague or indefinite to 
enable him to make a representation. The right to make 
a representation does not carry with it the right to an 
oral hearing or engage lawyer; he may present a petition 
to the appropriate executive authority.
The authority making the order of detention has been 
given the discretion not to disclose facts, which the 
authority considers to be against the public interest to 
disclose. Although this discretionary power of the 
executive has been upheld by the courts, the abuse of this 
power has been a subject of criticism.
Munir C.J. criticised the attitude of executive in the
(i) Muhammad Aslam Malik v. Province of West Pakistan,
P.L.D. 1968 lah. 1324.
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following words,
"In almost every case of detention, the detaining 
authority, when questioned by the Court about the reasons 
for detention, mechanically repeated the formula of "public 
safety and maintenance of public order" and displays a 
positive disinclination to the matter being probed further. 
While such disinclination is understandable, where high 
affairs of State are concerned, there is no reason why, in 
ordinary cases, as for instance where a man is arrested for 
defying law and order, the authority ordering the arrest 
should not take the Court and the public into its 
confidence, by giving a broad hint about the reasons for 
the action taken.
The justification for preventive legislation during 
war time is well recognised. As has been observed by His 
lordship lord Macmillan, "The liberty, which we so justly 
extol, is itself the gift of law and, as Magna Carta 
recognizes, may by the law be forfeited or abridged. At 
a time when it is the undoubted law of the land that a 
citizen may by conscription or requisition be compelled 
to give up his life and all that he possess for his country!s 
cause, it may well be no matter for surprise that there
(1) Inayat Ullah Khan Mashriqi v. Crown, P.1.1,1952 Lah.331
25
should be confided to the Secretary of State a discretionary 
power of enforcing the relative mild precaution of detention.1 ^  
The justification for such legislation during peace time in 
Pakistan is that the conditions in the Republic require such 
a law to put down the unlawful and subversive activities of 
certain groups of persons, whose action appears to be 
directed against the security of state and maintenance of 
public order. Moreover democracy in our country needs to 
be guarded more carefully than in the western countries, 
which are without such legislation during the peace time, 
as those countries have a long history of established 
democratic government. The alternative remedies, provisions 
contained in the Criminal Procedure Code and Pakistan Penal 
Code, with their judicial safeguards are inadequate and they 
cannot serve the purpose which the Preventive Detention 
legislation can achieve. Moreover the criminal codes are 
founded upon the principle that a man is innocent until 
proved guilty. The law of Preventive Detention is free from 
legal technicalities and a man can be detained in the interest 
of the security, defence or the maintenance of peace and order 
without strict judicial evidence. Moreover the existence of 
so many political parties, with conflicting ideologies and nn 
agreement between their leaders, may further justify the need 
for preventive detention.
(1) Liversidge v. Anderson, 1942 A.C. Page 257*
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Though preventive detention can be imposed without 
trial in a court of law, it is subject to the power of the 
High Court to issue an order of Habeas Corpus, unless it too 
is suspended or taken away by law* The major difference
between the Law of Preventive Detention, before the
introduction of Criminal Procedure Code in 1882, was, as 
Norman, J. observed, ^  that the Bengal Regulation, 1818, 
was a ^permanent suspension of habeas corpus.n But the 
detenu had the right to make a representation in his defence. 
After the introduction of Criminal Procedure Code, under 
section 491 a detenu had a right to pray for habeas corpus, 
which right is still available to the detenu in Pakistan, 
but not if he is detained under the Bengal State Prisoner 
Regulation, 1818, or the Bombay Regulation XXV of 1827, the 
State Prisoners Act, 1850, the State Prisoner Act, 1858, 
or the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952.
Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan confers
powers on the High Courts to issue orders in the nature of 
habeas corpus in cases of illegal and improper detention and 
this is applicable as a remedy in all cases of wrongful 
deprivation of personal liberty. This constitutional
(1) In the matter of Ameer Khan, (1870) 6 Ben.L.R. 392
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provision is of higher authority than sec.491 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure and is not subject to the restriction 
imposed by sub-section (3) of section 491 of Criminal 
Procedure Code or the provisions of any other law. The writ 
is one of right, but not of course, and issues only on 
reasonable cause shown. It is of a remedial nature and is 
not used as an instrument of punishment.
’’Power is expressly given by Article 98 to the Superior 
Court to probe into the exercise of public power by executive 
authority, how high soever, to determine whether they have 
acted with lawful authority. The judicial power is reduced 
to a nullity, if laws are so worded or interpreted that the 
executive authority may make what statutory rules it pleases 
thereunder and may use this freedom to make themselves the 
final judges of their own satisfaction for imposing 
restraints on the enjoyment of the fundamental rights of 
citizens."
The essential condition precedent to the issue of the 
writ under Article 98 is that High Court should be satisfied 
that no other adequate remedy is provided by law, but when
(l) G-hulam Jilani v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.L.P.1967 
B.C.373*
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the liberty of a person is involved, the question of 
adequate remedy does not come into p l a y . ^  All these 
remedies, which are available to the person who lias been 
deprived of his liberty, are discussed in the chapter on 
habeas corpus.
The Constitution of 1962 speaks of "orders’1 and omits
the word "writ.” Cornelius C.J. said that, though the
ancient names had been eliminated in the new constitution,
they would be used in judgments to distinguish the various
(2 )categories. v J The West Pakistan High Court has said that 
whereas, under the Constitution of 1956. the court had to 
gather the scope of the named writs from textbooks and 
cases, the Constitution of 1962 attempts to reduce the 
substance of the writs into self contained propositions.
In the last chapter I have drawn some conelusions 
based on the results of my research. I have been unable 
to cite a large number of Pakistani cases, because Pakistanis
(1) Muhammad Hossain v. General Manager E.B.Rly.,
P.IwD. 1961 Dacca 730.
(2) P.L.D. 1964 Journal 73.
(3) Mahboob Ali Malik v. W.Pakistan, P.1.D.1963 lah.575.
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only enjoyed the protection of the Fundamental Rights while 
the Constitution of 1956 was in force until 1958 and 
subsequently from the enactment of Constitution (First 
Amendment) Act, 1965, until they were abrogated on 25th 
March, 1969* During these short periods we have been 
unable to build up a body of case law or as Prof• Alan 
Grledhill has said, we do not seem to have the same 
enthusiasm for litigation in this field as Indians.
In the light of these facts it has often been necessary 
to rely on foreign cases.
Finally I would like to point out that, as 
preventive detention legislation is in operation in South 
Africa and Rhodesia to suppress the black majority and, 
for which these countries have been condemned by the rest 
of the world, it is a pity that such legislation is being 
enforced in India-held Kashmir, to suppress the Muslim 
majority, and nobody seems to have commented on it. The 
law providing for Preventive Detention in India-held 
Kashmir differs from the Indian Preventive Detention Act, 
1950, which is applicable in the rest of India.
(1) Alan G-ledhill, Fundamental Rights in Pakistan,
Journal of the Indian Daw Institute, Jan-June, 1965*
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The three important differences are:-
(I) The cases of persons detained in the interest
of the security of the State and for the 
maintenance of public order are not 
referred to an Advisory Board, if detention 
is to continue beyond three months.
(II) When a person is detained in the interest of the
State, grounds need not be communicated to 
the detenu.
(ill) The maximum period of detention in all categories 
of cases is ten years from the date of 
detention.
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Fundamental Rights in General
Apart from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948, almost all the written constitutions promulgated 
after Hitler’s war have adopted a declaration of Fundamental 
Rights. These rights vary from country to country, 
depending upon their political conditions hut the rights 
most worthy of mention are the right to personal liberty, 
freedom of movement, assembly, association, expression, 
freedom to choose one’s avocation, freedom of religion, 
the right to property, equality before the law and protection 
against retroactive penal legislation.
Fundamental rights are those rights which can be 
claimed by the individual, as citizen of a free and 
civilised community; they belong alike to every man, woman 
and child. These rights are protected and guaranteed
by the written constitutions and differ from the ordinary 
rights in the sense that, while the latter may be enlarged, 
abridged or destroyed by legislation in its ordinary process, 
the former rights, being generally guaranteed by the 
constitution, cannot be altered, taken away, suspended or 
abridged, except to the extent allowed by the Constitution,
(1) State v. Williams, 68 COM.131, 35 A24, 421, 48 X.R.A.465: 
re North Perth 21 ONT. 538.
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which usually puts it beyond the power of any organ o f
the State, whether executive or legislative, to act in
violation of them. The aim of having a declaration of 
fundamental rights in the Constitution is to place them 
beyond the reach of a majority in a legislature and the 
executive; they are thus limitations on the power of 
government, and are usually protected by the judicial 
authority.
In Qitizen!s Savings and Loan Association v. Topeka^ , 
Miller, J., said "It must be conceded that there are such 
rights in every free government, beyond the control of the 
State. A government which recognised no such rights, 
which held the lives, the liberty and the property of itfs 
citizens, subject at all times to the absolute disposition 
and unlimited control of even the most democratic depository 
of power, is after all but a despotism. It is true it is a
despotism of the majority, if you choose to call it so, but
is none the less d^potism.** Emphasizing the merits of 
having a declaration of fundamental rights in the United 
States Constitution, Justice Jackson observed, "The very 
purpose of a Bill of Rights is to withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
(1) (1874) 20 WAIL. 655 (622).
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them "beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
Courts. One’s right to life, liberty and property, to
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly
and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to the
(1)vote; they depend on the outcome of no e l e c t i o n . '
The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that, "the very
conception of a fundamental right is that, being a right
guaranteed by the constitution, it cannot be taken away by
the law and it is not only technically inartistic but a
fraud on the citizen for the makers of a constitution to
say that a right is fundamental but that it may be taken
(2 )away by the law.1*' ' This view was reaffirmed by Munir,C.J.
(3 )in a later case' when he said that the very essence of a 
fundamental right is that it is more or less permanent and 
cannot be changed like the ordinary law.
A right, to be fundamental, must be such as is 
enforceable by judicial or some other process. Any action 
taken by the Legislature or the Executive, in violation of
(1) West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
(1943) 319 U.S.624.
(2) Jibendra Kishore v. The Province of East Pakistan,
P.L.L.1957 B.C.9.
(3) The State v. Dosso, P.L.D.1958 S.C.533.
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a fundamental right, is void in law and the Courts are
hound to make a declaration accordingly and to give
suitable relief to the aggrieved party; this duty is the
very essence of what is called judicial review of
legislation.^
The view of Professor A. Gledhill is that a fundamental
right is a restriction on sovereignty for the benefit of the
(2 )individual.v * Generally the fundamental rights prohibit 
Mthe state1 (i.e., the central and provincial governments 
and legislatures and all local and other public authorities) 
from doing certain things. Most of the rights are 
limitations on legislative and executive power but the ban 
on retrospective penal laws and the rights of an arrested 
person to be informed of the reason for his arrest, to be 
produced before a magistrate within twenty-four hours and 
to consult and be defended by a pleader of his choice are 
also restrictions on judicial power. The ban on compulsory 
participation by a student in the ceremonies of a religion 
other than his own, the citizen's right of access to places 
of public resort, the ban on forced labour and the
(1) Abul A*la Maudoodi v. Govt, of West Pakistan,
P.1#D. 1964 S.C.673.
(2) Changing Law in Developing Countries.(1963) Page 8.
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prohibition of untouchability differ from the other
rights in that they operate not only against ”the state”
but also against private individuals and institutions.^^
There can be no absolute rights and no uncontrolled
liberties in the modern state, for the collective
interests of society, the peace and security of the state
and the maintenance of public order are of vital importance;
fundamental rights can have no meaning, if the state is in
danger or disorganised, for not only the state but also
the liberties of its subjects are endangered. There must
be equilibrium between the rights of individual citizens
(2 )and the collective good of society.' '
(1) Pakistan, The Development of its laws and Constitution,
(1967) p. 194.
(2) ITasrullah Khan v. District Magistrate, P.l.D. 1965 Lah.642.
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Evolution of Fundamental Rights in India
Before independence British India was governed by the 
Government of India Acts of 1858, 1909, 1919 and 1935, 
which were framed on the British pattern and did not 
guarantee fundamental rights. The absence of the fundamental 
rights was criticised by most educated Indians and demands 
were made for their incorporation in the proposed 
constitutional legislation to be passed by the United 
Kingdom Parliament but this demand was rejected by the 
British Government, following its own tradition that freedom 
is best preserved, not by constitutional provisions, but by 
adherence to the rule of law and the conventions of the 
constitution. This was not acceptable to Indians, who had 
long suffered from discrimination, disabilities and 
oppressive acts of the foreign rulers. To the most 
progressive minded Indians a declaration of fundamental 
Rights* was an essential feature of any Indian Constitution.
A series of Congress resolutions, adopted between 1917 and 
1919, repeated the demand for civil rights and equality of 
status with Englishmen. Oneof the Resolutions stated 
that the Parliament should pass a statute guaranteeing 
the Civil Rights of His MajestyTs Indian subjects a free 
press, free speech etc.1
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The demand for these fundamental rights was also 
made by the Muslim league at its 18th Annual Session held 
at Delhi in 1926. The Muslim league adopted a resolution, 
which was proposed by Quaid-E-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah.
This resolution, apart from demanding the revision of the 
Government of India Act, 1919, demanded that any scheme 
for the future constitution of India should secure and 
guarantee among others, of the following principles 
"Pull religious liberty i.e: liberty of belief, worship, 
observances, propaganda, association and education.1 
In November, 1927, the Governor-General, lord Irwin, 
announced the appointment of the Indian Statutory 
Commission, which was popularly known as the Simon 
Commission, to review the political situation in India.
The commission consisted of seven members, all citizens 
of the United Kingdom; Indians were deliberately kept 
out of it. The exclusion of Indians from the 
commission was felt as an insult to Indians as it 
denied Indians the right to participate in the 
determination of the constitution of their own country*
The result was that the commission was greeted with 
black flag demonstrations and cries of 1 Simon go back. 1
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It is important to note that all Indian parties were 
unanimous in their firm decision to have nothing to do 
with the Simon Commission. In spite of the hostile 
reception given to it, the commission did its work 
thoroughly and its report was published in May, 1930.
The All Party Report
In February 1928, while the Simon Commission was 
still touring the country, the All Parties Conference 
had its first meeting; it appointed a sub-committee, 
with Motilal Nehru as its Chairman. Its members 
represented the views of all articulate groups in British 
India. Its report was known as the Nehru Report.
Referring to the resolution of the Madras Congress of 
May, 1928, on Fundamental Rights, it declared that the 
first concern of Indians was to secure the Fundamental 
Rights that had been denied them. It further said that 
the Fundamental Rights should be guaranteed in a manner 
which would not permit their withdrawal under any 
circumstances. Another reason why great importance was 
attached to a Declaration of Rights is the unfortunate 
existence of communal differences in the country. Certain
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safeguards would be necessary to create and establish a 
sense of security among those who look upon each other 
with distrust and suspicion* The report concluded with 
the observation that Indians could not better secure the 
full enjoyment of religious and communal rights to all 
communities than by including them among the basic 
principles of the constitution.
The Simon Commission Report (1930)
The Simon Commission rejected the demand with these 
remarks, "Many of those who came before us have urged that 
the Indian Constitution should contain definite guarantees 
for the rights of individuals in respect of the exercise 
of their religion and a declaration of the equal rights 
of all citizens. We are aware that such provisions have 
been inserted in many constitutions, notably in those of 
the European States formed after the war. Experience 
however has not shown them to be of any great practical 
value. Abstract declarations are useless, unless there 
exists the will and means to make them effective."
The Indo-Pakistan leaders again raised the question of 
Fundamental Rights at the Round Table Conferences.
The Round Table Conference*
The report of the Conference of 1932 recorded the 
following remarks
"The Government have not in any way failed to realise and 
take account of the great importance which has been 
attached in so many quarters to the idea of making a 
chapter of Fundamental Rights a feature in the new Indian 
Constitution, as a solvent of difficulties and a source 
of confidence, nor do they undervalue the painstaking 
care, which has been devoted to framing the text of the 
large number of propositions, which have been suggested 
and discussed. The practical difficulties which might 
result from including many, indeed most of them, as 
conditions which must be complied with as a universal 
rule by executive or by legislative authority, were fully 
explained in the course of discussion and there was 
substantial support for the view that, as the means of 
securing fair treatment for majority and minorities alike, 
the course of wisdom will be to rely, in so far as 
reliance cannot be placed upon mutual goodwill and mutual 
trust, on the "special responsibilities," with which it 
was agreed the Governor-General and the Governors are to 
be endowed in their respective spheres, to protect the
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rights of minorities. It may well be, however, that it
will be found that some of the propositions discussed
could appropriately and usefully find their place in 
Constitution and His Majesty*s Government undertook to 
examine them most carefully for the purpose.1
The demand for Fundamental Rights was again made to 
the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Indian Constitutional 
Reform. In its report of the Session 1933-34, after
referring to the report of Simon Commission (mentioned
before), the committee recommended,
"With these observations we entirely agree and a cynic 
might indeed find plausible arguments, in history during 
last ten years of more than one country, for asserting 
that the most effective method of ensuring the destruction 
of a fundamental right is to include a declaration of its 
existence in a constitutional instrument. But there are 
also strong practical arguments against the proposal, which 
may be put in the form of a dilemma; for either the 
declaration of rights is of so abstract a nature that it 
has no legal effect of any kind or its legal effect will 
impose an embarrassing restriction on the powers of the 
legislature and create a grave risk that a large number of 
laws may be declared invalid by the Courts, because 
inconsistent with one or other of the rights so declared.
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An examination of the lists, to which we have referred, 
shows very clearly indeed that this risk would be far from 
negligible. There is this further objection, that the 
States have made it abundantly clear that no declaration 
of fundamental rights is to apply in State territories; 
and it would be altogether anomalous, if such a declaration 
had legal force in part only of the area of the Federation. 
There are, however, one or two legal principles which might, 
we think, be appropriately embodied in the Constitution” .... 
... that no British subject, Indian or otherwise, domiciled 
in India, shall be disabled from holding public office, or 
from practising any trade, profession or calling, by reason 
only of his religion, descent, caste, colour or place of 
birth, and it should be expended as regards the holding of 
office under the Federal Government, to subjects of Indian
States........  that some general provision should be
inserted in the Constitution Act safeguarding private property 
against expropriation.
The result of these recommendations was that section 298 
and section 299 were embodied in the Government of India Act, 
1935, which read as follows
298. -1- No subject of His Majesty domiciled in India
shall on grounds only of religion, place of birth, descent, 
colour or any of them be ineligible for office under the
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Crown in India, or be prohibited on any such grounds from 
acquiring, holding or disposing of property or carrying on 
any occupation, trade, business or profession in British 
India.
-2- Nothing in this section shall affect the 
operation of any law which -
(a) prohibits, either absolutely or subject to 
exceptions, the sale or mortgage of agricultural 
land situate in any particular area, and owned 
by a person belonging to some class recognised 
by the law as being a class of persons engaged 
in or connected with agriculture in that area, 
to any person not belonging to any such class; 
or
(b) recognises the existence of some right, 
privilege or disability attaching to members 
of a community by virtue of some personal law 
or custom having the force of law.
-3~ Nothing in this section shall be construed as 
derogating from the special responsibility of the Governor- 
General or of a Governor for the safeguarding of the 
legitimate interests of minorities.
299. -1- No person shall be deprived of his property 
in British India save by authority of law.
«2- Neither the Federal nor a Provincial 
Legislature shall have power to make any law authorising 
the compulsory acquisition for public purposes of any 
land, or any commercial or industrial undertaking, or 
any interest in, or in any company owning, any commercial 
or industrial undertaking, unless the law provides for 
the payment of compensation for the property acquired 
and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or 
specifies the principles on which, and the manner in 
which, it is to be determined.
-3- No Bill or amendment making provision for 
the transference to public ownership of any land or for 
the extinguishment or modification of rights therein, 
including rights or privileges in respect of land 
revenue, shall be introduced or moved in either Chamber 
of the Federal Legislature without the previous sanction 
of the Governor-General in his discretion, or in a 
Chamber of a Provincial Legislature without the previous 
sanction of the Governor in his discretion.
-4- Nothing in this section shall affect the 
provisions of any law in force at the date of the passing 
of this Ac t.
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*•5- In this section 1 land1 includes immovable 
property of every kind and any rights in or over such 
property, and wundertaking” includes part of an 
undertaking.
After independence, both India and Pakistan 
embodied a long list of Fundamental Rights in their 
respective Constitutions.
The 1956 Constitution and Fundamental Rights in Pakistan.
On the 14th August, 1947 Pakistan came into existence 
as a sovereign State. The idea was to provide a homeland 
for Muslims; a place where, after the British Imperial 
power had gone, they could freely develop their way of life 
in an Islamic environment. The first Constituent Assembly 
was elected and commenced its work with great enthusiasm in 
Karachi on 10th August, 1947. The Constituent Assembly 
consisted of forty-four representatives from East Pakistan, 
twenty-two from Pan jab, five from Sind, three from North 
West Frontier, one each from Baluchistan, Khairpur, 
Bahawalpur; the Baluchistan and North West Frontier states 
had one each. This Constituent Assembly was a failure; 
it had been not elected for this task. It was, in fact, 
a dismembered part of the All-India Constituent Assembly, 
elected in 1946, as recommended in the British Cabinet 
Mission*s plan, by members of the existing provincial 
legislatures. Quaid-E-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was 
unanimously elected as the first President. On the 
12th August, 1947, the Constituent Assembly met under the 
Presidentship of Quaid-E-Azam and various committees were 
set up* One of them, to report on Fundamental Rights
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and on matters relating to minorities, was presided over 
by Quaid-E-Azam himself*
The famous Objectives Resolution was passed in torch,
1949; this was the first step towards making the constitution. 
The Objectives Resolution reads as followss-
In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful:
Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to 
God Almighty alone and the authority, which He 
has delegated to the State of Pakistan through 
its people, for being exercised within the limits 
prescribed by Him, is a sacred trust :
This Constituent Assembly, representing the people of 
Pakistan, resolves to frame a Constitution for 
the sovereign independent State of Pakistan ;
Wherein the State shall exercise its powers and authority 
through the chosen representatives of the people ; 
Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, 
tolerance and social justice, as enumerated by 
Islam, shall be fully observed ;
Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives 
in accord with the teachings and requirements of
Wherein
Whereby
Wherein
Wherein
Wherein
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Islam, as set out in the Holy Quran and the 
Sunnah ;
adequate provision shall be made for the 
minorities freely to profess and practise 
their religions and develop their cultures ; 
the territories now included in or in accession 
with Pakistan and such other territories as may 
hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan, 
shall form a Federation, wherein the units will 
be autonomous, with such boundaries and 
limitations on their powers and authority as 
may be prescribed ;
shall be guaranteed fundamental rights, 
including equality of status, of opportunity 
and before the law, social economic and 
political justice, and freedom of thought, 
expression, belief, faith, worship and 
association, subject to law and public morality ; 
adequate provision shall be made to safeguard the 
legitimate interests of minorities, backward and 
depressed classes ;
the independence of the judiciary shall be fully 
secured ;
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Wherein the integrity of territories of the Federation, 
its independence and all its rights, including 
its sovereign rights on land, sea and air shall 
be safeguarded ;
So that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain 
their rightful and honoured place amongst the nations 
of the world and make their full contribution towards 
international peace and progress and happiness of humanity.
The Committee on Fundamental Rights presented its 
interim report to the Constituent Assembly on 28th 
September 1950. The main recommendations were, that all 
persons should be entitled to equal protection of the law. 
No person should be deprived of life or liberty save in 
accordance with law, nor punished for an act not declared 
punishable by law when it was done. Habeas corpus should 
only be suspended in grave emergencies. Apart from 
reservations for backward classes, there should be no 
discrimination in appointment to the public services on 
grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth.
No person should be deprived of property save in 
accordance with law, and adequate compensation should be 
paid for property taken for public purposes, citizens
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should enjoy freedom of expression, association, and 
peaceable assembly, liberty to follow any avocation, to 
deal with property, to move freely throughout Pakistan, 
and the right to equal pay for equal work. There should 
be freedom to practise and propagate religion, but secular 
activities of religious bodies were to be subject to 
regulation. No person attending an educational 
institution should be required to submit to religious 
instruction other than his own. All communities were to 
be permitted to establish and maintain educational 
institutions, to which the state should not deny 
recognition, if they refused admission to members of 
other communities. No person should be obliged to pay 
taxes to maintain any religion other than his own.
The first Constituent Assembly was dissolved on 
24th October, 1954 after seven years of intermittent 
debate, without having made an acceptable constitution.
The Constituent Assembly was dissolved by a proclamation 
of emergency issued by the Governor-General, Ghulani 
Mohammad, declaring that the constitutional machinery 
had broken down and that the assembly could no longer 
function. The dissolution of the assembly was challenged 
by Maulvi Tamiz-ud-Din Khan, President of the Constituent
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Assembly, in the chief Court of Sind. The court held that
the dissolution was illegal. The Federal Court on a
special Reference by the Governor-General held that the
(2 )dissolution was legal.v '
The second Constituent Assembly was soon elected and 
had its first meeting under the leadership of Chaudhari 
Mohammad Ali at Murree on 5th of July 1955* The new 
Constitution Bill was published on 8th January 1956. It 
was passed on 17th February, after some amendment, not 
exclusively on matters of detail. The new Constitution 
came into force on 23rd of March, 1956.
Part II of the 1956 Constitution embodied an elaborate 
list of Fundamental Bights. Articles 3 to 22 contained 
fundamental rights, which included the right to equality, 
prohibition against discrimination, freedom of speech, 
freedom of assembly and association, freedom to acquire, 
hold and dispose of property, freedom to Trade and practise 
a profession, freedom of religious belief and practise, 
limitations were imposed on State action and legislation
(1) Maulvi Tamiz-ud-Din Khan v. Federation of Pakistan,
P.X.D.1955 Sind 96.
(2) Special Reference by the Governor-General, P.1.D.1955
F.C.435.
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relating to compulsory acquisition, arrest and detention 
and penal laws with retrospective effect. The High 
Courts and the Supreme Court were given jurisdiction 
to issue appropriate writs for the enfcrcement of any 
of the rights conferred by Part II. Article 4 provided 
that laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the 
fundamental rights should he void to the extent of the 
inconsistency.
The Constitution came into force in 1956 and 
remained operative for about two and a half years.
What happened during these years, which led to the 
abrogation of the constitution and to the Military 
Revolution, was that, after Mr. Xiquat Ali Khan's death 
in 1951, the Ministry changed six times in seven years 
at the centre. In the Provinces the position was no 
better. Governors were frequently changed and some of 
the Governors, with the connivance of the Governor- 
General or the President, busied themselves in 
manoeuvring changes to their ovm advantage. In a 
country where the changes in Government were so frequent 
and persons in high position were perpetually engaged in 
creating and destroying majorities in their own interests, 
and where members of the Assemblies, tempted by the lure
of office, power, or gain, changed their political 
affiliations overnight, Government by majority became a 
farce and led to every kind of evil-corruption, favouritism, 
nepotism, inefficiency and lack of responsibility. Under 
pressure, threats and inducement, the services became 
demoralised and began to flow with the tide; Government 
became incapable of concieving long range social and 
economic policies; and measures of public welfare became 
a secondary consideration. Going to extremes, the 
situation became menacing to the preservation of social 
order itself and the ground was prepared for a revolution.
In such circumstances, when revolution comes, the person 
who tries to assume charge of the country, or perish in 
the attempt, may be a patriot or an adventurer, an army 
commander or a national hero, the determining factor 
being the inclination of the a r m y . ^
(1) M. Munir, Constitution of The Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan. Page 50.
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The Military Revolution of 1958*
During the night of 7th and 8th October, 1958, a 
group of generals led by the Commander-in-Chief, General 
Mohammad Ayub Khan, seized power and induced President 
Iskander Mirza to issue a proclamation, which abrogated 
the Constitution, dismissed the Central and Provincial 
Cabinets, "with immediate effect11, dissolved the Central 
and Provincial legislatures, abolished all political 
parties throughout the country and imposed Martial Lav/. 
General Mohammad Ayub Khan was appointed as Chief Martial 
Law Administrator.
On 8th October, 1958, General Mohammad Ayub Khan in 
a broadcast said, "Had he (President Iskander Mirza) not 
done so, the armed forces would have acted on their own 
initiative, because there was no other way to save the 
country from the chaos created by the baseness, chicanery 
and deceit of the old gang of politicians; his ultimate 
aim was to restore a type of democracy that Pakistanis 
could understand and work.” By the proclamation of 7th 
October, 1958 President Iskander Mirza, in fact, handed 
over the administration of the country to General Ayub 
Khan. It was evident that he could not enjoy the 
monopoly of power, while the responsibility for
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administration lay with the army* He therefore soon had 
to resign and on 27th October, 1958, General Mohammad 
Ayub Khan assumed the office of President as well.
The Laws (Continuation in Force) Order, 1958, issued 
by the President on 10th October, 1958 was deemed to have 
come into force with effect from 7th October, 1958. The 
general effect of the order was the restoration of laws 
that were in force before the Proclamation, of the 
jurisdiction of all Courts, including the Supreme Court 
and High Courts and of other public authorities, and the 
continuance in office of persons in the service of 
Pakistan. It provided that, subject to the Martial Law 
regulations and orders, the Republic was to be governed 
as nearly as possibly by the Constitution of 1956.
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The Constitution of 1962,
The Martial Law regime proved effective and at
least it gave stability to the country, which it was
lacking. On 17th February, I960 a Constitution Commission
was appointed to examine the circumstances which had led to
the abrogation of the constitution of 1956 and to submit 
constitutional proposals for the future constitution of 
Pakistan. The Commission issued a questionnaire and the 
replies that it received attributed to the failure of 
Parliamentary form of Government the following three 
causes
1) Lack of proper elections and defects in the 
Constitution,
2) Undue interference by the Head of State with 
the ministries and political parties, and by 
the Central Government with the functioning of 
the Government in the Province,
3) lack of leadership, resulting in lack of well- 
organised and disciplined parties, the general 
lack of character in politicians and their 
undue interference in the administration.
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The real cause of the failure was the last; that was 
the opinion of the Commission. Summing up their opinion 
in the report they observed,
"We therefore conclude, as we began, with the 
observation that the real causes of the failure of the 
Parliamentary form of Government in Pakistan were mainly 
the lack of leadership, resulting in lack of well organised 
and disciplined parties, the general lack of character in 
politicians and their undue interference in the 
administration."
The Commission (one member who recommended a unitary form 
of Government dissenting,) recommended the Presidential 
form of Government as most suitable to the conditions in 
Pakistan and made a number of other recommendations, which 
were generally rejected by the Government, but that 
relating to the Presidential form of Government was 
accepted.
The Commission considered the question "whether the 
provisions of the late constitution, which enumerated the 
Fundamental Rights, should be incorporated in the New 
Constitution, or the assurance of such rights can safely 
be left, as in United Kingdom, to the fundamental good 
sense of the Legislature and the operation of the recognised 
principles through the wisdom and experience of Courts."
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The Commission found that the majority view (98.39 per cent) 
was in favour of the first alternative. The Commission 
itself was in favour of this opinion and therefore 
recommended that Articles 4-22 of the late Constitution be 
incorporated in the New Constitution.
The Commission, however, recommended that the Frontier 
Crimes Regulation 1901 and West Pakistan land Reforms 
Regulation 1959 (Martial law Regulation No.64) should be 
given special protection from avoidance for violation of 
any constitutional limitation.
After about fourteen months work, which included 
considering more than 6,000 answers to the questionnaire, 
the Commission, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Shahab-ud-Din, 
former Chief Justice of Pakistan, presented its report to 
the President on 6th May 1961. The President with other 
members of the Cabinet then studied it and made many 
changes. Mr. Manzoor Qadir, who was himself Foreign 
Minister at that time and an eminent lawyer, played an 
important role in this finalisation of the constitution.
The resulting finalized Constitution was signed by the 
President on 1st March, 1962 and came into effect on the 
8th June, 1962,
The Constitution in Part II embodied fifteen principles
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as principles of Law-Making*, thereby purporting to 
maintain and guarantee thefundamental rights. Sub-Article 1 
provided that ,!ITo law should be repugnant to Islam.11 
Articles 2 -16 embodied equality of citizens, freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, freedom of movement, 
the right to acquire property, freedom to follow an 
avocation, freedom of religion, safeguard in relation to 
arrest and detention, protection against retrospective 
punishment, regulation of compulsory acquisition of 
property, protection against forced labour, public 
education, access to public places, protection of 
languages, scripts and cultures, protection against 
slavery and prohibition of untouchability.
The Principles of law Making were not made justiciable. 
Part II dealing with Principles of law Making and of Policy 
provided that
The Principles set out in this Chapter shall be known 
as the Principles of Law making and it is the responsibiliiy 
of each Legislature to ensure that a proposed law is not 
made by it, if the proposed lav; disregards, violates or is 
otherwise not in accordance with those Principles.^
It further provided that the responsibility of deciding
(1) Article (5) of the Constitution of 62, prior
to First Amendment Act, 1963*
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whether a proposed law does or does not disregard or 
violate, or is or is not otherwise in accordance with, 
the Principles of Law-making is that of the legislature 
concerned, but the National Assembly, a Provincial 
Assembly, the President or the Governor of a Province, 
may refer to the Advisory Council of Islamic ideology 
for advice on any question that arises as to whether a 
proposed law disregards or violates, or is otherwise 
not in accordance with, those principles.
The validity of a law shall not be called in question 
on the ground that the law disregards, violates or is otherwise 
not in accordance with the Principles of law-making.
President Ayub Khan tried to justify these 
constitutional arrangements and said,
"The responsibility for ensuring that no law is 
made which is contrary to fundamental human rights has been 
placed upon the law-makers. Principles have been 
enunciated for the law-makers, which they are under an 
obligation to observe. The first of these Principles is 
that no law shall be made that is repugnant to Islam.
The second is that all citizens shall be treated alike in 
all respects. There are fifteen such Principles of
(1) Article (6) Ibid.
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Law-making set out in the Constitution. In case the 
Central or the Provincial Legislature is in doubt whether 
a provision in any proposed law is not repugnant to Islam 
or at variance with any other principle, it has been made 
possible for it to refer the question for advice to a body 
set up under the Constitution to be called the flAdvisory 
Council of Islamic Ideology.11 A position has thus been 
brought about, under which the functions of the Courts will 
be to take notice and to rectify breaches of law. Any person, 
who has not been treated in accordance with law or who is 
treated otherwise than in accordance with law, will have 
the right to go to a Court with his grievance, whether it is 
against a private person, a public servant, an official 
agency or a department of the Government. No Court 
however, shall be at liberty to refuse to enforce a law, 
because it is of the opinion that the law is not in 
accordance with the Principles of Law-making. The 
relevant opinion for this purpose is of the law-makers and 
of nobody else. Fundamental Rights have thus been secured 
in the Constitution, without the complication of all law 
never reaching the stage of complete certainty, because 
they remain perpetually susceptible to challenge in a Court 
of law. Though it is frequently said this challenge 
guarantees rights of the citizens, in actual practice it
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is usually only a rich litigant who can afford to engage 
the best available talent to throw out a challenge to a law 
for getting rid of something that operates to his 
disadvantage, irrespective of whether it is to the 
advantage of the community at large or not, and frequently 
hold up indefinitely the implementation of beneficial 
schemes. The scheme adopted in the Constitution brings 
our position on the same lines as the position existing in 
England. Judiciary will have its own built-in arrangement 
for maintaining internal discipline.M
Nevertheless dissatisfaction was felt and a demand was 
made to make the Fundamental Rights justiciable. The 
First National Assembly summoned under the Constitution of 
1962, in response to the pressure and strong public opinion, 
passed the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963 and 
substituted as Fundamental Rights what has appeared in the 
guise of "Principles of Law-ltlaking." The Fundamental 
Rights are at present contained in the Part II of the 
Constitution. Some of these rights are limited to citizens 
only, whereas the rest are equally available to citizens and 
non-citizens. These rights may be reasonably restricted in 
the interest of security of Pakistan public interest, 
morality and decency, and regulating of any trade or 
profession by a licensing system. These rights are that
63
uNo person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in 
accordance with law.” The arrested person has the right 
to be informed of the grounds of his arrest and to consult 
and to be defended by the legal practitioner of his own 
choice and to be produced before a magistrate within 
twenty-four hours. The protection is also guaranteed 
against slavery and forced labour, as we11 as against 
retrospective punishment. Every citizen has the rights 
to move freely throughout Pakistan and of peaceful 
assembly and association.
Citizens are also guaranteed right to follow any lawful 
avocation and enjoy freedom of expression. Every 
citizen has a right to profess, practice and propagate 
any religion and to manage religious institutions.
There is safeguard against taxation for purposes of any 
particular religion and as to educational institutions 
in respect of religion etc. Subject to any reasonable 
restrictions imposed by law in the public interest, 
every citizen has the right to acquire, hold and dispose 
of property and no person is to be deprived of his 
property, save in accordance with law and compensation 
is to be paid where the property is taken for public
purposes. All citizens are equal before law and are
entitled to equal protection of law. In respect of
access to places of public entertainment or resort, not 
intended for religious purposes only, there shall be no 
discrimination against any citizen on the ground only 
of race, religion, caste, sex, or place of birth. No 
citizen otherwise qualified for appointment in the 
service of Pakistan shall be discriminated on grounds 
of race, religion, caste, sex, residence or place of 
birth. Any section of citizens, having a distinct 
language, script or culture, shall have the right to 
preserve the same. Untouchability is abolished, and 
its practice in any form is forbidden and shall be
declared by law to be an offence.
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Abrogation of the Constitution 1962
On March 24, President Mohammad Ayub Khan wrote to 
General A.M. Yahya that, "It is with profound regret that 
I have come to the conclusion that all civil administration 
and constitutional authority in the country has become 
ineffective. If the situation continues to deteriorate 
at the present alarming rate, all economic life, indeed, 
civilised existence will become impossible. I am left 
with no option but to step aside and leave it to the 
Defence Forces of Pakistan, which today represent the only 
effective and legal instrument, to take over full control 
of the affairs of this country.”
On 25th March, 1969, Field Marshal M. Ayub Khan 
announced his resignation in a special broadcast, stating 
at the very outset that this was the "last time that I am 
addressing you as President of Pakistan. It is impossible 
for me to preside over the destruction of my country.11 
Field Marshal Ayub Khan stepped down as President of 
Pakistan on March 25, following the complete breakdown of 
civil administration at the end of his ten years rule. 
Following his resignation, General Yahya Khan took the 
powers of the President of Pakistan. In a proclamation 
issued on March 31, General Yahya Khan said, "Whereas by
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his declaration made at 19*15 hours (WPT) on the night 
of 25th March, 1969* Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, 
President of Pakistan, has relinquished his office of 
President and has handed over all power to me, General 
Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, as Chief Martial law 
Administrator and Supreme Commander of Armed Forces of 
Pakistan.
"Now therefore I have, on the same night of 25th 
March, 1969* forthwith assumed office of the President 
of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and have taken upon 
myself the exercise of the said powers and all other 
powers enabling me in that behalf.1*
General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, Commander-in-Chief 
of the Pakistan Army, declared Martial law throughout 
Pakistan, following President Ayub Khan's relinquishment 
of the office of President on March 25th. In a proclamation 
issued from Rawalpindi, General Yahya Khan, who assumed the 
powers of the Chief Martial law Administrator, abrogated 
the Constitution and dissolved the National and Provincial 
Assemblies. According to the proclamation, a situation had 
arisen in the country, in which the civil administration 
could not effectively function and, in the interest of
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national security, it had become necessary to place the 
country under Martial law. The proclamation went on to 
declare that, notwithstanding the abrogation of the 
Constitution and subject to Regulations or Orders made by 
the Chief Martial law Administrator, all courts and tribunal 
in existence immediately before the abrogation of the 
Constitution, should continue and exercise all their powers 
and jurisdiction, which they would have exercised had the 
Constitution not been abrogated.
On April 4, 1969» General Yahya Khan, President of 
Pakistan, revived parts of the Constitution of 1962, which 
had been abrogated only ten days earlier, when Martial law 
was imposed in the country. The Provisional Constitutional 
order provided that notwithstanding the abrogation of the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, brought 
into force on the 8th day of June 1962 .... by the Proclamation 
and subject to any Regulation or Order made, from time to time, 
by the Chief Martial law Administrator, the State of Pakistan 
should, except as otherwise provided in the order, be 
governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the said 
Constitution. Paragraphs 2,4? 5, 6, 7, 8, 9* 139 14, 15 and 
17 of the Fundamental Rights set out in Chapter 1 of Part II
(1) Pakistan News, london, April 1, 1969*
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of the said Constitution should stand abrogated and all 
proceedings pending in any court, in so far as they were 
for the enforcement of those Rights should abate
General Yahya Khan promised to relinquish power to a 
civilian government, which would be allowed to draw up a 
constitution, as soon as law and order were restored. In 
a broadcast to the nation on the morning of 26th March 1969, 
the General said that he would eventually restore power to a 
civilian government. He emphasized that he had no ambition
to prolong period of military rule; his sole aim was to
protect life, liberty and property, and to put the 
administration "back on the rails.” ”1 wish to make it
absolutely clear to you,11 the General said, 1 that I have no
ambition, other than the creation of conditions conducive 
to the establishment of constitutional government. It is 
my firm belief that sound, clean and honest administration 
is a pre-requisite for a sane and constructive life and for 
the smooth transfer of power to the representatives of the 
people, elected freely and impartially on the basis of 
adult franchise.” In a hint that he was prepared to fulfil 
Ayub Khanfs promise to restore parliamentary democracy, 
General Yahya Khan said, nIt will be the task of these 
elected representatives to give the country a workable
(i) Pakistan Hews, London, April 15, 1969.
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constitution and find a solution to all other political, 
economic and social problems, agitating the minds of the 
people.” ...
General Yahya Khan announced on November 28, 1969 that
general elections for the National Assembly would be held on
October 5> 1970, on the basis of a "provisional legal
framework" to be evolved by his martial law regime. In a
radio address, General Yahya Khan said that the Assembly
would be charged with the task of framing a constitution
within 120 days of its first sitting. If it failed, it
would be dissolved and "the ration will have to go to the
polls again." The General also said that the elections
would be held on the basis of direct adult franchise and
the future form of government would be the parliamentary
federal form, as there was complete agreement in the
(2 )country on these two points ...v y
We now have to wait and see what sort of Constitution 
Pakistan is going to have; it is hoped that it wall be a 
copy of 1956 Constitution, with some amendments as to the 
distribution of powers between the centre and provinces.
(1) The Times, The Daily Telegraph, London, March 27, 1969*
(2) The Times, (London) November 29, 1969*
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORY OP PREVENTIVE DETENTION
The Development in India, 1773-1918.
Preventive Detention in the Indian Subcontinent has a 
long history and is often said to be a legacy of the British 
Indian Government* The Amending Act of 1781 was passed by 
the British Parliament to settle various controversies which 
had arisen between the Governor-General and the Supreme 
Court, established in Calcutta by the Regulating Act 1773*
It provided that the Governor-General and his Council should 
not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court for anything 
done in their public capacity. No person could be held 
responsible by the court for anything done by him under the 
written orders of the Council, so that the Court was obliged 
to refuse habeas corpus to a person held under the warrant 
of the Council. ^  But in the case of a British subject, 
the Court retained its jurisdiction.
The Charter Act, 1793 provided as follows 
ttIt shall and may be lawful for the Governor-General of 
Port William aforesaid for the time being to issue his warrant
(1) In the matter of Ameer Khan, (1870) 6 Ben.L.R.456
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under his hand and seal, directed to such peace officers 
and other persons as he shall think fit, for securing and 
detaining in custody any person or persons suspected of 
carrying on mediately or immediately any illicit 
correspondence dangerous to the peace or safety of any of 
the British settlements or possessions in India with any of 
the Princes, Rajahs or Zemindars or any other person or 
persons having authority in India, or with the commanders, 
governors or presidents of any factories established in 
East Indies by an European power, or any correspondence 
contrary to the rules and orders of the said Company or of 
the Governor-General in Council of Port William aforesaid.M
But even as early as this, the detainee was given 
certain rights. The Charter Act 1793, further provided 
that,
wIf there shall appear reasonable grounds for the 
charge, the said Governor General shall be and is hereby 
authorised and empowered to commit such person or persons 
so suspected or accused to safe custody and shall within 
a reasonable time, not exceeding five days, cause to be 
delivered to him or them a copy of the charge or 
accusation, on which he or they shall have been committed
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and that the party or parties accused shall be permitted 
to deliver in his or their defence in writing, together 
with a list of such witnesses as he or they shall desire 
to be examined in support thereof, and that such witnesses 
and also the witness or witnesses in support of the charge, 
shall be examined and cross examined on oath, in the 
presence of the accused party and their deposition and 
examination taken down in writing and if, notwithstanding 
such defence, there shall appear to the said Governor- 
General in Council reasonable grounds for the charge or 
accusation and for continuing the confinement, the party 
or parties shall remain in custody, until he or they shall 
be brought to trial in India or sent to England for that 
purpose.*1
This Act deprived the courts of their usual powers 
and the courts in Bengal were obliged to hold that the 
command of the Governor-General must prevail over any writ 
that the court had power to issue.
Then came the Bengal Regulation of 1812, which gave 
the local Governments power to remove immigrants from 
foreign countries and in certain cases to detain such 
persons in safe custody. The other well-known legislation 
on the subject was Bengal State Prisoners Regulation of 1818,
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commonly known as the Bengal Regulation; this was the 
first piece of important legislation on this subject. It 
empowered the Government to place persons "under personal 
restraint otherwise than in pursuance of some judicial 
proceedings.H The preamble of the Act explains why
"Whereas reasons of State, embracing the due maintenance 
of the alliances formed by the British Government 
with foreign powers, the preservation of 
tranquillity in the territories of Native 
Princes entitled to its protection and the 
security of the British Dominions from foreign 
hostility and from internal commotion occasionally 
render it necessary to place under personal 
restraint individuals against whom there may 
not be sufficient ground to institute any 
judicial proceeding or when such proceeding 
may not be adapted to the nature of the case, 
or may for other reasons be inadvisable or 
improper and where it is fit that, in every 
case of the nature herein referred to, the 
determination to be taken should proceed 
immediately from the authority of the Governor- 
General in Council;
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and whereas the ends of justice require that, when it may 
be determined that any person shall be placed 
under personal restraint, otherwise than in 
pursuance of some judicial proceedings, the 
grounds of such determination should from time 
to time come under revision and the person 
affected thereby should at all times be 
allowed freely to bring to the notice of 
Governor-General in Council all circumstances 
relating either to the supposed grounds of 
such determination or to the manner in which 
it may be executed ; 
and whereas the ends of justice also require that due
attention be paid to the health of every state 
prisoner confined under this Regulation and 
that suitable provision be made for his support 
according to his mark in life and to his own 
wants and those of his family ; 
and whereas the reasons above declared sometimes render it 
necessary that the estates and lands of 
Zamindars, taluqdars and others, situated within 
the territories dependent on the Presidency of 
Port William should be attached and placed under
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the temporary management of the Revenue 
Authorities, without having recourse to any 
judicial proceeding ; 
and whereas it is desirable to make such legal provision 
as may secure from injury the just rights 
and interests of individuals, whose estates 
may be so attached under the direct authority 
of Government ; 
the Vice-President-in-Council has enacted the following 
rules, which are to take effect throughout the 
Provinces immediately, subject to the Presidency of 
Port William from the date on which they may be 
promulgated.w
The prisoners thereunder had no right of habeas corpus 
but they were allowed to make representations. The 
Regulation was applied to the whole of Bengal, which 
included Bihar and Orissa, the U.P. and the Punjab, with the 
exception of a few scheduled districts. The Presidencies of 
Madras and Bombay enacted similar Regulations in 1819 and 
1827 respectively.
Thereafter the State Prisoners Act, 1850, was passed to 
remove the doubts as to whether State Prisoners confined under 
Regulation 11 of 1818 could be lawfully detained in any
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fortress, gaol or other place within the limits of the 
jurisdiction of any of the Supreme Courts of Judicature, 
established by Royal Charter. To remove similar doubts 
about the Madras and Bombay Regulations, the State Prisoners 
Act, 1858, was enacted.
The Indian Criminal law Amendment Act, 1908, provided 
for the more Bpeedy trial of certain offences and for the 
prohibition of associations, dangerous to the public peace.
There was not much change in the law until the outbreak 
of the First World War in 1914. Very soon after the 
commencement of the hostilities, an Ordinance was enacted 
and later on converted into
"Defence of India (Criminal law Amendment)Act 1915» 
to provide for special measures to secure the public 
safety and the defence of British India and for the 
more speedy trial of certain offences."
This enabled the Governor-General-in-Council to make 
rules for the safety and defence of India and for the arrest 
of any person who contravened the rules. When arrested, the 
person was not brought to trial before the ordinary courts 
but was tried by a special commissioner appointed under the 
Act.
Every trial under the Act had to be conducted by three
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Commissioners. Two had to have at least three years 
experience as judges in criminal trials in the Session 
Courts and the third had to have the qualifications required 
for appointment as a High Court Judge. The Commissioners 
had to follow, as far as practicable, the procedure of the 
ordinary Criminal Courts.
Except that the accused was brought to trial more 
quickly, the accused was given substantially the same sort 
of trial that he would have obtained in the Criminal Courts. 
The only departure in substance was that there was no right 
of appeal. The decision of the Commissioners was final, 
even when a sentence of death was imposed, and all 
interference by the Courts in any form whatsoever was 
excluded.
This Act expired six months after the termination of 
the war and the right to the writ of habeas corpus in 
Calcutta, Ifodras and Bombay and an analogous right contained 
in Section 491 of Criminal Procedure Code for the rest of 
India was restored.
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The Sedition Report, 1918.
To control the revolutionary movement prevailing at 
that time, the Rowlatt Committee recommended the enactment 
of new provisions and laid down the following principles for 
guidance ^
1) When it is considered necessary in the interest of the 
community to deprive the individual of liberty, then 
interference with liberty should not be penal in character 
and such person should be placed in an asylum of a different 
kind from that of a jail.
2) It must only be after a fair, impartial and adequate 
enquiry that an order depriving a person of his liberty 
should be made.
3) A provincial government intending to invoke the 
preventive measures in the province must declare, as a 
condition precedent, that these measures are warranted for 
reasons of necessity in the interest of public safety.
4) The period during which the preventive measures are 
intended to remain in force should also be specified and 
should not exceed one year, subject to renewal by an order 
reciting that the renewal was necessary in the interest of 
public safety.
(1) Sedition Committee Report 1918. P. 141.
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The report further added that cases requiring preventive 
measures should he divided into two classes, one being of a 
mild character merely requiring liberty to be restricted, 
the other, of a more serious nature, necessitating liberty to 
be temporarily taken away.
For the milder classes of cases it was recommended that 
the authority should be empowered
1) to demand security from such persons,
2) to restrict their residence,
3) to require their periodical report to the police, and
4) to require their abstinence from acts like journalism
or arranging public meetings.
For the more serious class of cases, the following 
powers were recommended :
1) arrest,
2) issue a search warrant,
3) confinement in non-penal custody.
But, in all cases it was recommended that the government 
should, before making a final order, refer the case to an 
investigating authority, which should be empowered to make 
an interim order of detention pending the enquiry 
proceedings. With regard to the formation of, and 
procedure to be adopted by the investigating authority, it
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was suggested that it should proceed in camera, without 
strict adherence to the rules in the Indian Evidence Act; 
the person affected should not have the right of appearance 
before it, either in person or by counsel, but the 
allegations should be communicated to him without 
disclosing their source.
The government concerned should be under an obligation 
to inform the authority of the objectionable activities of 
such person and should make orders only after hearing the 
findings of the authority, which should consist of three 
members, of whom one should be a non-official Indian, A 
visiting committee to look after the condition of the person 
so restricted and to report to the government was also 
suggested.
The recommendations of the Rowlatt Committee were 
substantially adopted in the Rowlatt Act, of 1919* though 
this Act became a dead letter.
However, the Rowlatt Committeefs report laid down 
principles from which future legislation on the subject 
of Preventive detention must be regarded as drawing its 
inspiration.
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The Anarchical & Revolutionary Crimes Act,1919*
(Rowlatt Act*)
This measure was enacted to cope with anarchical 
and revolutionary crimes, to supplement the ordinary 
criminal law. Its emergency powers should he exercisable 
by government for the purpose of dealing with anarchical 
and revolutionary movements.
The main provisions of the Anarchical and Revolutionary 
Crimes Act (Rowlatt Act) were divided into three parts.
The first consisted of provisions for speedy trial of 
specified offences, committed with the object of 
subverting the existing government; the second part 
contained provision for taking security from persons 
suspected of such crimes or placing them under 
surveillance or restricting their movements, and the 
third part provided for detention of person suspected 
of being concerned in such crimes.
i
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Preventive Detention, 1919 - 1939*
During the years 1919 - 1939> the following provisions 
were in force
(a) Bengal Emergency Powers Ordinance XI of 1931
(b) United Provinces Emergency Powers Ordinance XII of 
1931
(c) Horth West Frontier Province Emergency Power 
Ordinance XHIof 1931.
(d) Emergency Powers Ordinance 11 of 1932.
All four Ordinances were promulgated by the Governor-General 
of India, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 72 
of the Government of India Act 1919. All of them were 
valid for six months only.
The object of the Bengal Ordinance of 1931 was to 
suppress the terrorist movement and of the others to deal 
with situations inimical to public peace.
They empowered the provincial governments to authorize 
their officers, not below the rank of district Magistrate, 
sub-divisional Magistrate or deputy Superintendent of 
Police, to arrest persons, if satisfied that there were 
reasonable grounds for believing that they had acted, 
were acting or were about to act in a manner prejudicial to 
the public safety or peace.
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Except in the case of the Frontier Ordinance, 
preventive detention was not the main object of these 
ordinances* The power of detention after arrest was 
limited and ancillary to the purpose of trial before a 
special court or of externment from, or restriction to 
a particular area.
Under the United Provinces Ordinance an order to reside 
in a particular area, or not to enter a particular area, 
could be made by the Provincial Government and would remain 
in force for only one month, unless government decided 
otherwise.
Under the Bengal Ordinance, detention was authorized 
for 24 hours only and under the Frontier Province Ordinance 
and the Emergency Powers Ordinance, for a period of not more 
than fifteen days, the normal maximum period under section 
167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for remand of a 
person arrested by the police and charged with a cognizable 
offence, before he is released or sent before a magistrate 
for inquiry or Trial*
Under the Frontier Province and Emergency Power 
Ordinances, the period of detention could be extended up to 
maximum of two months with the approval of the provincial 
government.
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An arrest effected under the provisions of the Frontier 
Province Ordinance had to be reported forthwith to the 
provincial government, which may rightly be considered as 
some safeguards of the detenu's interest. No such report 
was necessary under the other ordinances.
There was no obligation to communicate the grounds of 
detention, nor was there any provision for hearing a 
representation from the detenu.
Detention in World War II.
With the outbreak of the Second World War, in 1939> 
the Defence of India Act, 1939> was passed to meet the 
then existing war emergency. It empowered the Central 
Government to frame rules, inter alia, to provide for 
Hthe apprehension and detention in custody of any 
person reasonably suspected of being of hostile origin or 
of having acted, acting or being about to act, in a manner 
prejudicial to the public safety or interest or to the 
defence of British India, the prohibition of such person 
from entering or residing or remaining in a particular area 
and the compelling of such person to reside and remain in 
any area or to do or abstain from doing anything.n
Defence of India Rule 26, was framed for the detention 
of such persons as were contemplated by the Act.
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In Keshav Talpade v. Emperor, ^  this rule was held by the 
Pederal Court to be invalid on the ground that it went 
beyond the rule-making power, in as much as the Act 
authorized the making of a rule for the detention of 
persons reasonably suspected of certain things, while the 
rule empowered the government to detain a person, even if 
it was satisfied that it was necessary to do so with a 
view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to 
any of the matters specified therein; in other words, the 
rule enabled government to detain a person about whom it 
need have no suspicions, reasonable or unreasonable, that 
he had acted, was acting, or was about to act in any 
prejudicial matter at all, but had only to be satisfied that, 
with a view to preventing him from acting in a particular 
way, it was necessary to detain him. While the Act imposed 
a condition of ’reasonableness1, the rule only required the 
’satisfaction1 of the Government. Thereupon the Governor 
General promulgated Ordinance No. 14 of 1943, which 
substituted a new clause for clause (X) of sub-section (2) 
of section 2 of Defence of India Act 1939, and also declared 
valid all orders made under Rule 26 of the Defence of India 
Rule.
(1) A.I.R. 1943 P.O.I
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The Defence of India Act, 1939, was to remain in 
force during the continuance of the war and for a period of 
six months thereafter. Under the Defence of India Act and 
fiules, both the central and Provincial governments were 
given the power to arrest and detain any person, if 
satisfied that it was necessary to do so, in order to 
prevent him from acting win any manner prejudicial to the 
defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance 
of public order or the efficient prosecution of war;1* and 
having been vested with these powers, the central and the 
state governments were given the right to delegate their 
authority to wany officer or subordinate.H In practice 
the power was usually delegated to the district magistrate 
and in some cases to the sub-divisional magistrate, but in 
theory it could have been delegated even to a police 
constable.
No reason had to be given for the detention; there 
was no right to make a representation and no one (except 
the authorities) knew or could tell where the person was 
detained. No one could see him and he was not allowed to 
have legal advice.
These provisions were challenged in the Courts. The 
validity of the Act and the powers conferred by the fiules
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were upheld by the Indian Courts, following the English 
cases about the emergency laws which were similar to Indian 
Laws.
In Emperor v. Keshav Gokhale,^  it was held that it 
was a condition precedent for a detention order that the 
authority making the order should apply his mind to the 
actual need for making the order. Otherwise the order of 
detention would be invalid for want of 'reasonable and 
satisfactory grounds. 1 If there was nothing to show that 
the authority had decided on a quasi-judicial consideration 
of the pertinent facts, or had exercised his discretion after
a full consideration of the facts, the order would be null
and void.
All that the Courts could do, therefore, was to 
interpret the rules and see whether they had been violated 
in any particular case. But this raised the fundamental 
question whether the courts had authority to do so. The 
only way in which the courts could become seized of this 
kind of case was by the issue of a writ of Habeas Corpus or 
its equivalent under section 491 of the Criminal Proceediire 
Code. Government contended strongly that, although there 
was no provision in the Act abolishing these powers, that
had been done by "necessary implication."
(1) A. I.E. 1945 Bom. 212
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The Hagpur High Court refused to accept this contention 
-^n Tare v. Emperor ^  and observed
wSuch fundamental rights safeguarded under the constitution 
with elaborate and anxious care and upheld time and again by 
the highest tribunals of the realm in language of the utmost 
vigour cannot be swept away by implication or remdved by some 
sweeping generality*n 
It held therefore that
"the rights conferred by section 491 subsist and will continue 
to subsist, until either the section is expressly or by 
necessary and express implication, abrogated or the rights 
are expressly t&ken away.”
In response to the criticism of the courts, government 
promulgated an Ordinance in 1944, expressly taking away these 
ri^its; but, until that was done, the view of the courts 
prevailed.
The first question raised was whether the courts could
inquire into the nsatisfaction of the detaining authority."
Here the rule laid in Xiversidge1 s case^^ was followed and
it was held that they could not, the satisfaction being 
subjective.
(1) I.L.R. 1943 Hag. 154
(2) 1942 A.C.206
But the Nagpur High Court held that, although the courts 
could not look into the grounds upon which the satisfaction 
was based, they had the power to determine whether there was 
satisfaction in fact and also to determine whether the order 
had been made in good faith. It also held that the 
satisfaction had to be special to each individual case.
Thus, when a general order was made directing the detention 
of all persons concerned in a particular activity, without 
having any particular person in mind at the time, the order 
was passed; the order was struck down as faulty. The other 
High Courts took the same view and so did the Federal Court 
in a later case, Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee.^ ^
Ordinance III of 1944, mentioned earlier, provided for 
preventive detention orders to be passed on substantially the 
same grounds as Defence rule 26, but specifically provided 
for delegation by the Central Government and Provincial 
Government of their powers to subordinate officers. Persons 
preventively detained under rule 26, as well as persons 
detained under the Ordinance, were, for the first time, 
entitled to receive from the detaining authority, in the 
former case "as soon as may be" after the Ordinance came into 
force, in the later case "as soon as may be" after the order
(1) A.I.E. 1943. F.C.75
of detention was passed, the grounds on which the order was 
made, with such particulars as were sufficient, in the opinion 
of the authority, to enable them to make representations 
against the order, but excluding facts which the authority 
considered it against the public interest to disclose. The 
authority was obliged to infoim the detenu of his right to 
make a representation and give him the earliest opportunity 
of making a representation.
An order passed by a subordinate officer had to be 
submitted forthwith to the government under which the officer 
waB serving, which could confirm or cancel it. An order of 
detention remained in force for a maximum period of six 
months, but could be renewed for a further period of six 
months at a time by the government which passed it, or the 
government, to which the officer who passed the original 
order of detention was subordinate, after further consideration 
of the circumstances.
The Defence of India Act lapsed on 1st October 1946, 
just after the end of Second World War. After its repeal, 
various Acts, Ordinances and Orders were passed, empowering 
detention to ensure the public safety, security, suppression 
of disturbances and maintenance of public order, both in 
India and Pakistan.
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CHAPTER III
THE NECESSITY FOR PREVENTIVE DETENTION
General Considerations
The Constitutions of Pakistan, following the practice 
of many modem constitutions, include a list of Fundamental 
Rights; the idea that 'rights are prior to the State1 and 
that every citizen must enjoy certain inalienable and 
fundamental rights which even the State authorities cannot 
or should not encroach upon is not new; it is as old as 
humanity itself. The concept of Natural law, that law is 
the essential foundation for the life of man in society 
and based on his needs as a reasonable being, has inspired 
such national documents as JSfegna Carta of 1215, the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1679> the Bill of Rights of 1689» the American 
Declaration of Independence in 1776, and the French 
Declarations of the Rights of Man in 1789* It has 
received international recognition in the declaration of 
"Human Rights" adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on 10th December 1948.
A Committee to report on the fundamental rights of 
the citizen and matters relating to minorities was set up
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in Pakistan at the inaugural session of the First 
Constituent Assembly in August 1947 and it*s interim report 
was accepted in 1950, long before the adoption of any other 
important clauses of the Constitution. The basic idea, in 
the interim report on Fundamental rights was, to quote the 
words of Khan Liaquat Ali Khan "to respect the dignity of 
a man." The fundamental rights adopted by the First 
Constituent Assembly included the familiar freedoms such 
as equality of status, equality of opportunity, equality 
before law; social, economic and political justice, freedom 
of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and 
association. These rights were to be enforceable in the 
Courts.
The Second Constituent Assembly approved all these 
rights, liberties and liberal principles. They were 
incorporated in the Constitution of 1956 and again in 
Chapter I of the Constitution of 1962. Khan Liaquat Ali 
Khan said, "it has become fashionable to guarantee certain 
fundamental rights, but I assure you that it is not our 
intention to give these rights with one hand and take them 
away with the other.
(1) Hon. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, Speech on "Objective 
Resolution" on 7th March 1949*
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But the fact remains that the Constitutions of 
Pakistan of 1956 and 1962, while they guarantee the right 
to personal liberty, also recognise the State's power of 
Preventive detention. The provision for preventive 
detention in a chapter of fundamental rights and liberties 
may seem anomalous. Such provision for preventive 
detention is inadmissable in England and the United States 
of America, except during such an emergency as war. The 
Constitutions of India and Pakistan, however, include 
provisions of preventive detention even in time of peace, 
but subject to prescribed limitations.
The partition of the Sub-continent into Bharat and 
Pakistan resulted in an influx into both countries, of 
millions of refugees, dissatisfied and disappointed with 
their lot. The war in Kashmir, grave scarcity of food in 
many parts of both countries, the exploitation of these 
conditions by political and economic opportunists and 
adventurers, profiteers and foreign agents, created a 
situation inimical to the political security and economic 
stability of the country, unprecedented in the annals of 
any democracy. It was the realization of these difficulties 
and the determination to deal with them in an effective 
manner, so that civil liberties could flourish in an
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orderly society that compelled the constitution-makers to 
recognise preventive detention and impose such limitations 
on it as would not inhibit unduly the enjoyment of the 
guaranteed fundamental rights.
To meet the threats of serious crises which it was 
anticipated that Pakistan would have to face, stringent 
measures against subversive and antisocial actions were 
deemed necessary; peace and tranquility had not become 
normal features of life in Pakistan, since its emergence 
as a sovereign state.
The party in power had to combat uncontrolled 
opposition, some individuals and political parties 
recognised no limits to political agitation for the 
purpose of ventilating grievances, subversive movements 
and abuse of personal liberties appeared to be likely to 
endanger the whole fabric of a society, which had only 
recently secured independence.
The reasons for introducing preventive detention in 
the Indian Constitution were explained in the Indian 
Constituent Assembly by hr. Ambedkar in the following 
words
wIt has to be recognised that, in the present 
circumstances of the country, it may be necessary for the
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Executive to detain a person who is tampering either with 
public order or with the defence services of the country.
In such case I do not think that the exigency of the liberty 
of the individual shall be placed above the interest of the 
state.n^
This explanation failed to satisfy a considerable section of 
the Assembly who criticised the provision in the strong 
terms. In a remarkable speech Bakshi Tek Chand assailed 
the provision in the severest terms which included the 
following question,
n....  if there is any written constitution in the world
in which there is provision for detention of person without 
trial in this manner in normal times
Replying to the debate Dr. Ambedkar laid emphasis on 
the special safeguards embodied in the constitution to protect 
a person arrested under a preventive detention law. He said, 
nIf all of us follow purely constitutional methods to achieve 
our objective, I think the situation would have been different 
and probably the necessity of having preventive detention 
might not be there at all. But I think in making a law we
(1) C.A.D. IX 1496
(2) C.A.D. IX 1529
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ought to take into consideration the worst and not the
b e s t   there may be many parties and persons, who may not
be patient enough to follow constitutional methods but are 
impatient in reaching their objective and if for that 
purpose (they) resort to unconstitutional methods, then 
there may be a large number of people who may have to be 
detained by the Executive. In such a situation, would it 
be possible for the Executive to prepare the cases and do 
all that is necessary to satisfy the elaborate legal 
procedure prescribed? Is it practicable?”^ ^
The reasons for the necessity of such legislation 
appear from an examination of the arguments put forward by 
the Indian Government in the Bok Sabha, when introducing the 
Preventive Detention Act. Sardar Patel said,
”When law is flouted and offences are committed, 
ordinarily there is the criminal law which is put into 
force. But where the very basis of law is sought to be 
undermined and attempts are made to create a state of affairs
in which, to borrow the words o f   (Moti lal) 'men would
not be men and law would not be law*, we feel justified in 
invoking emergent and extraordinary laws.”^
(1) C.A.D. IX 1556
(2) Lob Sabha Debates Feb.25 1950 P.976.
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Dr* Katju summarized the necessity for preventive 
detention in an entirely different way,
"the endeavour lie re is to preserve freedom, restore 
freedom, safeguard the security of the country, at a cost 
of one year's detention.M^
(2 )"We cannot dig a well when the house is on fire."v '
This class of legislation, which is legacy of war days, has 
been retained on our statute book, as it was felt desirable 
to combat certain types of situation, with which the 
country was continually being confronted as a matter of 
painful necessity. Brae ton said that "what is not otherwise 
lawful necessity makes lawful."
Sir William Scot wrote in his book,
"Necessity creates the law; it supersedes rules; and
whatever is reasonable and just in such, is likewise legal." ^  
It is a matter of evil necessity that we have adopted 
such legislation even in time of peace.
Preventive detention is an administrative necessity and 
likely to cause less human misery than might result from 
likely alternative measures to deal with persons who, cannot
(1) Lok Sabha Debates, August 6, 1952 Col.5713
( 2 ) Mr. Gr.A. Despande, Ibid. May 30, 1956
{3) Current legal Problems, 1953, P.218
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"be successfully prosecuted for their activities, though they
are menace to public security and order,
(2 )
President Nyererev , while emphasising the need of
preventive detention, said, "While the vast mass of the people
give full and active support to their country and itfe government,
a handful of individuals can still put our nation into jeopardy
and reduce to ashes the effort of millions.1
Judicially speaking the need for preventive detention further
arises in the sense that such detention of a person without trial
is necessitated by the fact that the evidence in possession of
the authority will not be sufficient to make charge or to
( '5 )secure the conviction of a detenu by legal proof, 7 but it may 
be sufficient to justify the detention for reasons connected with 
Defence, Foreign affairs, the security of the state, the 
maintenance of public order or the maintenance of supplies and 
services essential to community.
To sum up, Preventive detention in case of such an emergency 
as war is well recognised. But in recent time the necessity of 
having such legislation in time of peace has been felt necessary 
to prevent antisocial and subversive elements from imperilling 
the welfare of States. Pakistan, India, Burma, Ghana, Tanzania, 
telaya and other countries have made constitutional and other 
statutory provisions recognising and regulating it.
(1) Alan Gledhill. Fundamental Rights in India (1955) P.126
(2) Chief of State, Tanzania, speech inaugurating the
University College, Dar-es-Salam. 1964*
(3) liversidge v. Anderson, 1942. A.C.206 (218).
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Preventive Detention in England
In England it has not been easy to reconcile preventive
detention with the rule of law. There are no constitutional
limitations on the powers of the Parliament and it is only by
convention that preventive detention is enacted in time of war.
For long the orthodox view of English lawyers was expressed by
Dicey as follows
"The physical restraint of an individual may be justified
only on the ground that he has been accused of some offence
and must be brought before the court to stand his trial; and
that he has been convicted of some offence and must suffer
punishment for i t . " ^
It is on this view that the Lords have been asked to
intervene in cases of preventive detention in time of war
since 1914 but since the decisions in Rex v. Halliday ^  and
(1 )Livers id ge v. Andersonw/ it is settled law now that 
Parliament may empower the executive to make regulations 
for the detention without trial of persons whose detention 
appears to be expedient in the interests of the public 
safety or the defence of the realm, but this is subject to 
safeguards against abuse.
During the first world war, the national emergency
(1) Dicey, law of the Constitution.
(2) Rex v. Halliday 1917 A.C.260
(3) Liversidge v. Anderson, 1942 A.C.206.
required Parliament to pass The Defence of the Realm 
Consolidation Act, 1914, under which a number of Regulations 
were made, including Regulation 14-B, which permitted the 
Secretary of State to subject any person "to such obligations 
and restrictions as hereinafter mentioned in view of his 
hostile origin or associations." Under this Regulation 
one, Arthur Zadig was interned and he applied to Kingfs Bench 
for a writ of habeas corpus, which was refused. The matter 
was ultimately brought before the House of Lords in Rex, v. 
Halliday. ^  Lord Shaw described the Act as a violent 
exercise of ’arbitrary power*and that the prisoner had been 
regulated out of liberty. But the majority of Lords thought 
the Regulation, made under the Defence of the Realm 
Consolidation Act, valid and necessary for the public safety 
in a time of danger. Lord Pinlay, L.C. said that the rule 
that legislation dealing with the liberty of the subject must 
be construed, if possible, in favour of the subject and against 
the Crown, had no relevance in dealing with a measure intended 
to prevent public danger, when the safety of the State was 
involved. "One of the most obvious means of taking 
precautions against dangers such as are enumerated is to
(1) Rex v. Halliday 1917 A.C.260.
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impose some restriction on the freedom of movement of 
persons whom there may be any reason to suspect of being 
disposed to help the enemy." ^  "Preventive detention is 
not a punitive but precautionary method. The object is 
not to punish a man for having done something but to 
intercept him before he does it and to prevent him from 
doing it."
Lord Atkinson, while dealing with the merits of the
case, made the following observations
"If the Legislature chooses to enact that he can be
deprived of his liberty and incarcerated or interned for
certain things, for which he could not have been heretofore
incarcerated or interned, that enactment and the orders made
under it, if intra Vires, do not infringe the Habeas Corpus
(2 )Acts or take away any right conferred by Magna Carta."v *
The matter was again considered in Ronnfeldt v. Phillips^  
where under one of the Defence of the Realm Regulations a 
person was ordered not to reside in a particular locality, 
since the military authorities suspected him of acting in a 
manner prejudicial to public safety. Scrutton L.J. observed 
in his judgment,
(1) Ibid. Page 26y
(2) Ibid. Page 272
(3) Ronnfeldt v. Phillips, 1918 35 T.L.R. (46 - 47).
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'•The Courts were always anxious to protect the liberty 
of the subject* They did so both in the interest of the 
subject himself and in the interest of the State. In time 
of war, there must be some modification in the interests of 
the State. It has been said that a war could not be
conducted on the principles of the Sermon on the Mount. It
might also be said that a war could not be carried on according 
to the principles of Magna Carta.w
Thus in almost every case arising out of a Regulation 
or law made in time of war, the courts have upheld the 
paramount interests and security of the state. In Rex v. 
Superintendent of Vine Street Police Station, Ex parte Libman^1  ^
Bailhache J. observed
••Above the liberty of the subject is the safety of the 
realm and if the internment of an alien enemy is considered by 
the executive Government, charged with the protection of the 
realm, desirable in the interests of the safety of the realm, 
the action of the Government in so doing is not open to review
by the courts of law by Habeas Corpus."
(2 )lord Parker in Re Zamorav 7 said,
(1) Rex v. Supt.of Vine St. Police Station, Ex parte libman,
1916 K.B. 275
(2) Re Zamora 1916 2 A.C.77 at 107*
103
1 those who are responsible for the national security 
must be the sole judges of what the national security 
requires.11
The second world war necessitated the passing of the 
Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of 1939> which gave power to 
the executive to make regulations for the purposes of public 
safety, defence of realm, maintenance of public order, the 
efficient prosecution of the war, the maintenance of supplies 
and services essential to the life of the community, the 
apprehension, trial and punishment of persons offending 
against the Regulations and detention of persons "whose 
detention appears to the Secretary of State to be expedient 
in the interest of public safety for the defence of the realm, 
the taking possession or control of any property or 
undertaking, the requisitioning of any property other than 
land, entering and searching any premises.
The Regulation which directly dealt with preventive 
detention was 18-B, which said,
"If the Secretary of the State has reasonable cause to 
believe any person to be of hostile origin or association or 
to have been recently concerned in acts prejudicial t o  public 
safety or the defence of the realm or in the preparation or 
instigation of such acts and that by reason thereof it is
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necessary to exercise control over him, he may make an order 
against that person directing that he be detained.1 This 
ReguJa tion came up for consideration in Livers id ge v. 
Anderson. ^
The facts of the case were that in May, 194-0, Sir John 
Anderson, the Home Secretary, made an order for a detention of 
one, Robert Liversidge. Liversidge applied for particulars 
of the grounds, which had led the Home Secretary to entertain 
the belief that he was of hostile associations and for a 
declaration that his detention was unlawful and false 
imprisonment. This request was refused by the King*s Bench 
Division and the refusal was stained by the Court of Appeal.
It was held that, where the Secretary of the State, 
acting in good faith under Regulation 18-B, makes an order, 
in which he recites that he has reasonable cause to believe a 
person to be of hostile association and that by reason thereof 
it is necessary to exercise control over him and directs that 
that person be detained, a court of law cannot inquire whether, 
in fact, the Secretary of State had reasonable grounds for his 
belief; that the matter is one for the executive discretion 
of the Secretary of State.
(1) Liversidge v. Anderson 1942 A.C.206.
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Accordingly, in an action by a person detained against 
the Secretary of State for damages and for false imprisonment 
it was held that Mthe court could not compel the defendant to 
give particulars of the grounds on which he had reasonable 
cause to believe the plaintiff to be a person of hostile 
associations or that by reason of such hostile associations it 
was necessary to exercise control over the plaintiff and that 
the production by the Secretary of State of an order of 
detention, made by him and ex: facie regular and duly 
authenticated, constituted a defence to such an action, unless 
the plaintiff discharged the burden of establishing that the 
order was invalid.
Lord Macmillan observed,
MIn a time of emergency, when the life of the whole 
nation is at stake, it may well be that a Regulation for the 
defence of the realm may quite properly have a meaning which, 
because of it’s drastic invasion of the liberty of the subject, 
the Courts would be slow to attribute to a peace time measure
........  the liberty which we so justly extol is itself the
gift of the law and, as Ifegna Carta recognises, may by the 
law be forfeited or abridged. At a time when it is 
undoubted law of the land that a citizen may by conscription 
or requisition be compelled to give up his life and all that
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he possesses, for his country1s cause, it may well be no 
matter of surprise that there should be confided to the 
Secretary of State a discretionary power of enforcing the
relatively mild precaution of detention...... It is for
the Secretary of State alone to decide, in the forum of his 
own conscience, whether he has a reasonable cause to believe 
and he cannot, if he has acted in good faith, be called upon 
to disclose to anyone the facts and circumstances, which have 
induced his belief or to satisfy anyone but himself that 
these facts and circumstances constituted reasonable cause 
to believe.”
lord Ifeugham, in his speech in the House of lords, 
dealt with the question of construction of the words wif the 
Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe” and the 
question whether the words require that there must be an 
external fact as to reasonable cause for belief and one there­
fore capable of being challenged in a court of law, or whether 
the words in the context in which they are found point simply 
to the belief of the Secretary of State founded on his view 
of their being reasonable cause for the belief he entertains. 
His lordship observed,
n I am not disposed to deny that, in the absence
of a context, the prima facie meaning of such a phrase as
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"if A.B. has reasonable cause to believe a certain 
circumstance or thing" should be construed as "if there is 
in fact reasonable cause for believing that thing and if 
A.B. believes it." However I am quite unable to take the 
view that the words can only have that meaning. It seems 
to me reasonably clear that if the thing to be believed is 
something which is essentially one within the knowledge of 
A.B. or one for the exercise of his exclusive discretion, 
the words may well mean, ^if A.B. acting on what he thinks 
is reasonable cause (and of course acting in good faith) 
believes the thing in question.
The majority view was that the words "reasonable cause" 
cannot be construed as imposing an objective condition 
precedent of facts on which a person detained would be 
entitled to challenge the grounds of the Secretary of 
State fs honest belief; in short the cause is subjective 
and not objective.
Lord Atkin however recorded a strong dissenting note 
and took a different view of the question. He was of the 
opinion that
"Reasonable cause" for an action or a belief is just
(1) Ibid. . Page 219-220.
as much a positive fact, capable of determination by a 
third party, as is a broken ankle or a legal right. If its 
meaning is the subject of dispute as to legal rights, then 
ordinarily the reasonableness of the cause, and even the 
existence of any cause, is in our law to be determined by 
the judge, and not by the tribunal of fact, if the functions 
of deciding law and facts are divided. Thus, having 
established, as I hope, that the plain and natural meaning 
of the words "having reasonable cause" imports the existence 
of a fact or state of facts and not the mere belief by the 
person challenged that the fact or state of facts exists, I 
proceed to show that this meaning of the words has been 
accepted in innumerable legal decisions for many generations 
and that "reasonable cause" for a belief, when the subject of 
legal dispute has always been treated as an objective fact, 
to be proved by one or other party and to be determined by 
the appropriate tribunal."
His Lordship went on further to say
"Ho one doubts that the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 
1939 9 empowers His Lfejesty in Council to vest any minister 
with unlimited power over the person and property of the 
subject. The only question is whether in this Regulation 
they have done so." After referring to certain statutes
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empowering a police officer to arrest a person if he had
reasonable cause to believe that he had committed an offence,
he proceeded "... It is said that it could never have been 
intended to substitute the decision of judges for the decision 
of the Minister, or, as has been said, to give an appeal from
the Minister to the Courts. Ho one, however, proposes
either a substitution or an appeal. A judge1s decision is 
not substituted for the constable’s on the question of 
unlawful arrest, nor does he sit on appeal from the 
Constable. The judge has to bear in mind that the 
constable’s authority is limited, and that he can arrest only 
on reasonable suspicion and the judge has the duty to say 
whether the conditions of exercise of the power are fulfilled. 
If there are reasonable grounds, the judge has no further duty 
of deciding whether he would have formed the same belief, any 
more than, if there is reasonable evidence to go to a jury, 
the judge is concerned with whether he would have come to the 
same verdict .... 11
”1 view with apprehension the attitude of judges who, on 
a mere question of construction, when face to face with claims 
involving the liberty of the subject, show themselves more 
executive minded than the executive. Their function is to 
give words their natural meaning, not perhaps, in war time,
110
leaning towards liberty, but following the dictum of
(1 )Pollock, C.B. in Bowditch v. Bale bin,K 7 cited with
approval by my noble and learned friend Lord Wright in
(2)
Barnard v. Gorman.v y in a case in which the liberty of 
the subject is concerned, we cannot go beyond the natural 
construction of the Statute.
In this country, amid the clash of arms, the laws are 
not silent. They may be changed, but they speak the same 
language in war as in peace. It has always been one of 
the pillars of freedom, 1 one of the principles of liberty 
for which, on recent authority, we are now fighting, that 
the judges are no respecters of persons and stand between 
the subject and any attempted encroachments on his liberty 
by the executive, alert to see that any coercive action is 
justified in law. In this case, I have listened to 
arguments which might have been addressed acceptable to 
the Court of King's Bench in time of Charles 1."
Lord Mhcmillan, Lord Wright and Lord Romer agreed 
with the view of Viscount Maugham and concurred with him
(1) Bowditch v. Balchin, 1850 5 Ex. 378.
(2) Barnard v. Gorman, 1941 A.C.378, 393*
in dismissing the appeal.
Lord Atkin in an earlier casev ' also observed:-
MIn accordance with British jurisprudence, no member 
of the executive can interfere with the liberty or 
property of a British subject, except on the condition 
that he can support the legality of his action before a 
Court of Justice. And it is the tradition of British 
Justice that judges should not shrink from deciding such 
issues in the face of the executive.1
(1) Eshugbayi v. Government of Nigeria,
(1931} A.C. 662.
Preventive Detention in the U. S. A*
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There is no provision for preventive or emergency 
detention in the American Constitution during peace time, 
but it grants power to Congress to declare war* The 
Supreme Court has declared that the war power of the 
national Government is 1 the power to wage war successfully. n 
It extends to every matter and activity so related to war as 
substantially to affect its conduct and progress. The power 
is not restricted to the winning of victories in the field 
and repulse of enemy forces. It embraces every phase of 
the national defense, including the protection of war 
materials and the members of armed forces from injury and 
from danger which attend the rise, prosecution and progress 
of w a r . ^
When the executive is given wide power to deal with the
abnormal situation in their discretion during the war, they
can do what is in the best interest of the country. If any
specific act does not expressly give them the power to detain
a suspected person or spy of alien ancestry, such power can
(2 )be presumed to be implied. In Ex parte Bndo v J it was 
held that, 11 the Constitution, when it committed to the
(1) Hirabayashi v. U. S. (1943), 320 U.S. 81
(2) Ex-parte MItsuye Endo, (1944) 323 U.S. 283 •
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executive and to Congress the exercise of the war power, 
necessarily gave them wide scope for the exercise of 
judgment and discretion, so that war may be waged effectively 
and successfully. The fact that the Act and the orders 
(Act of Hhrch 21, 1942 and Executive Orders 9066, 9102) are 
silent on detention does not of course mean that any power 
to detain is lacking. Some such power might indeed be 
necessary to the successful operation of the evacuation 
program. At least we may so assume. Moreover, we may 
assume for the purposes of this case that initial detention 
in Relocation Centres was authorised. But we stress the 
silence of the legislative history and of the Act on the 
power to detain to empiiasize that any such authority which 
exists must be implied.11
In Korematsufs case 7 the Supreme Court found 
constitutional sanction for meeting the threats of subversion 
in time of war by the most stringent measures, including 
detention without trial, of an entire racial group in certain 
localities. Mr. Justice Black, delivering the opinion of the 
Court, said "Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as 
its privileges and in time of war the burden is always
(1) Korematsu v. U. S., (1944), 323 U.S.214-
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heavier. Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens 
from their homes, except under circumstances of direst 
emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic 
governmental institutions. But when, under conditions of 
modem warfare, our shores are threatened by hostile forces, 
the power to'protect must be commensurate with the threatened 
danger ... Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were 
this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in 
a concentration camp, because of racial prejudice.
Regardless of the true nature of the Assembly and Relocation 
Centres, and we deem it unjustifiable to call them 
concentration camps with all the ugly connotations that term 
implies, we are dealing specifically with nothing but an 
exclusion order. To cast this case into outlines of racial 
prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers 
which were presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu 
was not excluded from the Military Area, because of hostility 
to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war 
with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted 
military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and 
felt constrained to take proper security measures; they 
decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded 
that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from
115
the West Coast temporarily and finally because Congress, 
reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military 
leaders, determined that they should have power to do just 
this. There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of 
some; the military authorities considered that the need for 
action was great and the time was short. We cannot, by 
availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight, now 
say that at that time these actions were unjustified.**
Mr. Justice Murphy who dissented said, "No adequate 
reason is given for the failure to treat these Japanese 
Americans on an individual basis, by holding investigations 
and hearings to separate the loyal from the disloyal, as was 
done in the case of persons of German and Italian ancestry...
It is asserted merely that the loyalties of this group “were 
unknown and time was of the essence.** Yet nearly four 
months elapsed after Pearl Harbor, before the first 
exclusion order was issued; nearly eight months went by, 
until the last order was issued, and the last of these 
“subversive** persons was not actually removed, until almost 
eleven months had elapsed. Leisure and deliberation seem to 
have been more of the essence than speed.1*
After the Second World War provision for preventive 
detention in case of emergency was introduced by the Internal
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Security Act, 1950, commonly known as the McCarron Act.
Sections 100-111, entitled “Emergency Detention,” deal with 
it. The necessity for such legislation was that during 
World War II, enemy aliens, thought to be dangerous, were 
placed in internment camps and all Japanese-American citizens 
on the West Coast were shut up in War Relocation Centres.
Under executive orders, which brought about the Japanese- 
American evacuation, some two hundred individual citizens 
were required, on security grounds, to move out of other 
“defense areas” in which they were living and take up 
residence elsewhere. These World War II measures were more 
or less ad hoc and they are not regarded with much pride and 
satisfaction in America. The Internal Security Act, 1950, 
therefore seeks to regularize such drastic action by 
providing in advance for what is called emergency detention.
One of the reasons given in the Preamble reads as follows
The detention of persons, who there is reasonable ground 
to believe probably will commit or conspire with others to 
commit espionage or sabotage is, in a time of internal security 
emergency, essential to common defence and to safety and 
security of the territory, the people and the constitution of 
U. S. A. Under Section 102 of the Act, the President is 
empowered to proclaim an “internal security emergency” in the
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event of any one of the following
(I) invasion of the territory of the United States or its 
possessions,
(II) declaration of war by congress, or
(III) insurrection within the United States in aid of a 
foreign enemy.
A state of **Internal Security Emergency1* so declared shall 
continue in existence until terminated by proclamation of the 
President or by the concurrent resolution of Congress.**
In such an emergency the President, through the Attorney 
General, may detain any person **as to whom there is reasonable 
ground to believe that such person probably will engage in, or 
probably will conspire with others to engage in acts of 
espionage or of sabotage.1*
Any person detained shall be released from such 
emergency detention upon
(a) the termination of such emergency by proclamation of 
President or by concurrent resolution of the Congress,
(b) an order of release by the Attorney-General,
(c) a final order of release after hearing by the Board of 
Detention Review, hereinafter established, or
(d) a final order of release by a United States court, 
after review of the action of the Board of Detention 
Review or upon a writ of habeas corpus.
The procedure for detention is that such person 
(detainee) is to he confined in a place of detention 
provided by the Attorney-General. Within the forty-eight 
hours after detention, he must be given a hearing before a 
preliminary hearing officer, appointed by the President.
At this hearing he is to be told the ground of his detention 
and is to be represented by counsel, if he so desires. The 
detainee may introduce evidence in his own behalf and may 
cross-examine the witnesses against him, except that the 
Attorney General or his representative cannot be required to 
furnish information, the revelation by which would disclose 
the identity or evidence of a Government agent or officer, 
which he believes it would be dangerous to national safety 
and security to divulge.
Thereafter the detainee may appeal to the Board of 
Detention Review, consisting of nine members appointed by the 
President and from there to the Court of Appeals and by 
Certiorari, to the Supreme Court. Depending on the decision 
of the Board, the Attorney-General has also right to appeal.
Although there is no direct decision as yet upholding 
the validity of an order of detention under this Act, the 
cases discussed before suggest its constitutionality.
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CHAPTER IV.
THE NATURE OP A HD CONSTITUTIONAL
RESTRICTIONS ON PREVENTIVE DETENTION LAWS
Definition of Preventive Detention
Preventive legislation was introduced in Indo-Pakistan 
sub-continent by the Charter Act, 1793, but no authoritative 
definition was given to it in the sub-continent* This 
expression was critically examined by the judges in England, 
while explaining the nature of detention under the Defence of 
the Realm Act, 1914, passed on the outbreak of the First 
World War and the same language was subsequently repeated in 
connection with the Emergency Regulations made during the 
Second World War*
The measures are precautionary and not punitive and the 
detenu is not charged with any crime. In the words of Lord 
Finlay, 1 Any preventive measures, even if they involve some 
restraint or hardship on individual, do not partake in any 
way of the nature of punishment, but are taken by way of 
precaution to prevent mischief to State.11 ^
Preventive Detention in these measures was defined as MThe
(1) Rex v. Halliday, 1917 A.C.260.
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detention of a person without trial, in such circumstances 
that the evidence in possession of the authority is not 
sufficient to make a legal charge or to secure the 
conviction of detenu by legal proof, but may be still 
sufficient to justify his detention for any reason such as 
defence, foreign affairs, security of the state, maintenance 
of public order or of supplies and services essential to 
the community.”^
(2 )According to Professor A. Grladhillv y, in the 
Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, the expression”'Preventive 
Detention1 is used to describe detention by order of an 
authority empowered under a statute on his subjective 
satisfaction that the person detained is likely to act in 
a manner prejudicial to one or more of the matters described 
in the statute, such as national defence or public order. 
Normally the authority acts on information supplied by police 
or other public authority without taking any evidence.”
The detenu is deprived of his liberty, not because of 
the commission of an offence, which has to be subsequently 
proved in criminal proceedings, but on suspicion of the
(1) Liversidge v. Anderson, 1942 A.C.206 (218).
(2) A. Gledhill, Pakistan, The Development of its Laws and 
Constitution. 2nd Edition P.198.
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executive, in the interest of public security and order; 
the detenu is deprived of certain rights which are available 
to a person arrested under the ordinary law. It however does 
not include the detention of a person, who is awaiting trial 
on a criminal charge, nor the supplementary or additional 
term of imprisonment, inflicted after conviction upon a 
habitual offender. Preventive detention has three special 
features
(i) it is detention and not imprisonment,
(ii) it is detention by the order of the executive, without 
trial or inquiry by a Court,
(iii) the object is preventive and not punitive, with the 
aim to prevent a person from attaining an object, 
prejudicial to the interest of the state.
MAs the object is precautionary, the matter has to be left 
to the discretion of the executive authority, which can only 
act on suspicion and cannot be expected in every case to have 
proof of any crime committed which will satisfy a court of 
law .... the test is subjective, based on the cumulative 
effect of different activities, perhaps spread over a 
considerable period.0
(1) Liversidge v. Anderson, 1942 A.C.206 (per Lord Finlay).
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The basis of detention said S.M.Iqbal, J. is an 
apprehension based on his past conduct or some information 
as to the action which he is likely to take in future and 
therefore it is not possible to lay down any objective 
standards to come to this conclusion* To do so may create 
difficulties in the way of executive authority to maintain 
law and order. If in each case, they are to look for the 
evidence to satisfy the judicial standards, it may become 
difficult for them to take any decision, which otherwise 
may be necessary to prevent an apprehended action on the 
part of the person. It may well happen that, before they 
succeed in collecting the necessary evidence, or they may 
not succeed at all, the person concerned may succeed in his 
object.
Preventive detention is an abnormal measure, in that it 
authorizes the executive to impose restraint upon the liberty 
of a person, who may not have committed a crime but it is 
apprehended, is about to commit acts that are prejudicial to 
public safety and order, defence and security of the state.
It has been held that, "Preventive justice consists in
(1) Maulvi Parid Ahmad v. Govt.of West Pakistan, P.L.D.1965
Lah. 135.
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restraining a man from committing a crime, which he may 
commit but has not yet committed or from doing some act 
injurious to the members of the community, which he may do 
but has not yet done; it is common to all systems of 
jurisprudence. This concept of justic$£roceeds upon the 
principle that a person should be retrained from doing some 
thing, which, if free or unfettered, it is reasonably 
probable that he would do.”^^
(2 )According to Lord Atkinson v 7 MThe preventive justice
proceeds upon the principle that a person should be
restrained from doing some thing which, if free and
unfettered, it is reasonably probable he would do; it must
necessarily proceed in all cases, to some extent, on
suspicion or anticipation as distinct from proof.H Lord
( 3 \
Atkinson also cited with approval the case v y where !5ay,C.J. 
has observed that, tfPreventive justice consists in 
restraining those persons, whom there is a probable ground 
to suspect of future misbehaviour, to stipulate with and to 
give full assurance to the public that such offence as is
(1) Maung Hla Gyaw v. The Commissioner of Police and One, 1948
B.L.R.764 (766).
(2) Rex v. Halliday, 1917 A.C.260.
(3) Rex v. Justices of Cork, (1882) 15 Cox C.C.78.
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apprehended shall not happen by finding pledges or security 
for keeping the peace for their good behaviour."
As stated before, preventive detention is precautionary. 
The word "preventive? is used in contradiction to the word 
"punitive." To quote the words of Lord Finlay, ^  "One of 
the most obvious means of taking precautions against dangers 
such as are enumerated is to impose some restriction on the 
freedom of movement of persons whom there may be any reason 
to suspect of being disposed to help the enemy .... The 
measure is not punitive, but precautionary." While punitive
detention comes after the illegal §ct is actually committed, 
preventive detention is imposed because the apprehension of 
wrong doing. As Mukherjee, J. pointed out "A person is
punitively detained only after a trial for committing a crime 
and after his guilt has been established in a competent court 
of justice. Preventive detention, on the other hand, is not 
a punitive but precautionary measure. The object is not to 
punish a man for having done some thing but to intercept him 
before he does it and to prevent him from doing it. ETo 
offence is proved, nor any charge formulated and the 
justification is suspicion or reasonable probability and not
(1) Rex v. Halliday 1917 A.C.260 (269)
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criminal conviction, which only can he warranted by legal 
evidence.”^
In England preventive detention is only a war-time
emergency measure and the rule of interpretation, as observed
by Halsbury is, "In times of war and in matters relating to
war, the Crown enjoys generally a somewhat wider latitude in
the exercise of the prerogative than in times of peace, for
in such matters more stringent measures than are ordinarily
allowed by the common or statute law are frequently rendered
necessary for the public safety or for the restoration of
12 )peace and good order."v 7 Presumptions in favour of the 
liberty of the subject, which are usually of great effect in 
interpreting statute in times of peace, become relatively 
weak in times of war, when the safety of the realm is in 
danger.
The general rule is that, where an Act of Parliament is 
capable of more than one construction, the Court should prefer 
that construction "which is the least likely to imperil the 
safety of the realm.” It is right to interpret emergency 
legislation to promote rather than to defeat its efficacy for 
the defence of the realm. If there is a reasonable doubt as
(1) Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.E.1950 S.C.27
(2) Halsbury, laws of England, Vol.VI. Page 527.
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to the meaning of the words used, we should prefer a
construction which will carry into effect the plain intention
of those responsible for the order in council, rather than one
which will defeat their intention.^
In Pakistan and India preventive detention is authorised
not only by war time legislation but is also necessary
measures during normal times and, under normal circumstances,
such rules would not be applicable wholly. It has been
(2 )observed in India that, 1 "Par greater latitude is allowed 
to the executive, and presumptions in favour of the liberty 
of the subject are weakened but those canons and those rights 
do not disappear altogether. In my opinion some limit must 
be placed upon claims to the arbitrary exercise of absolute 
power in matters connected with the restraint of man*s liberty, 
and unless such powers are unmistakably conferred either 
expressly or by necessary implication and by ‘necessary*, I 
mean when no other construction is reasonably possible, they 
must be taken, at the very least, to be subject to the right 
of person detained to come before the court and complain of 
that detention and demand that he be either dealt with 
according to law or be set at liberty, and this notwithstanding 
that the act we are considering is a war time measure."
(1) liversidge v. Anderson, 1942 A.C.206
(2) Parbhakar v. Emperor, A.I.E. 1943 Hag.26.
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The rule that a penal statute ought to be strictly
construed has been to a great extent relaxed in modem
times, owing to the predominance of the rule that all statute
should be construed fairly, so as to effectuate the intention
of the Legislature.^ There is still a strong desire on
the part of the Courts to protect the life and liberty of a
citizen by the application of old doctrines, at least in
normal times, though in times of emergency, different
consideration would prevail. In normal times the Court
would still act on the presumption against interference with
(2 )the liberty of the subject. 7 When a clause or expression 
in a penal statute is capable of being interpreted either in 
favour or against the accused, the former interpretation 
ought to prevail and the benefit of the ambiguity ought to be 
given to the accused. To quote the words of Lord Porter,
"A man should not be put in peril on an ambiguity.w ^
When the legislature has given power to the executive to 
take any action it thinks fit, but limits the right to take
(1) Ifoxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Ed. pp 267* 289.
(2) Bruce v. Beaumont Trust, (1935) 2 K.B.257.
(3) L. and N.E.Rly v. Berriman, (1946) A11.E.R.268 (H.L).
(4) Howell v. Falmouth Boat Construction, (1951) 2 All.E.R.
278 (H.L).
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action only for a definite purpose, it will be the duty of 
the Court to decide whether the power has been exercised for 
that definite purpose, to construe the restriction on liberty 
as narrowly as possible and limit it within the words used by 
the Legislature.^ This principle has been earlier explained 
by Lord Shaw,^. His Lordship observed that "The appellant 
has been interned without a trial, because he is of hostile 
origin or associations. Parliament never said in words one 
of those things. If Parliament had really meant to sanction 
internment without trial for the cause assigned, it could have 
said so without the slightest difficulty and not left a point 
which is so fundamental to be reached by inference."
The various other rules of interpretation laid down by their 
Lordships when the liberty of the subject is involved are
1) any provision of a law encroaching upon the liberty of
the subject which seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the court,
(3)will be strictly construed. w / ,
2) ouster of Jurisdiction of the Court will not be inferred,
(A }
in the absence of express words of the statute v ,
(1) Eshugbayi v. Govt, of Nigeria, 1931 A.C.662.
(2) Rex v. Halliday, 1917 A.C.260.
(3) Chester v. Bateson, 1920 1 K.B. 829.
(4) Paul v. Wheat Commrs. 1937 A.C.139.
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3) should the statute he equally susceptible of two 
meanings, me leading to an invasion of the liberty of 
the subject, and "ths other not, the latter should be 
preferred, on the ground of the presumed intention of 
the legislature not to interfere with it
4) where however the words used by the Legislature are
clear and unambiguous, the court has no right to
interfere, by reading into the statute what is not
there, so long as the powers conferred by the Legislature
(2 )are used for the purpose for which they were meant v ',
5) a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes is
that, except in matters of pure procedure, a statute
will not be regarded as operating retrospectively, unless
it is so expressly provided therein or the inference
(3)follows by necessary implication or intendment ,
6) laws cannot be ”worded or interpreted” so as to invest 
executive authorities with power to make what statutory 
rules they please and to use such freedom to make 
themselves final judges of their own satisfaction'
(1) Marshall v. Blackpool Corp., 1932 1 K.B.688.
(2) A.G.Canada v. Hallet. 1952 A.C.427
(3) Dilbar Hussain v. Ch.Khurshid Ahmad, P.1.D.1956 Lah.865*
(4) Malik Ghulam Jilani v. The Govt.of West Pakistan,
P.L.B.1967 S.C.373
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During an emergency like war, however, it is clear that the 
rule that legislation encroaching upon the liberty of the 
subject should be construed in favour of the subject, "has 
no relevance in dealing with an executive measure by way of 
preventing a public danger, when the safety of the state is 
involved•" ^
The Supreme Court of Pakistan has laid down the following
general principles of construction in the Presidents Special
(2 )Reference v Munir, C.J. said, "One general rule that
emerges, and it is an ancient rule, that, in interpretation 
of written instruments, whether they are constitutional 
charters, or ordinary statutes, or other documents, the first 
object of the Court is to discover the intention of the author 
and that such intention is to be gathered from the words used 
in the statute or document.
"The second rule is that the intention of the Legislature in 
enacting a statute ought to be derived from a consideration 
of the whole enactment in order to arrive at a consistent 
plan. It is wrong to start with some a priori idea of that 
intention and try by construction to wedge it into the words 
of the statute.
(1) Liversidge v. Anderson, 1942 A.C.206
(2) President’s Special Reference Ro.l of 1957, P.L.D.1957
S.C. (Pak) 219.
131
"The third rule that a statute may not he extended to meet 
a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not 
been made.
"And the fourth rule is that, whenever there is a particular 
enactment and a general enactment in the same statute, the 
latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule 
the former; the particular enactment must be operative, and 
the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other 
parts of the statute, to which it may properly apply."
These rules are equally applicable to the interpretation 
of the Constitution, although, because of their permanence 
and the need to apply them to the changing conditions of the 
society for which they were meant, Constitutions are subject, 
in their interpretation, to certain modifications of these 
doctrines. The duly imposed upon the judiciary, however, of 
discovering the intention of the framers of the Constitution 
and the true meanings of the constitutional instrument is 
equally imperative, and the fundamental principle of 
constitutional construction has always been to give effect to 
the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the 
people adopting it.
The Central Legislature has power to make Laws under 
Article 131 of the Constitution for preventive detention for
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reasons connected with defence, external affairs or the
security of Pakistan, and person subjected to fcuch detention.
But there is a constitutional restriction on the power of the
members of the National Assembly to introduce a bill on this
topic. If the bill or amendment relates to preventive
detention, it cannot be introduced or moved in the Assembly
without the previous consent of the President. ^
Under Article 152 of the Constitution, the Provincial
Legislature has power to make laws for the Province or any
part of the Province, with respect to any matter other than a
matter enumerated in the Third Schedule, so a provincial
legislature can legislate on the subject of preventive
detention for the reasons connected with the preservation of
public safety and the maintenance of law and order. As this
sort of bill or amendment vitally affects the Executive, who
are responsible for maintaining the law and order, there is a
constitutional restriction that no bill or amendment of a
bill, providing for or relating to preventive detention shall
be introduced or moved in the Assembly of a Province without
(2 )the previous consent of the Governor of the Province. 7
(1) Article 26, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, 1962.
(2) Article 76, Constitution of Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, 1962.
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Security of the Person.
Fundamental Right Number 1 in the Pakistan Constitution 
of 1962 states
"No person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in 
accordance with Law.” This, the most important constitutional 
right, amounts to the declaration that no person is to take 
the life or liberty of another person, except under a law 
authorising him to do so. The person, whose life and liberty 
is threatened, is therefore entitled to require the person 
seeking to deprive him of the right to live or move freely, 
to show the legal authority under which he is purporting to 
act. No public functionary or private person may injure or 
confine a person, unless he has a legal warrant to do so. ^  
Similar provisions are embodied in the Constitutions of 
the democratic countries, some of which are reproduced here. 
Indian Constitution
"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty except according to procedure established by law." 
Article 21.
Irish Constitution
"No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty 
save in accordance with law.” Article 4 (4)
(1) Eshugbayi v. Govt.of Nigeria. , 1931 A.C.662.
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U. S. Constitution
"No person shall .. * be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." 5th Amendment. 
England
In Magna Carta it was enacted that 
,!No man shall be taken or imprisoned, disseiged or 
outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed, save by the 
lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”
This was reiterated in the Petition of Right 1628 and 
has become an important element of the Rule of law in 
England.
It is an established principle of law that the executive 
cannot take away the life and liberty of a person on it's own 
responsibility, unless it has the support of some legal 
provisions for doing so and is acting within the bounds of 
law.
lord Atkin in Eshugbayi v. Govt, of Nigeria observed as 
follows
"In accordance with British jurisprudence, no member of 
the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of 
a British subject, except on the condition that he can
(1) A.I.H. 1931 P.C.248; 1931 A.C.662 P.O.
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support the legality of his action before a Court of justice; 
And it is the tradition of British justice that judges should 
not shrink from deciding such issues in the face of the 
Executive."
The Pakistan Constitution of 1962, in its enumeration of 
Fundamental Rights gives first place to the above principle 
and protects the life and liberty of every person, whether a 
citizen or an alien.
The word ’'liberty1 has been adopted without any 
qualification. The Irish and Indian Constitutions use the 
expression "personal liberty*" But by qualifying the word 
"liberty" with the adjective "personal", the scope of the 
word "liberty" in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution is 
narrowed , to the meaning given in English Law to the 
expression "Liberty of the person or personal freedom," 
i.e. the right not to be punished or imprisoned or coerced, 
except according to the procedure established by law.
It is to be noted that the American Constitution 
provides that no person shall be deprived of life and liberty 
without "due process of law." India borrowed the phraseology 
from the American made Japanese Constitution (Article 31) and
(1) Keith, Constitutional Law P.434.
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instead of the words "except by due process of law,1* 
included in the draft Constitution, the Constituent Assembly 
substituted the words "except according to procedure established 
by law."
Pakistan has followed the Irish pattern and used the 
words "in accordance with Law*"
Deprivation means "total loss"^^ of liberty, as 
contrasted with a mere restriction thereon. The right not 
only covers the initial deprivation but extends to the 
continuation of such deprivation. Hence the continuation 
of deprivation of liberty also must be in accordance with
The expression "deprived of life" should not be 
construed to refer only to the extreme case of death. In 
Munn v. People of Illinois^  Justice Pield (dissenting) 
observed
"By the term "life" something more is meant than mere 
animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation 
extends to all those limbs and faculties by which the life 
is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation
(1) Blackstone's Commentaries, B.K.I. P.134
(2) In re. Pandurang, A.I.R.1951 Bom.30;
A.I.H.1951 Assam 119*
(3) (1877) 94. U.S.113.
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of the body by the amputation of an arm or leg or putting
out of an eye or the destruction of any other organ of the
body, through which the soul communicates with the outer
world. The deprivation not only of life but of whatever
God has given to every one with life for its growth and
enjoyment is prohibited by the provision in question, if
its efficacy be not frittered away by judicial decision.1
But freedom of the person cannot be extended to include a
personfs livelihood. ^
Liberty is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as being
"free from control." It is a very comprehensive term and
would include, not merely freedom to move about unrestricted
but such liberty of conduct, choice and action as the law
(2 )gives and protects. 7 It has been said to embrace every 
form and phase of individual right that is not necessarily 
taken away by some valid law for the common good. The right 
to liberty includes the right to exist and the right to 
enjoyment of life while existing; it is invaded, not only 
by deprivation of life but also by a deprivation of those 
things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according
(1) Sant Earn, in re A.I.E.I960 S.C.932 (935).
(2) Allegeyer v. Louisiana, (1897) 165 U.S.578.
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to the nature, temperament and lawful desires of the 
individual. ^  liberty is a concept of multiple strands; 
the word liberty, standing by itself, has been given a very 
wide meaning by the Supreme Court of United States of America.
It includes not only personal freedom from physical restraint 
but the right to free use of onefs own property and to enter 
into free contractual relations. "Personal liberty" largely
(2)consists of the right of locomotion - to go 7/here one pleases.v 7
(3 )Mr. Justice Peckham in Allegeyer v. Louisiana w  7 said:-
"The liberty mentioned in that Amendment means, not only 
the right of the citizen to be free from the physical restraint 
of his person as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to 
embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment 
of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful 
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood 
or avocation and for that purpose to enter into all contracts, 
which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying 
out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned."
But liberty is not a right which is uncontrollable or
(1) American Jurisprudence, Vol.II. P.329*
1st Edition, Edited by George S. Gulick.
(2) Williams v. Pears 179 U.S. 270
(3) Allegeyer v. Louisiana (1897) 165 U.S.578.
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which is absolute under all circun stance s. It has been said 
that a society, based on the rule that each one is a law unto 
himself, would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy, 
liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint and not 
immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed 
in the interest of society.
In India, there was a sharp cleavage of opinion among
(11the judges of the Indian Supreme Court in Gopalan^v 7 case, 
about the meaning of "personal liberty.1* At least three 
different meanings of the expression emerge from their 
respective judgments.
Kania C.J. and las, J., said;- "Personal liberty** 
includes not only freedom from bodily restraint but also all 
rights of the human personality. Fazal Ali, J., said;- 
**Personal liberty** meanB freedom of locomotion.
Mukherjea, J., said:- "Personal liberty" means liberty of the 
person or body i.e*, freedom from imprisonment and physical 
coercion.
In Pakistan, the word "liberty" is used simpliciter.
In the absence of any qualifying word like "personal," the 
Indian views have no direct bearing on the point; the 
expression liberty should be construed in a large and liberal 
sense •
(1) A.I.E. 1950 S.C.27
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But it is to be noted that some of the attributes of liberty 
mentioned in the American cases cited above are, in Pakistan, 
covered by freedom of movement (Fundamental Eight No.5), 
freedom of assembly (Fundamental Eight No.6), freedom of 
association (Fundamental Eight No.7), freedom to follow an 
avocation (Fundamental Eight No.8), freedom of speech 
(Fundamental Eight No. 9), and freedom to deal with property 
(Fundamental Eight No. 13). There is a conflict of opinion 
on whether freedom to travel abroad comes within the scope 
of Fundamental Eight No.l or Fundamental Eight No.5 . ^
Before proceeding further it is necessary to consider 
the meaning of the phrase, "Due process of law,1 
"Procedure established by law" and "in accordance with law," 
which has been used in American, Indian and Pakistan's 
Constitutions while enunciating security of person.
(1) See Abdul A'la Mauduodi v. State Bank P. 1.1.1969 Iah.708
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Due Process of Law.
One of the most famous definitions of "due process of 
law" is that of David Webster in his argument in the 
Dartmouth College Case,^ in which he declared that by 
the expression "Due process of law" is meant *a law which 
hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry and 
renders judgment after trial.1
In Ha gar v. Reclamation Dist. the Supreme Court said, 
"By fdue process of law1 is meant one which, following 
the forms of law, is appropriate to the case and just to the 
parties to be affected. It must be pursued in the ordinary 
modes prescribed by law; it must be adapted to the end to be 
attained, and whenever it is necessary for the protection of 
the parties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard 
respecting the justness of the judgment sought. The clause 
therefore means that there can be no proceedings against life, 
liberty or property, which may result in deprivation of either 
without the observance of those general rules established in 
our system of jurisprudence for the security of private rights 
"Due process of law" generally implies and includes actor 
neus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer and a
(1) (1819) % Wheaton (U.S) 518
(2) (1884) 111 U.S.701
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trial according to some settled course of judicial
proceedings, ^  It is a limitation upon arbitrary power
(2 )and a guarantee against arbitrary legislation.v 7 The 
expression "due process of law” has been interpreted by the 
American Courts in different ways at different times.
Willoughby, summarizing the requirement of due procedure,
says
1) that he shall have due notice, which may be actual or 
constructive, of the institution of the proceedings by which 
his legal rights may be affected.
2) that he shall be given a reasonable opportunity to appear 
and defend his rights, including the right himself to testify, 
to produce witnesses, and to introduce relevant documents and 
other evidence.
3) that the tribunal in or before which his rights are 
adjudicated is so constituted as to give reasonable assurance 
of it’s honesty and impartiality, and lastly
4) that it is a court of competent jurisdiction.^^
The debates in and reports of the Drafting Committee of 
the Indian Constituent Assembly show that it was aware of the
(1) King v. Penther 1 Comber Co., 171 U.S.437*
(2) Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502.
(3) Constitution of the United States, 2nd Edition,
Vol.Ill P.1769
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expression, "due process of law,” as it was known to exist in
the American Constitution but, after a prolonged discussion,
it decided not to adopt that phrase and the words "procedure
established by law11 were borrowed from the Japanese
(1 )Constitution. Sastri, J., in Copalan^s casev J observed
MtProcedure established by lawf must be taken to refer to 
a procedure which has a statutory origin, for no procedure is 
known or can be said to have been established by such vague 
and uncertain concepts as fthe immutable and universal 
principles of natural justice.1 The word 1 establishedf is 
significant and is not simply used as synonymous with 
prescribed.1 It implies some degree of firmness, 
permanence and general acceptance, while it does not exclude 
origination, by statute.”
By the use of these words, the Indian Constitution 
accepted the English principle of supremacy of law in 
preference to the American principle of judicial review, 
"liberty” according to this view is “Liberty confined and 
controlled by law.” "Law” in this expression means state 
made or enacted law and not the general principle of natural 
justice. "Procedure established by law” thus means procedure 
prescribed by the legislature.
(1) A.I.R. 1950 S.C.27.
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In accordance with law.
In Pakistan this phrase was adopted without much 
discussion. The courts power under this paragraph will 
include the following
(a) to see if the deprivation of life or liberty
of a person is done under any law and
(b) to see whether the law is valid;
The "law” contemplated by the Article must be one, which
has been passed by a competent Legislature and must not be 
repugnant to any Fundamental Right, or other provision of 
constitution. It therefore follows that whoever is called 
upon to deprive another person of his liberty, in the 
discharge of what he conceives to be hiB duty, must 
strictly and scrupulously observe the form and rules of 
the law.
(1) For cases see under Article 2.
145
Safeguards as to Arrest and Detention
Right No.2 in the Constitution of Pakistan, 1962 is ' 
stated as follows
1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody 
without being informed, as soon as m y  be, of the grounds 
for such arrest, nor shall he be denied the right to 
consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his 
choice.
2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody 
shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within 
a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest, excluding 
the time necessary f or the journey from the place of 
arrest to the Court of the magistrate and no such person 
shall be detained in custody beyond the said period 
without the authority of a magistrate.
3) Nothing in sub-paragraph 1) and 2) shall apply to any 
person ~
(a) who for the time being is an enemy alien or
(b) who is arrested or d etained under any law providing 
for preventive detention.
4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorize 
the detention of a person f cr a period exceeding three
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months, unless the appropriate Advisory Board has 
reported before the expiration of thesaid period of 
three months that there is, in its opinion, sufficient 
cause for such detention.
Explanation
In this sub-paragraph ”the appropriate Advisory 
Board” means
(i) In case of a person detained under a Central Law, 
a Board consisting of a judge of the Supreme Court, 
who shall be nominated by the Chief Justice of that 
Court, and a senior officer in the service of Pakistan, 
who shall be nominated by the President; and
(ii) in the case of a person detained under a Provincial 
Law, a Board consisting of a judge of the High Court of 
the Province concerned, who shall be nominated by the 
Chief Justice of that Court, and a senior officer in the 
service of Pakistan, who shall be nominated by the 
Governor of that Province.
5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order 
made under any law providing for preventive detention, 
the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, 
communicate to such person the grounds on which the 
order has been made, and shall afford him the earliest 
opportunity of making a representation against the order:
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Provided that authority making any such 
order may refuse to disclose facts which such authority 
considers it to be against the public interest to 
disclose.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the U.S.A. is 
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the 
witness against him; to have compulsory process of obtaining 
witnesses in his favour, and to have the assistance of Counsel 
for his defence.
In the Indian Constitution, the corresponding right is 
Article 22 -
1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody 
without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds 
for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to and 
to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice.
2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody 
shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a 
period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the 
time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest 
to the Court of the magistrate and no such person shall 
be detained in custody beyond the said period without the 
authority of a magistrate.
Nothing in clauses 1) and 2) shall apply -
(a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy 
alien; or
(b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any 
law providing for preventive detention.
No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise 
the detention of a person for a longer period than three 
months unless -
(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or 
have been or are qualified to be appointed as, judge 
of a High Court, has reported before the expiration 
of th^aid period of three months that there is in 
its opinion sufficient cause for such detention.
Provided that nothing in this sub-clause 
• shall authorise the detention of any person beyond 
the maximum period prescribed by any law made by 
Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or
(b) such person is detained in accordance with the 
provisions of any law made by Parliament under 
sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7)*
When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made 
under any law providing for preventive detention, the 
authority making the order shall, as soon as may be,
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communicate to such person the grounds on which the 
order has been made and shall afford him the earliest 
opportunity of making a representation against the order.
6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making 
any such order as is referred to in that clause to 
disclose facts which such authority considers to be 
against the public interest to disclose.
7) Parliament may by law prescribe -
(a) the circumstances under which, and the class or 
classes of cases in which, a person may be detained 
for a period longer than three months under any law 
providing for preventive detention without obtaining 
the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with 
the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause 4).
(b) the maximum period for which any person may in any 
class or classes of cases be detained under any law 
providing for preventive detention; and
(c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in 
an inquiry under sub-clause (a) of Clause 4).
There is not much difference between the provisions of 
Right No.2 of Constitution of Pakistan and Article 22 of the 
Indian Constitution. Whereas India requires the board to be 
composed entirely of persons qualified for appointment as
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judges of a High Court, the Pakistan Constitution of 1956 
required the board to be nominated, in case of detention under 
a Central statute, by the Chief Justice of Pakistan; in a 
case of detention under a Provincial statute, by the Chief 
Justice of the Provincial High Court. The Constitution of 
1962 requires the President or the Governor to nominate, in 
addition a senior member of the Civil Service. The provisions 
of the Indian Constitution, which empowers Parliament to 
prescribe classes of cases which need not be referred to an 
Advisory Board, to set maximum period of detention for 
different classes of detenus and to lay down the procedure to 
be followed by an Advisory Board are not in the Pakistan 
Constitution.
Pakistan's Right Humber 2 and India's Article 21 deal 
with two separate matters
(i) persons arrested under the ordinary law of crimes, 
and
(ii) persons detained under the law of preventive 
detention.
Sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) provide safeguards in respect 
of arrest and detention and ensure four things -
1) the right to be informed, as soon as may be, of 
the grounds of arrest,
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2) the right to consult and to he defended by a legal 
practitioner of his choice,
3) the right to be produced before the nearest 
magistrate within twenty-four hours of arrest, 
excluding the time necessary for the journey from 
the place of arrest to the Court of the Magistrate, 
and
4) the right not to be detained in custody beyond the 
period of twenty-four hours without the authority 
of the I&gistrate.
But these safeguards do not apply to
(i) an alien enemy, and
(ii) a person arrested or detained under any law 
providing for preventive detention.
The ordinary law relating to arrest should therefore, provide 
these four constitutional safeguards, but even if it does 
not, the requirements, being part of the Constitution, will 
in Pakistan be read as part of the law and the person 
aggrieved may seek redress, if they are disregarded.^
(1) Abdul Aziz v. The Province of West Pakistan, P.L.D.1958
S.C.499*
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Sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) lay down certain
fundamental principles relating to preventive detention,
which is designed to prevent abuse of freedom by anti-social
and subversive elements, which might imperil the national
(1)welfare of the Republic.v 7 The major difference between 
the status of persons punitively and preventively detained 
is that, in the former case, the individual must be 
produced before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours, 
while in the case of the detenu, he can only claim the 
right to grounds and the right of making representation 
against the order.
Sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) do not provide for 
Preventive detention; they only require certain safeguards 
to be incorporated and read into any law that provides for 
preventive detention.
(1) Gropalan v. State of l&dras, A.I#R. 1950 S.C.27*
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According to the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951> "Alien" 
means a person who is not a citizen of Pakistan or the 
Commonwealth. Broadly speaking, a person is an alien in 
a State of which he is not a citizen. But the question 
whether a person is an alien or not with respect to a State 
is to be determined by the law of that State. ^  In England, 
at Common Law, an alien was a subject of a foreign State, who 
was not born within the allegiance of the Crown. But now an 
alien may become a British subject by naturalisation, and a 
British subject may become an alien by renunciation of British 
citizenship. Aliens are either friends or enemy.
(2 )An alien enemy is defined in Halsbury's laws of Englandx ' as 
under,
"An alien enemy is one whose Sovereign or State is at war
with the Sovereign of England or one who is voluntarily
resident or who carries on business in an enemy’s country,
even though a natural born British subject or a naturalised
British subject." To prove that a person is an alien enemy
at a certain given time, it is, however, not enough to show
that he was sometime previously domiciled in territory
( ’5 )which has become hostile. y
(1) Halsbury, laws of England, 3rd Ed. Vol.l Para 964
(2) Ibid   Para 994
(3) Ibid   Para 995
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Aliens, other than •alien enemies* are alien friends.
By statute law, alien friends in England have been given full 
civil rights, as opposed to civic or political rights. Thus, 
an alien friend can -
(a) bring and defend actions and prosecutions like a British 
subject, including actions against the Crown and its 
officers/1)
(b} acquire property,
(c) enjoy full personal liberty,
(d) enter into contracts, trade or commerce,
(e) have the benefits of the English law relating to patents,
designs and copyright, bankruptcy, wills and descent,
(2 )
subject to certain conditions.v J 
The words Halien enemy” in the sub-clause carry the same 
meaning as mentioned.
The above mentioned two categories of persons are therefore 
not
1) given the right to consult nor to be defended by a legal 
practitioner,
2) entitled to be supplied with the grounds for their arrest 
nas soon as may be” in the same sense as under clause (1) 
of Right Number 2,
(1) Johnstone v. Pedlar 1921, A.C.262.
(2) Halsbury, laws of England, 3rd Ed. Vol. 1 PP 504-506.
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3) able to claim that they be taken before the nearest 
ft&gistrate within twenty-four hours of their arrest. 
While the detenu or alien have no right to consult or 
engage a lawyer on their behalf, in case of detenu at any 
rate, by virtue of Right 2 clause (5), he has a right of 
representation to the Advisory Board but this again does not 
entitle him to cross examine the witnesses.^
But sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) embody certain special 
constitutional safeguards regarding persons detained under 
the law relating to preventive detention.
The main provisions are
(i) if the period of detention exceeds three months, his 
case must be referred to Advisory Board, to report on 
the sufficiency of the cause of detention beyond three 
months,
(ii) the detenu must be informed, ”as soon as may be,H of the 
grounds on which the order of detention has been made,
(iii)he must be given the earliest opportunity of making a 
representation against the order of detention.
These are the only safeguards available to the detenu 
and it is the duty of the courts to see that these
(1) Gopalan A.K. v. State of Mhdras, A.I.R# 1950 S.C.27
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constitutional requirements are fulfilled, before a person
can be deprived of his liberty. Preventive detention is a
serious invasion of personal liberty and such meagre
safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the
improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and
enforced by the court....... ^  The provision of a Statute,
which imposes restrictions on the personal liberty of a
subject, must be strictly complied with before an order of
detention, without trial in a regular court of law, can be
upheld by the courts. The liberty of the subject is too
precious an asset to be interfered with, unless an order of
detention is passed in strict conformity with the provisions
of the detention law, however formal in character they may
appear to be, and all the statutory obligations enjoined on
(2 )the detaining authority are carried out to the letter.v y
The detention will be held illegal, if the provisions 
of the law providing for preventive detention are not 
complied with.
(1) Dr. Ram Krishan v. The State of Delhi, A.I.R.1953 S.C.318
(2) Siraj-ud-Din v. The State, P.1.D.1957 Xah.962.
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The Advisory Board
Right Number 2 Clause (4) says :- 
"No law providing for preventive detention shall 
authorize the detention of a person for a period exceeding 
three months, unless the appropriate Advisory Board has 
reported, before the expiration of the said period of three 
months, that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for 
such detention.1
Advisory bodies are provided for in most preventive 
detention laws in the Sub-continent and are a check on 
executive action in detaining persons without trial. The 
proceedings of the board are confidential. But men of 
reputed impartiality, with judicial and executive training, 
examine the one-sided material placed before them, hear 
the detenu, only if he so desires. It is a sort of a 
procedural safeguard against arbitrary encroachment on 
personal liberty by the Government. Government is bound to 
accept the opinion that there are not sufficient grounds for 
detention beyond three months.
In view of the fact that preventive detention is a normal 
feature of our Constitution, the legislatures are empowered 
to legislate on the aforesaid subject, even in time of peace, 
not only in times of emergency, for reasons concerned with
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public safety, public interest and maintenance of public 
order, defence, external affairs or the Security of Pakistan. 
Since independence neither Pakistan nor India has been 
without such legislation for a single day. It is 
interesting to note that the Bahawalpur State Public Security 
Act, 1944 and The Sind State Prisoners Regulations of 1827 
(Sind Reg. xxv of 1827), which were legacies of British rule, 
have recently been repealed by The West Pakistan Maintenance 
of Public Order Ordinance (XXXI of I960). The recurring 
need for a Board in the public interest was evident, in view 
of the existence of statutes providing for detention in 
regular operation.^
Under the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan, the Board was to 
consist, in case of a person detained under a Central Act or 
an Act of Parliament, of persons appointed by the Chief 
Justice of Pakistan, or, in the case of a person detained 
under a Provincial Act or an Act of a Provincial Legislature, 
a Board consisting of persons appointed by the Chief Justice 
of the High Court of Province. Under the 1962 Constitution,
the Advisory Board, in case of a person detained under Central
(1) Abdul Aziz v. The Province of West Pakistan P.L.D.1958
S.C.499.
(2) Article 7 (4) Constitution of Pakistan 1956.
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law is to consist of two persons, one a Judge of the 
Supreme Court, nominated "by the Chief Justice of that court 
and a senior officer in service of Pakistan, nominated by the 
President; In case of a person detained under a Provincial 
law, the Board consists of a Judge of the High Court of the 
Province concerned, nominated by the Chief Justice of that 
court and a senior officer in the services of Pakistan, 
nominated by the Governor of that Province. Even though
clause (4) of Article 7 of the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan 
did not contain words directly obliging the Chief Justice to 
appoint the Board in question, yet by inescapable implication, 
the duty of appointing such a Board was clearly imposed upon 
the Chief Justice. ^
It follows that, at present, the President, the Governors, 
the Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Pakistan, and Chief 
Justices of the High Court are under a constitutional
obligation to constitute Advisory Board for a person detained.
(3 )The constitution of the Board will be i m p r o p e r i f  an 
officer, who was concerned in the making of the order of
(1) Right No.2 (4) Explanation. Constitution of Pakistan 1962
(2) Abdul Aziz v. The Province of West Pakistan, P.1.D.1958
S.C. 499
(3) Rehmat Elahi v. Govt, of West Pakistan P.1.1.1965 Iah.112.
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detention on behalf of Government, is nominated as a member 
of the Board by the Government, Nemo debet esse judex in 
propria causa (no one can be judge of his own cause). His 
participation in the proceedings of the Board is a violation 
of natural justice.
The Constitution of Pakistan has taken a progressive step 
in making provision for nomination to the Board of an executive 
official from the services of Pakistan. The justification of 
this is that certain cases under review demand technical 
knowledge in fields with which the judicial mind is unfamiliar. 
For example, when a person is detained under the Defence rules, 
the executive member will be in a position to understand the 
considerations on which the Government made its decision and 
explain them to the judge, so as to enable him to form a fair 
and just view of the case of detenu and decide whether the 
grounds come within those specified in the relevant preventive 
statute. In the U.S.A., even during an emergency^1  ^a Board 
of Review consists of nine members; it would be better to have 
at least three members on the Board, two judges and one member 
of the Civil Service of Pakistan. This would provide a greater 
safeguard against arbitrary detention by the executive and the 
liberty of the subject would be better protected.
(1) Internal Security Act 1950.
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The Constitution of India prescribes the qualifications 
of the members, but does not lay down the number of members 
necessaiy to constitute an Advisory Board, Under section 8 
of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 as amended by 
subsequent Acts up to Act 51 of 1963, the Board is to consist 
of three members qualified to be appointed as Judges of a 
High Court.
The function of the Advisory Board is to consider the 
materials put before it and to report its opinion to 
government as to whether there is sufficient cause for the 
detention of detenu. Neither the Constitution nor any 
statute makes the Advisory Board a court of law or imposes 
on it the duty of determining whether a person's detention is 
legal. Under Bight Number 2 clause (4) of the Constitution, 
”No law providing for preventive detention shall authorize 
the detention of a person for a period exceeding three months, 
unless the appropriate Advisory Board has reported, before 
the expiration of the said period of three months, that 
there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for such detention."
While delivering judgment in one c a s e ^  Kayani C.J. , 
said, "If the preventive detention is to exceed three months,
(31) Grhulam Muhammad Khan v. The State, P#1.D.1957 Iah.497*
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it must have the approval of an Advisory Board, constituted 
by the Chief Justice and you could safely swear on the 
Constitution that the Chief Justice will keep only judicial 
officer on the Board. The present Provincial Board, it may 
be pointed out, consist of two judges of High Court. This 
reduces the "satisfaction” of the Government to a period of 
three months and it is pertinent to remark that the halo of 
subjectiveness and immunity from judicial scrutiny with which 
judicial authority has surrounded it since the last great war, 
both here and in England, has suffered perceptibly in visual 
charm by reason of these constitutional safeguards.11 
Dealing with detention for more than three months, Justice 
Kayani said, "I appreciate occasional urgency of situation 
when you may be called upon to take away the liberty of a 
citizen on your own responsibility for law and order, but my 
experience in police reports and what with your doubtful 
morals in the political field, constrains me to rely on your 
discretion for no more than three months.” This view of 
detention beyond the initial period of three months was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court where it was h e l d ^  that the 
satisfaction of the detaining authority, regarding the nedd 
for detaining a particular person is not by itself sufficient
(1) Abdul Aziz v. The Province of West Pakistan, P.L.D.1958
S.C.
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for continuing that detention beyond an initial period of
three months, unless an Advisory Board, as prescribed, has
concurred in the opinion held by the detaining authority in
that respect. The provisions of Right Number 2 clause (4)
were again subject of judicial interpretation in the more
(1)recent case of Rehmat Elahi v. Govt, of West Pakistanv y.
A full bench of the West Pakistan High Court explained the 
provisions of this paragraph. It was held that, 11 Sub-clause(3) 
of Fundamental Right Number 2 excepts preventive detention 
from the safeguard provided in clauses (1) and (2) but, to 
mitigate the hardship which may befall persons arrested and 
detained in preventive custody, an embargo is placed, that 
such a law shall not authorise detention of a person for a 
period exceeding three months, without the concurrence of 
the appropriate Advisory Board. What is being said in the 
clause is therefore, about the attributes of the law 
providing for preventive detention of fa person' and not 
about the person who may fall within its mischief. This 
enunciation will become clear, if we have before us a law 
providing for preventive detention for a maximum period of 
three months. Undoubtedly, such a law will be excluded from
(1) P.l.D. 1965 lah. 112
the embargo contained in clause (4) of Fundamental Right 
Number 2, and the opinion of the Advisory Board is not 
required, as to the sufficiency of the cause for detaining 
a person in preventive custody. It is only in cases where 
the period of detention exceeds three months or more, a 
serious inroad on the liberty of a person, that the opinion 
of the Government is made subject to a quasi-judicial review 
by an Advisory Board, consisting of a Judge of the High Court 
and senior officer in the service of Pakistan. The sine qua 
non for the attraction of clause (4) of Fundamental Right 
Number 2, is, thus, detention for a period beyond three months 
and not the period set out in the initial order of the 
detaining authority. Although we are not concerned with the 
policy of law, it is not difficult to visualise circumstances, 
which render it impossible for a detaining authority to fix in 
advance the period for which a person may be detained in 
preventive custody. For example, if an enemy alien is taken 
into custody during a war, no one would be able to predict as 
to when the war will end and, till that event happens, it will 
be endangering the security of Pakistan to release him from 
custody.11
What worried Mr. Brohi was that, on this interpretation, 
once the Advisory Board has given carte blanche, the
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executive authorities will be able to misuse the provisions 
of preventive detention laws by detaining, for an indefinite 
period, political adversaries of the party in power. That 
such a possibility exists cannot be denied, but the remedy 
against it lies with the Legislative and not the Courts.
In substance, no person can be detained in preventive custody 
for a period exceeding three months, without the concurrence 
of the Advisory Board, not only at the initial stage, but 
whenever it is intended to extend the period of detention 
beyond the total period of three months.
The grounds of the decision being that, to justify 
further detention the Board must report, not only that there 
were sufficient reasons for the initial detention but also 
that the reasons justified detention for a period exceeding 
three months. In so holding, the Court differed from the 
view taken by the Supreme Court of India in Puranlal Xakhanpal'a 
case where it was held that, what the Board is concerned
with is whether the grounds for detention were sufficient 
and, that on that finding it is for the Government to 
determine the period of detention. The Indian view is 
founded on the principle that, of the period for which a
(1) Puranlal Lakhanpal v. The Union of India, A.I.R.1958
S.C.163.
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person should he detained, the Government is the judge and 
not the hoard, as that body, at the stage at which it 
functions, does not have sufficient material to enable it 
to perform what is essentially an executive function.
If the Board reports that there is, in its opinion, no 
sufficient cause for the detention of the person, whose case 
has heen referred to it, for a period exceeding three months, 
Government must rescind the detention order and direct such 
person to he released on the expiry of the said period of 
three months* ^
Under Clause (4)a of Article 22 of the Indian 
Constitution, wUo law providing for preventive detention 
shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period 
than three months, unless an Advisory Board has reported 
before the expiration of the period of three months, that 
there is in it's opinion sufficient cause for such detention.11
The question of the proper function of the Advisory Board
(2 )was considered in Gopalan1 s case . 7 Sastri, J. , held that 
the words Msuch detention11 in the said clause refer hack to 
Hpreventive detention11 mentioned in the first part of clause (4)
(1) Sub-section 5-f of West Pakistan Maintenance of Public
Order Ordinance I960.
(2) Gopalan v. State, A.I.R. 1950 S.C.27 Para 24.
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and not to "detention for a longer period than three months.1 
According to his Lordship, the function of the Advisory Board 
under Clause (4) is to consider whether there is sufficient 
cause for detention at all. Kania, C.J. and tfazalAli, J., 
took a contrary view, holding that the function of the Board 
is to consider whether there is sufficient cause for detention 
for a longer period than three months. But the Advisory 
Board has no power to express any opinion as to how much 
longer than three months, if at all, the detenu should he 
kept in custody. In the very nature of things, the
decision as to period of detention must he of the detaining 
authority. The reference to the Advisory Board is only a 
safeguard against Executive vagaries and high-handed action.. 
It is necessary not only that the report of the Advisory Board 
should he received within the three months hut also that the 
order for the continuation of the detention heyond three
(2 )months must he passed within the period of three months. v J 
There is no procedure prescribed either in the 
Constitution of Pakistan or India as to how the enquiry is 
to he conducted hy the Board, hut Article 22 (7) of Indian
(1) Sham Bao v. District Idagistrate, Thana. A.I.E. 1952
S.C.524.
(2) Cohel Umed Singh v. State, A.I.R.1953 Sau.51.
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Constitution states that Parliament may by law prescribe the
procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board. Under the
West Pakistan Lfeintenance of Public Order Ordinance (XXXI of
I960) the prescribed procedure is :-
The Board shall, after considering the material placed
before it, and the representation, if any, made by the person,
whose case has been referred to it, hearing such person, if he
so desires, and calling for such further information as it
<
may require from Government or may be placed before it by the 
person detained, submit its report, before the expiration of 
the period of three months specified in sub-section (5-b), to 
Government whether in its opinion there is sufficient cause 
for the detention of such person.
The proceedings and the report of the Board, excepting 
that part of the report in which the opinion of the Board is 
specified, shall be confidential.
The right of representation given to the detenu does 
not entitle him to appear by any legal practitioner in any 
matter connected with the reference to the Advisory Board.
The same procedure is prescribed by the Preventive 
Detention Act, 1950, as amended, of India.
(1) Sub-Section 5-d
(2) Sub-Section 5-e
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If, in any case, the Board reports that there is, in 
its opinion, no sufficient cause for the detention of the 
person, whose case has been referred to it, for a period 
exceeding three months, Government shall rescind the 
detention order and direct such person to be released on 
the expiry of the said period of three months* In case 
the Board reports that there is, in its opinion, sufficient 
cause for the detention of such person, Government may, 
subject to the provision of sub-section (l), continue to 
detain him for such period as it may deem fit. ^  Similar 
provisions are in section 11 of Preventive Detention Act 1950, 
of India.
It is not necessary that every law providing for 
preventive detention should invariably provide for an 
Advisory Board. If the period of detention provided in the 
Act is less than three months, a provision for the 
constitution of an Advisory Board would not be necessary*
It has been held that clause (5) of Article 7**^^ 
clearly guarantees certain rights to the detenu but does
(1) Sub-Section (5-f)
(2) Abdul Aziz v. The Province of West Pakistan, P.1.D.1958
S.C.499*
(3) Constitution of Pakistan, 1956.
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not prescribe that the detention law must necessarily 
contain any corresponding provision. Therefore a provision 
in the relevant statute regarding the constitution of the 
required Board is not necessary. In a case ^  under the 
Sind State Prisoners Regulation (XXV of 1827), which did 
not embody the provisions relating to Advisory Board and 
communication of the grounds of detention, as required under 
Article 7, clause (4) and (5), Constitution of Pakistan 1956, 
it was held that the Regulation does not become void, because 
of the apparent inconsistency with clause (4) and clause (5) 
of Article 7 (relating to provision for an Advisory Board 
and communication of the grounds of detention). Thus the 
failure to provide for the establishment of an Advisory 
Board will not necessarily amount to an infringement of a 
fundamental right under the Constitution in every case..^^
(1) Sobho Tanwarmal v. The State, P.1.1). 1959 Iah.435
(2) Gopalan v. State, A.I.R. 1950 S.C.27.
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CHAPTER V 
JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Jurisdiction of the High Courts
The opinion of the Advisory Board does not make the 
detention valid, if it is ultra vires the Constitution or 
contrary to the statute, or mala fide. The function of the 
Advisory Board and the Court are quite distinct and do not 
overlap each other . . ^  As mentioned before, the Advisory 
Board is a purely advisory body, whose function is to advise 
the Government whether in its opinion there is sufficient 
cause for the detention of a particular person. Its opinion 
cannot oust the jurisdiction of the High Court to determine 
whether the grounds upon which the petitioner was detained 
satisfy the requirements of the law. The High Court has no 
concern with the proceedings of the Advisory Board. The 
fact that the Constitution has provided an Advisory Board 
for advising on cases of Preventive Detention does not mean 
that the right of the High Court to grant a writ of "Habeas 
Corpus” has been taken away ... ^
(1) Raman Lai v. Commr. of Police, A.I.R, 1952 Cal.26.
(2) Prem Dutta v. Supdt. Central Prison, A.I.R.1954 All.315*
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The right of a person to a writ of Habeas Corpus is a 
high prerogative right and is a constitutional remedy in 
all cases of illegal confinement; it is one of the most 
fundamental rights in the Constitution* There being no 
limitation placed on the exercise of this right, it cannot 
be excluded by any actual or assumed restriction, which may 
be imposed by any sub-constitutional legislation* Article 
2 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962, says that it is an 
inalienable right of every citizen to enjoy the protection 
of law and, in particular, no action detrimental to life 
or liberty can be taken except in accordance with law.
If the arrest of a person cannot be justified in law, there 
is no reason why that person should not be able to invoke 
the jurisdiction of the High Court immediately for the 
restoration of his liberty* In all cases where a person 
is detained, and he alleges that his detention is in 
violation of the safeguards provided in the Constitution 
or that it does not fall within the statutory requirements 
of the law under which the detention is ordered, he can 
invoke the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 98 of 
the Constitution of Pakistan, 1962 and ask to be released 
forthwith. Where a period of detention is two months
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only and it is not necessary to refer the matter to the
Advisory Board, it cannot be argued that the detenu is
not entitled to pray for a writ of Habeas Corpus before
his case is referred to the Advisory Board. The detenu
need not wait for the opinion of the Advisory Board,
fl)before asking for a writ of Habeas Corpus .......  v J
(1) Maulvi Parid Ahmad v. Covt. of West Pakistan, 
P.L.13.1965 Lahore 135-
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Grounds of Detention and Representation.
Fundamental Right No.2, Clause 5 of Constitution of 
Pakistan 1962, says:-
"When any person is detained in pursuance of an 
order made under any law providing for preventive detention, 
the authority making the order shall, as soon as may he, 
communicate to such person the grounds on which the order 
has been made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity 
of making a representation against the order:
Provided that the authority making any such order may 
refuse to disclose facts which such authority considers it 
to be against the public interest to disclose.1*
It is a constitutional obligation on the part of the 
detaining authority to furnish to the detenu the grounds 
"as soon as may beTf after arrest and afford him the 
earliest opportunity of making representation against the 
order. The first obligation constitutes an elementary 
right in a free democratic State and the second follows as 
a corollary to the first, for furnishing of grounds would 
be meaningless, unless the detenu were given a chance of 
representation.
A "ground,** according to the dictionary meaning, is a 
valid reason. "Grounds*’ in this context means the base8 
of the conclusion, leading to the order made by the
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detaining authority. The information received constitutes
the data on which the conclusions or the 11 grounds” are
based. But the ” grounds” must be distinguished from the
material in the form of information, confidential
communications and other matters by which the detaining
authority is moved to take action. The sub-paragraph does
not require the detaining authority to communicate to the
detenu the sources of information or the actual information
received about the detention and his activities ....
It is the constitutional right of the detenu to obtain
all the grounds on which the order of detention against him
has been made and none of them can be withheld from him by
(2 )the Government v ' The authority need not disclose
all the evidence, but the communication must give the 
detenu the conclusions, which impelled the authority to take 
action against him, with sufficient particulars or facts as 
are necessary, in the circumstances of the case, to enable 
the detenu to make a representation, which, on being 
considered may give him relief . The facts need not
(1) Rarasimhamurty v. State, A.I.E.1951 Orissa 251.
)2) Ghulam Muhammad Khan v. The State, P.1.D.1957 Lahore 497
(5) Ram Krishan v. State of Delhi, A.I.R.1953 S.C.318
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be exhaustive but the grounds stated and the particulars
supplied must be sufficiently precise, to make it possible
for the detenu to make his representation; This is the
object of requiring a full disclosure of grounds under the
present clause ...
Mere reproduction of the words of the section of the
statute under which action has been taken is not a proper
compliance with sub-paragraph (5)« The authority must
disclose in full the grounds upon which action has been
taken, subject to the proviso to clause (5) that certain
(2 )facts may be excluded in the public interest . ..v 1 If
no facts leading to the detention of a detenu are mentioned
in the grounds, which are furnished to the detenu, then
obviously the intention underlying the enactment of
('5)sub-paragraph is frustrated ...
The grounds, on which the authority passes the order 
of detention, do not necessarily mean the detailed facts 
on which a prosecution in a Criminal Court may be launched. 
It is not necessary to mention in the grounds the • 
particulars in the same way as they are mentioned in a
(1) State of Bombay v. Atmaram, A.I.R.1951 S.C.157
(2) Ibid
(3) In re Magan Lai Jivabhai, A.I.R. 1951 Bom. 35-
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charge of a criminal offence but they must be sufficiently
clear and precise to enable the detenu to understand what
(1)the authority has against him ...' 7
It is the constitutional right of the detenu to obtain 
all the grounds on which the order of detention against him
(2 )has been made and none of them can be withheld. In a case' 7 
under U. W. P. P. Public Safety Act (XXI of 1948) section 3 
of which empowered the Provincial Government to arrest and 
detain any person for any length of time "on being satisfied 
that he has committed a prejudicial act or that arrest and 
detention are necessary with a view to prevent the 
commission of a prejudicial act." The power of the 
Provincial Government could be delegated to any authority 
under Section 28 of the Act and had been delegated to the 
District Magistrate up to a limit of one month’s detention.
The District Magistrate apprehended that Ghulara Muhammad 
would cause trouble in his district on the occasion of a 
visit to Pakistan of Mr. Chou En lai; after consulting 
the Chief Minister he passed the following orders,
"Y/ith a view to prevent Ghulam Muhammad Khan ... from 
committing any prejudicial act and from endangering public
(1) Mohit Dal v. The State A.I.K, 1951 Patna 439
(2) Ghulam Muhammad Khan v. The State, P.l.D. 1957 Dah.497*
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safety and maintenance of public order, I, Abdul Majid 
Mufti .... order the arrest without warrant of the said 
Ghulam Muhammad Khan. '*
On the 31st December, 1956, the Provincial Government, 
operating through the Home Secretary, passed another order 
of detention under Section3 but this was for a period of 
six months. It was an independent order and had no 
reference to the previous order of the District Magistrate. 
The grounds, served on the detenu on the 16th January 1957 
were,
uYou have been fomenting agrarian trouble between 
landlord and tenants in Mardan district and inciting the 
tenants in a manner likely to endanger peace and 
tranquillity.1
It was held by the High Court that the District 
Magistrate’s order was ab initio void. The District 
Magistrate did not communicate to the detenu the grounds 
on which the order of detention was based. The grounds 
furnished by the Home Secretary were not stated in 
sufficient detail to make an effective representation 
possible. Originally there were five or six grounds, 
four of which related to the visit of Mr. Chou En Iai, 
but the Home Secretary regarded only that set out above
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as adequate for a detention order. It was further held that 
the Home Secretary only issued a formal order. He did not 
substitute his own satisfaction for the satisfaction of the 
Chief Minister. Even, therefore, if he was satisfied that 
the single ground of detention was adequate, the actual 
detention had resulted from the satisfaction of a different 
authority, and having been based on several other grounds, 
the detenu had a right to be supplied with all those grounds. 
The detention order was held illegal, because the grounds on 
which action had been taken were not the grounds 
communicated to detenu, who was consequently deprived of an
opportunity of making representation against the order.
(1 )In Chandra Sheikhar v . State of Bihar . ; 7, it was 
observed that the detaining authority is not at liberty to 
disclose some and withhold other grounds on which the order 
of detention has been made. If some of the grounds on which 
the order of detention has been made are not communicated to 
the detenu, then he is not in a position to make an effective 
representation, which he has right to do under clause (5) •• 
There may be a number of grounds in support of the order, 
but the authority making the order is entitled to base the 
order of detention upon some only of the many grounds
(1) A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 389.
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reported to him. It is only those grounds on which the 
order is made that have to be communicated to the detenu*
The safeguard provided by clause (5) is a safeguard in
favour of the detenu, and the detenu is entitled as a
matter of right to know the grounds on which the order of 
detention has been made against him; no question of 
waiver can arise in such circumstances. The detenu is 
entitled to know only the grounds on which the order is 
based; it is not incumbent on Government to communicate 
to the detenu all the grounds it may have in its possession
in support of the order.
The question whether the detaining authority was 
satisfied on sufficient or insufficient grounds in
(1)issuing the order of detention is not justiciable.' '
In State of Bombay v. Atma Ham The Supreme Court 
of India observed:
"The adjective "supplementary" is capable of 
covering cases of adding new grounds to the original grounds, 
of giving particulars of facts already disclosed, and of 
giving facts in addition to facts mentioned in the grounds 
originally furnished. It is clear that if by "supplementary 
grounds" is meant "additional grounds," i.e; conclusions of 
fact required to bring about the satisfaction of the
(1) Maulvi Farid Ahmad v.Govt.of West Pakistan,P.l.D.1965- Lah.
135
(2) A.I.R. 1951 S.C.157, Para.15.
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Government, the furnishing of any such additional grounds 
at a later stage will amount to an infringement of the first 
mentioned right in .. clause (5), as thegrounds for the 
order of detention must be before the Government, before 
it is satisfied of the necessity for making the order and 
all such grounds have to be furnished as soon as may be.
If "additional grounds” are, in fact, only particulars of 
facts mentioned or indicated in the grounds previously 
supplied, or are additional incidents, which, together 
with the facts mentioned or indicated in the grounds already 
supplied lead to the same conclusion of the fact (i.e. the 
"ground” furnished in the first instance) the matter stands 
on a different footing. These are not new "grounds,” 
within the meaning of the first part of ...clause (5).
Y/hile the first mentioned type of "additional grounds" 
cannot be given, after the grounds have been furnished, the 
other type, even if furnished after the grounds have been 
furnished, provided they do not affect the right of the 
detained person to make a representation, will not be 
considered an infringement of either of the rights mentioned 
in clause (5). While the authority must discharge the duty 
to furnish grounds for the order of detention 'as soon as 
may be' and also provide 'the earliest opportunity to make
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representations,1 the number of communications from the 
detaining authority to the detenu may be one or more and 
they may be made at intervals, provided the two parts of 
the aforesaid duty are discharged in accordance with the 
wording of clause (5). So long as the latter 
communications do not make out a new ground, their contents 
are no infringement of the rights of the detenu mentioned in 
the clause. They may consist of a narration of facts or 
particulars relating to the grounds already supplied, 
but in doing so the time factor in respect of the second 
duty, viz; to give a detained person the earliest opportunity 
to make a representation cannot be overlooked ... "
The grounds cannot be subsequently amplified or clarified.
In short, though new "grounds" cannot be added, there is 
nothing to bar the communication of particulars or facts 
relating to the grounds already supplied, by one or more 
subsequent communications, provided the "earliest" 
opportunity of making a representation is not denied.
In another case the original ground supplied was 
"You tried to create disorder amongst tenants in Una Tehsil 
by circulating and distributing objectionable literature 
issued by the underground communists," and subsequently,
(1) Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R.1952, S.C.350.
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the following grounds were furnished by way of supplementary 
grounds:-
,!You were responsible for hartal by labourers working- 
on Bhalera Dam” .... ’’You instigated labourers working in 
Nangal in 1948 to go on strike.” ....
The grounds subsequently supplied were "new” or "additional” 
grounds having no relation to the original grounds. Hence 
the validity of the detention order could not be founded 
upon these additional grounds, and they were eliminated 
from consideration.
Where the subsequent communication does not contain 
new grounds but particulars of the general allegation 
contained in the grounds originally communicated, the 
particulars should be taken into consideration, in 
determining whether the detenu has been furnished with 
sufficient information to enable him to make a representation, 
but where the particulars are supplied after an inordinate 
delay, such as four months after the order of detention, 
it was held that the detenu had been denied the earliest 
opportunity of making representation, that there had been 
a violation of .. clause (5), and the detention was 
unconstitutional
(1) Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R.1952 S.C.350.
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A description of the contents of the second 
communication of the grounds for detention as "supplementary 
grounds" does not necessarily make them additional or new 
grounds. One has to look at the contents to find out 
whether they are new grounds. When they only furnish 
details of the grounds furnished to the detenu previously, 
they cannot he treated as new grounds. Further, the fact 
that the details were communicated later does not 
necessarily show that they were not within the knowledge 
of the authorities, when they sent the first communication 
of the grounds.
(1) Tarapada v. State of Vest Bengal, A.I.R. 1951 S.C.174.
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Particulars ;-
The grounds must be exact and precise and sufficient 
particulars regarding grounds must be given to enable the 
detenu to make a representation. Furnishing grounds is 
not a mere formality; it is intended to serve the ends 
of justice by giving the person deprived of his liberty 
adequate information of the case against him, so that he 
is able to give, if possible, an explanation calculated 
to secure his release.
"Particulars1 are distinct from "grounds.”
"Grounds" are the reasons for his detention. They are 
inferential deductions from facts reported and they must 
be sufficient to justify the detention order in the 
interest of the general public. In order to afford the 
detenu an opportunity to be heard in his defence, acts of 
the detenu bearing a proximate relation to a ground must 
be given as part of the ground, the ambit of which must 
be determined on the particular facts of each case. The 
rules, in this connection, must be flexible, rather than 
hard and fast. In this view of the matter, the facts, 
illustratively stated, are incidents, events and
(1) Mrs. Rowshan Bijaya Shaukat Ali Khan v. Govt, of
East Pakistan, P.X.D, 1965 Dacca 241.
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circumstances, information^ suspicions, conjectures and 
the like, including the sources of informations and agencies 
set up in that behalf; they may constitute the background, 
which determines the nature and character of the acts 
manifesting the grounds that make detention necessary.
They may amount to proofs that set the machinery in motion. 
They are zealously guarded by the Legislature against 
disclosure ....
Although there is no express provision in Right Number 2 
that particulars of the grounds of detention must be given to 
the person detained, the furnishing of particulars may be 
necessary in order to enable the detenu to make an 
effective representation.
(2)The Supreme Court of India in State of Bombay v. Atmaram v 7 
analysed the whole position in the following words
"The first part of Article 22, clause (5) gives a right 
to the detained person to be furnished with "the grounds on 
which the order has been made" and that has to be done "as 
soon as may be." The second right given to such person is 
of being afforded "the earliest opportunity of making a 
representation against the order." It is obvious that the
(1) Narasimhamurty v. State, A.I.R.1951 Orissa 251.
(2) A.I.R. 1951 S.C.157
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grounds for making the order as mentioned above, are the 
grounds on which the detaining authority was satisfied that 
it was necessary to make the order. These grounds therefore 
must be in existence when the order is made. By their very 
nature the grounds are conclusions of facts and not a complete 
detailed recital of all the facts. The conclusions drawn 
from the available facts will show in which of three 
categories of prejudicial acts the suspected activity of 
the particular person is considered to fall. These 
conclusions are the "grounds’1 and they must be supplied.
No part of such "grounds” can be held back nor can any more 
"grounds” be added thereto. Y/hat must be supplied are the 
"grounds on which the order has been made" and nothing less..."
"The second right, of being afforded "the earliest 
opportunity of making a representation against the order," 
is not confined to only a physical opportunity by supplying 
paper and pen only. In order that a representation can be 
made, the person detained must first have knowledge of the 
grounds on which the authorities conveyed that they were 
satisfied about the necessity of making the detention order.
It is therefore clear that, if the representation has to be 
intelligible to meet the charges contained in the grounds, 
the information conveyed to the detained person must be 
sufficient to attain that object ... \7hile the grounds of
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detention are thus the main factors on which the 
subjective decision of the Government is based, other 
materials on which the conclusions in the grounds are 
founded could and should equally be conveyed to the 
detained person, to enable him to make out his objections 
against the order. To put it in other words the detaining 
authority has made its decision and passed its order. The 
detained person is then given an opportunity to urge his 
objections, which, incase of preventive detention, comes 
always at a later stage. The grounds may have been 
considered sufficient by the Government to pass its 
judgment. But to enable the detained person to make his 
representation against the order, further details may be 
furnished to him. In our opinion, this appears to be the 
true measure of the procedural rights of the detained 
person under Article 22 (5)«n
Thus, though the Constitution does not lay down any 
obligation to give particulars or details* and leaves it 
to the discretion of the authority to disclose or withhold 
facts, it cannot be held, that a mere recital of the clauses 
of the statute, without giving any particulars of details, 
would suffice, for, without any particulars, it is not 
possible to make a representation, which is the very object
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of communicating the grounds. The detenu is not
entitled to know the evidence, nor the source of
information, but he must be furnished with the grounds for
his detention and sufficient details to enable him to make
out a case, if he can, for the consideration of the
(2 )detaining authority. v ' The mere statement that the
detenu had been carrying on ’subversive propaganda1 conveys
no precise information to the detenu, so as to enable him
('5 )to make a proper representation.v 7 Similarly, an
allegation of ’secret or underground activity*, without
particulars as to the nature of such activities, is vague,
for ’secret activity , * does not necessarily mean that
it is an activity subversive of public order.
The same view was reiterated by Supreme Court of India
( 5)in the case of hr. Ram Krishan W7 in the following words
11 ...... Preventive detention is a serious invasion of
(1) State of Bombay v. Atmaram, A ,1.2*1951 S.0.157
(2) hurgadas v. Rex A.I.R.1949 ALL.148, 151.
(3) In re Krishanaji, A.I.R.1948 Bomb. 360.
(4) Nek Mohammad v. Emperor, A.I.R, 1949 Pat. 1.
(5) hr.Ram Krishan v. State of helhi, A.I.R.1955 S.C.318
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personal liberty and such meagre safeguards as the 
Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of 
the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the 
Court.... the petitioner has the right, under Article 22(5), 
as interpreted by this court by a majority, to be furnished 
with particulars of the grounds of his detention "sufficient 
to enable him to make a representation, which, on being 
considered, may give relief to him this constitutional
requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the 
grounds communicated to the person detained, subject of 
course to a claim of privilege under clause (6) of Article 22. 
That not having been done in regard to one of the grounds 
mentioned in ... the statement of grounds, the petitioner1© 
detention cannot be held to be in accordance with the 
procedure established by law, within the meaning of Article 21. 
The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to be released .... 11 
Even where the grounds or the "basic facts" have been 
furnished, the detenu may require further particulars or 
details, in order to enable him to make an effective 
representation, or the particulars supplied may be vague so 
that further information becomes necessary. In such a case 
the Supreme Court has held that it is for the detenu to ask 
for such particulars as are necessary to enable him to make
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a representation, after the detaining authority has 
discharged its duty to communicate the 'grounds1 as required 
by the earlier part of clause (5) of Article 22. If
he does not ask for such particulars, his conduct may, in 
particular circumstances, he taken into consideration in
(2 3 )deciding whether the grounds can he considered to be vague; 9 J
Where a number of grounds are furnished to the detenu as
forming the basis of detention, he must be supplied
sufficient particulars about each ground to enable him to
make the representation against the order, for the Advisory
Board might recommend the continuance of detention on the
basis of a vague ground, about which sufficient particulars
were not furnished to the detenu, and about which the detenu
could not make an effective representation to the Advisory
(A-)Board to carry conviction with it* v 7
(1) Nareeh v. State, A.I.R. 1959 S.G.1355 (1340)
(2) D'Souza v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1956 S.C.382 (390).
(3) Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1952 S.C.350
(4) Hr. Ram Krishan v. State of Delhi, A.I.R.1953 S.C.318.
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Delays.
The communication of grounds "as soon as may he*1 is not
sufficient. The particulars must also he furnished within
a reasonable time, for without particulars the detenu would
not be able to exercise his constitutional right of making
effective representation. Where there is unexcusable delay
in furnishing particulars, the detenu would be entitled to be
released,.though the determination of the unreasonableness
(2 )of the delay would depend upon the facts of each case. v 1
(3 )In Atmaram' s case, 7 Kania, G.J. did not definitely 
indicate the time within which the particulars, where they 
were necessary, should be communicated. His lordship merely 
observed that Article 22 (5) prescribed two different time 
factors in respect of the furnishing of 'grounds1 and of 
'particulars;1 while 'grounds' were to be furnished 'as soon 
as may be1 after the order of detention, 'particudars' should 
be furnished in such time that the detenu gets the 'earliest 
opportunity of making representation.' The position was 
left uncertain by the comment - "However, the second 
communication should not be liable to be charged as not being
(1) Ujagar Singh v.State of Punjab, A.I.R.1952 S.C.350 
State of Bombay v. Atmaram, A.I.R.1951 S.C.157*
(2) 1952 S.C.350
(3) A.I.R. 1951 S.C.157
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within the measure 'as soon as may he. ' What seems to have 
been meant by this is that the particulars could be furnished 
some time later than the grounds. But the question what 
degree of delay in furnishing the particulars would be upheld 
by the court, remains uncertain.
When the subsequent communication does not contain new 
grounds but only particulars of the general allegation 
contained in the grounds originally communicated, the 
particulars should be taken into consideration in determining 
whether the detenu has been furnished with sufficient 
information to enable him to make a representation, but where 
the particulars are supplied after an inordinate delay, say 
four months after the order of detention, the detenu has 
been denied the earliest opportunity of making representation, 
so that there is a violation of Article 22 (5), and the 
detention is unconstitutional..
Vague Grounds
What is meant by 'vague1? 'Vague' can be considered as 
the antonym of 'definite'. If the ground which is supplied 
is incapable of being -understood or defined with sufficient 
certainty, it is 'vague;1 it is not possible to say anything 
more definite on the question what is vague; it must vary
(1) Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R.1952 S.C.350.
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according to the circumstances of each case. It is however,
improper to contend that a ground is necessarily vague, if
the only answer which the detained person can make is a
denial. That is a matter which has to be examined in the
light of the circumstances of each case. If, on reading
the ground furnished, it is capable of being intelligently
understood and is sufficiently definite to enable the detained
person to make a representation against the order ofdetention,
it cannot be called vague. If the language used in
specifying the ground is so general that the detained cannot
meet the charge against him except by a denial, it is at
least arguable that it is too vague. It may be contended
that, having regard to the general language used in the ground,
the detenu has not been given the earliest opportunity to make
a representation against the order of detention. The
representation mentioned in the second part of Article 22(5)
must be one which, on being considered, may give relief to the
detained person." ... ^ ^
(2 )In a later case v ' the principles laid down in the 
above mentioned case were summarised as follows
"If the representstion has to be intelligible to meet
(1) State of Bombay v. Atmaram, A.I.R, 1951 S.C.157
(2) Ram Singh v. State of Delhi, A.I.R.1951 S.C.270.
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the charges contained in the grounds, the information conveyed 
to the detained person must he sufficient to attain the object. 
While there is a connection between the obligation on the part 
of the detaining authority to furnish grounds and the right 
given to the detained person to have the earliest opportunity 
to make the representation, the test to be applied in respect 
of the contents of the grounds for the two purposes is quite 
different. For the first, the test is whether it is 
sufficient to satisfy the authority; for the second, the test 
is whether it is sufficient to enable the detained person to 
make the representstion at the earliest opportunity.
In the case of Ujagar Singh Aiyar J. summarised the 
principles as under
u(a) That mere vagueness of grounds standing by itself 
and without leading to an inference of mala fides or lack of 
good faith is not a justiciable issue in a court of law for 
the necessity of making the order, in as much as the ground 
or grounds on which the order of detention was made is a 
matter for the subjective satisfaction of the Government or 
of the detaining authority.
(b) That there is nothing to prevent particulars of 
grounds being furnished to the detenu within a reasonable
(l) Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R.1952 S.C.350.
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time, so that he may have the earliest opportunity of making 
a representation against the detention order, what is a 
reasonable time being dependent on the facts of each case.
(c) That failure to furnish grounds with the speedy 
addition of such particulars as would enable the detenu to 
make a. representation at the earliest opportunity against the 
detention order can be considered by a court of law as an 
invasion of a fundamental right or safeguard guaranteed by 
the constitution, viz; being given the earliest opportunity 
to make a representation.
(d) That no new grounds could be supplied to strengthen 
or fortify the original order of detention.M
The beneficial effect of the decision in Atmaram1s case, 
however, has been curtailed to a substantial extent by the 
majority decision in the later case of Ram Singh, to the 
effect that, though the detenu has a right to be furnished with 
sufficient materials to enable him to make an effective 
representation, it is not necessary for the detaining 
authority to communicate to the detenu the exact words used 
by the detenu or their substance by reason of which the order 
is being made.
In Abdul Rahim v. State, ^  the Rajasthan High Court
(1) Abdul Rahim v. The State, A.I.R. 1952 Raj. 33 •
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appears to have correctly held that, where various grounds 
had been furnished, giving considerable detail as to the 
xactivities and the places where they had been carried on and 
the detenu had, in his representation, denied all these 
allegations, without any misgiving as to the nature of 
allegations, the detenu cannot subsequently be heard to 
complain that the grounds v/ere vague for omission to state 
the dates of the activities alleged.
But it must be remembered that r,A layman, who is not 
experienced in the interpretstion of documents, can hardly 
be expected without legal aid, which is denied to him, to 
interpret the grounds in the proper sense. It is therefore? 
up to the detaining authority to make his meaning clear 
beyond doubt, without leaving the person detained to his 
own resource for interpreting them. Otherwise such grounds 
would be regarded as vague, so as to render it difficult, if 
not impossible, for the petitioner to make an adequate 
representation.,r
In the f ollowing cases, the grounds have been held to 
be vague
1) In Mrs. Rowshan Bijaya’s case the grounds
(1) Dr. Ram Krishan v. The State of Delhi, A. I.R,1953 B.C.318.
(2) Mrs. Rowshan Bijaya Shaukat v. G-ovt. of East Pakistan,
p.L.D.1965 Dacca 241.
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furnished were, uThat you have been and are associated with
the illegal activities of a secret association in the districts
of Dacca, Mymensingh, Bogra and Jessore and that during the
years 1957. 1958, 1959, 1961, 1962, 1963 and 1964 (till your
arrest and when you were not in Jail) you were concerned in
prejudicial activities in the districts of Dacca, Mymensingh,
Bogra, 'Jessore and that particularly in the months of July,
August and October 1957; February, April, May, June, July,
November 1959; April, July 1961; May, June, August and
November 1962; April, July, August, October and November 1965;
February, March, May, June and September 1964; (till your
arrest and when you were not in Jail) you carried prejudicial
acts and propaganda against the Government among the people,
including the students and peasants, with the ulterior object
*
of disrupting the stability or integrity of the Province of 
Bast Pakistan and exciting disaffection towards the 
Government established by law.11 It was held that, nthis 
ground says that the detenu has been associated with the 
activities of secret associations in the districts of Dacca, 
Mymensingh, Bogra, and Jessore during the years 1957, 1958, 
1959) 1961, 1962, 1963 and 1964 excepting the period of his 
detention in the Dacca Central Jail.
(These allegations are indeed vague and they give no
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clear indication as to the charges made against him to 
enable him to make a representation, which the constitution 
guarantees him.)
2) "In pursuance of the Policy of the Communist party,
you are engaged in preparing the masses for violent
revolutionary campaign and attended secret party meetings
fl)to give effect to this programme . .."v J
3) "You tried to create public disorder amongst tenants in
Una Tehsil by circulating and distributing objectionable
(2 )literature issued by underground communists ..."v y
4) "That you, along with your associates, have been 
collecting and are likely to collect arms and ammunitions
(3 )illegally for illegal purposes and illegal activities . ..,twy
5) That the petitioner was a member of the Communist Party 
and is likely to go underground to further plans of the 
Communist Party, viz: commission of sabotage and violence.
The grounds were held to be vague for omission to state when, 
where, and with whom he was going to plan..^^
(1) Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1952 S.C.350.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Sushila v. Commissioner of Police A.I.R,1951 Bom.252
(4) Kulomoni v. The State, A.I.R.1950 Orissa 20.
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6) That the applicant's "local reputation is so bad that 
he is known as a smuggler and prof iteer. . *n
7) That the petitioner organised two illegal strikes.
The grounds were held to be vague as there was no mention
of date, and no particulars as to place or places where
alleged strikes were said to have occurred, nor of the
persons against whom they were alleged to have been
(2 )directed..'1 1
8) That the detenu was an active worker of the Muslim
League and had been carrying on communal activities amongst
Muslim labourers in West Bengal and in certain areas in
particular, with a view to creating disorder and bringing
about dislocation in the industries and thus paralysing the
(3)administration ..
In the following cases the grounds have been held not 
to be vague
(i) That he threatened public peace and tranquillity in a 
certain district by urging violent methods, especially among 
the labour classes and that his speeches at public meetings 
and demonstrations were prejudicial to the maintenance of
(1) Raman Lai v. Commissioner of Police, A,I.R.1952
Cal.26, 29.
(2) Prern Dutta v. Supdt. Central Prison, A,I,R.1954 All.315*
(3) Safat Ullah Khan v. Chief Secretary, West Bengal Govt.
A.I.R.1951 0al,194.
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( Dpublic order in that district . ..v J
(ii) That the petitioner was a member of the Communist
Party of India, which was spreading a doctrine of violence
to acquire power and that though since 1950, the party had
been divided into two groups by changing its draft
programme, in fact, the change was a mere camouflage and
the party was carrying on loot. (The grounds do not
become vague for failure to mention to which group the
(2 )
petitioner belonged ...v '
(iii) That you have been assisting the operations of the 
Communist Party of India ... which has for its object 
commission of rioting with deadly weapons ... thus acting 
in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order; 
that as member of the Communist Party of India you have 
fomented trouble amongst the peasants of the Howrah 
district .. and amongst the tramways men and other workers 
at Calcutta,1'
and in continuation of these grounds,
instances of meetings and processions with dates were
furnished, illustrating the attempt to foment ^rouble
(3)amongst workers ..
(1) Benoy v. Govt, of Assam, A.I.R.1950 Assam 49
(2) Sheobachan v. State of Bihar A *1.11.1952 Pat. 177
(3) Tarapada v. State, A.I.B. 1951 S.C.174-
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(iv) "Your activities generally and particularly since the
recent trouble in East and West Bengal have been of a
communal nature, tending to excite hatred between
communities and, whereas, in the present composition of the
population of Delhi and the recent communal disturbances of
Delhi, feelings are aroused between the majority and minority
communities, your presence and activities in Delhi are likely
to prove prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order, it
(1)
is considered necessary to order you to leave Delhi. ...1 v '
(v) Where the grounds singly and far more so collectively, 
were conclusions drawn from the available facts, showing 
that suspected activities of the detained persons fell 
within the category of prejudicial acts affecting the 
maintenance of supplies essential to the community, and 
though not all the fgroundsf were equally full, but even 
in the case of the •grounds1 with the fewest details, they 
were capable of being intelligently understood and were 
sufficiently definite to furnish materials to enable the 
detained persons to make a representation against the 
respective orders of detention, the only answer t>f the 
detenus to the grounds being to deny them, the grounds
(1) Dr. N.B.Khare v. The State of Delhi, A.I.R.1950 S.C.ai.
203
were not necessarily vague on that account only ...
(vi) Where the first sentence in the grounds supplied to
the detenu only alleged his association with a gang headed
by a certain named person wanted by the police in 15 cases
of murder and dacoity, but in the same paragraph the grounds
continued with the words ’’amongst the many acts of your
association and assistance, a few specific acts are
mentioned below” which were followed by details of three
recent occasions on which the detenu had been seen in the
company of that leader of the gang, the ground was held not to
be vague, though the first sentence taken by itself might
(2 )possibly be regarded as somewhat vague '
Where the grounds are vague and give no clear
indication of the charges made against the detenu to as to
enable him to make the representation, which the Constitution
(r5)guarantees him, the court will set the detenu at liberty ..
The Supreme Court of India, in an earlier case, held that
(1) Shri Krishna Sharma v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R.1954
Cal.581
(2) Shri Krishna Sharma v. State of West Bengal, A ,I.R.1954
Cal.581
(3) Mrs.Rowshan Bijaya v. Govt.of East Pakistan, P #L.D.1965
Dacca 241.
Safat Ullah v. Chief Secretary, A.I.R.1951 Cal.194-
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"When the grounds supplied to the petitioner at the time 
of order are so vague (apart from question of technical 
defects) as prevents the detenu to make representation 
at "the earliest opportunity” ..Clause (5) is infringed
and this renders the detention order void ab initio.
(2 )In Ujagar Singh’s case v y the Supreme Court again 
held that mere vagueness of grounds standing by itself, 
without leading to an inference of mala fides or lack of 
good faith, is not a justiciable issue in a Court of law 
for the necessity of making the order, in as much as the 
ground or grounds on which the order of detention was 
based, is a matter for the subjective satisfaction of 
the Government or of the detaining authority.
(1) State of Bombay v. Atmaram, A.I.E.1951 S.C.157
(2) Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R*1952 S.C.350.
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Irrelevant Grounds.
A distinction must be made between "irrelevant” and 
"vague" grounds. "Irrelevant" means not relevant, to the 
object of the legislation and has no connection at all with 
the satisfaction of the authority, whereas "vague1 grounds 
are such as are not sufficiently clear to enable an 
effective representation to be made.
If one of the several grounds supplied to the detenu be 
either irrelevant or vague or non-existent, the detention is 
invalid. Thus
(a) If any of the grounds or reasons that lead to the
satisfaction is 'irrelevant1, the detention would be invalid,
even if there are other relevant grounds, because it can
never be certain to what extent the defective grounds
operated on the mind of the authority or whether the
detention order would have been made, if only one or more
(2 )valid reasons had been before him. v J In such a case, the 
court is bound to quash the order, unless it can be 
predicated that the defective ground was of an unsubstantial 
or inconsequential nature. Where the detention order
(1) Rehmat Illahi v. Govt.of West Pakistan, P.L.P.1965 lah.112. 
Pwarka Pas v.State of J. & K. A.I.R.1957 S.C.164
Shibban Lai v.State of U.P., A.I.R.1954 S.G.179
(2) Keshav Talpade v. Emperor, 1945 P.O.I.
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stated that detention was necessary to prevent the 
petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the 
provision of supplies and services, essential to the 
community and it was alleged that petitioner was 
smuggling essential goods, such as shaffon cloth, zari 
and mercury, and it was found that shaffon cloth and zari 
had not been declared "essential goods,” the order was 
quashed. ^  In Prem huttafs c a s e ^ ,  it was held that, 
where good grounds for detention had been mixed up with 
vague, indefinite and bad grounds, the petitioners 
detention could not be held to be in accordance with 
procedure established by law.
(b) Ho doubt, the grounds are to read togetherK ' but 
the detenu, who is denied legal aid, cannot be expected 
to interpret a vague ground in the light of another ground, 
as a lawyer would have done, according to the rules of 
interpretation of documents. The first paragraph of 
the statement of grounds stated
"The Jan S&ngh etc. have started an unlawful campaign
(1) hwarka has v. State of J. & K. , A. I.R. 1957 S.C.164
(2) Prem hutta v. Supdt. of Central Prison A. I.R.1954
All.315.
(3) Shamrao v. h.M.Thana, A.I.R,1952 S.C.324
Ram Krishan v. State of Delhi, A.I.R.1953 S.C.318.
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in sympathy with the Praja Parishad movanent of Kashmir 
for defiance of the law, involving violence ... ” as evidenced 
by sub-paragraphs (a) which referred to incidents which are 
said to have ranged from the 4-th to the 10th March 1953? 
but they did not directly implicate the petitioner.
The second paragraph showed how the petitioner was concerned 
in these activities
,!The following facts show that you are personally 
helping and actively participating in the above mentioned 
movement, which has resulted in violence and threat to 
maintenance of public order.M
Of the several paragraphs which followed, sub-paragraph (e) 
stated
MYou have been organising the movement by enrolling 
volunteers among the refugees in your caja city as President 
of the Refugee Association of the Bara Hindu Rao, a local 
area in Delhi.”
It was held that the particulars given in sub-paragraph (e) 
were vague, as they omitted to mention the time of this 
activity. The contention that, if the grounds were read as 
a whole, they could reasonably be taken to mean that the 
petitioner was organising the movement by enrolling 
volunteers from the 4th to the 10th March, was rejected on
the ground that the petitioner, who was a layman, could not 
be expected to interpret the grounds as a lawyer would 
interpret a document ..
(c) The same principle is applicable to the case when one 
of the several grounds communicated to the detenu is non­
existent, as found by the Advisory Board or admitted by the
(2 )detaining authority/* J Thus, where an order of detention 
was made on two grounds and the Advisory Board held that 
one of the two grounds was non-existent but confirmed the 
order on the other ground and the Government issued an 
order confirming the detention order on the latter ground, 
the Supreme Court held the detention order to be void.
(d) But in applying the above principles the court must be
satisfied that the vague or irrelevant or non-existent
grounds are such as, if excluded, might reasonably have
affected the subjective satisfaction of the appropriate
authority. It is not merely because some ground or reason
of a comparatively unessential nature is defective that such
an order based on subjective satisfaction can be held to be 
("5 )invalid.v '
(1) Ram Krishan v. State of Delhi, A. I.R.1953 S.C.318
(2) Dwarka Das v. State of J. & K., A.I.R.1957 S.C.164.
(5) Shibban lal v. State of U.P., A, I.R,1954 S.C.179-
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The reason underlying the foregoing principle was explained 
in the instant case
fl7/here power is vested in a statutory authority to 
deprive the liberty of a subject on its subjective 
satisfaction with reference to specified matters, if that 
satisfaction is stated to be based on a number of grounds 
or for a variety of reasons, all taken together, and if some 
out of them are found tn be non-existent or irrelevant, the 
very exercise of that power is bad. That is so because the 
matter, being one for subjective satisfaction, it must be 
properly based on all the reasons on which it purports to 
be based. If some out of them are found to be non-existent 
or irrelevant, the Court cannot predicate what the subjective 
satisfaction of the said authority would have been on the 
exclusion of these grounds or reasons. To uphold the 
validity of such an order in spite of the invalidity of some 
of the reasons or grounds, would be to substitute the 
objective standards of the Court for the subjective 
satisfaction of the statutory authority. In applying these 
principles, however, the Court must be satisfied that the 
vague or irrelevant grounds are such as, if excluded, might 
reasonably have affected the subjective satisfaction of the 
appropriate authority. It is not merely because some
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ground or reason of a comparatively unessential nature is
defective that such an order based on subjective satisfaction
can be held to be invalid. The Court, while anxious to
safeguard the personal liberty of the individual, will not
lightly interfere with such orders.”
Being a member of Jama’at, which had been guilty of
prejudicial activities is, by itself, not sufficient ground
to take action against the person. ^  While mere belief in
or acceptance of any political ideology may not be ground for
detention, affiliation to a party, which is alleged to be
spreading its ”doctrine of violence rendering life and property
insecure and trying to seize power by violence” may, in
certain circumstances, lead to an inference that the person
concerned is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the
public safety, order or tranquillity. The fact that the
party has not been outlawed is not material, for that is a
(2 )
matter of expediency. v 1 Affiliation to the Communist party, 
which is not banned but whose objects are said to be the 
overthrowing of Government by subversive and territorial 
activities, would have a relation to the security of the 
state and the maintenance of public order and would afford
(1) Rehmat Elahi v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.L.D.1965 Lah.112
(2) Machindar Shivaji v. The King, 1950, F.C.129
211
ground for detention of the person,
(2 )It has been observed that, J "When nothing else is 
known, a mere membership of the Communist Party, if it has 
not been declared an unlawful body, would not attract the 
provisions of the Preventive Detention Act. In all the 
democratic states it is essential that the citizens should 
be made conversant with the pros and cons of every political 
system and every political ideology, and, so long as a party 
organisation merely tries to place its own views before the 
people, it does not matter and a court cannot in such a case 
interfere with the activities of that party, as long as they 
are confined to the limits mentioned above. The 
broadcasting and the preaching of the philosophy and the 
ideology of a party, like the Communist Party would not 
justify an interference by the Government with the activities 
of that organisation but once such an organisation, in 
attempting to achieve its object, has recourse to activities 
of a violent nature, resulting in danger to public safety, 
the Government would step in to stop the organisation from 
carrying on its activities. Spread of disaffection against 
a Party Government cannot be regarded as amounting to
(1) Harayana Raju v. Secretary, Govt.of Madras, A.I.R .1951
Mad.182
(2) Maqdoom v. State of Hyderabad, A, I. R. 1952 Hyd. 112.
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interference with the maintenance of public order in 
democratic government, because it is the right of every 
citizen to criticise the existing Government and bring 
into disrepute the existing Government, if he believes 
that the Government is acting against the interests of 
the public at large* This right of the citizen is always 
subject to this condition, that the criticism does not 
transgress the limits of public order or that disaffection 
does not develop into recourse to unlawful methods, 
rendering unsafe security of life and property* Where, 
therefore, members forming part of an organisation are 
known to indulge in acts of violence and brutality and 
a person is a member of such organisation, it is 
sufficient to raise a suspicion in the mind of the 
Government that, if such person were allowed to be at 
large, he is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to 
the safety of the public.”
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Mala Fidea.
The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction,
can go into the question whether the grounds on which a
person was detained, fall within the terms of law under
(1 )which action was taken,v ' An order of detention is mala 
fide if it is made for a "collateral" or "ulterior" 
purpose, i.e., a purpose other than what the legislature 
had in view in passing the law of preventive detention, 
such as prevention of acts prejudicial to the security of 
State and the maintenance of public order. There is a 
mala fide exercise of the power, if the grounds upon which 
order is based are not proper or such grounds as would
(2 )justify detention under the provisions of the Act itself, y 
or when the grounds alleged for the detention are not 
relatable to the objects of detention or are non-existent, or 
where such detention on the part of the detaining authority 
is proved to be of a mala fide character. If a District
Magistrate, for example, detains a person under a 
Preventive Detention law, because the detenu was having an
(1) Farid Ahmad Khan v. Govt.of West Pakistan, P.X.D.1965
Iah.135
(2) Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C.27
(3) Miraj Muhammad Khan v. Govt.of Pakistan, P.l.D. W.P. 283. 
Abuzar v. Province of West Pakistan, P.1.D.1966 KAr.260.
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affair with the District Magistratefs wife, the order would 
have been made mala fide. The action was prompted by 
ulterior and extraneous reasons. In order to prove this 
charge, the detenu would have to show that the reasons given 
by the authority for making the order were not the reasons 
which in fact motivated the action.
Bad faith in legal terminology is called "malice in law" 
as distinguished from "malice in fact." Lord Haldane gave a 
good description of distinction between malice in law and 
malice in fact in Shearer v. Shields. ^  "Between 'malice 
in fact1 and 'malice in law' there is a broad distinction, 
which is not peculiar to any system of jurisprudence. The 
person who inflicts a wrong or an injury upon a person in 
contravention of the law is not allowed to say that he did 
so with an innocent mind. He is taken to know the law and
can only act within the law. He may therefore be guilty 
of ’malice in law’, although, so far as the state of mind 
was concerned, he acted ignorantly and in that sense 
innocently. ’Malice in fact* is a different thing. It 
means an actual malicious intention on the part of the 
person who has done the wrongful act."
The doctrine of 'malice in law' was invoked in
(1) Shearer v. Shields, 1914 A.C.808.
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Vimlabai Desapande v. Emperor^ . It was pointed out that
"If either the Police or the Provincial Government desire
an investigation into an offence, whether under the Penal Code
or under the Defence of India Rifles, then they are bound to
conduct that enquiry in accordance with the provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code. They cannot call in aid their
powers of detention and, under the guise of exercising these
powers, conduct a secret investigation into a crime. If
they have information that these detenus have committed
crimes or offences, they are not bound to investigate into
them. They can rest content with detaining them under R.26
or R.129. But if they want an investigation, they must
proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal
Procedure Code. If they do otherwise, it is a fraud upon
the Act and their action is not taken in good faith. They
cannot make the best of both words. The expression ‘good
faith1 as used here is akin to ‘malice in law. ! "
Though Section 16 of the Defence of India Act lays down
that no order made in exercise of any power conferred by or
under the Act shall be called in question in any Court, yet
this did not preclude the Court from deciding whether a
power had been conferred or whether a power which had been
(2 )conferred had been abused. ' The previous section, section 15
(1) A.I.R.1945 Nag. 8.
(2) Kewal Ram v. Collector of Madras, A.I.R. 1944 Mad.285
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was directory and must be read in conjunction with 
section 16. Section 16 requires that the order should be 
passed in exercise of the power conferred by the Act and not 
merely a colourable exercise of such powers. It is not 
enough that the orders should be passed under a colour of 
the power conferred. They must be done in actual exercise 
of it and no power is conferred to make such orders in bad 
faith, or in abuse of the Act and consequently these issues 
must be investigated if they are raised.
(2 )In the case of Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji,v J it was 
observed by their Lordship of the Privy Council that, ,TIt 
cannot be said that the High Courts have no jurisdiction, 
in view of section 59(2) of the Constitution Act and 
section 16 (l) of the Defence of India Act, to investigate 
the validity of orders of detention made under Rule 26 of 
the Defence of India Rules. Section 59 (2) of the 
Constitution Act only relates to one specified ground of 
challenge, namely that the order or instrument was not made 
or executed by the Governor and section 16 (1) of the 
Defence of India Act, which assures that the order is made 
in the exercise of the power, clearly leaves it open to 
challenge on the ground that it was not made in conformity
(1) Harish Chandra v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1945, All.277
(2) Emperor v. Sibnath Danerji, A.I.R. 1945 P.C.156.
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with the power conferred. In either case, no douht, the 
burden of proof lies heavily on the challenger to produce 
admissible evidence, sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case as to the inaccuracy of the recital in the orders of 
detention.
Similarly, if the detenu can show that the Governor 
acted under a misapprehension as to the extent of the jx>wers 
entrusted to him or did not in fact order detention of the 
detenu with a view to "preventing him from acting in a 
manner prejudicial to the public order," but with some 
ulterior object, such as to regularize his illegal detention 
or to punish him for acts, which he had already done, rather 
than to prevent him from doing, or for investigating the 
doing of, similar acts again, he would be entitled to be 
released. In such a case it could not be said that the 
Governor had in law acted in good faith, and the order of 
detention would be practically a sham order ana it must be 
set aside.
In Ali Gohar v. Emperor the Peshwar Judicial 
Commissioner's Court considered the scope of section 491 of 
Criminal Procedure Code, with reference to section 60, 40, 47 
of the Frontier Crimes Regulation 3 of 1901. It was held
(1) Ali Gohar v. Emperor, A.I.E. (32) 1945 Peshwar 12.
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that, even if the person applying to the Court of Judicial 
Commissioner under section 491> Criminal Procedure Code was 
arrested under section 40 of the Regulation, section 60 did 
not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to consider the 
application and interfere, if the arrest was not made under 
the Regulation but was made mala fide and without any legal 
authority whatever. By reason of section 47 of the Regulation, 
section 114, Criminal Procedure Code applied to proceedings 
for taking security under section 40 of the Regulation and 
in as much as, under Section 114, Criminal Procedure Code, 
the only way in which persons can be brought before the 
Court under arrest for the purpose of security being taken 
was by means of a warrant issued by a Magistrate, the arrest 
of a person for purpose of taking security under section 40, 
without any warrant for their arrest having been issued by 
the proper authority, was illegal.
An order of detention cannot be made for an ulterior 
motive or for a collateral purpose. The detaining authority 
must only consider the objects for which the Act was passed 
and the only considerations which must weigh with the 
detaining authority are those laid down in the Act, such as 
public safety, maintenance of public order and the 
preservation of peace and tranquillity. If in making the 
order the mind of the authority is influenced by any
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consideration extraneous to the Act, the order is bad and 
cannot be upheld.^
(2}(a) In Abuzar*s case, ' detention orders were set aside 
as being mala fide, where the grounds for detention had 
been stated to be distribution of a poster, allegedly 
containing material prejudicial to public order. But in 
fact, the contents of the posters were no more than an 
election manifesto on behalf of combined opposition parties 
against a candidate of the ruling party and were not, as 
such, likely to incite the general public to commit acts
of violence or breaches of peace; the grounds for detention 
were not relatable to the statutory purpose of detention and 
were accordingly non-existent.
(b) In Dhruvara,j1 s case,^^ where the petitioners affidavit 
set out allegations that the action of the Commissioner of 
Police of Bombay was the result of the desire of the U. P. 
Police to apprehend him and that it was not the bona fide 
act of the Commissioner of Police himself, based on any 
reasonable suspicion entertained by himself; the motive was 
to hand over the detenu to the custody of the U.P. Police, 
These allegations were not traversed in the counter-affidavit
(1) Ivlaledath v. The Commissioner of Police, A.I.B. 1950 Bomb.2(2
(2) Abuzar v. Province of West Pakistan, P.1.I). 1966 Ear.260
(3) Dhruvara j v. Vishwanath Singh, A.I.H.1946 Bomb. 65-
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filed by the prosecution and there was an order of the 
Bombay Government directing that the detenu be removed to 
Lucknow and delivered to the U. P. Police. ' It was held that 
what the Commissioner of Police of Bombay purported to do was 
not bona fide; the arrest was actuated by indirect motives 
and was a fraud on the power invested in the Commissioner of 
Police under Rule 128(1) Defence of India Rules, and 
therefore the order of detention passed by the Bombay 
Government was illegal.
(c) In Gopalan1 s case,^^ the court reserved judgment in an 
application for habeas corpus against an order of detention 
and three days later delivered judgment making the rule nisi 
absolute. During this interval, Government had a 
conference with its legal advisers and came to the conclusion 
that the petitioner would, in all probability, be released 
by the Court, on account of a technical defect in the form 
of the order and so passed a subsequent order of detention, 
which, however, was not brought to notice of the Court. 
Y/ithin a few minutes of the delivery of judgment, the 
petitioner was rearrested under the subsequent order of 
detention. It was held that the subsequent order, not 
having been communicated to the Court, lacked bona fides
(1) Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R.1950 S.C.27.
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and was made solely with the object of defeating the order 
of the Court, during the pendency of the petition against 
the previous order.
(d) The petitioner was detained in jail as an under-trial 
prisoner in three cases for about six months. In one of 
them he was acquitted and in another discharged.
Immediately after this, while the third case was still 
pending, he was served with an order of detention under the 
Preventive Detention Act, based on the ground of his 
activities extending for a period of two years prior to his 
detention as an under-trial prisoner. It was held that the 
order of preventive detention was made for a collateral 
purpose, either to punish him for his past acts or to 
prejudice his defence in the pending case. Hence, the
(i)
order was mala fide and illegal. v y It is improper to
issue an order under the Preventive Detention Act, when a
person is already under detention under the ordinary law
(2 )and awaiting his trial. ' *
If either the Police or the Provincial Government 
desires an investigation into an offence, whether under 
Penal Code or under Defence Rules, then they are bound to
(1) Ishar Singh v. The State, A.I.R. 1955, Pepsu 111.
(2) Rameshwar v. D.M. A.I.R. 1964 S.C.334 (357).
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c o n d u c t  their enquiry in accordance with the provisions 
of the Criminal Procedure Code. They cannot call in aid 
powers of detention and, under guise of exercising those 
powers, conduct a secret investigation into a,, crime. If 
they have information that detenus have committed crimes 
they should investigate them. They can rest content with 
detaining the suspects under Rule 26 or Rule 129, but if 
they want an investigation, they must proceed in accordance 
with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. If they 
do otherwise, it is a fraud upon the Act, and their action not 
taken in good faith.
When an offence has been committed, the Police 
authorities m y  investigate it, in which case they must 
comply with the provisions of law with regard to 
investigation; they may feel that the detention of the 
accused is more essential in the interests of the State 
and that what he is likely to do is more important than 
what he lias already done, in which case it would be open 
to them to detain him under the Security Act. But they 
cannot pursue both courses &t the same time. They cannot 
detain a person under the Security Act and at the same 
time carry on investigation against him, without providing 
him with the safeguards to which he is entitled under the law.
(1) Vimlabai Bespande v. Emperor, A.I.R.1945 Nag.8.
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The powers of the detaining authority under the Security 
Act are very wide. The detaining authority may detain a
person, even though the grounds clearly disclose that he
could have been prosecuted under the ordinary criminal law 
with regard to those very grounds. The detaining authority 
may detain a person, although a Criminal Court has acquitted 
him in respect of the very charge for which he is being 
detained under the Security Act.
If however extraneous circumstances influence the making 
of the order, the order can never be said to have been made 
bona fide. Even if the detaining authority was satisfied,
still in the eye of lav/ it is an order which was made for a
collateral purpose; it is made mala fide, and it cannot be
sustained in a Court of Law.
(2 )In Jagdish’s case v y, it was pointed out that it was 
impossible to construe Rule 129 of the Defence of India Rifles 
as justifying the police, in effect taking a person, already 
in their custody under the Criminal Procedure Code, out of 
that custody and placing him in detention under the Defence 
of India Rules, for the purpose of investigating the very 
crime, for which he was originally apprehended. It was held
(1) Maledath v. The Commr. of Police, A.I.R.1950 Bomb.202.
(2) Emperor v. Jagdish, A.I.R.1946 All.249-
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that Rule 129 could not be invoked in the case of a person 
who, whatever he may have done, was no longer even at 
liberty, but had already been taken into custody under the 
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. The same 
principle was reiterated by the Xahore High Court in 
another case.^^ If the police use their powers of 
detention under Rule 129, not for any purpose connected with 
the Defence of India or the efficient prosecution of the war, 
but merely to enable them to investigate a crime under the 
Penal Code more easily and possibly more efficiently, it is 
a misuse of the powers given by the rule and the High Court 
is competent to release the detenu under Section 491 
Criminal Procedure Code, in spite of Section 16 of Defence 
of India Act. An order of detention for investigation of 
an offence already committed was held not to be valid and
(2 )
could be questioned in the Courts, in spite of Section 16. '
In Narayanamma *s case, * it was held by the Hyderabad 
High Court that, if the main purpose of detention be 
investigation of a crime, detention of a person under the
(1) Bisheshwar Dayal v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1946 Dah.36
(2) Dilbhag Singh v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1944 Lah.373
(3) Narayanamma v. Hyderabad, A.I.R.1950 Hyd.68.
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Preventive Detention Act would be colourable, improper and 
amount to circumventing important provisions of the 
Constitution, and as such it cannot be allowed.
Where the detaining authority makes up his mind to 
detain a person, who is alleged to have committed an offence, 
the detaining authority has made his choice and it would not 
be permissible to investigate the offence, v/hile the person 
is under detention and the provisions of the law with regard 
to investigation are ignored. If the purpose of detaining 
a person is collateral, i.e. to deprive him of his rights 
and safeguards under the Criminal Procedure Code and to 
carry on an investigation without the supervision of the 
Court, then the detention is mala fide and cannot be 
justified.
Where it is clear from the averments in the affidavit
filed by the detaining authority, that the object of a
detention order was to prevent the release on bail of the
detenu, who was charged under certain sections of the Penal
Code, such an order is mala fide and where a detention is
traceable to such mala fide exercise of power alone, the
(2 )detention must be held to be illegal. v *
Where an under-trial prisoner is ordered to be 
released on b&il and soon after is detained under the
(1) 1/Ialedath v. Commr. of Police, A.I.R. 1950 Bomb.202
(2) In the matter of N.K.Sreenivasan, A.I.R. 1949 Mad.761.
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provisions of the U.P. Maintenance of Public Order 
(Temporary) Act, 1947, the detention cannot in all cases 
he held to be mala fide. Every case depends upon its 
merits. The Court, when granting bail under the provisions 
of the Criminal Procedure Code and the executive authorities 
when ordering detention under the Maintenance of Public 
Order (Temporary) Act, act in different spheres, guided by 
different considerations and actuated by different 
objectives. The Courts are charged with the judicial 
determination of an offence already committed and in that 
connection to consider whether or not to grant bail to the 
accused. The detaining authority on the other hand, while 
acting under the Public Order Act, has before him the object 
of taking preventive action in the interest of the 
maintenance of public order and safety and communal harmony. 
Their fields of activities are not concurrent. They are 
largely exclusive of each other. The overlapping arises 
only incidentally, when considering the past conduct of that 
person. It may be that the Court, on a consideration of 
the relevant matters and in the light of the provisions in 
the Criminal Procedure Code, may consider the grant of bail 
proper, whereas the Provincial Government or the District 
Magistrate, acting under the U.P. Maintenance of Public 
Order (Temporary) Act 1947, may consider his detention
22 7
necessary in the interest of public order, safety and 
communal harmony. In such a case the order of detention 
cannot be said to be mala fide. But where it appears that 
the detention order was passed to defeat the order of the 
Court granting bail and not for purposes mentioned in the 
U.P. Maintenance of Public Order (Temporary) Act, 1947, it 
is mala fide.^^ Where the order of detention was passed 
by the District Magistrate long before the release of the 
detenus on bail was thought of, but he thought that, as the 
detenus were already in jail, it was unnecessary to give 
immediate effect to the orders of d etentiftn and when the 
detenus were released in pursuance of the order of the High 
Court granting bail, the District Magistrate, in the 
interest of public peace, enforced the order of detention, 
the District Magistrate must be held to have acted bona fide.^^ 
But where the applicant was in judicial custody at the time 
when the order of detention was passed, that exercise of 
power was held to be not in good faith.
Where the order of detention is communicated to
(1) Mohd Hasan Khan v. Rex, AI.R. 1949 All. 406.
(2) In re K. Rajogopalrao, (1949) 2 M.jL.J.614
(3) In the matter of Sreenivasan, A.I.R.1949 Mad.761
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Government long before the detenu is actually arrested, it 
is impossible to attribute mala fides to the authority
(I)
concerned by reason of the delay in communication. 7
The validity of an order of detention after acquittal
*
on trial of a criminal charge came up for consideration with
reference to the Bombay Public Security Measures Act, 1947?
( 2 )in the case of Hira.ji Shivram v. Commissioner of Police. v 7 
Their Lordship held
"The act does not contemplate that there should first 
be a prosecution for the purpose of securing conviction and 
then, when after that long drawn out process was over, the 
Police Commissioner should have recourse to the special 
powers, and arrest the person concerned on these very grounds, 
which, in the first instance, should have been made the 
ground of detention. It is not for the Police to usurp 
the function of the Magistrate to keep the detenu in custody 
when the magistrate has granted bail to the detenu and thus 
to arrogate the right to review the judgment of the 
Magistrate.”
In the instant case Desai, J. observed ,
HI do feel and feel strongly, that it is not
(1) Venkataraman v. Commissioner of Police, A.I.E.1949 Mad.605
(2) A.I.R. 1948 Bomb.417-
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permissible for the Commissioner of Police to lend himself 
to any course of action, which suggests that he arrogates to 
himself the right to review the judgment of the Magistrate.
He must respectfully abide by it. When then a situation 
arises, which lends itself to the construction that the 
action of the Police Commissioner is an attempt to supersede 
the order of the Magistrate, Courts of Justice mist be 
vigilant to see that justice is not brought into ridicule 
and rendered impotent and that a tendency towards autocracy 
does not prevail in the minds of the representatives of the 
democracy.11
In another case it was observed, that 
Where a man is arrested and brought up before a Court on
some definite and specific charge, it seems to me very 
undesirable and indeed quite wrong for an order of detention 
to be made against him before he has been tried on the charge 
and his guilt or innocence finally determined. If he is 
convicted or sentenced, the necessity of any order of 
detention ceases to exist, at least until he has served out
his sentence, by which time conditions may have entirely 
altered. If on the other hand, he is acquitted, and an 
order of detention is sought against him, surely, the 
official on whom the responsibility of making such an order
(1) Kamla Kant v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1944 Pat.354. 365.
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rests, should obtain and study a copy of the judgment,
I do not say that, in no case where a man has been 
acquitted, should or can an order of detention be made. 
Prosecutions may break down, and acts of the person against 
whom an order is sought other than the act or acts, which
led to his being prosecuted, may quite properly have to be
taken into consideration. Clearly however in most of such 
cases, the act which led to a manfs prosecution will also be 
the overt act relied on or principally relied on to connect 
him with some subversive movement and justify the making of 
an order of detention and if the official, on whom the duty 
of making the order is cast neglects to send a copy of the 
judgment, it may very well be said that he has failed to act 
with due care and attention in the discharge of that duty.'1
In Emperor v. G-.K. Yagli,^^ Lokur, J, observed
1 It is a fallacy to say that the right to prosecute a 
person under the ordinary criminal law and the right to
detain him under the Defence Rules or the Ordinance are
mutually exclusive. If a person, who is really dangerous 
to public safety and maintenance of public order, commits 
an offence, Government would certainly be justified to 
prosecute him for the offence first, and if, for want of
(1) (1945) 47 Bom. L.R.669.
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sufficient evidence, the prosecution fails, it would none 
the less he necessary to keep him in detention for the sake 
of public safety and maintenance of public order. If the 
argument be accepted, it would be risky for Government to 
prosecute such a man, lest the power of detention would be 
lost in case of his discharge or acquittal, Ihe standard 
of evidence required for conviction is different from that 
required for a reasonable satisfaction of the necessity for 
detention in the interest of public safety or maintenance 
of public order. For conviction the Court has to be 
convinced of the guilt of the accused and the benefit of a 
reasonable doubt goes to the accused. But for the purpose 
of detention, it is enough if the Government or any officer 
duly empowered is reasonably satisfied of the necessity of 
his deteiition and there can be no benefit of doubt, since the 
public safety and maintenance of public order are the 
paramount concern of Government during these times of 
emergency. Hence even if the evidence adduced at the trial 
is not sufficient to secure his conviction, the power of the 
Provincial Government to order his detention is not lost, if 
it is reasonably satisfied that it is necessary to do so 
with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial 
to the public safety or the maintenance of public order.1
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A plea of mala fides cannot succeed on mere vague
allegations. There should be specific allegations of mala 
fl)fides. v ' Where a person has been arrested and is under
Police custody with a view to investigation into a crime
and his prosecution for the same, but subsequently Government
decides to drop the said proceedings and to detain him under
the Preventive Detention Act, the fact that, while in police
custody, he was interrogated does not necessarily prove that
the subsequent detention order was for a collateral purpose
(2 )or mala fide. ' J
The mere fact that the detention order followed the
release of the detenu on bail in a criminal case is not
sufficient to hold such order to be mala fide. In Hira,j Mohd *s
(3 )case' the detenu was already in Jail in connection with
a separate criminal case. On the date he was to be released 
on bail by order of the High Court, the a etenu was served with 
a detention order under Section 3 of the Y/est Pakistan 
Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, I960. It was urged 
that, since the detention order followed the release of the 
detenu on bail, the order was mala fide. It was held that 
it was not possible on this single circumstance alone to
(1) Iftikhar-ud-Din v. Sarfraz, P.L.D.1961 S.C.585
(2) L&qdooin Mohi-ud-Din v. State, A.I.R.1952 Hyd.112,
(3) Miraj Mohd v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.1.D.1966 Kar.283.
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hold that the order was mala fide. Possibly the detention 
order was made to deprive the detenu of the liberty restored 
to him by the bail order of the High Court, but it is equally 
possible that the detaining authority had an honest 
conviction that the petitioner was not a person to be allowed 
free movement and action in the context of the situation then 
prevailing, without detriment to the maintenance of "law and 
order." In the absence of any proof that the action of the 
detaining authority is motivated by malicious intent and 
purpose, which the petitioner must prove as a fact, we are 
unable to attribute any malice to the detaining authority.
Preventive justice in all cases must proceed to a 
certain extent upon suspicion or anticipation, as distinct 
from proof. For passing an order of detention, it is the 
satisfaction of the magistrate which is necessary. If the 
authority has sufficient material to satisfy himself, he 
can act even though there is no detailed evidence of the 
type on which a court of law can convict an accused. The 
fact that the police were unable to furnish a detailed report 
till a date very near the one on which the order was passed 
cannot lead to the inference that the order was passed mala 
fide in the absence of materials.
\
(1) Mohit lal v. The State, A.I.E. 1951 Pat. 459
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Instances of paBt activities are relevant to be 
considered in giving rise to the subjective mental 
conviction of the detaining authority that the persons to 
be detained are likely to indulge in objectionable 
activities. Though the object of preventive detention 
is to prevent a person from acting in future in an 
objectionable way, the Court cannot hold that the order of 
detention is mala fide because it refers to past activities, 
for, the satisfaction of the detaining authority is 
subjective. ' It is also legitimate to consider 
activities outside the jurisdiction of the authority making 
the order of d e t e n t i o n , b u t  the past activities must be 
related to the situation existing at the moment when the 
detaining authority makes the order. If the detaining 
authority, on proper material, is satisfied that such 
relations exist, it will be difficult for the court to 
hold the detention illegal.^
The order of detention is not mala fide, merely because
(1) Bhim Sen v. The State of Punjab, A.I.E. 1951 S.C.481
(2) Sarju v. State, A.I.R.1956 All 589 (593).
(3) ftkhbub Anam v. Govt.of East Pakistan, P.L.D.1959 Dacca 774*
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a person, on the expiry of his detention under a temporary
law of preventive detention, has been detained on the same
(1)ground, under another Act. y
Recourse to preventive detention, where the ordinary 3aw 
would be sufficient to meet the needs of the case, may lend 
colour to the conclusion that the order is mala fide. It
cannot be stated as a rule of law that, when a person is
accused of an offence, the only course open to the authorities 
is to prosecute him and that he cannot be detained. It is a 
fallacy to say that the right to prosecute a person under 1he 
ordinary criminal law and the right to detain him are mutually 
exclusive. There is no rule of law that, unless a choice of 
one of two alternatives, prosecution or detention, is made at 
the earliest moment, the order of detention must be held to 
be invalid. The proper approach is to consider the facts of
each case and then consider whether the order of detention is
mala fide or not. No doubt there may be cases in which there 
will be a clash between the different rights, if both 
detention and prosecution are made and pursued at the same time. 
In such cases, if the State Government pursues the prosecution 
it must comply with the safeguards in the Criminal Procedure 
code, and must give the under-trial prisoner such rights as
(1) Ananta v. State, A.I.R.1951 Orissa 27 
Ram Adar v. State, A.I.R.1951 All.18
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he may have under the law. It is not open to the State
Government to fall hack on Clause (3) of Article 22 and hold
an investigation or trial in disregard of the provisions of
Criminal Procedure Code. Apart however, from this difficulty,
the test whether a detention order is or is not mala fide
depends on whether the order is for the purpose mentioned in
the order itself, namely, the maintenance of public order, or
(1)whether it is for any ulterior or collateral purpose.v 7
Cases can be imagined in which the activities of a person 
might be of a most dangerous type ana yet there may not be 
enough evidence to secure a conviction or witnesses may not 
be forthcoming. In a case like these and olhers, it might 
not be possible to take action under the ordinary lav/ and the 
detention of the person, in exercise of the powers under the 
Preventive Detention Act, may be considered essential.
There may be other cases in which detention of the person is 
deemed to be more essential in the interests of the State. 
Y/hether the person should be prosecuted under the ordinary 
law or the Government should exercise their power under the 
Preventive Detention Act is a matter for the authorities to 
decide.^  ^
(1) Subodh Kumar v. The State, A.I.R. 1951 Pat.68
(2) Jhala Jorubha v. The State, A.I.R. 1952 Sau.12 (16).
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If the authorities have recourse to the drastic measure 
of detention rather than to a preventive order under Section 
144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it lends some colour to the 
petitioner’s contention that the order is mala fide but 
suspicion is not proof. In the absence of other facts to 
show that the authority was actuated by any improper or 
indirect motive, the order cannot be impugned as mala fide.^^
When a man is arrested on some specific charge, it is 
not desirable to pass an order of detention against him 
before he has been tried on that charge and his guilt or 
innocence has been finally determined. The order of 
detention, in such circumstances, may result in some 
prejudice to the person detained, but it cannot be said that 
the order of detention will be illegal. When the police 
arrest a man under the ordinary law and xvhen the authorities 
order detention under the Public Safety Ordinance, they act 
in different spheres, guided by different objectives and their 
fields of activity are not concurrent. They are largely 
exclusive of each other. Hence the order is not illegal.
But to order detention under Public Safety Act, while a person 
is already under arrest under the ordinary law is, to say the
(l) Ashutosh Lahiri v. The State of Delhi, A.I.R. 1953 S.C.451
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least, undesirable, even though it may not be wanting in
(i)
good faith.v '
Y/here serious communal disturbances had broken out in 
the city the executive authorities in the discharge of their 
duty to maintain public order and communal harmony, thought 
it necessary to take preventive action against persons whom 
they considered to be fomentors of the trouble. They 
started cases against them on charges of offences alleged to 
have been already committed by them, as they thought it 
necessary, in order to prevent them from acting in a manner 
prejudicial to the public safety and maintenance of public 
order and communal harmony, to pass detention orders under 
the U.P. Maintenance of Public Order (Temporary) Act, 1947* 
They were faced with a difficult situation. Quick action 
had to be taken and the trouble had to be nipped in the bud.
It was held that the detention orders were passed in the 
honest discharge of the public duty and were not mala fide.^^ 
Whether an order of detention of a person can be made 
simultaneously with the institution of a prosecution against 
him does not depend on any rule of law; the question has to 
be approached, and answered in each case, on a consideration
(1) Mahbub Anam v. Govt, of East Pakistan, P.1.D.1959 Dacca774
(2) Mohd Hussain v. Hex, A.I.R. 1949 All 406.
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of the question whether the order of detention, in view of
the pending prosecution, is bona fide or not. To answer the
question, the uncontroverted facts have to be considered, and
the test will be whether the order of detention is for the
purpose it purports to be or really for an ulterior or
(1)collateral purpose. 7
When there is a pending criminal case against a person
but the same is withdrawn and an order of detention is made
(2 )
against him, the order is not necessarily mala fide. J 
The proper approach is to consider the facts of each case to 
determine whether the order is mala, fide or not.^^
The case of The Lahore Electric Supply Co.^^ furnishes 
an example of malice in fact. In this case the plaintiffs 
instituted a suit challenging the validity of the various 
acts and notices to terminate the licence of the Electric 
Company; then an order under Rule 75-A of Defence of India 
Rules (1939) was made. The subsequent order of 
acquisition and the seizure of the undertaking was made to 
defeat the plaintiff’s claim, pending in Court, for the
(1) D$yanand Modi v. State of Bihar, A.I.R.1951 Pat.47
(2) Raman Lai v. Commissioner of Police, A.I.R. 1952 Cal.26,30.
(3) Ratan Lai v. D.M.Ganjam, A.I.R.1952 Orissa 52.
(4) Lahore Electric Supply Co.Ltd. v. Province of Punjab,
A.I.R,1943 Lah.41 (P.B); 35 Deccan Law Reporter 153*
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purpose of over-reaching the Court. It was not made 
bona fide; Rule 75-A did not warrant the type of order 
made and the order was held to be ultra vires. In relation 
to preventive detention cases, it would however be very 
difficult to establish malice in fact of the authority, 
for it is always a matter of subjective determination.
The onus of proving mala fides is upon the detenu^^ 
and the trend of recent decision shows that the burden is 
heavy. !fIt is not sufficient merely to allege that the 
detention is not in good faith ... Pacts have got to be 
alleged by the detenu, sufficiently cogent to persuade the 
Court that, although the order, ex facie, indicates that 
everything that should have been done has been properly 
done, it is proper for the Court to call upon the Executive 
to justify further what is expressed to have been done in 
the order.”
It is true that an executive authority must exercise 
its authority honestly and without malice and it is the 
duty of the Courts to see that a fraudulent exercise of such 
power or a colourable exercise of it, to gain an ulterior
(1) Mahbub Anam v. The Govt, of East Pakistan, P.L.D.1959
Dacca 774*
(2) Green v. Secy, of State (1942) A.C.248.
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object, is stifled; but the question of the mala fide 
exercise of power is one of fact in each case and the onus 
is on the detenu to show that the order of detention is in 
fact a fraudulent exercise of power vested in the Government 
and he can sustain that burden only if he can successfully 
rebut the presumption of bona fides on the part of the 
Government. ^  The presumption of validity and adequacy 
of grounds attaches to the order of detention in the 
assumption that it is made in good faith. The mere 
challenge of the bona fides made by the applicant, will not, 
ordinarily, be enough to put the matter in issue. He must 
put material before the Court to lead to conclusion that 
good faith is lacking in relation to his detention. If a 
doubt is created in the mind of the Court as to the bona 
fides of the authorities, it is for the authorities 
concerned to dispel the d o u b t . ^
(1) Miraj Mohd v. Govt.of West Pakistan, P.L.D.1966 Ear.283
(2) I.It.R# (1949) 1 CUT. 244 (257).
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CHAPTER VI 
THE DETAINING AUTHORITY
Satisfaction
The power of preventive detention is based on the
"satisfaction11 of the detaining authority that it is necessary
to detain a specific person because he is likely to act in a
manner prejudicial to the public safety, the maintenance of
public order or the security of the State. The satisfaction
of the Government or other detaining authority, its nature
and the right of the detenu to challenge it before the Court
are questions of fundamental importance and many legal
battles have been fought over the satisfaction clause
contained in the various statutes and ordinances.
The satisfaction of the detaining authority may be
based upon the past activities of the detenu; if such
activities, in the opinion of the detaining authority, give
rise to the apprehension of prejudicial conduct on his part
in the future or his past objectionable activities have a
(1 )relation to the existing situation.' ' The fact that the 
detenu has been in jail since he indulged in activities 
giving rise to such apprehension is itself no bar to action
(1) Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab A.I.R.1952 S.C.350, 352
Mahbub Anam v. Govt* of East Pakistan P.L.P. 1959 Dacca 774
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■under preventive detention law, if the detaining authority 
is satisfied that, having regard to the past activities, 
the intended detenu is likely to indulge in prejudicial 
activities on his release.^
The satisfaction contemplated by the various acts, 
must be of the particular authority empowered by the law 
to pass the order of detention. The Secretary to the Home 
Department cannot thus substitute hjs own discretion in
place of the Home Minister, whose satisfaction alone is
(21required under the law.v 7
(31In Liversidge v. Andersonv , J the majority held that 
the Home Secretary*s satisfaction was not subject to review 
by the court and, until recently, in India and Pakistan, 
this has been followed by the courts. In his dissenting 
judgement Lord Atkin said that the court should not act as 
a court of appeal in this matter but should deal with it 
in the same way as arrest by a police officer, empowered 
to arrest a person reasonably suspected of being concerned
(1) Santhamma v. State of Hyderabad A.I.R.1951 Hyd,128.
(2) State v. Som Nath. A.I.R* 1953 Orissa 35, 37.
(3) (1942) A.C.206
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in the commission of an offence; the question for
determination would be whether a reasonable man, in the
circumstances, would have arrested. The majority
conceded that, were the statutory rule involved a piece of
peace-time legislation, Iiord A thin #s view would be valid
hut not when it was a piece of war-time legislation. In
1950 in Tinsa Maw Naing v. Commissioner of Police^1 ,^
E. Maung J., citing Liversidge« held that, as the statute
involved was peace-time legislation, the court could enquire
into the reasonableness of action of the detaining authority
but his logic and independence brought him no immediate
honour in his own country or elsewhere.
What the law requires, it was held, is the satisfaction
of the detaining authority and not of the Court.
Satisfaction must be that of the detaining authority and
not of the Court.
It must be an "honest" and bona fide satisfaction, not
unreal, sham or mala fide. It must be a 'reasonable
satisfaction* not arbitrary or irrational.v * In a
(3)casev 7 under the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order 
Ordinance, (I960, it was observed that, "It is for the
(1) B.L.R. (1950) SC 17.
loba Pam v. State, A.I.R. 1951 Assam 45 (44)
(5) Kiraj Muhammad v. Grovt. of West Pakistan, P. I.E. 1966 Ear.282
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detaining authority to judge and put its own interpretation 
on the suspected prejudicial acts of an intended detenu for 
its own subjective satisfaction and it does not fall within 
the province of the Courts to probe into that satisfaction 
or analyse the substance and quantum of the evidence on
(1)which that satisfaction is based. In Maqdoom1 s case .. 7
it was held as follows
"Whether there is sufficient material for arriving at 
the conclusion that the detenu is likely to indulge in 
prejudicial activities is a question solely to be decided 
by the detaining authority. It is not necessary that such 
a conclusion should be arrived at on legal proof. It is 
well settled that the question whether the detaining authority 
was right, in view of the material before it, in issuing the 
ofder of detention is not justiciable. The scope of 
judicial enquiry in the proceeding challenging the order 
under the Preventive Detention is a limited one. The 
correctness of the statements relating to the past activities 
of the detenu is not justiciable. The Court cannot examine 
the past activities of the detenu, as alleged by the 
detaining authority. The reason for the exclusion from 
judicial scrutiny is that the satisfaction under section 3 of
(1) Maqdoom Mohi-ud-Din v. State of Hyderabad, A.I.R.1952
Hyd. 112.
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the Preventive Detention Act is subjective and no Court
can substitute its opinion  for that of the
authority and thereby hold the satisfaction to be 
wrongly reached. In the instant case Srinivasa Chari J. 
observed "The satisfaction that is expected is of the 
executive as it is entrusted with the duty of maintaining 
peace and order.11 This view was affirmed by the Supreme 
Court of India in State of Bombay v. Atma Bam, where 
it was held that the satisfaction in such cases is to 
be that of Government which alone is necessary to be 
established.
(2 )In Abid Mirza^ case, 7 it was held that the 
’Satisfaction* contemplated by the Ordinance (West 
Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order, I960) is the 
satisfaction of the authority which passes the order 
under Section 5* At the same time it cannot be 
disputed that, before such an order is passed, the 
authority has to apply its mind to all the material, 
which is relevant and to which its attention must be
(1) A.I.R, 1951 S.C.157
(2) Abid Ali Mirza v. Govt, of West Pakistan, 
P.L.D.1967 Ear.408.
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drawn. It must be remembered that, under Section 5 
the Government has to be satisfied that, with a view 
to preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner 
prejudicial to public safety, etc., it was necessary 
to pass an order.
That being the requirement of law, the Government has 
to have all the necessary material placed before them, 
which it would have to examine and apply its mind to.
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Reasonableness
In Ghulam Jilani's c a s e ^  the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan considered the question of judicial reviewability 
of detention orders under the Defence of Pakistan Rules.
In this cgse, which is of great importance, the Supreme 
Court (per Cornelius C.J.) held that a mere declaration 
of executive "satisfaction11 is not sufficient to justify 
detention. The existence of "reasonable grounds”, 
though not expressly required by the relevant rule, is 
essential. The court also held that, "It was the 
function of the judiciary to ascertain the existence of 
reasonable grounds." In arriving at this conclusion, 
the court found support in Article 2 of the 1962 
Constitution, which requires every citizen to be treated 
in accordance with law and in Article 98 , which the court 
construed as conferring power on a superior court to 
examine every exercise of executive power in ascertaining 
its lawful authority.
In 1967 the Supreme Court of Pakistan declined to
(1) Malik Grhulam Jilani v. The Govt, of West Pakistan
P.L.D. 1967 S.C.373.
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follow the majority in Xiversidge v. Anderson^ , applied
the objective test and accepted the view of lord Atkin,
which the other law lords had said would be applicable to
peace-time legislation. If the Supreme Court had
followed the rule laid down in liversidge1s case, that
would have meant recognising a rule applicable in England
in grave emergencies and to apply it to legislation in
Pakistan, not enacted in such a situation.
Although lord Atkin’s view was not welcomed at the
time, some jurists, like Sir Carleton Allen, strongly
(2 )supported his view. In an article publishedv y on 
”Reg.l8-B and Reasonable Cause,” he wrote
’’The hinge of lord Atkin’s speech is that the term 
•reasonable cause1 had, up to the date of this decision one 
clear meaning and one plain effect, in every branch of law, 
whether common or statutory. It involved an objective 
examination by an independent tribunal, of the reasonableness 
claimed for the conduct impugned. lord Atkin had supported 
this proposition by an abundant illustration and stated 
categorically that there is no known exception to it.”
(1) 1942 A.C.206
(2) law Quarterly Review 1942 (58) P.232
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Further on it has been said, ,!...when the Regulation 
requires the Minister merely to be satisfied,” apparently 
it is not necessary for him to be convinced that it is 
reasonable to detain a subject with trial, whereas when he 
is required to have ’reasonable cause,1 his satisfaction —  
his ’mental state' must be accompanied by an element of 
reasonableness. Sir Carleton believed that objective test 
should have been used by the House of lords in this case and 
in conclusion wrote s-
”The spectacle of dispassionate justice and of calm 
adherence to the law of land, even in the force of imminent 
danger, will always be more admired ... than immunity of 
executive action on any grounds of temporary urgency; 
and it will be particularly admired at a time when the 
nation is embattled against no enemy more sinister than the 
odious doctrine that the administration of justice is 
subservient to the requirements of ’Policy.’ ”
Ghulam Jilani's case came on appeal before the Supreme 
Court against the decisions of the High Court of West 
Pakistan on challenging a petition for habeas corpus the 
detention, under the Defence of Pakistan Rules, of three 
persons namely, Malik Ghulam Jilani, Sardar Shaukat Hayat 
Khan and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, who were leading politicians.
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A brief histmry of the events, which led to the making 
of the detention orders against them may be stated as followss-
On the 11th January 1966 the Tashkent Declaration was 
announced in Lahore. It had been signed at about midnight 
on the previous night. The Declaration aroused feelings of 
strong resentment among certain sections of the people, not 
only in Lahore, but elsewhere in Y/est Pakistan as well. On 
the 12th January posters appeared in Lahore, announcing a 
procession of protest on the following day. On the 13th 
January, a procession of students was taken out, despite the 
fact that an order under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, 
was in force in Lahore, prohibiting the assembly of five or 
more persons. Violence followed and there waB extensive 
damage to public and private property. Another procession 
was taken out on the 16th January and, on the 18th January, 
there was a similar procession which was, it seems, sponsored 
by the combined opposition parties.
All these processions were taken out in defiance of the 
order under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code. On the 28th 
January an announcement was made after the Friday prayers 
outside Wazir Khan Mosque in Lahore City, consisting of a 
'’heartfelt appeal" by named representatives of the four 
parties, including l&lik Ghulam Jilani, to their supporters 
that "in their efforts for restoration of basic rights,
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they should not endanger their personal liberty and defy 
the order under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, until 
after the Conference called far the 5th/6th February by the 
combined opposition parties had announced its decisions.”
On the 5th February 1966, the Conference was duly held 
in Gulberg, the three detenus being among those present. In 
the Welcome Address, the speaker applauded the sacrifices of 
the troops and civil population, as well as the military 
successes gained by the armed forces, during the September 
war and immediately went on to say that ”a valuable victory, 
which we had won in the field of battle, was lost at the 
conference table.” The reference was to the Tashkent 
Declaration.
This defeat had appalled and shocked the people. The 
speaker went on to say that, in the face of the frustration 
so caused, all outlets for expression of opinion were blocked 
by control of propaganda machinery under section 144, Criminal 
Procedure Code, by the arrest of speakers and by violence 
against students. The speech was not however concerned with 
the Tashkent Declaration. It went on to say that it had 
become necessary to change the whole political system. For 
this a single conference was not enough. ”Constructive and 
lasting changes can be brought about only through a determined, 
organised and sustained struggle planned and launched after
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real consideration," and "if this Conference can make 
satisfactory arrangements, it is bound to succeed."
On the following day, six resolutions were passed; 
one of the Resolutions condemned the Tashkent Declaration and 
said that, despite this Declaration, the people of Pakistan 
would continue to fight for the right of self-determination 
of the Kashmiri people and "will not make peace with India, 
until the State of Jammu and Kashmir has been liberated from 
India's forcible occupation.1 Following this Conference, a 
committee of five persons was appointed to "work for freedom 
and democracy."
On the 16th February 1966, the Deputy Commissioner of 
Lahore made a detention order under rule 32 of the Defence of 
Pakistan Rules which had been made in exercise of the power 
in section 3 of the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance; that order 
is the subject for consideration in the present case. The 
order said that the Deputy Commissioner had considered "the 
report of the Police and all the attending circumstances, 
namely, the recent disturbances in the Province of West 
Pakistan and particularly in the city of Lahore, culminating 
in the commission of violence against the police personnel 
and the public tranquillity and necessitating the closure of 
schools and colleges." On such consideration, he was
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satisfied that there was enough material to show that the 
three detenus concerned in this case, along with two other 
persons" are or have been jointly engaged in activities which 
are likely to seriously prejudice the maintenance of public 
order and peaceful conditions in the city of Lahore and 
elsewhere in the Province. "In order to prevent them from 
acting in the aforesaid manner, it was necessary that they 
should be arrested and detained.
During the course of the hearing of these appeals, all 
the three detenus were released by the Provincial Government. 
In the ordinary course, such release would have had the 
effect of causing the appeals to abate, but in these cases, 
learned counsel urged that, since, in each case, the 
detention had exceeded a period of nine months, the detenus 
had thereby incurred disqualification in respect of their 
right to stand for elections to representative offices, by 
the effect of section 53 of Electoral College Act and section 
106 of the National and Provincial Assemblies (Election) Act. 
Each of them was a politician of standing and was gravely 
prejudiced by this result in respect of his future political 
career and each of them was therefore interested to have it 
declared that his detention was illegal. The Court was 
therefore asked to record a decision as to the legality of 
the detention order of the 16th February, 1966.
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Cornelius, C.J; said, "the number of rules made under the 
Defence of Pakistan Ordinance is 208. Of these, it appears 
to us, as at present advised, that only two rules, viz: Nos. 
32 and 204 are relateable by subject to the power afforded by 
section 3 (2)(x). Rule 32, so far as it is relevant to the 
present discussion, is reproduced below2-
32. (1) The Central Government, if satisfied with respect to 
any particular person, that, with a view to preventing him 
from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security, the 
public safety or interest or the defence of Pakistan, the 
maintenance of public order, Pakistani relations with any 
other power, the maintenance of peaceful conditbns in any 
part of Pakistan, the maintenance of essential supplies and 
services or the efficient conduct of military operations or 
prosecution of war, it is necessary so to do, may make an 
order:-
(b) directing that he be detained."
Rule 204 is worded as follows in its relevant part:- 
"204.(1) Any police officer, or any other officer of 
Government empowered in this behalf by general or special 
order of the Central Government, may arrest without warrant 
any person whom he reasonably suspects of having acted, 
of acting, or of being about to act -
(a) with intent to assist any State at war with or engaged
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in military operation against Pakistan, or in a maaner 
prejudicial to the security, the public safety or interest, 
or the defence of Pakistan or to the efficient conduct of 
military operations or prosecution of war. A point of 
initial importance is that section 3(2)(x) makes suspicion 
of at least one of a number of specified activities a 
necessary condition for action to apprehend or detain.
Rule 204 follows, in respect of persons with certain 
injurious intentions, the very words of section 3(2)(x), viz 
"suspects, on grounds appearing to such authority to be 
reasonable, of having acted, acting, being about to act" 
in a prejudicial manner. The power of a police or other 
empowered officer given by Rule 204 is dependent upon 
suspicion, based on reasonable grounds that the person in 
question has performed or is performing or is about to 
perform a prejudicial act. One may ask whether, if the 
officer believes on reasonable grounds that the person in 
question has acted or is acting or is about to act in 
prejudicial manner, he is debarred from exercising this 
power under Rule 204, when his state of mind, in the 
relevant respects, is appreciably more definite than if 
he were acting on mere suspicion. Can it be supposed that 
he could not exercise the power of arrest conferred upon 
him by Rule 204, if he in fact knew, not necessarily by
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direct observation, but on the basis of evidence which he 
could reasonably accept, that the person had committed, was 
committing or was about to commit a prejudicial act? And 
what would be the position, if he had this knowledge by 
direct observation? Would his power under Rule 204 be 
defeated, because his state of mind was formed from direct 
knowledge or inferential conviction or reasonable belief, 
each of which as a ground for action, is immeasurably 
stronger than mere reasonable suspicion? There can be no 
doubt that Rule 204 must be construed and applied so that, 
if the ground for action be stronger than mere suspicion, 
the power afforded by that rule would certainly be available. 
In perhaps a more pertinent aspect, the extent of protection 
that the public servant can claim for his actions, it is even 
more clear that a state of direct knowledge, or inferential 
conviction, or reasonable belief, would be at least as 
complete a justification as reasonable suspicion.
A similar construction may be placed in my view upon the 
words "suspect on grounds appearing to such authority to be 
reasonable," that have been employed in section 3(2)(x) of 
the Ordinance. Even under these words, rules may therefore 
be made which enable action to be taken on grounds of direct 
knowledge, inferential conviction, or reasonable belief. It 
is in that light that Rule 32 falls to be construed. Its
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wording follows a provision in clause (x) enabling the making 
of rules for the detention of persons "with respect to whom 
(such) authority is satisfied that his apprehension and 
detention are necessary for the purpose of preventing him 
from acting in any such prejudicial manner", e.g? in a 
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This 
rule requires a stronger ground for action than mere suspicion, 
however reasonable. For the making of an order of detention 
of any person, it is necessary that the detaining authority 
should be satisfied in relation to such person, that it is 
necessary to make such an order for the purpose of 
preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner e.g; 
acting so as to disturb the public order. There must be in 
the mind of the detaining authority a belief that the person 
in question is either about to act or is likely to act in the 
aforesaid manner; only so can the word "satisfied" be 
construed. Preventive action is called for only by imminent 
and real necessity, under this rule. Such satisfaction, as 
has been said above, would be within the power of the rule 
making authority to prescribe under section 3(2)(x) of the 
Ordinance, even under the earlier words, viz; "suspects, on 
the grounds appearing to such authority to be reasonable" of 
being about to act to the prejudice of public order. But 
if "satisfaction" may, for sec Tiring protection to empowered
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authorities, be deemed to be included within the meaning 
of M suspicion,1 the other condition must also be deemed to 
apply viz; the requirement of reasonable grounds for 
satisfaction. Is it admissible to differentiate between 
protection for action on suspicion and action on satisfaction, 
both understood as analysed above, so that in the one case 
reasonable grounds must be established to give protection 
and in the other a mere declaration is sufficient? Clause (x) 
does not differentiate between the authorities which may be 
empowered to act,with the incident of protection on suspicion 
and those which may act, under similar protection, on 
satisfaction. The element of status in the empowered 
authority does not appear from any words used in the clause, 
though it is present in Rules 32 and 204* Yet by virtue of 
subsections (4) and (5) of section 3* the delegation of 
power under any rule may be made to any officer of the 
Central or a Provincial Government and under Rule 204, the 
same power that a police-constable has may be conferred upon 
any other officer, by general or special order of the Central 
Government, which may delegate this power of making orders to 
a Provincial Government.
Reading clause (x) according to the tenor of its 
language, and bearing in mind that it makes legal provision 
for restraint upon personal liberty, which is a fundamental
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right of a citizen in Pakistan, the conclusion that appears 
unavoidable is that, to gain protection for any action 
thereunder, the existence of reasonable grounds is essential 
and a mere declaration of satisfaction is not sufficient.11
"The ascertainment of reasonable grounds ig essentially
a judicial or at least a quasi-judicial function. It is too
late in the day to rely, .... on the dictum in the English
(1}case of Liversidge,v 7 for the purpose of investing the 
detaining authority with complete power to be the judge of 
its own satisfaction. Public power is now exercised in 
Pakistan under the Constitution of 1962, of which Article 2 
requires that every citizen shall be dealt with strictly in 
accordance with law. If then Rule 32 owes its vires to 
section 3(2)(x), it must follow that, by the use of the 
words "reasonable grounds," clause (x) has unmistakably 
imported into this rule, controlling the exercise of public 
power, the requirement that, to gain protection of the rule 
for its action thereunder, the authority should be prepared 
to satisfy the Courts, to which the subject is entitled to 
have resort, for determination of the question whether he 
has been treated in accordance with law, that it has acted 
on reasonable grounds."
His Lordship, referring to the Article 98 of the 
Constitution of 1962 further observed, "Power is expressly
(1) 1942 A.C.206
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given by Article 98 to the Superior Court to probe into 
the exercise of public power by executive authorities, how 
high soever, to determine whether they have acted with lawful 
authority. The judicial power is reduced to a nullity if 
laws are so worded or interpreted that the executive 
authorities may make what statutory rules they please 
thereunder and may use this freedom to make themselves the 
final Judges of their own "satisfaction" for imposing 
restraints on the enjoyment of the fundamental rights of 
citizens. Article 2 of the Constitution could be deprived 
of all its content through this process and the Courts would 
cease to be guardians of the nation’s liberties.
The Supreme Court of Pakistan reaffirmed the rule laid
(1)down in Ghulam Jilani’s case in two later cases. 7 After 
the decision of Ghulam Jilani’s case, Clause (x) of the 
sub section (20) of section (3 ) of the Defence of Pakistan 
Ordinance, 1965 was amended by Ord. No.2 of 1968, with the 
specific object of providing that the High Court should not 
examine either the sufficiency or the reasonableness of the 
grounds of detention under the said ordinance. It was held 
that, in this view of the matter, the amendment to clause (x) 
of section 3(2) of Defence of Pakistan Ordinance "Has been 
an exercise in futility" and has in no way affected the
(i) Abdul Baqi Baluch v.Govt.of Pakistan,P.Ii.D.1968 S.C.313 
Govt.of West Pakistan v.Begum Agha Shorish EJashmari,
],l.B.19b9 S.C•14
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reason given by this court in Ghulam Jilani*s case.^^
The Supreme Court of India has laid down that •satisfaction* 
of the executive authority, under section 3 of the Preventive 
Detention Act, 1950, as to the necessity for making an order 
of detention against any person, is not subject to judicial 
review, and the question as to the propriety of the order of 
detention is not justiciable. The reasoning of the Supreme 
Court is, that, fta law providing for preventive detention 
lays down the principles governing the scheme of detention 
and the grounds on which an order of detention could validly 
be based; such a law is perfectly constitutional and cannot 
be challenged as an unauthorised delegation of legislative 
power to the executive, if it leaves it to the satisfaction 
of the executive authority to decide in each case, as it 
arises, whether one or the other of such grounds exists in 
that case, and whether the detention of the person concerned 
is necessary with a view to prevent his future prejudicial 
activities. It follows that the Court cannot place itself 
in the seat of the detaining authority and that the 
satisfaction of that authority cannot be challenged in a 
Court of Law."
Action for preventive detention has, of necessity, to be 
taken only on well founded suspicion as to future activities.
(1) Govt, of West Pakistan v. Begum Agha Shorish Xashmari,
P.1.D.1969 S.C.14
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Preventive detention is not a punishment for some specific
act or omission, but is only restraint imposed on a person
to prevent him in future from acting to the detriment of the
State. The test for the order of detention is necessarily
subjective and is based on the cumulative effect of different
actions spread over a considerable period. A Court of law
is the least appropriate tribunal to investigate the question
whether circumstances warranting the restraint do or do not
exist. The purpose of detention is not to prevent a
specific act but to prevent the achievement of a detrimental
object and all the action which may lead to that object could
never be anticipated.
Therefore, objective standards of conduct, which the
Court can utilise for determining whether in a particular
case the requirements of law have been complied with, cannot
be laid down in a law providing for preventive detention,
and the satisfaction of the executive authority cannot be
subject to judicial examination.^
In a later case (2) the Supreme Court of India reiterated
its earlier view that a detention order, being within the
subjective satisfaction of the executive, could not be judically 
scrutinised and could not be challenged on constitutional 
groundb .
(1) Gopalah A.K. v. State of Madras A.I.E.1950 S.C.27.
(2) Sadanan Dan v.State of Kerala, A.I.E.1967 S.C.1170
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Proof of the factum of satisfaction of detaining 
authority is a condition precedent for valid exercise 
of power under Rule 32. But an order of detention 
passed on fictitious and colourable satisfaction and 
without care or circumspection commensurate with gravity 
of cases affecting the liberty of citizens, cannot be 
sustained.
(1) Abul A fla Mudoodi v. Govt, of West Pakistan, 
P.L.D.1964 S.C.673
Hussain Ali Changla v. District Magistrate, 
P.1.D.1966 Lahore (309).
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Communication of Grounds
Fundamental Right No.2 Cl.(5) says:-
When any person is detained in pursuance of an order 
made under any law providing for preventive detention, the 
authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, 
communicate to such person the grounds on which the order 
has been made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity 
of making a representation against the order. Provided 
that the authority making any such order may refuse to 
disclose facts which such authority considers it to be 
against the public interest todisclose.
The term was soon as may be" means "as soon as feasible1 
in the circumstances of each case. If the grounds are not 
communicated to a detenu as soon as may be, there would be 
infringement of his Fundamental Right, guaranteed by the 
Constitution and his detention would become illegal. In
(i)
an Indian case v * the phrase was explained as follows 
"This (expression) allows the authorities reasonable time to 
formulate the grounds on the materials in their possession. 
The time element is necessarily left indeterminate, because 
activities of individuals tending to bring about a certain 
result may be spread over a long or short period, a larger 
or a smaller area, or may be in connection with a few or
(1) State of Bombay v. Atmaram, A.I.R.1951 S.C.157*
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numerous individuals. The time required to formulate the 
proper grounds of detention, on information received, is
hound to vary in individual cases.”
(1)In Pakistan, Kayani, C.J.V * gave different interpretations
to this phrase* His Lordship observed in a case under the
Constitution of 1956 "If these words n 'as soon as may be ' M
have the same meaning in clause (5) as they have in clause (1),
or at least as near them as may be, then a delay of sixteen
days clearly violates the constitutional safeguard. The
grounds, on which the detaining authority makes the order,
must be known to it on the day when the order is made, and
can ordinarily be served on the detenu along with the order
of detention. We were referred by the learned counsel for
(2 )the State to a decision of the Indian Supreme Courtv y in
which a delay of sixteen days was not held to violate the
Constitution ’under the circumstances of the case.1 The
circumstances were these. ’Under the Bengal Criminal Law 
Amendment Act, 1930, a very large number of persons were 
detained. The validity of that Act was being challenged 
in the High Court and the judgment was expected to be 
delivered towards the end of February 1950. The Preventive
(1) Chulam Muhammad Khan londkhawaru v. The State, P.L.L.1957
Lah.497*
(2) Tarparda Be v. State of If e a t Bengal, A. I. R. 1951 S.C.174*
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Detention Act, 1950, was passed by Parliament in India in 
the last week of February 1950 and these orders on all 
these detenus (100 persons) were served on 26th February 
1950* Having regard to the fact that the Provincial 
Government had thus suddenly to deal with a large number 
of cases on one day, we are unable to accept this 
contention* Their Lordships might have added that the 
detenus, having already been under detention under another 
enactment, the words !as soon as may be* were robbed of 
practical value. The delay in the present case resulted 
from ordinary dilatoriness in various offices and cannot 
be allowed to invade a Fundamental Right.”
In a case^^ under the 7/est Pakistan Maintenance of 
Public Order Ordinance, I960, it was held that, under 
sub-section (5) of section 5 of the Ordinance, it is 
rendered obligatory on the District Magistrate to communicate 
to the petitioner the grounds on which the order has been 
made and the grounds are to be communicated ’as soon as 
possible,' so that he may be able to make a rep resentation. 
Whenever any of the directions enumerated in clause (a) to 
(e) in sub-section (1) of section 5 is initiated, the grounds 
on which the District Magistrate makes the order must be
(1) Ghulam Ullah Khan v. District Magistrate, Campbellpur, 
P.L.D.1967 Pesh (195) DB.
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known to him at least on the day when the order is made and 
can ordinarily be served on the petitioner along with the 
order. Gases, however, may be visualised, which would 
be very exceptional and rare, in which the detaining 
authority may not be able to serve the grounds along with 
the order and, in order to meet such contingency, the 
detaining authority is permitted to serve the grounds after 
the order of detention, but the grounds must be served with 
the least possible delay and 24 hours may be considered to 
be dead line, within which the grounds may be served.
The period of 24 hours was fixed having regard
1) to the fact that section 5 (5) of the Ordinance is an 
encroachment on the fundamental rights of the citizen, 
which must be jealously guarded by the Courts, and
2) that the right of making a representation by the 
aggrieved person to the Government would be rendered 
illusory, if the grounds were served later than twenty-four 
hours.
In a more recent case in the Lahore High Court^^ the 
words fas soon as may be* were interpreted as follows:- 
The words ’as soon as may be* appearing in 
Sub-section (5) of Section 5 of the Ordinance must be
(1) Muhammad Aslam Malik v. Province of West Pakistan,
P.L.L.1968 Iah.1324.
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taken as indicating the intention of the law-maker that the 
grounds must be served without any avoidable delay, keeping 
in view the circumstances of the case. Their Iiordships went 
on to say that the question whether this has been done is 
clearly a matter open to judicial review. The phrase ’as 
soon as may be' must, in the vast majority of cases, mean 
simultaneously with or soon after the order is made. If 
there is any delay, it must be justified to*the satisfaction 
of the Court. And if sufficient cause is not shown for not 
communicating the grounds as soon as possible, then the 
detention order in question must be declared to be without 
lawful authority, on account of its failure to comply with 
an essential requirement of the law, under which it is 
issued. In the instant case there was delay of 35 days in 
serving the grounds of detention, allegedly on account of 
the pre-occupation of the officers concerned with other 
matters. It was held that this is hardly a satisfactory 
explanation, when the authorities are dealing with the 
liberty of the subject. In the light of these circumstances, 
it was held that the grounds were not furnished to the 
'petitioner 'as soon as may be’ after the order had been 
made, thus resulting in a violation of the statutory 
requirement contained in sub-section (5) of section 5 of the 
Ordinance.
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But in Mahbub Anamfs case^^ there was delay of two 
months in communicating the grounds to the detenu. The 
reason for the delay given by an Assistant Secretary to 
the Government of East Pakistan was as follows
nSince the Department concerned was dealing with large 
number of cases of similar nature and since there were 
large number of facts covering a considerably long period 
of this detenu and other persons, from which the authority 
concerned had to weigh and sift the relevant facts and 
prepare grounds for communication to the detenu, in order 
that he may make a representation, without however disclosing 
such facts as the authority concerned deems that it would be 
against public interest to do so, and this process took some 
time for preparing such grounds and as such the detenu could 
not be served with a copy of the grounds prior to 26th 
January, 1959
Taking judicial notice of the fact that Martial Law was 
declared on 7th October 1958, the Dacca High Court held that 
the time taken by the detaining authority in furnishing 
grounds under the circumstances of this case was not 
unreasonable. But it was pointed out that Section 19 of the 
East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance (LXXVII of 1958) has 
given a valuable right to the detenu to vindicate his 
innocence, if he has been wrongly detained, and hence he is
(1) Mahbub Anam v.Govt. of East Pakistan, P.L.D.1959
Dacca 774.
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entitled to know without unreasonable delay on what grounds 
the authority has deprived him of his liberty. Therefore, 
although in this particular case, having regard to the 
changes in the country, the delay of tv/o months was not 
unreasonable, but the Court should not be understood to 
have laid down that in every case a delay of two months 
will be condoned.
While examining the quality of these rights, the 
Court should place itself in the position of a detenu 
and assume that he is the innocent victim of a 
misunderstanding or intrigue. If he is kept in the 
dark even for a single day as to the reason for his 
arrest, would he not feel that he was still in the dark 
ages?^
(1) Muhammad Hashim v. State, P.I.E.1956 Kiar.485
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Representa tion z
The purpose of requiring the detenu to he furnished
with the grounds and particulars is to enable him to make
a representation against the order of detention and that
purpose cannot be served, unless the detenu knows what
exactly had moved the Government to deprive him of his
liberty. The Court, therefore, can order the release of
the detenu, if the grounds of detention are too vague and
indefinite to enable him to make a representation.^^
The right to grounds is of no value, if the person
affected is not given a right to redress if the grounds
given do not justify his detention. He may justifiably
urge that the detention is wholly unjust or illegal. The
representation allowed is against the order of detention,
as based on the grounds furnished. His right of
representation is valuable, as it is the only method
available to a person detained to convince the authority
that his detention is unmeritted. The right to make a
representation does not involve a right to a judicial
trial or a judicial enquiry by an independent tribunal.
(2 )This was the view of the majority in Gopalan1 s casev 7 but
(1) Mahbub Anam v. Govt, of East Pakistan, P.L.D.1959 
Dacca 774*
(2) A.I.R. 1950 S.C.27
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Fazal Ali, J. expressed the opinion that the right to make 
a representation must carry with it, right to the 
representation being properly considered by an impartial 
person or persons. According to the learned judge, there 
must, therefore, be some machinery for properly examining 
the cases of detenus and determining whether they have 
been detained without reason.
The right to make a representation implies that the 
detenu should have sufficient information to enable him 
to make a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h e  right is not confined 
to a physical opportunity of using paper and pen. The 
person detained must first have knowledge of the ground 
on which the authorities felt satisfied of the necessity 
of making the detention order. The purpose of the 
representation is to answer the charges contained in the 
grounds, so the information conveyed to the detained 
person must be sufficient to attain that object.
While the grounds of detention are the main factors on 
which the subjective determination of the authority is 
based, other materials on which the conclusion embodied 
in the grounds is founded should be conveyed to the 
detained person to enable him to state his objections
(1) Puran Lai v. Union of India A.I.R.1958 S.C.163
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to the order. The court is entitled to examine the 
statement of grounds and particulars given to the accused 
from this point of view and to see whether the statement 
is sufficient to enable the detenu to make a representation. 
The regrettable practice of the executive furnishing 
insufficient details to the detenu to enable him to make 
a representation against his detention has been deprecated
by their Lordships of the Supreme Court time and again.
(2 )But in Bam Singh^s casev it was held that, when 
detention was ordered on the basis of certain speeches 
delivered by the detenu, it was enough if the date and 
place and the general nature and effect of the speeches, 
e.g. creating dissensions between Hindus and Muslims, 
were given. It was not necessary to point out the 
offending passages or give their gist.
The fact that the petitioner would suffer no hardship 
or prejudice by reason of sufficient particulars not 
having been already furnished to him is immaterial. The 
question is not whether the petitioner will in fact be 
prejudicially affected in the matter of securing his
(1) State of Bombay v. Atmaram, A.I.E.1951 S.C.157;
A.I.E.1951 S.C.270.
(2) Earn Singh v. State of Delhi, A.I.E.1951 S.C.270.
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release by his representation but whether his constitutional 
safeguard has been infringed.
The authorities must not only inform the detenu of the 
grounds of his detention, but also afford him the earliest 
opportunity of making a representation against the order. 
Here also the time limit is not definitely fixed. The 
judicial decisions seem to assume that the time for making 
the representation will be after the time for communicating 
the grounds and that during the interval the authority may 
supply materials and particulars, which would enable the 
detenu to make a proper representation.
(2 )In a case before the Indian Supreme Court' , the 
particulars were supplied to the detenu af^er the Court had 
issued a rule nisi for habeas corpus to the authority, and 
yet the Court held that ’earliest* opportunity for making 
representation had been given.
There is no provision in the Constitution for the 
detenu to be given an oral hearing. The right to make a 
representation does not necessarily carry with it the right 
to oral representation, and a preventive detention law is
(1) Prem Dutta v. Supdt. Central prison, A.I.E.1954 All.315
(2) State of Bombay v. Atmaram, A.I.E. 1951 S.C.157
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not rendered void because it does not provide such a right* 
The right to be heard orally is not an essential right of
(1)procedure, even according to the rules of natural justice. 7
The right to make a representation does not also
necessarily carry with it a right to engage a lawyer and be
(2)represented by him.v 7 Such right is conceded to an 
arrested person under Clause Q-) of Fundamental Right 2, 
but clause (3) makes this inapplicable to persons detained 
under any law providing for preventive detention.
The Constitution does not specify to whom the 
representation is to be made or how the representation is 
to be dealt with. Under section 3 of West Pakistan 
Maintuanance of Public Order Ordinance I960, the represenlatim 
is to be made to the Government of West Pakistan; 
obviously when a person is detained under the East Pakistan 
Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, the representation is 
to be made to the East Pakistan Government and in the case of 
the person detained under the Central Government statute, the 
representation is to be made to the Central Government.
(1) Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R.1950 S.C.27 para 30.
(2) ibid. para 28, 30.
Discretion to withhold facts.
Fundamental Right 2, clause (5) gives the authority 
making an order of the preventive detention a discretion 
not to disclose facts, which the authority considers to 
be against the public interest to disclose.
There is a constitutional obligation to disclose all 
grounds but not all facts. The obligation to furnish 
particulars and the duty to consider whether the 
disclosure of any fact involved therein is against the 
public interest are imposed on the detaining authority. 
The present clause appears to be founded on the
doctrine enunciated by Dord Maugham in Liversidge v.
(2 )Andersonv 7 "It is beyond dispute that he can decline 
to disclose information on which he has acted, on the 
ground that to do so would be contrary to the public
interest .....  There must be a large number of cases in
which the information on which the Secretary of State is 
likely to act will be of a very confidential nature.” 
Under the Constitution, the Court has no power to 
enquire whether it is against the public interest to
(1) Puran lal v. Union of India, A.I.R.1958 3.C.163*
(2) 1942 A.C.206.
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disclose particular facts. Once the authority has refused 
to disclose any fact or facts in the fpublic interest1, the 
court has no power to declare that it was not against 
public interest to disclose those f a ct s . ^ In the words 
of the Indian Supreme Court in the instant case "Clause 6 
gives a right to the detaining authority not to disclose 
such facts, but from that it does not follow that what is 
not stated or considered to be withheld on that ground must 
be disclosed and if not disclosed, there is a breach of a 
fundamental right. A wide latitude is left to the 
authorities in the matter of disclosure."
The Court cannot interfere on the ground that what 
has been withheld should have been disclosed, but it can 
do so on the ground that what has been stated is 
insufficient to enable a representation to be made. It 
should not be supposed that, because this clause permits 
the withholding of facts which it is considered not 
desirable to disclose in the public interest, the 
authorities are bound to disclose all other facts. The 
sole test for determining the sufficiency of the facts is 
their sufficiency for giving an opportunity to make a 
representation.
- - —
(1) State of Bombay v. Atmaram, A.I.R. 1951 S.C.157
(2) Ibid.
279
"They are given a special privilege in respect of
facts which are considered not desirable to be disclosed
in public interest. As regard the rest, their didy is to
disclose facts so as to give the detained person the
earliest opportunity to make a representation against the
order of detention.I! ^  The protection of this clause,
however, is not available, unless it is stated in the
communication that it is not in the public interest to give
(2 )the particulars which are withheld. v f 
Although this discretionary power of the Government has 
been upheld by the Courts, the misuse of this power has
been a subject of criticism.
In Inayat Ullah Khan Mashriqi's case^^ for instance, 
it was observed that, "Home Secretary need not have 
attempted to build a fortress of privilege around him by 
repeated reference to the instructions from his Minister 
and, instead of saying that the Allama was arrested with a 
view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to 
public safety, he could be more plain and disclose that
(1) State of Bombay v. Atmaram, A.I.R.1951 S.C.157
(2) Nityananda v. Chief Secretary, A.I.R.1951 S.C.206, 258
(5) Inayat Ullah Khan Mashriqi v. Crown, P.X.D.1952 Lah.531.
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Allama was arrested because Government believed that he 
was attempting to raise a private army, which constituted 
a threat to public safety and order.11
It was observed earlier in the judgment that "In almost 
every case of detention, the detaining authority, when 
questioned by the Court about the reasons for detention, 
mechanically repeated the formula of "public safety and 
maintenance of public order" and displayed a positive 
disinclination to the matter being probed further. While 
such disinclination is understandable v;here high affairs 
of State are concerned, there is no reason why, in ordinary 
cases, as for instance where a man is arrested for defying 
law and order, intending to lead a banned procession, 
fomenting labour discontent or communal hatred or for 
otherwise endangering the public peace, the authority 
ordering the arrest should not take the Court and the 
public into its confidence, by giving a broad hint about 
the reasons for the action taken. In such cases the 
Court does not desire to go into details or to ask for 
disclosure of the material, on which the authority 
ordering the arrest formed its opinion, except to the 
extent that such information is relevant to the question 
whether the action taken was bona fide."
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Language of Grounds
Grounds of arrest may be communicated to the detained 
person verbally, where the detained person is illiterate. 
It has been held that the illiteracy of the detenu would 
undoubtedly make it impracticable to communicate to him 
the grounds of his arrest in writing. Where such grounds 
were communicated orally to the persons arrested, who were 
illiterate, it was held that the information was duly 
given to t h e m . ^
(2 )In a case before the Supreme Court of Indiav ', the 
grounds in support of the order served on the appellant 
ran into fourteen typed pages and referred to his 
activities over a period of thirteen years, besides 
referring to a large number of court proceedings 
concerning him and other persons, who were alleged to be 
his associates. It was held that a mere oral explanation 
of a complicated order of the nature made against the 
appellant, without supplying him with the translation in 
a script and language, which he understood, would amount
(1) Juma Khan v. The Govt, of West Pakistan, P.P.P.1957
Kar.939*
(2) Hadibandhu Pas v. Pistriet Magistrate, S.C.N.1968
Page 308.
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to denial of the right of having the grounds communicated 
and of being afforded the opportunity of making a 
representation against the order,1 In a subsequent 
case^^, it was held that "The grounds must be such that 
the petitioner may be able effectively to make a 
representation, submitting his explanation relating to 
those grounds and that necessarily implies that the 
grounds, when communicated in writing, must be in a 
language with which the detenu is familiar.w
(1) Sukesh Chandra v. State of West Bengal, S.C.N.1969
page 60.
CHAPTER VII
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JUSTIFICATION OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION
Crave Emergency
Necessity is the main justification for any legislation 
to exist* Whether the necessity is real or self created or 
self imposed may he a highly controversial issue. The law of 
Preventive Detention, as it exists now, has a long history which 
can be traced back to the early days of British government in 
India. At that time, its main justification was that the 
British Government had to maintain law and order in the 
sub-continent and combat the danger of being thrown out of 
power by revolutionary elements. Whatever they did, so long 
as they remained in power, we cannot blame them, as they were 
foreign rulers and they had to do what was in their own best 
interest, with the object of preventing the upsurage of a 
liberation movement.
Nobody can deny that freedom of the person is the most 
precious of all the freedom; Preventive Detention laws are 
repugnant to democratic principles and they are not recognised 
in the Constitutions of most of the democratic countries of 
the World... Curiously enough this subject has found a 
place in the Indian and Pakistan Constitutions in the chapter 
on Fundamental Rights.
(1) A.K.Gopalan v. The State of Madras, 1950 S.C.J. 247
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However alien to liberal thought preventive detention 
may be, there are very few persons who will dispute its 
justification during war. There may be persons against whom 
a judicial trial, with such convincing proof as is required in 
a criminal proceeding, could not be resorted to in the interest 
of the security of State, so their liberty has to be 
arbitrarily curtailed in the interest of the State.
There are ample grounds to support the theory that, when 
the security of the State is in conflict with the liberty of 
person, liberty should be taken away at the discretion of the 
executive in the interest of State.
lord Atkinson said in R. v. Halliday ^  "However 
precious the personal liberty of the subject may be, there is 
something for which it may well be to some extent sacrificed 
by legal enactments, viz; national success in war, or escape
from national plunder, or enslavement." In Ronnfeldt v.
(2 )Phillips x y it was observed by Scrutton, l.J; that
"The Courts were always anxious to protect the liberty 
of the subject. In time of war there must be some 
modifications in the interest of the State. It had 
been said that a war could not be conducted on the
(1) (1917) A.C. 260, 271.
(2) (1918) 55 T.l.R. (47)
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principles of the Sermon on the Mount. It might also be 
said that a War could not be carried on according to the 
principles of Magna Carta.’1
In Liversidge v. Anderson Lord Macmillan said, f,the
liberty which we so justly extol is itself the gift of law and,
as Magna Carta recognizes, may by the law be forfeited or
abridged. At a time when it is the undoubted law of the land
that a citizen may by conscription or requisition be compelled
to give up his life and all that he possess for his country’s
cause, it may well be no matter for surprise that there should
be confided to the Secretary of State a discretionary power of
enforcing the relative mild precaution of detention.”
(2 )In an Australian case ' J dealing with a Law of Preventive 
Detention for many purposes, including immigration, it was held 
by Williams J. :
"A State of War, therefore, justifies legislation by the 
Commonwealth Parliament in the exercise of the defence 
power, which makes many inroads on personal freedom.
So, where the security of the country is in danger, there 
is justification for interference with the liberty of
(1) 1942 A.C. 206 Page 257
(2) Adelaide Co: of Jehovah's witnesses v. Commonwealth. 
1943 67 C.l.R. Page 116.
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individuals in ways which would not be acceptable in peace 
time. Individuals may profess ideas or carry on 
activities, which in time of peace may be harmless, but 
which in time of war may interfere with the successful 
defence of Commonwealth.”
11 It is recognized that the internment of such persons on 
mere suspicion without trial for some period not exceeding 
that of the war upon the opinion of a Minister that their 
liberty is prejudicial to the safety of the realm, is a 
valid exercise of a plenary administrative discretion.”
(1 )In an American case v ' it was observed that, ”In every 
war, there are men previously of good character, wicked enough 
to counsel their fellow citizens to resist the measure deemed 
necessary by a good government, to sustain its just authority 
and overthrow its enemies; and their influence may lead to 
dangerous combinations. In the emergency of the times, an 
immediate public investigation according to law may not be 
possible; and yet, the peril to the country may be too 
imminent to suffer such persons to go at large.n
(1) Ex parte Milligan, (1866) 4 WALL 2
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THE SITUATION IN PAKISTAN
Now the question arises, after we achieved Independence, 
what justification was there to retain such preventive 
legislation# The answer to the question is not very simple; 
one has to look to the initial difficulties with which we were 
faced. At that time the liberty of the person was not at 
stake but the survival of the newly born State was the main 
object of the fathers of the nation. The analysis of the 
initial problems which are outlined below themselves justify 
the necessity for such measures. When Pakistan came into 
existence as an independent State, the confident expectation 
of our enemies and many neutral observers was that the 
administration in Pakistan would break down in a few months.
But it was proved false by the efficiency, fortitude and 
devotion to duty of those in the services of Pakistan. The 
whole nation was imbued with a sense of mission to make 
Pakistan a going concern; and Government servants, at that 
time as a class, were deeply infused with this national spirit. 
They worked long hours and put up with hardships of all kinds. 
There was no thought of self but only of how to serve the 
nation in order to strengthen and consolidate Pakistan. The 
whole administration worked as one team. Every Government 
servant from highest to lowest, placed all the resources of his 
knowledge and all the energy of his body and mind “unreservedly
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at the service of Pakistan. Those who participated in the 
great task of establishing Pakistan were privileged beyond all 
later generations in sharing a unique experience.
The East Wing of Pakistan was faced with a number of 
serious problems. It had to establish a new Capital at Dacca 
and to set up a new administration. There was a shortage of
personnel to run the administration. The majority of officials 
were Hindus and they opted for West Bengal. Over 50 per cent 
of the Civil and Criminal Courts could not function, owing to 
the shortage of judicial and executive officers. The number 
of Muslims from Bengal in the Superior Services of Government 
was negligible. The economic life of the Province was 
affected by the partial withdrawal of Hindu businessmen, who 
held a monopoly of commerce and banking and, for a time, there 
was almost a total stoppage of consumer goods from West Bengal.
The mass influx of Muslim refugees from East Punjab,
Delhi and neighbouring States, on a scale unparalled in Europe 
even in its worst hours, created problems of such vast 
proportions and complexity, that even a fully organised and 
well established administration could not have coped with. 
Quaid-E-Azam and the Central Government had to devote much 
time and energy to these problems and to the even more serious 
Kashmir dispute, that erupted soon after partition.
In North West Frontier Province, Dr. Khan Sahib's Congress 
Ministry was still in office on 15th August, 1947*
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Quaid-E-Asam wanted the loyal co-operation of all citizens, 
regardless of political differences in the past, for the task 
of building up Pakistan. No one was to be victimized for 
having opposed the establishment of Pakistan. In keeping 
with this policy, Dr. Khan Sahib and his Ministers would have 
been allowed to continue in office, but they refused to salute 
the Pakistan flag and showed no sign of a change in their 
previous attitude of opposition to Pakistan. Therefore on 
22nd August, 1947, the Governor dismissed Dr. Khan Sahib's 
Ministry on Quaid-E-Azam Orders and Khan Abdul Qayyum became 
Chief Minister.
The secret deal between Lord Mountbatten and Congress 
for advancing the date for the transfer of power from 1st June 
1948 to 14th August, 1947 was deliberately intended by the 
Congress party to deny Pakistan time to organize an 
administration and to establish itself on a sound basis. As 
a result of these happenings, the Provincial Government of 
Punjab was unable to reorganize itself properly. There was 
the greatest mass migration in history. Within a matter of 
weeks millions of people had left their homes and gone forth 
gn foot, by bullock-cart, by railway, by car and by 'plane to 
seek shelter and safety in the newly-born State. For the
(1) Chaudhari Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, P.254
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existing administration the task of feeding, clothing, settling 
and rehabilitating these millions was impossibly difficult.
The violent upheavals that had taken place had shattered the 
economy, strained a yet hardly formed administration beyond 
breaking point and disrupted communications. Pakistan is 
unique in being composed of two equally important parts 
separated by a thousand miles of foreign territory. The 
physical characteristics of the two regions are very different. 
The problem of communication was of outstanding importance.
East and West are separated by 1,200 miles by air and 3,000 
miles by sea. The over-riding necessity of the time was to 
get the administration going. Some officers had to be 
transferred to the East Wing, to meet the deficiency of the 
staff there. Anti-social elements had publicised the idea 
of provincialism to such an extent that Quaid-E-Azam had to 
make appeal for national consolidation. In a public speech 
in Dacca on 21st March, 1948, Quaid-E-Azam said :-
"let me warn you in the clearest terms of the danger 
that still faces Pakistan and your province in particular, 
as I have done already. Having failed to prevent the 
establishment of Pakistan, thwarted and frustrated by
(1) Quaid-E-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, speeches as Governor
General of Pakistan, Pakistan Publication, Karachi, 1963- 
Page 58.
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their failure, the enemies of Pakistan have now turned 
their attention to disrupt the State by creating a split 
amongst the Muslims of Pakistan. These attempts have 
taken the shape principally of encouraging provincialism.
As long as you do not throw off this poison in our body 
politic, you will never be able to weed yourself, mould 
yourself, galvanise yourself into a real true nation .... 
Islam has taught this and I think you will agree with me 
that, whatever else you may be and whatever you are, you 
are a Muslim. You belong to a nation now, you have now 
carved out a territory, vast territory; it is all yours; 
it does not belong to a Punjabi, or Sindhi, or a Pathan, 
or a Eengali; it is yours. You have got your Central 
Government, where several units are represented.
Therefore, if you want to build up yourself into a Nation, 
for GOD's sake give up provincialism.1
Our leaders were given a country; not only were they 
inexperienced but they were given a country in which chaos could 
easily have prevailed. The sub-continent had been partitioned 
and they were asked to realign the economy of the country, 
which, up till then, had been based on India, as it then was, 
regarded as a single and compact economic unit; the 
communication system of the country, railways, roads, telegraphs, 
which had their centres at strategic spots, had to be changed,
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the centres relocated and lines running to and from them 
gathered up and relaid. A strong communication system had to 
be established between East and Y/est Wing.
Under these circumstances, when the whole nation was 
trying to strengthen, consolidate and build up Pakistan on a 
firm footing, there were anti-social elements bent on violence 
and the overthrow of law and order, by striking at vital 
necessities of government, like railways, telegraph, post 
offices and the destruction of private as well as public 
property. In certain parts of the country the conditions 
were worse than could be guessed. The newly formed independent 
government decided, therefore, that it could not afford to take 
risks and that a period of stability was essential, if the 
country was to settle down. That is why the law of preventive 
detention was retained on our legal books, as the government 
could not afford the time and risks of going through the 
elaborate legal process of prosecuting suspected persons.
Even after a long time, when we have overcome the initial 
difficulties and problems, the internal conditions are not so 
good as to justify the repeal of this kind of preventive 
legislation. On the contrary conditions necessitate it to be 
the permanent feature of the Constitution. The conditions in 
the Republic require such a law to put down unlawful and 
subversive activities of certain groups of persons whose
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actions appeared to be against the security of State and the 
maintenance of public Order.
Prof: Alan Gledhill, defending the existence of preventive 
law during the British Raj and putting forward a justification 
for the continuance of such laws in India (which is of course 
applicable to Pakistan as well, with the exception that the 
majority of Pakistani leaders did not taste the hardship of 
preventive detention as did the Indian leaders) wrote "the 
Indian Pounding father, some of whom had been subjected to 
preventive detention, if they had followed the voice of their 
hearts, might have abolished it as an attribute of British 
Imperialism, but their conduct was dictated by their heads.
They were well aware of the various provincial laws authorising 
preventive detention and, including clause 4 (ART.22) in the 
Constitution, they obviously intended to preserve the efficiency 
of those laws, while affording some protection against their 
abuse. Lawyers may dislike it, as repugnant to their notions 
of the rule of law; democratic politicians may inveigh against 
it, but the Constituent Assembly retained it with good reasons, 
as a necessary instrument for ensuring the peace and good 
Government of India at the time when the Constitution came into 
force and in the foreseeable future."
(1) Life and Liberty in Republican India. Journal of the 
Indian Law Institute Vol.2., P.253*
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L.C.B. Grower in his book ^  justified the existence of 
such measures in African countries; he said that many of these 
countries have resorted to preventive detention, a development 
that has caused concern and understandably so. But it was, 
surely, too much to hope for anything else. The British, after 
all, did not succeed in ruling most of these Countries without 
preventive detention and the new rulers do not feel themselves 
likely to be more successful. One sometimes feels that they 
exaggerate their insecurity and that, as in the early days of 
Ghana, it was repression that led to disaffection rather than 
disaffection which led to and justified repression. But 
disaffection there certainly has been, plots everywhere, mutinie 
in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika; successful coups d fetat in 
Zanzibar, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and (arguably) Uganda.
The situation in surrounding territories has been even worse: 
successful coups d ’etat in Togo, Lahome, Congo Brazzaville, the 
Central African Republic, Upper Volta, Gabon, Burundi and the 
Sudan: Civil War in Congo-Kinshasa; sabotage in the Cameroons;
genocide in Ruanda; and assassination (of two Prime Ministers) 
in Burundi In these circumstances it is hardly surprising
(1) Independent Africa, the Challenge to the Legal Profession 
Pages 85-87-
(2) This incomplete catalogue makes Africa sound terribly 
dangerous: yet when one is there it seems more friendly and 
less dangerous than Central Park or Boston Common
(L.C.B. Gower).
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that the Governments have protected themselves with the shield 
that the colonialist taught them to use. The threat from 
anti-social elements within a nation sufficiently strong to 
disrupt the life of the country and jeopardize the existence 
of the prevailing form of Government is a problem of apparently 
accelerating importance. The activity of such groups may stem 
from various causes. The most common, particularly in Pakistan 
perhaps, is disloyalty to the existing Government, often 
accompanied by the desire to effect change by violent means. 
Another cause may be strong dis-satisfaction with certain 
Government policies and a demand for a separate State within 
the federation. Also the presence of powerful lawless elements, 
with perhaps no political motive, but for various reasons beyond 
the scope of the ordinary machinery of the law, may give rise to 
these problems. In these circumstances the only weapon which 
comes to the rescue of the Government in maintaining law and 
order is preventive detention. In Rose v. King there is a 
reference to this presumption, "The strict, rigid and necessary 
rule that the State, first and foremost, owes to its own 
Citizens, independently of its foreign duties, to ensure its 
own security and to repress crime, which its own nationals 
might commit against the King and against the security of the 
country.1
(1) 1946, 88 C.C.C. 144 at 144 (Canadian case).
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The justification of the imposition of preventive 
detention by the ruling party is based on the assertion that 
conditions are threatening but to demonstrate that they are 
threatening is difficult. There are certain facts and figures 
within the possession of the Government, which would justify 
the necessity of such legislation, but which the Government 
officials say cannot be made public. As Dr. Katju said,
H... we must take a realistic attitude about this matter and 
while, owing to a variety of circumstances, the situation has 
improved, there are still very many black clouds on the horizon 
and very many danger signals to be seen. I am not in a 
position, and it would not be a proper time for me to say, what 
sort of information is received from time to time, almost every
week, by Government and we cannot be complacent about it .....
We know the philosophies, the ideologies, the different passions 
and emotions which are prevailing over large groups of people..."
The Government has presumably initiated preventive 
detention legislation on information not available to the 
general public but which was entirely persuasive of its 
necessity.
The executive has usually admitted that preventive 
detention is not an unmixed blessing. Preventive detention 
is an unfortunate derogation from the principles of democracy 
and the rule of law.
(1) Lok Sabha Debates August 3l, 1952, Col.5001.
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The Government of the day may fail to justify its 
existence by producing facts and figures. The ruling party 
in Pakistan has failed to specify the circumstances which 
necessitate recourse to this sort of law, so it may be argued 
that it has no real reasons. The Government can only say in 
defence that, if the number of detenues increases, such law is 
needed and if the number falls, the Government argues that the 
law is doing its job. To make a clear cut case is really 
difficult for the Government of the day. One member of the 
Constituent Assembly of India justified these measures in the 
following words:-
"Those who occupy seats of authority and responsibility •. 
.... warn us that the aftermath of war and partition has 
unchained fcrces which, if allowed to gain (the) upper 
hand, will engulf the country in anarchy and ruin. They 
therefore advocate that Parliament must be able to pass 
laws, arming the executive with adequate powers to check 
these forces of violence, anarchy and disorder. They are
great patriots and our trusted leaders .......  the
difficulty is this, that, even if we were to stand for our 
own convictions, there is no scope for experimenting in 
such matters. There is a saying in Marathi that whether 
a thing is a poison or not cannot be tested by swallowing it
(1) Constituent Assembly Debates, Sept.16, 1949* Page 1554 
(India).
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because if it is poison the man dies. So in such matters 
there is no scope for experiment and we have therefore to 
heed to the warning given by our leaders."
There is no infallible test of when such legislation is 
needed nor is there any indication that it will be abandoned 
voluntarily in the near future. The experience of the United 
Kingdom and the U.S.A. may give valuable guidance to Pakistan 
and India. In both these Countries the availability of the 
power of preventive detention has been made contingent upon 
the existence of extreme emergencies like war. In ordinary 
circumstances, if a sudden emergency arises, Government may 
act in panic and haste. Moreover, a threat, which in the 
West would be regarded as a sudden emergency, is in our country 
a condition of every day life. Democracy in our country needs 
to be guarded more carefully than in the West, where the 
countries have a long history of established democratic 
principles.
After all our Constitution does not order preventive 
detention; it simply lays down certain rules which must be 
followed, if there is resort to such detention. It follows 
that the people and their representatives can abandon such 
legislation or amend the Constitution, if they think it will 
be beneficial to the country as a whole. The opposition may 
claim that the power to legislate for preventive detention is
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also used to suppress opposition for the party in power but a 
study of legislation on this subject will show that it is not 
directed against a particular ideology or political party but 
against those who make it impossible for Government to functiLon 
normally* It may be a provocateur, political agitator, black 
marketeers, communist or any other person of dangerous character. 
The liberty of the vast majority is threatened by a small group 
of persons which is sufficiently active to justify the 
curtailment of their liberty. The justification for such 
legislation can be found in the actions of those people» who 
deliberately engage in fomenting \iolence and agitation. A 
relatively small number of provocateurs can create a large 
amount of unrest, protest and outright violence. The policy 
of preventive detention is directed against actions and not 
against the individuals or political parties. Pandit Nehru's 
justification was that it was directed primarily against 
activity which was communal, communist, purely terrorist and 
jagirdari. The Government, he said, has a fundamental 
responsibility to maintain order and to staunch the provocative 
influence of a few, which is directed to the exploitation of 
narrow prejudices of various groups. There is no democracy 
or liberty in a society where order is lacking.
(1) Xok Sabha Debate, August 2, 1952. Col. 5192.
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It may be argued that such measures are ■used by the 
party in power to suppress the opposition but the fact is that 
it is used for eliminating communal activities, harbouring of 
dacoit and goondaism, which are threats to peace and order and 
security of the state. There may be cases where political 
opponents have been detained on charges of goondaism or 
violence. It may be said that in such cases the executive 
acted mala fide The Government no doubt in some cases
may have acted mala fide but this is difficult to prove in the 
Courts, unless there is first hand evidence of improper 
motivation. If it is proved that the Governments action was 
motivated by ulterior purposes, the Court, apart from setting 
free the detenu, has also deprecated the Government's action.
There are commonly accepted limits to the manner in which 
protest can be expressed. Since the establishment of 
Pakistan, many agitations have been led by semi-political or 
religious personalities, which have been marked by long 
processions which were violent, by strikes, by picketing of 
public offices, and burning of public and private property.
In our country there is a lack of understanding about when and 
how to agree. If it is asked who is responsible for these 
out-breaks of violence, the answer from the opposition may be 
that Government adopts policies not acceptable to the masses.
(1) See case3in the previous chapter.
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Government would say it is the political agitators, who, for 
their own selfish ends, instigate the people to protest against 
everything which, after due care and consideration, it decided 
to adopt. Government cannot make a scientific laboratory, 
where its piicies can be tested and results published before 
legislation is introduced in the House. It is only after a 
lapse of time that it can be proved that a particular 
Government in those particular circumstances was justified in 
adopting a particular policy or attitude towards its problems.
A member of the opposition in India once said that the
Prime Minister had warned again and again that the days of 
street demonstration and the like were over. But as long as 
his Government and its officers did not act justly and fairly, 
there would be demonstrations and things like that. After 
all, why should a lover of freedom and democracy get so upset? 
Are these not the usual processes of democracy?
The right of revolution may not be incompatable with 
democratic government. Democratic theory has always insisted 
that government was to be limited in its encroachment on 
individual rights and freedoms. Peoples have a moral right 
to demonstrate, even by violent means, against an oppressive 
government. The question is where the line between oppressive 
and non-oppressive government is to be drawn. Government may 
be oppressive for some people, when it touches the question of
(1) Reported in the Times of India (Bombay) Sept.3* 1955* 
Page 5 (J.P.Narayan).
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national language or when it proposes to modify property 
rights or abolish the dowry system or change the law of 
marriage, or to reform the religious laws and so on; for 
others each of these is a matter on which the Government must 
take some initiative* The result is demonstrations for and 
against the Government reforms. The threat to peace remains, 
so long as political parties or small bodies of people claim 
the right to agitate for their demands by organized defiance 
of law. So long as such thinking prevails, there will always 
be a justification for preventive legislation in order to 
maintain law and order.
It is essential for economical and social progress to 
maintain the rule of law. Social stability is a sign of 
national advancement and ensures meaningful individual freedom. 
The instrument for carrying out the wishes of the people for 
the amelioration of their lot is a democratically elected 
Government. This instrument must be responsible to the 
people as a whole, not just to one or another set of special 
interests. Within the limitations of a freely adopted 
Constitution, the Government must see to it that the social 
progress of the mass is not frustrated by the narrow prejudices 
of a few. To secure this end, it is often necessary to restrain 
the anarchical freedom of some individuals, in order to ensure 
to a greater number, the fulfilment of other forms of freedom. 
Regulatory action of this type may be called arbitrary
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repression, which in a genuine way it is, but no Society 
ever became orderly without an element of restriction.
Those who try to compare our country with the United Kingdom, 
where there is no such legislation in peace time, should keep 
in mind the social and economic differences between the two 
countries. Apart from the recent students* demonstration 
against the Vietnam War (1968-69), one rarely hears in the 
United Kingdom of demonstrations against Government policy 
and even these recent demonstrations, with few exceptions, 
were not violent but peaceful. The fact is that the people 
of United Kingdom seem to have a greater respect for the law 
than our people. In such circumstances there can hardly be 
any justification for such law during peace time. In our 
country preventive detention may be justified by the fact 
that the people generally do not appreciate the advantages 
of democracy. Our Government must deal more severely with 
malefactors, because the example of successful defirtance of 
law is more injurious to the development of a democratic 
political culture, than it would be in the West. Organized 
defiance of law by a minority, against the wishes of the 
majority, often leads to anarchy. When the Government in 
under-developed countries is trying to establish democracy 
on firm footing and give the country social, political and 
economic stability but is faced with coercive public protest, 
the only instrument which can protect the Government is the
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law of preventive detention. The main advantage of 
preventive detention is that a person may he removed from a 
troubled scene quickly; surely the authorities should not be 
obliged to wait for judicial approval or tolerate the release 
of a defendant upon a bail pending trial. Preventive 
detention is a Heaven-sent opportunity to the opposition for 
criticism of and attack on the ruling Government, but it is 
evident that no nation can fight a War or survive the kind of 
extraordinary emergency with which our country is threatened 
every day, without having a power like this in reserve. Once 
this is conceded, it is better to face the facts, concede such 
power and impose reasonable restraint on the ambit of its 
exercise. Nobody has ever denied that detention without trial 
is prima facie a denial of justice but when some element in the 
country or a political party tries to attain power by 
unconstitutional or violent means, disrupting peace and public 
order and creating political and economic chaos, it is the 
innocent man who suffers. To save the masses from injury 
preventive detention is justified. It is necessary to meet 
the communist menace and to control the growth of undisciplined 
movements and parties, which are disturbing factors in our 
Country. The evidence in possession of the authorities may 
not be sufficient to support a judicial conviction of crime 
but it should be sufficient to convince a reasonable man that 
a detenu is likely to indulge in activities which are dangerous
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to public peace and order. If the executive is obliged to 
go through the lengthy process of collecting evidence to 
support a judicial conviction, it may or may not succeed 
but the person concerned may succeed in his object. The 
object of the preventive detention is not to punish a man 
for having done something but to intercept him before he does 
it and to prevent him from doing so. The Government has often 
been criticized on the ground that the object of preventive 
detention is not what they say it is, that it misuses it for 
its own benefit, so that the ruling party may retain the critics 
of their policy behind bars. In other words it is used by the 
Government mainly for political purposes and abuse of the power 
cannot be denied, but the Courts are able to help those who are 
innocent victims of the Government.
If we look at other fundamental rights, it will be clear 
that most of the rights can be reasonably restricted in the 
public interest or in the interest of morality, public order, 
security of Pakistan, friendly relations with foreign States, 
decency or in relation to contempt of Court. These limitations 
on fundamental rights are recognised in most of the democratic 
Countries of the World. On the same principle, liberty of the 
person may be restricted in the interest of public order and 
security of the State.
Why are persons detained under the law of Preventive 
Detention? The answer to the question is not simply that
they can’t be tried under any other law. Preventive 
detention is provided for people who indulge in 
extraordinary activities calculated to encourage violence 
and public disorder, to produce evidence of which is 
difficult and takes a long time, but if left at liberty 
would be dangerous to the maintenance of peace, order and 
security of state.
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Prof. Alan Gledhill ^  points out in a nutshell that 
"Preventive Detention is an administrative necessity and 
likely to cause less human misery than might result from 
likely alternative measures to deal with persons who cannot 
he successfully prosecuted for their activities, though they 
are a menace to public security and order."
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
Now we have to see what other remedies are available 
and whether they can achieve the object which the Government 
has in view.
There are certain provisions in the Criminal Procedure 
Code, the object of which is the prevention and not the 
punishment of the offences. These provisions are for 
persons who are a danger to public, by reason of the 
commission by them of certain offences. Magistrates are 
supposed to exercise this preventive jurisdiction with 
watchful care and see that the administration of this branch 
of law does not become harsh and oppressive. These 
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code are reproduced 
here below with some comments; we shall consider whether 
these sections serve the purpose which the Government has in 
view when promulgating Preventive Detention Laws.
(1) fundamental Rights in India. 1955 P.126.
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Section 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure providess-
(1) Whenever any person accused of any offence 
punishable under Chapter VII of Pakistan Penal Code, other 
than an offence punishable under Section 143 > Section 149? 
Section 153 A or Section 154 thereof, or of assault or other 
offences involving a breach of the peace or of abetting the 
same or any person accused of committing criminal intimidation, 
is convicted of such offence before a High Court, a Court of 
Session or the Court of a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional 
Magistrate or Magistrate of the Pirst Class and such Court is 
of opinion that it is necessary to require such person to 
execute a bond for keeping the peace*
Such Court may, at the time of passing the sentence on 
such person, order him to execute a bond for a sum 
proportionate to his means, with or without sureties, for 
keeping the peace during such period, not exceeding three years, 
as it think fit to fix.
(2) If the conviction is set aside on appeal or 
otherwise, the bond so executed shall become void.
There are some serious limitations before a person can be 
ordered to execute a bond for keeping the peace :
(i) He must be convicted of one of the offences 
enumerated *
(ii) The bond can only be ordered in addition to 
sentence and not in lieu of sentence.
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(iii) On appeal, if the conviction is set aside, 
the bond is void.
It was not contemplated that an order to furnish
security under the Section would be coupled with a
non-appealable sentence. It should rarely if ever be
necessary to do this and should certainly not be done, until
it has been ascertained that the accused is able to furnish
security An Appellate Court can cancel an order to
furnish security passed by the original Court while upholding 
(2 )the sentence*1
Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides :-
(1) Whenever a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional 
Magistrate or Magistrate of the Pirst Class is informed that 
any person is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb 
the public tranquillity or to do any wrongful act that may 
probably occasion a breach of the peace, or disturb the public 
tranquillity, the Magistrate, if in his opinion there is 
sufficient ground for proceeding, may, in manner provided, 
require such person to show cause why he should not be 
ordered to execute a bond with or without sureties for 
keeping the peace for such period not exceeding one year as 
the Magistrate thinks fit to fix.
(2) Proceeding shall not be taken under this Section
(1) Emp. v. Nga Tun, A.I.E. 1935 (13) Rang. 363
(2) Abdul Y/aheed v. Amiran Bibbi (30) I.L.R. 1903 Cal. 101.
unless either the person informed against or the place where 
the breach of the peace or disturbance is apprehended, is 
within the local limits of such Magistrate's jurisdiction, and 
no proceedings shall be taken before any Magistrate other than
a ...........District Magistrate, unless both the person
informed against and place where the breach of the peace or 
disturbance is apprehended, are within the local limits of 
the Magistratefs jurisdiction.
(3 ) -----
(4 ) -----
The section is preventive and not penal; it is not
intended for the punishment of past offences but for prevention
of acts that may amount to or lead to a breach of peace
thereafter. Action under this Section can be taken only
when "in the opinion of the Magistrate there is sufficient
ground for proceeding". Thus, in each case, the Magistrate
has to exercise his discretion with reference to the
credibility and sufficiency of the information received by
him The information must show that there is a strong
and reasonable probability of a breach of the peace and not
(2 )merely a bare possibility v J . If he comes to the conclusion 
that the apprehension as to breach of the peace is unfounded
(1) Asghar Khan v. State, A.I.R. 1964 All.391
(2) Malik v. Bano, P.L.R. 1903> 115*
311
he need not take any action under this Section The
information regarding the past acts alone would not be enough
to justify an order requiring a person to furnish security for
keeping the peace. Something more is necessary, viz: the
likelihood of the commission in the near future of a particular
breach of the peace or wrongful act, likely to lead to a breach
(2 )of peace v y. A Magistrate can only proceed under this 
Section, if both the place where the breach of the peace or 
disturbance of public tranquillity is apprehended and the 
person proceeded against are within the local limits of his 
jurisdiction. This is a limitation on the power of the 
Magistrate; if the person leaves the jurisdiction, no action 
can be taken against him.
Section 108 (I) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:- 
Whenever .. a District Magistrate, or a Magistrate of the 
First Class, specially empowered by the Provincial Government 
in this behalf, has information that there is, within the 
limit of his jurisdiction, any person who, within or without 
such limit, either orally or in writing, or in any other manner, 
intentionally disseminates, or attempts to disseminate, or in 
any wise abets the dissemination of :
(a) any seditious matter, that is to say, any matter
(1) Shamas-ud-Din v. Bam Dayal, A.I.B. 1924 Lah.630
(2) In re Bangaswami, A.I.B. (30) 1943 Mad. 394.
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the publication of which is punishable under 
Section 123 A or Section 124 of the Pakistan 
Penal Code; or
(b) any matter the publication of which is 
punishable under Section 153A of the Pakistan 
Penal Code; or
(c) any matter concerning a Judge which amounts to 
criminal intimidation or defamation under the 
Pakistan Penal Code.
Such Magistrate, if in his opinion there is sufficient 
ground for proceeding may, in manner hereinafter provided, 
require such person to show cause why he should not be 
ordered to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for his 
good behaviour for such period, not exceeding one year, as 
the Magistrate thinks fit to fix.
The implication of this section is that, in order that 
a person may be bound over under this section, it must be 
shown that the person concerned is in the habit of intentionally 
disseminating or attempting to disseminate any such matter as 
is referred to in section^^. For this purpose it is 
necessary to show that the person proceeded against was 
connected with the dissemination of the matter in question.
The mere writing of the matter disseminated or authorship
(1) Jagan Nath v. Emperor, A.I.B. 1932 Lah.7
thereof is not sufficient to bring a person under this 
section^^. So under this section strict legal evidence 
of judicial standard is required before a person can be 
ordered to furnish a security for good behaviour. No 
proceeding under this section can be taken against the editor, 
proprietor, printer or publisher, except with by the order 
or under the authority of Provincial Government or some 
officer empowered by the Provincial Government in this behalf.
The section requires that the person should be within 
local jurisdiction of the Magistrate. This means the moment 
a person leaves the jurisdiction and goes to settle in another 
District, no proceedings can be taken against him.
Section 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides 
Whenever a District Magistrate, Sub Divisional Magistrate 
or Magistrate of the First Class receives information 2-
(a) that any person is taking precaution to conceal 
his presence within the local limits of such 
Magistrate^ jurisdiction, and there is reason 
to believe that such person is taking such 
precaution with a view to committing any offence
(b) that there is within such limits a person who 
has no ostensible means of subsistence, or who 
cannot give a satisfactory account of himself, 
such Magistrate may, in manner hereinafter
(1) Emperor v. T.K.Pitre A.I.E. 1923 Bomb.255
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provided, require such person to show cause why 
he should not be ordered to execute a bond, with 
sureties, for his good behaviour for such period 
not exceeding one year as the Magistrate thinks 
fit.
The section deals with proceeding against persons, who in 
English law would be classed as rogues and vagabonds.
The first part of clause (b) refers to ordinary beggars 
and vagrants but the latter parts deal with cases of persons 
who cannot give a satisfactory account of themselves. The 
object of the section is to frustrate the criminal designs of 
such persons before they are carried out
Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides s 
Whenever a District Magistrate, or Sub-Divisional 
Magistrate or a Magistrate of First Class, specially empowered 
in this behalf by the Provincial Government, receives 
information that any person within the local limits of his 
jurisdiction :~
(a) is by habit, a house breaker, thief or 
forger ; or
(b) by habit a receiver of stolen property, knowing 
the same to have been stolen; or
(c) habitually protects or harbours thieves or 
aids, in concealment or disposal of stolen 
property; or
(1) Emperor v. Phuchai A.I.E.1929 All.33
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(d) habitually commits or attempts to commit, or 
abets the commission of, the offence of 
kidnapping, abduction, extortion, cheating or 
mischief or any offence punishable under 
Chapter XII of Pakistan Penal Code or under 
Section 489-A, Section 489-B, Section 489-C or 
Section 489-D of that Code; or
(e) habitually commits or attempts to commit or 
abets the commission of offences involving a 
breach of peace; or
(f) is so desperate and dangerous as to render his 
being at large without security hazardous to 
the community,
such Magistrate may, in manner hereinafter provided, require 
such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to 
execute a bond with sureties for his good behaviour for such 
period not exceeding three years, as the Magistrate thinks 
fit to fix.
The object of the section is to afford protection to the 
public against a repetition of crimes in which the safety of 
property is menaced as well as those in which the security of 
the person is jeopardised. Again the object of the section 
is the prevention and not the punishment of offences and, with 
that object, it authorises the Magistrate to take good and 
sufficient security for good behaviour and with much
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discretion by the Magistrate and only in those cases where 
the evidence is very clear and precise
Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure - 
empowers Magistrates to issue orders absolute and at 
once in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger.
(1) In cases where, in the opinion of a District 
Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or of any other 
Magistrate, not being a Magistrate of the third Class, 
specially empowered by the Provincial Government or the 
District Magistrate to act under this section, there is 
sufficient ground for proceeding under the section and 
immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable,
Such Magistrate may by a written order, stating the 
material facts of the case and served in manner provided by 
section 134 direct any person to abstain from a certain act 
or take certain order with certain property in his possession 
or under his management, if such Magistrate considers that 
such direction is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent, 
obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any person lawfully 
employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a 
disturbance of the public tranquillity, or a riot, or an 
affray.
(2) An order under this section may in cases of 
emergency or in cases where the circumstances do not admit
(1) Rajendra v. Emperor, 1912 (17) C.W.N. 238
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of the serving in due time of a notice upon the person 
against whom the order is directed, be passed, exparte.
(3) Any orders under this section may be directed to a 
particular individual, or to the public generally when 
frequenting or visiting a particular place.
(4) Any Magistrate may either on his own motion or on 
the application of any person aggrieved, rescind or alter any 
order made under this section by himself or any Magistrate 
subordinate to him or by his predecessor in office.
(5) When such an application is received, the Magistrate 
shall afford to the applicant an early opportunity of 
appearing before him either in person or by a pleader and 
showing cause against the order; and if the Magistrate rejects 
the application wholly or in part, he shall record in writing 
his reasons for so doing.
(6) No order under this section shall remain in force for 
more than two months from the making thereof, unless, in cases 
of danger to human life, health or safety or a likelihood of a 
riot, or an affray, the Provincial Government, by notification 
in the official Gazette, otherwise directs. The orders under 
this section are judicial and not administrative v 7 .
The section provides for temporary orders being passed 
in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger. Two
(1) Belvi, A.I.R. 1931 Bom. 325, 326.
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conditions are necessary to be satisfied before a Magistrate 
can act under this section.
(a) The Magistrate must be satisfied that immediate 
prevention or speedy remedy is necessary. It 
is in fact, the urgency o f the case that vests 
the Magistrate with jurisdiction to exercise the 
powers conferred by this section^. A mere 
statement that he considers the case to be 
urgent is not sufficient, if the facts show that
in reality, there is no urgent necessity for
(2 )action'
(b) The Magistrate must be satisfied that the
direction to abstain from a certain act or to
take certain order with property is likely to
prevent or tends to prevent obstruction etc;
( 3 )as specified in the section'
There is another limitation on the use of this power
under this section; the powers conferred by this section are
discretionary and should be used sparingly and only where all
(4)the conditions prescribed are strictly fulfilled' 7. Action 
under this section is taken by the District Magistrate in
(1) P.T.Chandra v. Emperor, A.I.E. (29) 1942 Xah.171
(2) Chandra Nath v. Emperor, A.I.E.1919 Cal. 584
( 3 )  S r i Raj Narain v. D.M. A.I.R.1956 All.481
(4) P.T.Chandra v. Emperor, A.I.E. (29) 1942 lah.171
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cases of apprehended danger. It is therefore unreasonable to 
expect that, in the circumstances of a case, the District 
Magistrate should act in closest and full consultation with 
the Government, which is responsible for the maintenance of 
public order The duration of the order must be
co-extensive with the emergency; it should not be wider than 
is necessary to prevent the emergency. The Magistrate cannot 
issue an order intending to have effect for all time.
A person disobeying an order under this section is liable 
to be punished under S.188 of Pakistan Penal Code. The
prosecution in such cases has to be launched under the
provisions of S.195 or S.476 of the Code^^.
In short, this portion of the Code reproduced above 
applies to five classes of persons.
(i) Persons, upon conviction, who have committed or 
abetted offences against the public tranquillity 
with certain exceptions, or of assault or other 
offences involving a breach of the peace.
(ii) Persons who are likely to commit a breach of the
peace or disturb the public tranquillity, or do
(1) Gul Hussain v. Crown, P.L.D. 1956 P.C. 190 
P.Ii.R. 1956 Xah. 1351
1955 P.C.R. 81 (Cornelius, J.)
(2) In re Veerappa Moopan, A.I.R. 1939 Mad.496
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any wrongful act that may probably occasion a 
breach of the peace or disturb the public 
tranquillity.
(iii) Persons who disseminate seditious matter.
(iv) Vagrants and suspeated persons.
(v) Habitual offenders.
These categories of the persons may be asked to execute 
a bond with or without sureties and the bond executed by these 
persons will be forfeited upon failure to maintain good 
behaviour or upon engaging in the kind of activity for which 
they become suspect.
There are certain serious limitations upon the 
effectiveness of these sections in preventing the social 
unrest. In the first place jurisdiction is limited to the 
District Magistrate or Sub Divisional Magistrate or Magistrate 
of the first class.
This means that no other Magistrate can take the 
action if he has a suspect in his area. Again, as there is 
a question of jurisdiction, a man against whom an order has 
been passed in one district can go to another district and 
continue his activities there. Secondly, Magistrates may 
arrest and detain these persons, only if they cannot furnish 
the bond specified. Thus a wealthy person with means, a 
political agitator, provocateur, who constitute the greatest 
threat and whom the Executive is most anxious to lock up, are
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precisely those who can execute the needed bond. These 
people will always have the money available to avoid detention 
under these provisions and it will be the poor who will be the 
victim under these sections.
Under section 144 of Criminal Procedure Code the power is 
uncomprehensive and, for that reason, is very often used. The 
section imposes a penalty upon an individual or group for 
acting in a particular way. It does not ensure, as detention 
would, that the proscribed behaviour will not take place.
Many determined individuals would undoubtedly find a maximum 
imprisonment of six months and a fine, a small price to pay 
for creating disturbances by taking part in a riot or inciting 
ordinary citizen to act in the defiance of section 144. This 
section has lost much of its force, because too many people at 
one time can join in an agitation against the Government and 
it is difficult to arrest all of them. There is no disgrace 
attached to going to jail for disobedience of an order under 
section 144. The judicial authorities in many areas seem to 
be fully aware of this, for whether as cause or effect, they 
impose inadequate fines or no fine at all for transgressing 
orders prohibiting the assembly of five or more persons. 
Although the section could not be applied as a deterrent 
usually it is applied in this way. However, even if it were 
applied in the most stringent way, it would not completely 
eliminate the threat to law and order. Some people take
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pleasure in defying the orders under this section and in many 
cases voluntarily join a mob which is prepared to defy the 
orders under this section. In some c a s e s t h e  people who 
defied an order under section 144 of Criminal Procedure Code 
were never even brought before the Court, but were taken 
several miles from the place of arrest by the police and left 
there to find their way home by walking during the darkness 
of night. If this is done, section 144 cannot be relied on 
as an effective deterrent. It can also be argued that this 
section cannot be relied upon to prevent violence and riot on 
a large scale in any situation where stability is balanced 
against chaos. There are cases of political agitators, 
determined to disturb the peace and order of a locality, in 
which section 144 may fail to prevent this threat to peace and 
order but if these persons were detained under preventive 
detention laws, the threat to peace and order could be 
avoided.
The Code of Criminal Procedure also makes provision for 
preventive action by the law enforcement authorities in 
relation to certain classes of offences. The police are 
enjoined to prevent the commission of any cognizable offence 
(section 149 of Criminal Procedure Code). A schedule of 
cognizable offence is given in the second schedule to the
(1) See Ghulam Jilani case. P.I.D. 1967 S.C.373
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Code of Criminal Procedure. Cognizable offences are the 
more serious offences, likely to cause public alarm and, for 
that reason,a police officer may arrest without a warrant any 
person designing to commit such an offence. furthermore, 
police officers have the duty of preventing injury to public 
property (section 152 of Criminal Procedure Code). Whether 
these preventive powers of the police are adequate for 
stifling the kind of endemic unrest and instability, with 
which the executive is faced depends in part on what offences 
are listed as cognizable.
The Pakistan Penal Code defines the criminal offences 
and the punishments involved. The offences which are relevant 
for our purpose are ‘’offences against the public tranquillity” 
(sections 141 - 160 of the Pakistan Penal Code). These 
sections deal with unlawful assembly, rioting, rioting with 
deadly weapon, assaulting public servants, giving provocation 
to riot, promoting enmity between classes, hiring persons to 
take part in unlawful assemblies, riot and affray. All the 
offences mentioned in sections 141 to 160 are cognizable, with 
the exception of sections 155/A, 154, 155, 156 and 160, so 
a police officer may arrest persons without warrant in order 
to prevent the commission of these offences other than those 
last enumerated, but unless it is possible to secure a 
conviction, the person goes free; The action taken by the 
police to prevent cognizable offences under the provision of
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these sections will only temporarily check the activities of 
a particular person, unless a case can be made out with 
sufficient evidence to secure punishment in a Court. This 
means the action under these sections is always punitive, 
which is neither the aim of executive nor the object of 
preventive detention, which is to prevent a person from doing 
anything which will be prejudicial to the piiblic peace and 
maintenance of public order. The provisions of the Pakistan 
Criminal law intend to prevent breaches of the public peace, 
do not deal with the kinds of offences the executive is 
anxious to prevent and they contemplate investigation and 
tri&l, according to the established principle of jurisprudence. 
The Preventive Detention laws are valuable because the 
detention can be secured without judicial proof of an offence 
committed. The Pakistan Criminal Law does not allow a 
suspected provocateur to be removed from the scene of his 
activities whereas, under the Preventive detention laws such 
person can be detained. Moreover the offences under Pakistan 
Penal Code are bailable, whereas a person preventively 
detained cannot be released on bail. If it is necessary in 
the interest of public peace a possible provocateur or 
trouble-maker may be removed from the scene and the ordinary 
criminal law of the land is certainly inadequate. The 
criminal codes are founded upon the principle that a man is 
innocent until proved guilty. The law is designed to
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ascertain the facts and to assess them. The law of 
Preventive Detention is free from such legal technicalities 
and a man can be detained in the interest of security. There 
are many cases in which effectiveness of action is more 
important than certainty of judgment. As we have seen that 
the Pakistan Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code are 
insufficient to meet the needs which the executive has in mind 
for the peaceful and stable running of the Government and to 
maintain peace and order in the country. Again as in a 
Criminal Court the accused can always be represented by a 
pleader; witnesses are examined and cross-examined and strict 
rules of evidence are followed, with the result that a 
well-to-do mischief-maker always has a chance of being set 
free to disrupt peace and order, by acquiring the services 
of a good lawyer. The Court can only proceed, on formal 
charges, to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused 
on the particular charge it punishes; it does not prevent.
The Courts are too weak and inadequate to cope with a 
situation where the authority of Government and its stability 
are being challenged. When law and order breaks down, it is 
the innocent who suffer. How far the powers under the 
Criminal Procedure Code can enable the police to maintain 
peace and order in a locality can be seen from the report in 
a newspaper^^, that about 2,000 shopkeepers of Brandreth Road,
(1) The Pakistan Times dated 10.1.1970
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Circular Road, Bull Roads, Chowk Dalgram and Iron Market 
observed complete strike to protest against the criminal 
activities of a gang of bad characters in the area. The 
police say they are pov/erless; the powers given to them to 
deal with this type of person are inadequate. They cannot 
obtain concrete evidence, which would lead to a conviction.
On the other hand, if the executive will enforce preventive 
detention, they need not produce legal proof of an offense 
but only have to satisfy an authority that by detaining a 
person, peace and order can be restored in the locality.
We have now seen that the various provisions in the 
Criminal Procedure Code and Pakistan Penal Code are insufficient 
to do the job, which a good Government should have in mind.
It can now be said that the justification for the laws of 
detention without trial in a constitutional democracy is that 
the ordinary criminal laws with their historic safeguards, 
designed to produce a fair trial before conviction, are 
inadequate and cannot be made adequate to meet the 
recurring emergencies, with which the Pakistan Government 
is faced.
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EMERGENCY POWERS 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
1956 in Article 191 and the Constitution of 1962 in Article 30 
empower the President to declare by Proclamation that a grave 
emergency exists in the Country, by reason of which the 
security or economic life of Pakistan or part thereof is in 
imminent danger of being threatened by war or external 
aggression or by internal disturbances, which is beyond the 
power of the Provincial Government to control. While a 
Proclamation of Emergency is in force, laws and executive 
acts contravening the fundamental rights to freedom of 
movement, assembly, speech, the rights to deal with property 
and to follow an avocation are valid until the Proclamation 
is revoked. The President may further declare that the 
right to move a court for the protection of any fundamental 
right is suspended while the Proclamation remains in force. 
Such a declaration would probably affect the protection 
against arrest and detention. It would however still be 
possible to impugn a detention order, for non-compliance 
with the law under which it was made, for mala fides or for 
unreasonableness. One may ask whether the Criminal 
Procedure Code and the Pakistan Penal Code are not adequate; 
can't the President proceed under the powers conferred upon 
him by the Constitution to restore peace and order in the 
interest of the State? The answer may be that the object
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of the framers of the Constitution is that these powers 
should be used in extreme emergency and not when the peace 
and order of a locality is in danger. The justification of 
the law of preventive detention is that, while the emergency 
powers of the Constitution cannot be used often, the power 
under the law of preventive detention can be used as 
frequently as is desired. The law of preventive detention 
can be used to meet minor troubles, which may lead to the 
emergencies contemplated by the Constitution; the law of 
preventive detention is a check on circumstances which may 
give rise to a grave emergency.
The law of preventive detention is aimed at those who 
cannot be dealt with under the ordinary law of the land.
The liberty of some individuals may be curtailed, so that 
they may not make a nuisance of themselves to the others. 
Absolute and uncontrolled liberty would lead to anarchy and 
disorder. The enjoyment of personal liberty must be 
subjected to reasonable restriction in the interest of 
peace, order and stability of the State. There should be 
a proper balance between the right of the individual and the 
power of the State to restrict it in the interest of the 
State and not for the benefit of those who have, for the 
time being, been elected to run the Government. The use of 
these preventive powers is aimed at a class of people who, 
though a danger to the State, are generally regarded as in 
a different class from these against whom the sanctions of
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law of crimes are directed. They are the people against 
whom prompt action is necessary, if it is to be effective.
The State cannot run the risk of encouraging immunity of 
such persons either by failure to bring them to trial or 
unsuccessful prosecutions. It is better perhaps that this 
class of person should be subjected to preventive detention 
than that he should be arrested on specific charges, ill 
treated to extort confessions, tried on evidence and convicted 
by a judge.
The main problem of our Country is the existence of so 
many political parties with political leaders of various 
ideologies, and extreme views about the modes of protest and 
agitation. As long as this is the problem and there is no 
agreement between the leaders, there will always be a 
justification for the laws of preventive detention.
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES FOR LOSS OF LIBERTY „
The Writ Procedure
A right without remedy for enforcing it is of little 
value. A mere declaration of fundamental rights would be 
a formality, if there were no effective means of enforcing 
it. Keeping this in view our constitution contains 
provisions by which these fundamental rights can be enforced. 
The Constitution of 1962 has conferred power on the High 
Courts to issue direction or orders or writs, in the nature 
of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and 
certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the 
enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
“The writ jurisdiction," declared Kayani, C.J. ‘‘brings 
to a benighted morality the light that never was on sea or 
land. God is in His Heaven and allfs right with the world 
God was in His Heaven even before the writ jurisdiction, but 
all wasn*t right with the world. Consequently, if you are 
spiritually inclined, you say the writ jurisdiction is the 
modem manifestation of God‘s pleasure and God’s pleasure
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(1)dwells in the High Court.”v ' Referring to the analogous
(2)provisions in the Indian Constitution Dr. Ambedkar said,v 7 
”If I was asked to name the particular Article in the 
Constitution as the most important, without which this 
Constitution would be a nullity, I could not refer to any 
other Article except this one. It is the very soul of the 
Constitution and the very heart of it.”
The Constitution of Islamic Republic of 1956, by virtue 
of Articles 22 and 170, empowered the Supreme Court and High 
Courts to issue directions, orders and writs, including 
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas 
corpus. This Constitution was abrogated on 7th October 1958 
and the country was placed under Martial law but, even at that 
time, under Article 2 (4) of the Laws (Continuance in Force) 
Order of 10th October 1958, the Supreme Court and the High 
Courts still retained power to issue the writs of habeas 
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, 
though the Fundamental Rights were abrogated.
The Constitution of 1962, Article 2, declares that every 
citizen, wherever he may be, and every other person for the 
time being in Pakistan, has the inalienable right to en^oy
(1) Kayani *Not The Whole Truth* ....  P.44
(2) C. A. Debates Vol.VII P. 955-
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the protection of the law and to he treated in accordance 
with law; no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, 
reputation or property of any person shall be taken, except 
in accordance with law, no person shall be prevented from or 
be hindered in doing what is not prohibited by law and no 
person shall be compelled to do that which the law does not 
require him to do. When this right is infringed by a private 
individual, the person aggrieved must seek the appropriate 
remedy provided by the ordinary law. But when it is infringed 
by an official or public authority, a remedy may be sought in
(i)
a High Court by a writ petition. v '
Article 98 which empowers the High Courts to issue orders 
(not writs) for specific purposes, generally in the nature of 
mandamus, habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition and quo 
warranto, reads as follows.
Article 98
Jurisdiction of High Courts
1) A High Court shall have such jurisdiction as is 
conferred on it by this Constitution or by law.
2) Subject to this Constitution, a High Court of a Province 
may, if it is satisfied that no other adequate remedy is 
provided by law -
(1) Alan Grledhill, ’Pakistan, the Development of its law
& Constitution1 (1967) P. 179*
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(a) on the application of any aggrieved party make an 
order -
(i) directing a person performing in the Province 
functions in connection with the affairs of the 
Centre, the Province or a local authority, to 
refrain from doing that which he is not permitted 
by law to do, or to do that which he is required 
by law to do; or
(ii) declaring that any act done or proceeding taken in 
the Province by a person, performing functions in 
connection with the affairs of the Centre, the 
Province or a local authority, has been done or 
taken without lawful authority, and is of no legal 
effect; or
(b) on the application of any person, make an order -
(i) directing that a person in custody in the Province 
be brought before the High Court so that the Court 
may satisfy itself that he is not being held in 
custody without lawful authority or in an unlawful 
manner; or
(id) requiring a person in the Province holding or 
purporting to hold a public office to show under
(1)
what authority of law he claims to hold that office; or
(1) Substituted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1963 
(1 of 1964) Sec.6, for the full-stop.
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(i)
(c) on the application of any aggrieved person, make an 
order giving such directions to any person or 
authority, including any Government, exercising any 
power or performing any function in, or in relation 
to, any territory within the jurisdiction of that 
Court, as may be appropriate for the enforcement of 
any of the fundamental rights conferred by Chapter I 
of Part II of this Constitution.
3) An order shall not be made under clause 2) of this
Article -
(a) on application made by or in relation to a person in 
the Defence Services of Pakistan in respect of his 
terms and conditions of service, in respect of any 
matter arising out of his service or in respect of any 
action taken in relation to him as a member of the 
Defence Services of Pakistan; or
(b) on application made by or in relation to any other 
person in the service of Pakistan in respect of his 
terms and conditions of service, except a term or 
condition of service that is specified in this 
Constitution.
(1) Paragraph (c) added ibid.
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4) Where -
(a) application is made to a High Court for an order 
under paragraph (a) ^ ( o r  paragraph (c)) of clause
2) of this Article; and
(b) the Court has any reason to believe that the making 
of an interim order would have the effect of 
prejudicing or interfering with the carrying out of 
a public work or of otherwise being harmful to the 
public interest,
the Court shall not make an interim order unless the prescribed 
law officer has been given notice of the application and the 
Court, after the law officer ^^(or any person authorised by 
him in this behalf) has been given an opportunity of being 
heard, is satisfied that the making of the interim order wouM 
not have the effect referred to in paragraph (b) of this 
clause.
5) In this Article, unless the context otherwise requires -
"person1* includes any body politic or corporate, any
authority of or under the control of the Central
Government or of a Provincial Government and any
Court or tribunal, other than the Supreme Court, a
High Court or a Court or tribunal established under a
law relating to the Defence Services of Pakistan ;
(1) Inserted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1963 
(1 of 1964) sec•6.
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••prescribed law officer*1 means -
(a) in relation to an application affecting the 
Central Government or an authority of or under the 
control of the Central Government - the
A11 orne y-Ge ne ral; and
(b) in any other case - the Advocate-General of the 
Province in which the application is made*
Article 98 of the Constitution differs from the previous 
provisions of 1956 Constitution. It speaks of orders and 
omits the word "writ." Further the jurisdiction is conferred 
only on the High Courts. No writ or "order" can therefore, 
be issued directly to the Supreme Court, except on appeal by 
leave tinder Article 58 (3) from a High Court.
Speaking at the Civil Services Academy on April 25th,1964, 
Cornelius C.J. s a i d , ^
"Now in Pakistan, we have Article 98 and the ancient 
names of the writ have been eliminated from the Constitution, 
although the categories distinguish themselves easily under 
those names, and they will always be used with their specific 
meanings in judgments. In Article 98 the true content of 
each of the major wiits has been set out in the long foim of 
words. The object probably was to attain certainty as to the
(1) P*2j.D. 1964 Journal 75-
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limits within which the Court may act. Previously in each 
case the Courts referred to precedents from England, the 
United States, India and several other countries, to determine 
whether they had power to interfere in case before them. It 
is perhaps supposed that this may not be necessary, now that 
the powers are stated not by label, but by full expression. 
However, it is to be remembered that the superior Courts have 
the power and duty of interpreting the words of the Constitution 
and it is difficult to suppose that earlier precedents will 
lose their value as guidance. In the new Article there are 
verbal changes in respect of the availability of the writ to 
public servants, for the protection of their rights in the 
public service.M
n )
The West Pakistan High Court has said ' ' that whereas, 
under the Constitution of 1956, the Courts had to gather the 
scope of the named writs from text books and cases, the 
Constitution of 1962 attempts to reduce the substance of the 
writs into self-contained propositions. Incidents which, in 
the course of their evolution, have been attached to some of 
the writs, but which are not of the essence of the remedy, 
are not incorporated. The field of some writs has been 
enlarged; certiorari is no longer restricted to judicial
(1) Mahboob Ali Malik v. West Pakistan, P.jL.D.1963 Lah. 575*
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matters. Any order passed in excess of lawful authority can
be declared without legal effect.
A writ is defined by Blackstone ^  as ”a mandatory
letter from the King in Parliament, sealed with his Great Seal,
and directed to the Sheriff of the County wherein the injury
is committed or the respondent is supposed so to be, requiring
him to command the wrong-doer or party accused, either to do
justice to the complainant or else to appear in Court, and
answer the accusation against him.”
Habeas Corpus.
The writ of habeas corpus is a writ directed to the
person detaining another and commanding him to produce the
body of the prisoner at a certain time and place, with the
day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to,
and receive whatsoever the Court or Judge awarding the writ
shall consider in that behalf. It is a legal process
designed and employed to give summary relief against illegal
(2)restraint of personal liberty.v '
Generally the writ of habeas corpus is issued in cases
(1) Blackstone, Commentaries (iii), C.18.
(2) Perris & Perris, ’’The Law of Extraordinary Legal 
Remedies” P.21, 22.
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of illegal and improper detention in public or private
custody but the writ is applicable as a remedy in all cases
(1)
of wrongful deprivation of personal liberty.v J In brief 
the writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative process for 
securing the liberty of the subject by affording an 
effective means of immediate release from unlawful 
detention whether in prison or in private custody.
(1) Rao Mahroz Akhtar v. District Magistrate, 
P.L.D. 1957 Iah. 676.
340
Historical Development in England.
The right of personal liberty, the most precious of
all rights, rests upon the common law, which was defined and
declared by Magna Carta. The subject was therefore always
legally free from detention, except on a criminal charge or
conviction or for civil debt. At common law any free man
imprisoned was entitled to demand from the Court of King's
Bench a writ of habeas corpus, or corpus cum causa as it was
called, directed to the keeper of the prison, and commanding
him to bring up the body of the prisoner, with the cause of
the caption and detention, in order that the Court might
judge its sufficiency and either remand the prisoner, admit
him to bail, or discharge him according to the nature of the
charge. In the fifteenth century it was used by the
central courts to supervise commitments made by local and
feudal courts; in the sixteeth it was used in the contest
with the prerogative and admiralty courts, in the course of
which it became apparent that the writ could be employed in
fl)the defence of the liberty of the person.v 1
The writ was issued as a matter of right, and ex debito 
justitiae, and could not be denied. It however possessed 
various defects, which caused much delay in obtaining the writ;
(1) Thomas Pitt Taswell-Iangmead, English Constitutional 
History, 10th Ed. Page 483.
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but a more serious matter was the attempt made by the Crown 
to defeat the right altogether, by maintaining that "the 
special command of the king” was per se a sufficient cause 
to justify the commitment and detention of a subject.
This important point was elaborately argued in Court and in 
Parliament in the great case of the Five K n i g h t s during 
the reign of Charles I, who levied and exacted a general 
loan from every subject, in order to find funds for carrying 
on the war with Spain, the common man who refused to contribute 
was punished by impressment into the army or the navy; many 
of the gentry were committed to prison; several regiments 
of soldiers were sent into different countries and quartered 
upon the inhabitants, and in some places martiel law was 
enforced. Out of many persons imprisoned throughout 
England for refusing the loan, five applied for writs of 
habeas corpus in the King's Bench, to which the Warden of 
the Fleet returned that they were detained under a warrant 
from the Privy Council "by special command of the king.1'
This gave rise to a most important discussion as to the 
sufficiency of such a return as a legal cause of detention, 
there being no charge made against the prisoners. The 
decision of the Court was in favour of the Crown, and the
(1) Darnel's Case, 1627. 3 St. Tr. 1.
prisoners were remanded to custody - a custody which, hy this 
judgment, might be indefinitely prolonged, without any specific 
charge being brought against the prisoners or any trial with
(i )
its consequent condemnation or acquittal. v ' The judgment 
however spread indignation among the people, who saw their 
right of personal liberty practically annihilated by this 
decision.
After the decision in Darnel1s case, the King's power of 
arrest was discussed at length in Parliament, and, despite the 
need recognized by many members for a discretionary power of 
arrest in emergencies, the majority would not hear of any 
limitation on the freedom of the subject, and eventually the 
result was the petition of Eight drawn up by the Commons, to 
which the Royal Assent was accorded on June 7th, 1628 (3 Car.l.Cj 
The Petition of Right declared against the decision in Darnel's 
case.
This Act, after reciting among other things, Magna Carta 
and the statute of Edward III C.3 states that:-
" never the less against the 'tenor of the said statutes, 
divers of your subjects have of late been imprisoned without 
any cause shown; and when for their deliverance they were 
brought before your justices by your Majesty’s writs of 
habeas corpus, there to undergo and receive as the Court should
)1) Constitutional History. Thomas Pitt Taswell- Langmead
P.410.
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order, and their keepers commanded to certify the causes of 
their detainer, no cause was certified, hut they were detained 
by your Majesty's special Command, signified by the lords of 
your privy council; and yet were returned back toseveral 
prisons, without being charged with anything to which they 
might make answer according to law.”
This Act regulated the Privy Council and dissolved the 
Star Chamber. It contained a clause providing that any person 
imprisoned by order of the abolished Star Chamber and other 
arbitrary Courts, or by command or warrant of the king's 
majesty in his own person, or by command or warrant of the 
council board, or of the lords or others of his majesty!s 
privy council, should be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus 
from the Courts of King's Bench or Common Pleas, without delay 
upon any pretence whatsoever; that the officer, having the 
prisoner in custody should produce him and certify the cause 
of his detention and that the Court before which the prisoner 
was produced should either remand, bail, or deliver him within 
three court days of the writ's return. A violation of this 
section was punishable by treble damages.
In 1676 the delay and difficulty in procuring a habeas 
corpus was forcibly exemplified in the case of Francis Jenkes.
(1) 6 St. TV. 1190, 1193. (Ed.1676)
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A. citizen had delivered a speech at the Guildhall, urging that 
a Common Council should speedily he held to petition the king, 
in the name of the City, to call a new parliament. 3?or this 
he was summoned before the Privy Council and committed to 
prison. Various attempts were unsuccessfully made to obtain 
his release. The Court of Quarter Sessions for Westminster 
refused to admit him to bail, on the plea that he had been 
committed by a superior court, or to try him because he was 
not entered in the Calendar of prisoners. The Lord Chancellor, 
on being applied to for habeas corpus, refused to issue it 
during the vacation, and the Chief Justice of the King*s Bench, 
to whom in the next place recourse was had, made so many 
difficulties that Jenkes lay in prison many weeks before he 
was eventually enlarged on bail.
Three years after the proceedings in Jenkes case in 1679> 
the famous Habeas Corpus Act was passed nfor the better 
securing of the liberty of the subject, and for prevention of 
imprisonments beyond the seas.11 It was restricted to cases of 
persons imprisoned before sentence for fcriminal or supposed 
criminal matters. 1 Its aim was to circumvent all the devices 
by which the effect of the writ of habeas corpus could be 
avoided both on the part of judges and of the gaoler.
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The statute introduced no new principle, though the
occasion for passing it was cogent, viz; the arbitrary
imprisonment of the subject by the King himself. "The
nation had been partially awakened to the question of several
instances of a like character in that and the previous reign,
attended with other acts of evasion, by which trials were
greatly delayed. This was the reason for that part of the
habeas corpus act, directing the bailing or discharging of
persons properly imprisoned, if their trials were unreasonably 
(11postponed.”v '
The Act of 1679 was, however, subject to three defects.
1) It fixed no limit on the amount of bail which might 
be demanded
2) It only applied to commitments on criminal or supposed 
criminal charges; all other cases of unjust 
imprisonment being left to the habeas corpus at 
common law, as it subsisted before this enactment.
3) It did not guard against falsehood in the return.
The first of these defects was remedied in 1689* by the
Bill of Rights, which declared "that excessive bail ought not 
to be required.” The other two subsisted down to the year
(1) Mr. Hill in his note to Mcleod Case, 3 Hill, 647.
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(1 )1816, when they were at length removed by "An Act v 7 for 
more effectually securing the liberty of the subject.1 
By this Act, in addition to various minor but important 
improvements, the statutory remedy was extended to cases of 
imprisonment on non-criminal charges, and the judges were 
empowered to examine and determine the truth of the facts 
set forth in the return, and in all cases of doubt to bail 
the prisoner.
James II attempted to set the King above law and to
revive and extend the royal prerogative; he endeavoured to
establish or extend the royal power to suspend or dispense
(2 )with the l5}ws. For this purpose, a case v 7 was brought by 
an informer against the defendant, whom the King had appointed 
Colonel of a foot regiment, and who had not taken certain 
oaths, nor received the sacrament, indicating thereby that he 
was a protestant. The defendant pleaded a dispensation 
granted by the King, discharging him from the obligation 
placed on him by the statute.
The Plaintiff's argument was that the King might dispense 
with the penalty for an individual breach of a penal statute,
(1) 56 Geo. Ill, C.100
(2) Godden v. Hales, (1686) 11, St. Tr. 1165*
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where no other person was prejudiced or a breach of a statute, 
enacted for the benefit of the Crown but not with a statute 
made for the general welfare of the public. It was held by 
the majority that the King's prerogative extended to dispensing 
with all penal laws, in particular cases and for necessary 
reasons, the King being the sole judge of the necessity.
God, they said, may dispense with His own laws; the laws of 
England are the King's laws, and any law may be dispensed 
with by the law giver. This was a victory for the Crown but 
of short duration. Three years later the same King lost his 
throne and this decision was nullified by the provisions of the 
Bill of Rights, which is the third great charter of English 
liberty. It stated
"That the pretended power of suspending of laws or the 
execution of laws by legal authority, without consent of 
Parliament, is illegal.
That the pretended power of dispensing with laws or the 
execution of laws by legal authority, as it hath been assumed 
and exercised of late, is illegal.n
The Bill of Rights finally declared the supremacy of the 
British Parliament, which was established, not so much by 
judicial decisions, as by aimed conflict. The Bill of Rights 
recited all the outstanding points of dispute between King and
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subject, James II*s claim to suspend laws, to dispense with 
their operation, and to maintain a standing army among others 
and decided against the King. Though the Bill of Rights 
abolished the suspending power outright, yet its validity had 
always been doubtful. It condemned the dispensing power only 
was it hath been used and exercised of late,” and contemplated 
a statutory regulation of its exercise, which was never carried 
out. However, the Courts admitted that the powers of the King
were subject to restriction by statute, and they regarded as
valid the limitations imposed by the Bill of Rights.
The Act of Settlement of 1701 deprived the Crown of the only 
remaining means of interference with the course of law as it 
provided that the judges should hold their offices, not at the 
Kingfs pleasure, but during good behaviour, being subject to 
dismissal only upon an address of both Houses of Parliament.
The Act of 1862 provides that the writ of habeas
shall issue out of England by authority of any judge or
Court of Justice therein, into any colony or foreign dominion 
of the Crown, where Her Majesty has a lawfully established 
Court or Courts of Justice, having authority to grant and 
issue the said writ, and to ensure the due execution thereof 
throughout such colony and dominion.
According to Dicey, the net result of the habeas corpus
(1) Dicey, ”Baw of Constitution” P..218.
349
procedure is that "while the Habeas Corpus Act is in fcrce, 
no persoh committed to prison on a charge of a crime can be 
kept long in confinement, for he has the legal means of 
insisting upon either being let out upon bail, or else of 
being brought to speedy trial."
The Habeas Corpus Acts have occasionally been suspended 
in times of great public danger for a limited time, so as to 
allow the Government to detain persons on mere suspicion and to 
keep them in custody without trial. In critical times there 
is a presumption that the liberty of the subject should be 
sacrificed in the interest of the welfare of the State. As 
Sir T. Carr mentioned in his work,^^ "nations cannot 
now-a-days wait for hostilities before arming themselves with 
crisis powers ... as emergencies are seen to be intensified, 
there is naturally a greater need and readiness to tighten up 
the l a w  Enemy action may require departure from the slow
and stately process of peace time criminal justice."
(2 )To quote Diceyv, '"During periods of political excitement, the 
power or duty of the courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus, 
and thereby compel the speedy trial or release of persons
(1) Concerning English Administrative Law. Edn.(1941) P.72-78
(2) Dicey, "law of Constitution" P.228 - 229*
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charged with crime, has been found an inconvenient or 
dangerous limitation on the authority of the executive 
government.11 ttIn former times it was the practice in times 
of danger to the State to pass what were popularly known as 
the Habeas Corpus Suspension Acts. ^  These Acts, in effect, 
prevented the use of the writ of habeas corpus for the 
purpose of insisting upon speedy trial or the right to bail 
in the cases of persons charged with treason or other specified 
offences. They did not suspend generally the use of habeas 
corpus proceedings, and, as soon as the period of suspension 
in relation to a particular crime was passed, anyone, who for 
the time being had been denied the assistance of the writ, 
could seek his remedy in the Courts by an action for false 
imprisonment or malicious prosecution. Suspension did not 
legalise illegal arrest; it merely suspended a particular 
remedy in respect of particular offences. Accordingly it was 
the practice, at the close of the period of suspension, to pass 
an Indemnity Act, in order to protect officials concerned from 
the consequences of any incidental illegal acts, which they 
might have committed under cover of the suspension of the 
prerogative writ. During a period of emergency, many
(1) Dicey, MIaw of Constitution.w P.229
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illegalities may be committed by the Executive in their 
effort to deal with a critical situation. The object of the 
suspension was to enable the government to take steps, which 
though politically expedient, were, or might be, not strictly 
legal. An Indemnity Act legalises all such illegalities and 
so supplements a suspension Act, which may not have given to 
the Executive all the power that it required
During the years 1715 and 1745, when the safety of the 
realm was endangered by Jacobite Rebellions, the Habeas Corpus 
Acts were suspended by an Act of Parliament. In 1794,
34 Geo III was passed after the execution of X»ouis XVI in 
Prance in 1789. This Act began with the preamble "whereas a 
traitorous and detestable conspiracy has been formed for 
subverting the existing laws and constitution, and for 
introducing the system of anarchy and confusion, which has 
so fatally obtained in Prance ... " Its main object was to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus; persons arrested under a 
warrant of the King and six Privy Councillors, or by warrant 
of a Secretary of State, for treason, or treasonable practices 
were to be detained "without bail or mainprize," till 1st 
February, 1795, and no judge was under an obligation to 
release them under the provision of any law or statute 
contrary to the Act.
(1) Wade & Phillips "Constitutional law." P*354 -355*
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Neither during the First nor the Second World War was
there any direct suspension of habeas corpus. The Defence of
Realm Acts 1914-15, empowered the Executive to make regulations
by Order in Council for securing the public safety or for the
(1 )defence of the realm. In Halliday *s casev y it was held that 
this general power was wide enough to support a regulation 
authorising imprisonment without trial.
A person detained under a valid regulation, giving 
unrestricted power to detain, cannot subsequently bring an 
action for false imprisonment, in order to test the merits of 
his detention. Thus, though habeas corpus proceedings are 
not suspended, there is a greater infringement of liberty in 
giving the Executive unrestricted power to detain than in 
suspending habeas corpus proceedings in respect of particular 
c h a r g e s . D e s p i t e  the wide powers conferred by the Defence 
of the Realm Acts, numerous illegalities were undoubtedly 
committed and, after the War, the Indemnity Act, 1920, and a 
separate Act, relating to illegal charges, the War Charges 
Validity Act, 1925, were passed.
During the Second World War, the Emergency Powers (Defence)
(1) Rex v. Halliday, 1917, A.C.260
(2) Wade & Phillips "Constitutional law" P.355, 356.
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Act, 19395 empowered the making of regulations by Order in 
Council "Defence Regulations” for five general purposes, the 
public safety, the defence of the realm, the maintenance of 
public order, the efficient prosecution of any war in which 
His Majesty might be engaged; and the maintenance of supplies 
and services essential for the life of the community. There 
followed a list of particular purposes for which reguda tions 
could be made, without prejudice to the generality of the 
five enumerated purposes; these included a power to try 
offenders against the regulations in special courts, a power 
to make provision for the detention of persons by the Secretary 
of State in the interests of public safety or the defence of 
the realm and authority to enter and search premises. This
was followed by other emergency measures.
(2 )Dicey,K J summing up the whole position, observed 
"It cannot be disputed that the so-called suspension of 
Habeas Corpus Act, followed by an Act of Indemnity, is, in 
reality, a far greater interference with personal freedom than 
would appear frcm the very limited effect, in a merely legal 
point of view, of suspending the right of persons accused of
(1) Wade & Phillips "Constitutional law” P.355, 356.
(2) Dicey "law of Constitution11 P.235-236.
354
treason to demand a speedy trial. The Suspension Act, coupled 
with the prospect of an Indemnity Act, does in truth arm the 
executive with arbitrary powers. Still, there are one or two 
considerations, which limit the practical importance, that can 
fairly be given to an expected Act of Indemnity. The relief 
to be obtained from it is prospective and uncertain. Any 
suspicion on the part of the public, that officials had 
grossly abused their powers, might make it difficult to obtain 
a parliamentary indemnity for things done, while the Habeas 
Corpus Act was suspended. As regards, again, the protection 
to be derived from the Act by men* who have been guilty of 
irregular, illegal, oppressive, or cruel conduct, everything 
depends on the terms of the Indemnity. These may be either
narrow or wide ........  An Act of Indemnity, again though it
is the legalisation of illegality, is also, it should be noted, 
itself a law. It is something in its essential character, 
therefore, very different from the proclamation of martial law, 
the establishment of a state of siege, or any other proceedings, 
by which the executive government, at its own will, may suspend 
the law of the land. It is no doubt an exercise of arbitrary 
sovereign power; but where the legal sovereign is a Parliamenta^ 
assembly, even acts of state assume the form of regular 
legislation; and this fact of itself maintains in no small 
degree the real, no less than the apparent supremacy of law."
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Habeas Corpus in Indo-Pakistan sub-Continent*
The history of Habeas Corpus in the sub-continent 
begins with the grant of Letters Patent to Supreme Court in 
Calcutta in 1775• Now Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code 1898, empowers any High Court in India to issue 
directions in the nature of habeas corpus and whenever it 
thinks fit, except in the case of persons detained under the 
Bengal State Prisoners Regulation 1818, Madras Regulation II 
of 1819> Bombay Regulation XXV of 1827 or the State Prisoners 
Act, 1858.
A case^^ was brought before the Supreme Court of 
Calcutta and the question arose whether the Supreme Court of 
Calcutta could issue a writ of habeas corpus for the 
production of a person confined beyond the limits of Calcutta. 
It was held that the issuing of this high prerogative writ, 
not being a matter of ordinary original civil jurisdiction and 
being made in the Supreme Court, not on any side, such as the 
plea side or the equity side of the Court, the limits within 
which such writs could be issued were not affected by the 11th 
clause of the Charter of 1865 and the local limits within 
which such habeas corpus could be issued depended on the
(1) In the matter of Ameer Khan (1870) 6, Ben.L.R. 592
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jurisdiction, which the late Supreme Court possessed under 
the Charter of 1774. It was accordingly held that the High 
Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus into 
the mofussil, outside the original jurisdiction, as the 
Supreme Court had powers to issue writs of habeas corpus in 
the same manner as they were issued in England and the same 
power was conceded to the High Courts under their respective 
charters.
In 1872 the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872) 
was enacted. Two sections were introduced in that Code, 
namely sections 81 and 82, the later enacting that,
"neither the High Courts nor any Judge of such High Court 
shall issue any writ of habeas corpus, mainprise de homine 
replegiando nor any other writ of the like nature beyond the 
Presidency Towns."
In 1875 the High Courts Criminal Procedure Act (X of 1875) 
was passed. Section 148 of that Act set out various purposes 
for which an order in the nature of habeas corpus might be made 
and it gave power to the High Courts to make such orders in 
the case of persons within the limits of their original 
jurisdiction.
Thus, the power to issue writs of habeas corpus, except 
as provided in those Acts, wteis expressly withdrawn from the
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High. Courts. When the Code of Criminal Procedure was 
amended in 1882 the Acts of 1872 and 1875 were included in 
Sch. I as enactments repealed by section 2 Mbut not so as to 
restore any jurisdiction or form of procedure not existing or 
followed of 1st January 1883”. The Code was again amended 
by Act V of 1898 and the same provision was re-enacted as 
Section 491 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure. The 
matter remained very much in the same position until 1923 , 
when the Code was amended by the Criminal law Amendment Act, 
(Act XII of 1923) and a right was given to everybody within 
the Appellate Criminal Jurisdiction of any High Court to make 
an application to that Court, under Section 491 of the Code.
It would seem to follow from the above that, under Codes 
of 1882: or of 1898, the High Court could not issue any writ 
of habeas corpus for any of the purposes mentioned in section 
491 of the Criminal Procedure Code, apart from the provisions 
of the Code.
A full bench of Madras High Court held,^^ that the Hi^i 
Court or any Judge of it could not issue a common law writ of 
habeas corpus in any case covered by section 491 of Criminal 
Procedure Code. This view was reaffirmed by the Privy
(1) District Magistrate v. M. Mappillai, A.I.R. (1939) Mad.120
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Council. Their Lordships of the Privy Council cited
with approval the following observations of the Chief Justice 
of the Madras High Court, who delivered judgment on behalf of 
the full bench :
"The High Courts Act of 1861 authorised the Legislature, 
if it thought fit, to take away the power, which the Court 
obtained as the successor of the Supreme Court and Acts of 
the Legislature, lawfully passed in 1875 and subsequent years, 
leaves no doubt in my mind that the Legislature has taken away 
the power to issue the prerogative writ of 'habeas corpus' in 
matters contemplated by section 491 of Criminal Procedure Code 
of 1898."
In brief, the courts in the sub-continent had no 
jurisdiction to issue the common law writ of habeas corpus and 
to exercise the power which the courts in England exercise.
The powers of the courts are now controlled by section 491 
of Criminal Procedure Code, which has ftaken the place of the 
old common law writ of habeas corpus.
(1) Matthen v. District Magistrate, A.I.R. (1939) P.C.213.
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Habeas Corpus in Pakistan.
The history of habeas corpus was traced by Shabir Ahmad,J; 
in Muhammad Anwar*s^  case in the following words
"The jurisdiction to issue orders of the nature of 
habeas corpus has been with High Courts for a very long time. 
Originally when the present Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V 
J.898) was passed in 1898, jurisdiction to pass an order under 
section 491 thereof was conferred only on three High Courts, 
namely, those of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, which were 
called the Presidency High Courts. By an amendment brought 
about in the section in 1923 by means of section 3 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1923 (XII of 1923), 
the power to issue orders under section 491 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure was conferred on all High Courts. Another 
change which was brought about by the abovementioned amending 
Act of 1923 was that, whereas at the beginning, an order under 
section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be passed 
only with regard to persons within the ordinary original 
civil jurisdiction of the three High Courts that had power to 
act, the amending Act conferred jurisdiction on all High Courts 
to pass orders with regard to persons in places within the 
limits of their criminal appellate jurisdiction. The
(1) Muhammad Anwar v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.L.D.1963
Bah. 109 F.B.
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marginal note of section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
is to the effect that the High Courts could issue directions 
in the nature habeas corpus. The position continued like 
this till the partition of British India, to which territory 
the Act was applicable, but sometimes in 1953, Section 223-A 
of the Government of India Act, 1935, which Act continued to 
be the Constitution of Pakistan for quite some nine years after 
its establishment, was added. This section gave the High 
Courts powers to issue some writs, including that of habeas 
corpus and that power continued till the 23rd of March 1956, 
when the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan came 
into force, which conferred powers of issuing writs on the 
High Courts. The Constitution Act of 1956 was abrogated on 
the night of the 7th October, 1958, when the whole of Pakistan 
was placed under Martial lav/ but, even during the Martial law 
regime, powers of the High Courts to issue those and some 
other specified writs were made in the laws (Continuance in 
Force) Order, 1958. Then came the Constitution of 1962, 
which is now in force. By its 98th Article, the new 
Constitution confers on High Courts the power to set free 
persons detained in unlawful custody.1
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Object of Habeas Corpus
The right of a person to petition for habeas corpus is 
a high prerogative right and is a Constitutional remedy for 
all matters of illegal confinement.^^ ftThe writ has for its 
object the speedy release, by judicial decree, of persons who 
are illegally restrained of their liberty. It also lies 
where a party is held by one person, when another is entitled 
to his custody, in which case the court is empowered to 
deliver him from the unlawful imprisonment by committing him 
to the custody of the person who is by law entitled thereto, 
as in the cases of infants and insane persons. The purpose 
of the writ is not to punish for the wrongful act of restraining 
petitioner, or to afford him redress for his illegal detention. 
Such is not its design, nor can judgment thereunder be 
entered against anybody therefor. Nor does it concern, 
necessarily, the wrongful act causing the detention. It is 
simply confined to compelling the immediate human instrument 
of the unlawful restraint to restore his victim to liberty, 
notwithstanding any charge made against him.
Although the writ of habeas is a writ of right, it is not 
a writ of course. There are authorities to support the view
(1) Farid Ahmad v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.L.P. 1965 Lah.135
(2) Ferris and Ferris, "The Law of Extraordinary Legal
Remedies,11 1926 P.23, 24.
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that, even if a fit case has been made out, showing ex facie
a want of jurisdiction in the authority making an order of
commitment, yet if it appears to the Court that it is a
purely technical defect, or the conviction is otherwise valid,
the Court may not interfere even in those circumstances.^
It has been observed
MThe writ is one of right, but not of course, and issues
only on reasonable cause shown. Allowance of the writ is a
judicial, not a ministerial act. Its issuance is not a
perfunctory operation to be had for the asking. While by
statute it may issue as a matter of course, when the petition
shows on its face that there is a cause therefor, yet even the
Federal Courts will be cautious, especially when it is on behalf
of state prisoners. It will not issue as a matter of course,
where it would be vain or futile, or obvious that, on final
hearing, petitioner must be remanded to custody, for the law
does not require a vain act, or where the petition shows on
its face that detention is legal, or unless the petition is in
n (o )
substantial compliance with statutory provisions.v 7
The whole object of proceedings for writs of habeas corpus 
is to make them expeditious, to keep them as free from 
technicality as possible and to keep them as simple as possible.
(1) Abdul Hannan v. Govt, of East Pakistan, P.L.D.1959
Dacca 279
(2) Ferris and Ferris HThe Law of Extraordinary Legal
Remedies,« 1926 P.25-26.
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When there is no question of fact to be examined or 
determined, no affidavit is needed * But if a fact is
disputed, affidavits are needed. If the detention is under 
the orders of the detaining authority in the exercise of its 
plenary discretion or a person is detained under the orders 
of Court, no affidavit is called for. But in any other case, 
the detaining authority has to justify his action by disclosing 
facts, which would satisfy the Court that the custody is not 
improper.
The writ of habeas corpus is of a remedial nature and is
(2)not used as an instrument of punishment. v y The object of
the writ is not to punish previous illegality, but to release
(3)from previous illegal detention. / It is inapplicable, if 
the illegal detention has ceased before the application for 
the writ is made. 'When it is clear that the person charged 
with unlawfully detaining another, whether a child or an adult,
has de facto ceased to have any custody or control, the writ
(a ) )
ought not to issue. J In a case, ' on an application
by the parent for a writ of habeas corpus in respect of a child,
(1) Ranjit Singh v. State of Pepsu, A.I.R.1959 S.C.843
(2) Barnardo v. Ford Gossage, 1892 A.C.326.
(3) Rex v. Home Secretary, Ex parte O’Brien (1923) 39 T.L.R.
487.
(4) Halsbury Wlaw of England,” Vol.IX Para. 1204 P«705
(5) Barnardo v. Ford Gossage, 1892 A.C.326.
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directed to the head of an institution for destitute 
children, in which the child had been placed, it appeared 
that, before the proceedings began, he had, without authority 
from the parent, handed over the child to another person to 
be taken to Canada and he alleged that he did not know where 
he or the child was. The Court of Appeal affirmed an order 
absolute of the Queens Bench Division that the writ should 
issue. The House of Lords held that the writ was properly 
issued, on the ground that the applicant was entitled to have 
the facts fully investigated on the return. Lord Watson 
observed, nThe remedy of habeas coipus is, in my opinion, 
intended to facilitate the release of persons actually 
detained in unlawful custody and was not meant to afford the 
means of inflicting penalties on those persons by whom they 
were at some time or other illegally detained .... ”
In the general sense, the writ of habeas corpus may
issue to test the validity of any detention whether by the 
Executive or by a private person or by any other authority 
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers; but in such 
proceedings the answer to the writ is usually considered to
be sufficient, if a valid commitment order is produced by the
detaining authority and where a person has been convicted by 
a Criminal Court, ex facie there is such a valid order for the 
detention of the person concerned. Therefore, in cases where
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the writ is taken out to challenge the validity of a 
conviction by a Criminal Court, its scope is somewhat 
restricted and it may he said that, in such cases, the Court 
will only interfere by a writ of this nature, if it clearly 
appears to it, on the record itself or on the face of the 
commitment order, that the act for which the person concerned 
is committed is no crime or, if it is a crime, he has been 
committed for it by a person who has no jurisdiction so to 
commit him or if the sentence imposed upon him is in excess 
of that prescribed by law* It is now universally accepted 
that a writ of this nature cannot issue to question the 
propriety or correctness of the decision of an inferior 
Court on any matter which is within its jurisdiction to 
decide, for, a Court has a jurisdiction to decide either 
rightly or wrongly. The writ is not, by any means, a 
substitute for appeal.
The Court has power to see that the document authorising 
detention is on the face of it valid and the authority 
ordering detention has acted within the limits prescribed by 
law or whether any fundamental right has been contravened. 
Enquiry into all these questions is permissible, because each
(1) Abdul Hannan v. Govt, of East Pakistan, P.L.D.1959
Dacca 279.
of them affects the legality of the arrest. Thus the High 
Court may set at liberty a person detained under the Frontier 
Crimes Regulation, if his detention is ordered in violation 
of a provision of the Regulation. ^  In a recent case ^  it 
was observed that "Habeas Corpus is essentially a writ of 
inquiry, and upon matters in which the state itself is 
concerned, in aid of right and liberty, though private rights 
may be involved. It by no manner of means follows that the 
prayer of petitioner will be granted, because the writ has 
been ordered to issue. The writ simply brings the parties 
before the Court for the ascertainment of the facts of the 
case. The Court is clothed with the power, with a sound
discretion, to grant or refuse relief."
('5)In Ghulam Jilani^ casev 1 the Supreme Court held that, 
"Power is expressly given by Article 98 to the Superior Court 
to probe into the exercise of public power by executive 
authority, how high soever, to determine whether they have 
acted with lawful authority. The judicial power is reduced 
to a nullity, if laws are so worded or interpreted that the 
executive authority may make what statutory rules it pleases
(1) Ali Muhammad v. Commissioner, F.C.R. Quetta, Division
P.L.D. 1964 Quetta 1.
(2) Nasim Fatima v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.D.D.1967 Lah.105
(F.B.)
(3) Malik Ghulam Jilani v. Govt.of West Pakistan, P.L.D.1967
S.C.373.
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thereunder and may use this freedom to make themselves the 
final Judges of their own "satisfaction" for imposing 
restraints on the enjoyment of the fundamental rights of 
citizens. Article 2 of the Constitution could he deprived 
of all its content through this process and the Courts would 
cease to be guardians of the nation's liberties."
The writ is applicable as a remedy in all cases of 
wrongful deprivation of personal liberty. Where the detention 
of an individual is under process for criminal or supposed 
criminal causes, the jurisdiction of the Court and the 
regularity of the commitment may be inquired into. Where 
the restraint is imposed on civil grounds under claim of 
authority, the legal validity of such claim may be inquired 
into. Where the restraint is imposed on civil grounds under 
claim of authority, the legal validity of such claim may be 
investigated and determined, and where, as frequently occurs 
in the case of infants, conflicting claims for the same 
individual are raised, such claims may be inquired into on 
the return to the writ of habeas corpus, and the custody 
awarded to the proper person. In other cases, where the 
personal freedom of an individual is wrongfully interfered tirith 
by another, the release of the former from the illegal 
detention may be effected by habeas corpus. The illegal
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detention of a subject, that is a detention or imprisonment,
which is incapable of legal justification, is the basis of
(1)jurisdiction in Habeas Corpus* x y
The right of a person to a petition for habeas corpus is 
a high prerogative right and is a Constitutional remedy for 
all matters of illegal confinement* This is one of the most 
fundamental rights known to the Constitution. There being no 
limitation placed on the exercise of this right, no actual or 
assumed restriction can be imposed by any subordinate 
legislation. If the arrest of a person cannot be justified 
in law, there is no reason why that person should not be able 
to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court immediately for 
the restoration of his liberty, which is his basic right.
In all cases where a person is detained and he alleges that 
his detention is unconstitutional and in violation of the 
safeguards provided in the Constitution, or that it does not 
fall within the statutory requirements of law under which the 
detention is ordered, he can invoke the jurisdiction of the 
High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 
(1962) and ask to be released forthwith.^
(1) Halsbury, "laws of England," Vol. IX. P.702
(2) Farid Ahmad v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.L.D. 1965 Lah.135.
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It is thoroughly established that, in habeas corpus 
proceedings, the Court is confined to the examination of 
fundamental and jurisdictional questions. The question to be 
considered is, not whether the judgment was erroneous, but 
whether the Court had jurisdiction to try the issue and to 
render the judgment. The Court examines only the power and 
authority to act, not the correctness of the conclusions. 
Judgments of Courts cannot be treated as void and attacked by 
habeas corpus, even if errors or irregularities have actually 
supervened, if the Court has jurisdiction; and this is so, 
even if such errors or irregularities be subject to review, 
and even if they would necessarily result in reversal of the 
judgment. This is so for the very reason that errors and 
irregularities, which do not go to the jurisdictions of the 
Court, may thus be inquired into on motion, appeal or writ 
of error.
Under Article 98, clause (2) (b) (i), the High Court 
may, on theapplication of a person, not necessarily an 
aggrieved party, if there be no other adequate remedy, direct 
a person in custody in the Province to be produced to satisfy 
itself that he is not being held in custody without lawful 
authority or in an unlawful manner.
(1) Ferris & Ferris, "The law of Extraordinary Legal
Remedies." P.39^
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Under Fundamental Right No. I, there is a declaration 
that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty, save in 
accordance with law and Fundamental Right No.2 embodies 
safeguards in respect of arrest and detention but these 
safeguards are not available to a person
(a) who is for the time being an enemy alien or
(b) who is arrested or detained under any law providing 
for preventive detention.
For the persons who are detained under any law relating
to preventive detention, the safeguards are 2-
(i) that no person detained under any such law can be
detained for a period exceeding three months unless, 
before the expiration of that period, the Government 
obtains from the Advisory Board the opinion that there 
is sufficient cause for such detention.
(ii) the authority making the order of detention must, as 
soon as possible, communicate to the arrested person 
the grounds for his detention, unless the disclosure of 
any particular ground be against the public interest, 
and afford him the earliest opportunity of making a 
representation against his detention.
The provisions of a statute which imposes restrictions 
on the personal liberty of a subject must be strictly and
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rigorously complied with and unless such order is passed in
strict conformity with the provisions of the detention law,
however formal in character they may appear to he, and all the
statutory obligations enjoined on the detaining authority are
carried out to the letter, the order will not he upheld.
It is the very purpose of habeas corpus that, when any person
has been deprived of his liberty in an unlawful manner or
without lawful authority, or when the safeguards guaranteed
are not taken into consideration, the detenu has a right to
(2 )petition for habeas corpus, and in the majority of cases} 7
the court has held the order void and lias set the detenu at
liberty. Some of the instances are reproduced here
When all the grounds on which the order of detention
(3)
is made, are not communicated to the detenu, or
when the grounds are vague and indefinite and do not
enable the detenu to make a representation against his 
(4)
detention, or
(5)
when the order of detention is mala fide, or
when the satisfaction of the detaining authority is not
(6)
based on reasonable grounds, or
(1) Siraj-ud-Din v. The State, P.D.D.1957 Dah.962
Rehmat Illahi v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.i.D. 1965 Iah.112
(2) The cases have been discussed in detail in the Chapter V.
(3) Ghulam Mohd.Khan v.The State, P. 1.1). 1957 Iah.497
(4) State of Bombay v.Atma Ram, A.I.R.1951 S.C.157
(5) Abuzar v. Prov. of West Pakistan,P.L.I).1966(W.P) Kar.260
(6) Ghulam Gilani v.The Govt, of West Paki s tan, PLD. 1967 SC.373
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(1)
where the grounds are not communicated as soon as may be, 7 
a petition for habeas corpus will lie.
"The remedy by habeas corpus is equally available in 
Criminal and Civil cases: Provided that there is a
deprivation of personal liberty without legal justification 
or personal justification. Many of the purposes to which 
the writ has been applied in the past are of historical
interest rather than of present importance  In modern
practice the purposes to which the writ is most frequently 
applied are
1) the testing of the regularity of commitment and 
particularly in cases of the commitments for extradition 
and of fugitive offenders; and
2) the investigation of the right to the custody of 
Infants. ^  ^
The obvious purpose of habeas corpus is to procure the
release of a person in illegal custody, but it also provides
a means of calling in question the original arrest of a
person, who has subsequently been released on bail, for in
the eyes of law, he is then transferred to the custody of his 
(3 )s u r e t i e s . I t  has also been used to impugn an order of
(1) Ghulam Ullah Khan v. hist, fr&gistrate, Campbellpur,
P.L.h.1967 Pesh. 195 D.B.
Mohd. Aslam Malik v. Province of West Pakistan, P.l.h.1968
lah.1324
(2) Ealsbury, laws of England, Vol.IX P.713.
(3) Sandal Singh v.hist.Magistrate ,A.I.R.1934 A l l .148.
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(1)extemment,v * but it does not lie to protect a person
(2 )from police surveillance* ;
Adequate Alternative Remedy.
An essential condition precedent to the issue of the
writ under Article 98 (62) is that the High Court should be
satisfied that no other adequate remedy is provided by law.
Thus, by an express provision of the Constitution the
jurisdiction to give an aggrieved party the relief, which
has been provided by Article 98, depends upon the question
whether the petitioner has any other adequate remedy. If he
( 3 )has, he is not entitled to ask for any relief thereunder.v ' 
The tests for determining the scope and adequacy of such 
remedy were laid down in the judgment of the Pull Bench of 
West Pakistan High Court, ^  in which it was held that, to 
oust the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 98, not only 
should there be an alternative remedy but it must also be 
adequate. It is for the High Court itself to decide whether, 
in the particular circumstances, the alternative remedy is 
adequate or not. The Court ruled that, 11 the alternative
(1) H.B.Khare v. State of Delhi, A.I.E.1950 S.C.211.
(2) Bimla v. Chaturvedi, A.I.E.1953 All.613.
(3) Dutf-un-Nissa v. Deputy Commissioner, P.L.D. 1964 Dacca 132.
(4) Mahboob Ali Malik v. The Province of West Pakistan,
P.L.D.1963 Lah.575.
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remedy has to be adequate to the requisite relief, i.e; the 
removal, or lessening of the cause of distress or anxiety;
the deliverance from that which was burdensome ....  If the
relief available through the alternative remedy, in its 
nature and extent, is what is necessary to give the requisite 
relief, the 'adequacy1 of the alternative remedy must further 
be judged with reference to a comparison of the speed, the 
expense or convenience of obtaining that relief through the 
alternative remedy, with the speed, expense or convenience of 
obtaining it under Article 98." The object of requiring that 
there should be no alternative remedy is to emphasize that the 
writ jurisdiction is not intended to become a substitute for 
the ordinary remedies available at law, and that, as such, the 
discretionary powers under Article 98 should be exercised only 
where exceptional circumstances exist, calling for the 
exercise of these extraordinary powers. In Farid Ahmed !s^^
case, £>ardar Mohammad Iqbal J. said, "In all cases where a 
person is detained and he alleges that his detention is 
unconstitutional and in violation of the safeguards provided 
in the Constitution or that it does not fall within the
(1) Khalique v. Pakistan, P.Ii.D. 1957 Dacca 437*
(2) Farid Ahmad v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.Ij.D.1965 lah.135*
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statutory requirements of the law under which the detention 
is ordered, he can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court 
under Article 98 and ask to be released forthwith. It has 
to be observed that the right of the petition for Habeas 
Corpus is a high prerogative right and is a constitutional 
remedy for all matters of illegal confinement. This is one 
of the most fundamental rights known to the Constitution."
In another case,^^ where it was observed that, "In this 
application under Article 98 of the Constitution, the 
petitioner has primarily asked for the enforcement of his 
Fundamental Rights conferred on him by Chapter I, Part II of 
the Constitution and for that adequate relief can be granted 
to him by this Court alone." It follows that Habeas Corpus 
will not be refused because an alternative adequate remedy is 
available, if it is sought for the protection of a Fundamental 
Right.
(2 )In a very recent casev J where the proceedings were 
commenced against the petitioner under West Pakistan Control 
of Goondas Ordinance, 1959, in a writ petition for habeas 
corpus, it was urged by the Additional Advocate-General that 
this writ petition was not maintainable, because the order
(1) Hawabzada Hasrullah Khan v. The Hist.Magistrate, Lahore,
P.L.L.1965 Lah.642.
(2) Abdul Sabur v. The Dist. Magistrate, P.L.L.1969 Pesh.167.
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passed by the Tribunal, under Section 8 of the Ordinance, 
was appealable under section 18 and, since the detenus 
failed to exhaust their remedies, the writ petition was not 
maintainable. It was held that, when the liberty of person 
is involved, the question of adequate remedy does not come 
into play, in particular in cases of habeas corpus.
Conditions Precedent to Issue of Habeas Corpus.
The general rule is that, in order to make a case for 
habeas corpus, there must be an actual confinement or the 
present means of enforcing it. Mere moral restraint is not 
sufficient. ^
Ordinarily the purpose of the writ is to enable the 
Court to inquire first, whether the petitioner or a friend of 
his is restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the Court 
can do nothing but discharge the writ. If there is such a 
restraint, the Court can then inquire into the cause of it, 
and if the alleged cause be unlawful, it must then discharge 
the prisoner. "The test as to the right to the writ is the 
existence of such imprisonment or detention, actual though it 
may not be, as deprives one of the privileges of going when and 
where he pleases. Actual physical restraint, like
(1) Bailey, Habeas Corpus, 1913 Edition, Vol.I P.15, 16.
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confinement in jail, is not necessary. Obviously, the extent 
and character of the restraint, which justifies issuance of the 
writ, must vary according to the nature of the control, which 
is asserted. Petitioner must be in such control or custody 
of the person against whom the petition is directed, that his 
body can be produced in Court. Therefore the writ will not lie 
where the party is permitted to go at large, without apparent 
restraint, as where the order of court read "that the 
defendant may depart without giving any recognizance, subject 
to the issuing of a new warrant, if ordered by this Court.1*
The position is less clear when the petitioner is out on bail; 
or when an effort is being made to enforce a judgment ordering 
his commitment, and defendant is at liberty on bail, pending 
motion for a new trial, as he is constructively in the custody,
not of the sheriff of the Court, but of his bondsmen.11
( 2 )
It was saidv J by Miller J. that,
nThere is no very satisfactory definition to be found in 
the adjudged cases of the character of the restraint or 
imprisonment suffered by a party applying for the writ of 
habeas corpus, which is necessary to sustain the writ. This 
can hardly be expected from the variety of restraints for which
(1) Perris and Perris, 1 law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies,11
P. 32, 33.
(2) Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S.564, 571.
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it is used to give relief. Confinement under civil and 
criminal process may be so relieved: wives restrainted by
husbands, children withheld from the proper parent or guardian, 
persons held under arbitrary custody by private individuals, as 
in a workhouse, as well as those under military control, may 
all become proper subjects of relief by the writ of habeas 
corpus. Obviously, the extent and character of the restraint, 
which justifies the writ, must vayy according to the nature of 
the control, which is asserted over the party in whose behalf 
the writ is prayed.w
Something more than moral restraint is necessary to make 
a case for habeas corpus. There must be actual confinement 
or the present means of enforcing it. In the above cited case 
a Court-martial was ordered to try a surgeon-general of the 
Navy, after he had vacated that office under charges and 
specifications of mis-conduct as chief of the bureau and 
surgeon-general. The Secretary of the Navy issued this order 
to him :-
11 You are placed under arrest, and you will confine 
yourself to in the limits of the City of Washington.w It was 
stated that it was evident that the petitioner was under no 
physical restraint. As a Naval Officer, the Secretary of the 
Navy could order him to remain at Washington, and he could not
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leave without obtaining leave of absence. There was no more 
restraint of his personal liberty by the order of arrest than 
there was before. In the case of a military officer, who is 
more or less at all times subject in regard to his movements 
to the orders of his superior officer, it should be made clear 
that some unusual restraint upon his liberty of personal 
movement exists, to justify the issue of the writ. A 
distinction was made in case of an officer, with a writ in his 
hands for the arrest of a person, and that person submitted to 
arrest without force being applied. The officer had the 
authority to arrest and the power to enforce it. If the 
party named in the writ resisted or attempted to resist, the 
officer could summon bystanders to assist him and could 
himself use personal violence. Here the force is imminent 
and the party is in presence of it. It is a physical power 
which controls him, though not called into demonstrative 
action.
All statutory provisions concerning this writ 
contemplate a proceeding against some person, who has the 
immediate custody of the party detained, with the power to 
produce the body of such person before the Court, so that
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he may be liberated, if no sufficient reason is shown to 
the contrary. In the case of a person at large, with 
no one controlling or watching him or detaining him, his 
body cannot be produced by the person to whom the writ is 
directed, except by consent of the alleged prisoner or by 
his capture and forcible production into the presence of 
the C ou r t . ^
(1) Wales y. Whitney, 114 U.S.564
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TROCSDURE FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,
Application for the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The procedure for applying for the writ of habeas corpus 
is prescribed by the rules framed by the High Courts*^
The application must be in writing, addressed to the Court or 
to a Bench of the Court or to a Judge of the Court, as may be 
prescribed under the rules. It must set out, concisely in 
numbered paragraphs, the facts upon which the applicant relies 
and the grounds on which the Court is asked to issue an order 
or direction and must conclude with a prayer, stating as 
clearly as circumstances permit, the exact nature of the 
relief sought. Each application for a writ of habeas corpus 
must be accompanied by an affidavit of the person restrained, 
stating that it is made at his instance and setting out the 
nature and circumstances of the restraint. Where the person 
restrained is unable, owing to the restraint, to make the 
affidavit, the application should be accompanied by an 
affidavit to the life effect, made by some other person, who 
should state the reason why the person restrained is unable 
to make the affidavit himself. The application must be
(1) Chapter 4-R lahore High Court Rules and Orders, Vol.V.
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accompanied by an affidavit or affidavits in proof of any 
other facte referred to in the application. The Rules 
generally provide that the affidavits are to be restricted to 
matters which are within the deponent's own knowledge.
The Patna High Court observed
"Affidavits filed on behalf of the detenus may generally 
be divided into three classes -
(i) those that consist of a mere denial of the grounds or 
facts alleged;
(ii) those that consist of an attempted explanation of the 
fact alleged, the truth of the explanation depending 
on credibility of evidence; and
(iii) those that disclose circumstances, which render the 
grounds, or the facts on which the grounds are founded, 
completely non-existent, that is, inaccurate on the 
face of them, without the necessity and independent
of the question, of any evidence."
It is the last class of cases the High Court can 
interfere on the ground that the order is not bona fide.
The first two classes of cases are those in which the 
Advisory Board is the proper authority to. consider the 
denial or the explanation."
(1) Madan Lai v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 153.
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An application for writ of habeas corpus may be made
during vacation also.
Under Article 98, there is no restriction as to the
person who may make an application for an order of habeas
corpus. An exception is made to the general rule that a
petitioner must urge his own grievance, because a person may
be incarcerated in circumstances making it impossible for him
to communicate with the Court or his legal a d v i s o r . I n
other words the person who applies and the person who is
detained need not be identical and the restrie tion that the
petitioner should be an aggrieved party is not applicable to
an application of this writ.
The question as to who may apply and in what manner, is
one to be regulated by the High Court by Rules framed under
Article 101, but it seems that, until such Rules are framed,
any-one may apply, even a stranger, though the relief being
discretionary, the High Court may not make the order asked
for, if the applicant has no interest whatsoever in the
(2)
matter. v ' It has been held that it is not necessary that
(3)the detenu himself should a p p l y ; a  habeas corpus petition
(1) Alan Grledhill, Pakistan, the Development of its Daws and
Constitution. 1967• P.182.
(2) M. Munir, Constitution of The Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, 1967. P.377
(3) Mohammad Anwar v. Govt.of West Pakistan, P.L.D. 1963 Iah.109*
384
can be moved even by a friend of the person detained 
illegally.
(2 )According to Halsbury, J Mthe person illegally 
imprisoned or detained in confinement without legal 
justification is, both at common law and by statute, entitled 
to apply for a writ of habeas corpus, but it is not essential 
that the application should proceed directly from him. Any 
person is entitled to institute proceedings to obtain a writ 
of habeas corpus for the purpose of liberating another from 
an illegal imprisonment, and any person who is legally 
entitled to the custody of another may sue out the writ in 
order to regain such custody. In any case, where access is 
denied to a person alleged to be unjustifiably detained, so 
that there are no instructions from the prisoners, the 
application may be made by any relation or friend on an 
affidavit, setting forth the reasons for its being made. A 
stranger or volunteer, however, who has no authority to 
appear on behalf of a prisoner, or right to represent him will 
not be allowed to apply for habeas corpus.0
On receiving an application for writ of habeas corpus,
(1) Rao Bfeihroz Akhtar v. Dist.Itfkgistrate, P.1.D.1957 Lah.676
(2) Halsbury, laws of England, Vol. IX. P. 721.
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the Court will examine the application and may reject it, if it 
does not find sufficient reason to admit it. If it is of 
opinion that a prima facie case for granting the application 
is made out, a rule nisi or notice is issued, calling upon the 
person or persons against whom the order is sought, to appear 
on a day named therein, to show cause why such order should 
not he made and at the same time to produce in Court the body 
of the person or persons alleged to be illegally or improperly 
detained, then and there to be dealt with according to law.
It is usual that such a rule nisi or a notice be accompanied 
by copies cf the application and the affidavit, the copies 
being supplied by the applicant.
The High C o u r t h a s  a discretion in the matter of 
directing the attendance of the detenu in Court. Generally 
the allegations made in a petition for habeas corpus are not 
conclusive by themselves and the practice is to issue an 
order to the respondent to show cause why the petition should 
not be granted. A rule nisi for production of the detenu in 
Court would be made only where a prima facie case of unlawful 
detention has been made out on behalf of the person invoking 
the aid of the Court. Where the order of detention produced
(1) Abdul Karim v. Govt, of Hyderabad, A. I. R. 1951 Hyd.83*
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by the Government appears to b e on the face of it a proper 
order and there is no defect or irregularity about the same, 
it cannot be said that the detenu has made out a prima facie 
case for the issue of an order directing his production in 
Court, On the day for return of such rule or notice or any 
day to which the hearing thereof may be adjourned,if no cause 
for detention is shown or if cause is shown and disallowed, 
the Court will pass an order that the person or persons 
improperly detained shall be s et at liberty. If cause is 
shown, the rule or notice will be discharged. After an order 
for the writ to issue has been granted, the Court official, 
authorised under the Kules, must draw up the order in the 
prescribed form. The order for the release made by the Court, 
or the Judge, is a sufficient warrant to any gaoler, public 
official, or other person for the release of the person under 
restraint. All questions arising for determination in these 
applications are decided ordinarily upon affidavits, but the 
Court may direct such questions as it may consider necessary 
to be decided on such other evidence and in such manner as it 
may deem fit and, in that case, it may follow such procedure
and pass such orders as may appear to it be just.
(1 )According to Halsbury, J ,fIf it be impossible for the
(1) Halsbury, laws of England, Vol. IX Para.1252 Page 734.
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person to whom the writ is directed to produce the body of 
the person alleged to be in his custody by reason of his having 
parted with the custody of such person before the service of 
the writ, he must nevertheless make a return setting out the 
facts unequivocably and distinctly and showing the reason why 
he is unable to obey the writ. Such a return will constitute 
a good and sufficient return; the object of the writ is not 
punitive but remedial; the fact that a prisoner, whose 
production has been ordered, has been discharged from custody 
before the return should be stated on the return and in such 
event the cause of taking and the detainer need not appear on 
the return.*
Under the English law, obedience to the writ is enforced 
by attachment. "The appropriate mode of enforcing obedience 
to a writ of habeas corpus is by attachment. When a writ is 
disregarded and no return is made thereto, the party to whom 
the writ is directed, even if he is a peer, will be liable to 
attachment. If a writ of habeas corpus be disobeyed by the 
person to whom it is directed, application may be made to the 
Court for an attachment for contempt, or an application may 
be made to a judge in Chambers, for a warrant for the 
apprehension of the person in contempt to be brought before 
him, or some other judge, to be bound over to appear in Court
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to answer for his contempt or to be committed to prison for 
want of bail. An application for an attachment for contempt
must be made on an affidavit of service and disobedience, 
proof of personal service of the original writ of habeas corpus 
being essential, before attachment for disobedience will be 
granted.
The application to a judge in Chambers for a warrant can 
be made during vacation or when there is no divisional Court 
available, and in such event, takes the place of an application 
to the Court for attachment. Attachment may be granted against 
a person, who intentionally makes a false return to a writ of 
habeas corpus, but an unintentional misrepresentation upon a 
return is not a good ground for attachment. An insufficient 
return constitutes a contempt and the party knowingly making it 
is liable to attachment."
In Pakistan, obedience to writ is enforced by proceedings 
for contempt of Court under Article 123 of the 1962 Constitution. 
The respect due to a Court itself is owed also to its process.
It amounts to contempt of Court, when a person served with 
process shows a disrespect for the process of the Court by 
using indecent expressions or violent language on being served
(1) Halsbury "Laws of England." Vol. IX. Para. 1260.
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with such a process or assaulting or ill-treating the
process-server and deliberately disobeying the order of the
0
Court. Failure or inexcusable delay on the part of any person, 
including any high government official, to obey the orders of 
the Court is punishable for contempt under clause (2) (a) of 
Article 125.
Disobedience to the Court*s order for the release or 
production before it of a person alleged to be illegally 
detained is considered to be contempt of Court.
The Supreme Court of Pakistan has held^^ that,
"A police officer was liable for gross contempt by his 
refusal to obey the High Courtfs order and by resisting the 
bailiff in the exercise of the Court's power in habeas corpus.
Similarly, the continuation of the detention after the 
order for release, on the basis of the fresh order for 
detention which is mala fide- would also amount to contempt of 
Court.^ ^
Re-arrest after discharge ;-
Where a person has been discharged and the Court, in 
ordering his discharge, has, in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction, held that the grounds of his detention were
(1) Abdul Hamid v. State, P.L.D.1964 S.C.186 (189).
(2) Subodh Singh v. Province of Bihar, A.I.R.1949 Pat.247*
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not proper grounds under the law, he cannot be re-arrested 
and kept under detention on the same grounds. Where the Court 
has declared the detention of a person &o be without justificatim 
upon the merits, a fresh order of detention made, in order to 
circumvent the decision, would be mala fide and a detention 
under such fresh order would be illegal. But where the
sufficiency of the grounds is not subject to examination by 
the Courts, there is nothing inherently illegal about
(2 )successive orders passed against a person on the same ground. 7 
Thus where the Court has proceeded on the ground that the law 
under which the order had been made was invalid or the order 
was irregular in form, a fresh order of detention under 
another law or in regular form would not necessarily be 
mala fide.^^ In a case^^ under Section 491 of Cr. P.C., 
it was held that the High Court has to consider the legality 
or otherwise of the detention of a particular person in public 
or private custody. The legality has to be considered, not 
with reference to a particular order only. If there are more
(1) In re A.K. Gopalan. A.I.E. 1953 Mad.41
(2) Ibid.
(3) Bhupendra Be v. The Chief Sep. Govt, of West Bengal,
A.I.E. 1949 Cal. 633
(4) Subodh Singh v. Province of Bihar, A.I.R.1949 Pat.247
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orders than one against a particular person on the date on 
which the question of his detention is under consideration, 
it is certainly the duty of the detaining authority to produce 
the orders of detention in support of, or in justification of 
the detention. Where, therefore, the legality of the 
detention of a person under the first order of detention is 
under consideration and the detaining authority has a second 
order of detention against the same person, it is not open to 
the detaining authority to keep the second order of detention 
up its sleeve, to allow an order of release to he passed on the 
first order of detention and then produce the second order of 
detention for the purpose of detaining the man after the order 
of release has been passed. To allow or encourage such a 
practice would he tantamount to stultifying the order of the 
High Court. So if the person is re-arrested under a second 
order of detention, such arrest and detention would he invalid. 
The order or release on the habeas corpus application would 
automatically discharge the fresh order of detention passed 
before the Court pronounced its judgment hut not brought to 
its notice. These observations relate only to an order of 
detention passed before the order of release and which the 
detaining authority had an opportunity of producing in support
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of the detention. These observations would not apply to a
case where an order of detention is passed subsequent to the
order of release on fresh or different grounds.
Successive Applicati ons
(1)In an appeal, 7 it was contended on behalf of the 
applicant that, by the common law of England, which applied 
in Nigeria, fit is the right of any imprisoned person to 
apply successively to every tribunal competent to issue a 
writ of habeas corpus, and that each tribunal must determine 
such an application upon its merits, unfettered by the 
decision of any other tribunal of Co-ordinate jurisdiction, 
even if the grounds urged are exactly the same.’ It was 
held that ’’Each Judge of the High court of Justice has 
jurisdiction to entertain an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus, in term-time or in vacation, and he is bound to hear 
such application on its merits, notwithstanding that some 
other judge has already refused a similar application.
The same principle applies in the case of the Judges of the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria, to which the Common law of this 
country is applicable.
In Pakistan the rule is different; the Court always
(1) Eshugbayi v. Govt, of Nigeria, 1931 A.C.662,
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finds itself in an embarrassing position, when a petition by 
a stranger has been dismissed and is followed by one from the 
detenu himself or someone interested in him, who is more 
conversant with the facts. Under our constitution the 
repetition of the application on the same grounds is not 
permissible, though in England, until recently application 
might be made to each judge in succession.
Under our constitution, it is suggested, ^  there can be no 
scope for such successive applications, for the reason that 
the power is the power of the High Court and not of individual 
Judges, and once it is exercised, one way or the other, the 
Court is functus officio, except for purposes of review, 
if review be competent, and the only remedy to the aggrieved
(2 )party is a petition for leave to appeal under Article 58(3). J
(3 )The Allahabad High Court has held, 7 that, where an 
application under section 491 was dismissed by a judge of the 
High Court, a second application to the same effect and with 
the same object, was expressly prohibited and was not 
maintainable.
(1) Munir, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
Ed. 1967 P.378.
(2) Kishori v. The Crown, A.I.R. (1945) 26 lah. 573
Mirza Mohammad Yaqub v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner,
lah., P.Ij.D. 1965 S'.C.254
(3) (Mst.) Haidri Begum v. Jawad Ali Shah, A.I.R.1934 All.22.
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The Patna High Court held that it is not open to a 
detenu to ask for a review of an order already made under 
section 491 of Cr. P.O., that successive applications on the 
same facts cannot he made for a writ of habeas corpus, that 
entertaining a second application on the same facts would 
amount to review of the earlier judgment and would be clearly 
barred by section 369*
However it has been recently held by a Pull Bench of the 
(2 )
lahore High Court V ' that an application for habeas corpus 
on fresh grounds can never be barred. It can be visualised 
that a rejection of a former petition of this nature may not 
in every case operate as res judicata or have finality. Even 
in a case in which the Court has determined that, on the day 
of the order, the person in custody was being lawfully 
detained, a subsequent petition, if directed against his 
continued detention, on a date subsequent to the order of the 
Court, need not involve a review of the earlier order of the 
Court, dismissing the earlier petition, and it may not 
violate the principle of finality of judgment of theCourt.
If the detention is shown to be either unlawful or in an
(1) Eaghunadan Yadav v. Province of Bihar, A.I.E.1949 Pat.262
(2) Nasim Patima v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.L.D.1967
lah. 103 (P.8)
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unlawful manner, it is the duty of the Court to release the 
person in detention, and it is no answer to the petition that 
an earlier petition has been dismissed. It has further been 
held that, the purpose of the Constitution will be defeated, 
if a second application is not entertained on the technical 
ground that a former petition has been dismissed. One cannot 
visualise a technicality standing in the way of setting at 
liberty a person who is being detained without lawful authority 
or in an unlawful manner. If the question is to be decided on 
general principles of public policy, then obviously the Courts 
must lean in favour of granting the relief, rather than 
refusing it, unless there is a prohibition in the rules or the 
statute, but there is no prohibition of successive 
application in the rules or the statute. The wording of the 
Constitutional provision enables a challenge to an order of 
Detention and the Court is authorised to satisfy itself that 
the person in custody is not detained without lawful authority. 
This duty the Court must perform. The Court is not relieved 
of this duty, because a pertain ground, or a question of law 
or fact or a certain reasoning, which could have shown by the 
order of detention to be unlawful, was not raised or taken 
before the Court in an earlier petition.”
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A writ or direction in the nature of habeas corpus can
be issued in a case in which the movements of a person have
been restricted to a specified area, provided that the
deprivation of liberty involved cannot be legally justified.
A person may be released from custody by a writ of habeas
corpus, if he has been committed for extradition, where the
offence is not extraditable, e.g., where it is a political
offence, or is not covered by the Extradition Treaty,
but if there be evidence that the offence alleged to have been
committed is extraditable, no writ can be granted on the ground
that extradition is being asked for to take action against him
for political activities.^
Natural Justice.
Orders and proceedings in violation of the principles of
natural justice are liable to be quashed in the exercise of
the jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution.
(5 )In one case, ' it was pointed out that the principles of
natural justice are
(1) Rao l\fe.hroz Akhtar v. Dist.Ifeigistrate, P.L.D.1957 Lah.676
P.L.L.1963 Lah. 109
(2) Re: Castioni, (1891) 1 Q.B. 149-
(3) In re: Wilson, (1877) 3 Q.B.D. 42
(4) Adhibanduv. Emperor, A.I.R. 1946 Pat.196
(5) Safi-ud-Din v. Secy. Social Welfare & Local Bodies
Department, P. L.D. 1958 Pesh. 157-
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(1) that every person whose civil rights are affected
must have a reasonable notice of the case he has to meet
(2) that he must have reasonable opportunity of being heard
in his defence
(3) that the hearing must be by an impartial Tribunal, i.e.,
a person who is neither directly a party to the case, or 
who has an interest in the litigation, or is already 
biased against the party concerned
(4) that the authority must act in good faith and not
arbitrarily, capriciously or maliciously. If the 
discretionary power conferred on an executive is exercised 
arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably, or by taking 
into account extraneous and irrelevant consideration, the 
authority concerned must be deemed not to have exercised 
the discretion at all, that is, he has not discharged his 
duty.
When the law confers a certain power on a certain 
authority, then it is that authority which has got to exercise 
it, according to the established principles of fair-play and 
natural justice. If it is shown that the power has been 
exercised by such an authority not independently, but under 
instructions of some superior officer, then the exercise of 
such authority would in the eye of law be a nullity. It
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would be more so, if the superior authority happens to be 
authority to whom the case has ultimately to be submitted for 
confirmation. When the law enjoins that a certain order should 
not take effect, until it is confirmed, by another authority, 
then the law requires that the authority passing the order and 
the one confirming it should act independently of each other, 
and not in collaboration, and if that is not done, then it 
clearly amounts to violation of the principles of natural 
justice.
In a case before Supreme Court of Pakistan, Shahab-ud- 
(2 )Din, J. observed, '
"It cannot be disputed that it is a principle of natural 
justice that no one should be dealt with to his material 
disadvantage or deprived of his liberty or property without 
having an opportunity of being heard and making his defence.
That being so, when a statute gives a right of appeal, it 
should be understood as silently implying, when it does not 
expressly provide, that the appellant shall have the right of 
being heard. As argued by the learned Advocate for the 
respondent, and indicated by the learned Judges of the High
(1) Muhammad Ayub Dar v. Deputy Commissioner, P.L.D.1957
Pesh. 63
(2) Chief Commissioner v. Dina Sohrab Katrak, P.L.D.1959
S.C.45
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Court, the above rule of Justice is not confined to 
proceedings before Courts but extends to all proceedings, 
by whomsoever held, which may affect the person or property 
or other right of the parties concerned in the dispute. As 
a just decision in such controversies is possible only if the 
parties are given opportunity of being heard, there can be, 
as regards the right of hearing, no difference between 
proceedings which are strictly judicial and those which are 
in the nature of a 'judicial proceeding though administrative 
in form.w
In Mahrab Khan*3^^ case, it was observed, 
ttA personal hearing before deciding a matter is not a necessary 
requirement of the principle of natural justice. All that is 
necessary is a full and fair opportunity of making a 
representation or showing cause. What is full and fair 
opportunity depends upon the facts of each case.”
In an emergency, when grave danger to the public safety 
or maintenance of public order is involved, it might be 
necessary for the authorities to take immediate action. In
(1) Mahrab Khan v. Taj Mohammad, P.1.D.1961 Quetta 1.
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such case, prior hearing may not be feasible. In such a
situation, it is sufficient if opportunity is afforded
therefor subsequently. This point was dealt with in the
(1)case of Maudoodiv ' by their lordships of the Supreme Court
and the following observations were made by Cornelius, C.J
wIt is noted by Willoughby that it is fundamental to the idea
of due process to give notice in advance and an opportunity
to be heard to the person affected, who may present such
pertinent facts and arguments as he may desire in opposition
to actions that may adversely affect him or his proprietary
interests. But where, because of the urgency of the public
need or for practical reasons of administrative efficiency,
such prior notice and hearing is not feasible, the Courts of
the United States have held that the requirements of due
process are satisfied, if the like opportunity is later given
to the person affected. Instances of this kind are to be
found in the laws of Pakistan, in particular those relating
to public order and public safety. The provisions of
section 144, of Criminal Procedure Code furnish an excellent
example. The judgment delivered in the High Court of East
Pakistan mentions an Indian case, that of Babulal Pa rate v.
(2 )The State , where the provisions of this section were
(1) Abul A !la Ifeiudoodi v. Govt.of West Pakistan, P.L. 1.1964
B.C.673
(2) Babulal Parate v. The State, A.I.fi. 1961 S.C.884
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challenged as being in violation of certain Fundamental 
rights and, after full analysis and examination, it was held 
that the 'restrictions1 which could be imposed under the 
section were 'reasonable.' Stress was laid on the following 
elements, viz. 1) the restraints were ordinarily to be laid 
after notice, and it was only in emergency that the order 
could be made ex parte, 2) though action was based on 
formation of an opinion yet that opinion is in respect of 
factual matters, i.e., to prevent obstruction, annoyance, etc. 
to persons lawfully employed or to prevent danger to human 
life, health or safety, or disturbance of public tranquillity 
or a riot or affray, so that the opinion is not purely 
subjective, 3) an order under section 144, Cr. P.O. is of a 
temporary nature, 4) the order must state the material facts 
by which it is justified, 5) the person affected is entitled 
to represent against the order, and is to be heard in person 
or by pleader, and if the representation is rejected, reasons 
must be given, and 6) there is further judicial review 
available in the form of a revision before the High Court.
In the Constitution itself, the power of preventive 
detention is recognized, but is made subject to a time-limit, 
and also to the requirements that extension shall only be made 
after reference to an advisory board with the additional
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requirements that the grounds of the detention shall be 
communicated to the persons detained and he shall be afforded 
the earliest opportunity of making a representation against 
the order.
Therefore, there need be no hesitation in holding it to 
be within the spirit of the Constitution, as well as of the 
relevant laws of Pakistan, that where grave danger to the 
public safety or public order is involved, reasonable 
restrictions upon the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution 
are ensured in respect of peremptory executive actions to 
avert the danger, if opportunity is provided as soon thereafter 
as may be convenient, for exercise by the person of the right 
to represent that the restraint was not justified in relation 
to the factual requirements of the law applied, or that in 
other way the restrictions lacked the elements of 
reasonableness.11
Kaikaus, J. , in the same case observed 
111 am prepared to concede that whenever an emergency 
requires the passing of an order without hearing the party 
concerned, an order may be passed and to this extent there 
has to be a proviso to the maxim audi alteram partem, but 
action can be taken ex -parte only to the extent to which ■.
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it is absolutely necessary. The ex-parte order is in such 
cases to be regarded only as an interim order or a 
provisional order, which will remain in force till a final 
order is passed after hearing the party concerned.”
11 Without lawful authority” and 1 In an unlawful manner.”
Under Article 98 (2)b, it is the duty of the Court, on 
the application of the aggrieved party, to satisfy itself 
that he is not being held in custody without lawful 
authority or in an unlawful manner.
The Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that,
”It is agreed that expression "without. lawful authority” 
and ”in an unlawful manner” occurring in sub-clause (b) were 
not merely tantologous. A definite meaning had, therefore 
to be given to each of them. The Constitution, it appears, 
casts a heavy responsibility upon the Court to satisfy itself 
with regard to both these two matters. The question 
therefore arises as to what these matters mean. It is 
agreed that 'without lawful authority* will include all 
questions of vires of the statute itself, as also of the 
authority of the person or persons acting under the statute, 
i.e; there must be a constitutionally valid law authorising
(1) Govt, of West Pakistan v. Begum Agha Shorish Kashmari,
P.IuD.1969 S.C.14
the detention and the officer issuing such an order must 
have been lawfully vested with the power. But what is it 
that falls within the expression 1Unlawful manner?'
It has been held "that 'in an unlawful manner1 in 
sub-clause (b) of the Article 98 (2) has been used 
deliberately to given meaning and content to the solemn 
declaration under Article 2 of the Constitution itself, that 
it is the inalienable right of every citizen to be treated 
in accordance with law .... therefore, in determining how 
and in what circumstances a detention would be detention in 
an unlawful manner, one would inevitably have first to see 
whether the action is in accordance with law; if not, it
is action in an unlawful manner  An action which is
mala fide or colourable is not regarded as action in
accordance with law. Similarly, action taken upon 
extraneous or irrelevant considerations is also not action 
in accordance with law. Action taken upon no ground at all 
or without proper application of the mind of the detaining 
authority would also not qualify as action in accordance with
law and would therefore, have to be struck down as being
action taken in an unlawful manner.”
405
Review
There is no provision in the Constitution of 1962 which 
enables the High Court to review its own orders or judgment, 
passed in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. The Supreme 
Court of Pakistan however possesses this power. The reason 
for this is obvious; while against the order of Supreme 
Court itself no appeal lies, therefore the Supreme Court is 
to correct its own judgment; in case of the High Court its 
judgment could be corrected by the Supreme Court in appeal.
So it has been held that, "Unless a statute provides a 
remedy by way of review the Court cannot review its own 
judgment, except in very exceptional circumstances, such as 
for example, where it passed an order inadvertently or on 
account of some false representation by the officer of the 
Court.
"It has been made clear by Article 130 that no Court 
shall have any jurisdiction that is not conferred on it by 
the Constitution or, by or under any law. Arguments based 
on the existence of inherent jurisdiction, apart from that 
conferred by the Statute, are therefore, no longer available. 
In any case, an order made in exercise of a judicial power 
carries with it the incidents of finality, so far as that
(1) M.J.Kutinah v. Mrs. Nathal Pinto, A.I.R. 1941 ted.272
foim is concerned, whenever rights accrue under that 
order. Unless it is provided that an order once made 
may he reviewed, it would not normally be capable of 
being reviewed
Appeal
An appeal may lie to the Supreme Court under
Article 58, where a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the Constitution is involved, or where
the Supreme Court grants special leave for appeal, in a
(2 )habeas corpus matter, from the orders of a High Court. v 7
(1) Jalal Din v. Muhammad Akram Khan, P.L.D. 1963 (W.P.)
Iah.596. (Per tenzur Qadir, C.J.)
(2) In re Parhald Krishna, A.I.R. 1951 Bom.25*
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STATUTORY REMEDIES.
Statutory Habeas Corpus
Under Section 491 of Criminal Procedure Code, High 
Courts have power to issue directions of the nature of 
Habeas Corpus. The relevant section reads as follows
1. Any High Court may, whenever it thinks fit direct:-
(a) that a person within the limits of its appellate 
Criminal jurisdiction be brought before the Court 
to be dealt with according to ]aw;
(b) that a person illegally or improperly detained 
in public or private custody within such limit 
be set at liberty;
(c) that a prisoner detained in any jail situate 
within such limits be brought before the Court 
to be there examined as a witness in any matter 
pending or to be inquired into in such Court;
(d) that a prisoner detained as aforesaid be brought 
before a Court-martial or any Commissioners for 
the trial to be examined touching any matter 
pending before such Court-martial or Commissioners 
respectively;
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(e) that a prisoner within such limits he removed 
from one custody to another for the purpose of 
trial; and
(f) that the body of a defendant within such limits 
be brought in on the Sheriff fs return of Cepi 
Corpus to a writ of attachment.
2. The High Court may, from time to time, frame rules or 
regulate the procedure in cases under this section.
3. Nothing in this section applies to persons detained 
under the Bengal State Prisoners Regulation, 1818, or 
Bombay Regulation XXV of 1827, or the State Prisoner 
Act, 1850, or the State Prisoner Act, 1858, or the 
Security of Pakistan Act, 1952.
Custody
The essence of custody is that there should be a lack 
of freedom to move about where and when one pleases, coupled 
with a physical power immediately available to prevent an 
attempt at breaking the restrictions imposed, as distinguished 
from the power subsequently to punish for a breach of these 
restrictions. If a person has been ordered that he must 
not go beyond certain boundaries, but there is no physical 
impedient or threat of physical force to ensure that he does 
not go outside those boundaries, there would be no
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confinement and no custody, even though that person may be 
liable to be punished in due course of law, if he did go out.
On the other hand, if he was told that he must not go beyond
those boundaries and is told that if he did, physical force 
would be available to prevent him from doing so, there would 
then be no difference of kind between his confinement or
custody and that of a person confined in jail, though there
would, of course, be a difference of degree. ^
Therefore in such a case an application under section 491
(2 )would be maintainable. In one casev ' restrictions imposed 
under the W. P. Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, I960, 
were held to amount to the person being in custody and as such 
the provisions of section 491, Cr. P.O., were held to be 
attracted.
Successive Orders of Detention
When an order is for continuing the detention of the 
detenu, it does not necessarily mean that an illegal 
detention was being continued by a fresh order of detention, 
and what is to be seen is whether the last order of detention 
were legal and if, at any time before the Court directs the
(1) Muhammad Anwar v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.L.I). 1963
lah. 109 (F*B)
(2) Ibid
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release of detenu, a valid order directing his detention
is produced, the Court cannot direct his release, merely
on the ground that at some prior stage there was no valid
cause for detention; the question is not whether the later
order invalidated the earlier detention hut.whether in the
face of the later valid order, the Court can direct the
(1)release of the detenu. y 
Review
An application for review of an order made under
section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is harred
under section 369 of the Code.
Cases where Habeas Corpus Directions under
Section 491 of Criminal Procedure Code were issued
(2 )1. In Rehmat Ullahfs case \ J where the petitioner had been 
detained under section 89 of Bahawalpur State Public Safety 
Act, 1944, it was argued by the Crown Counsel that, in the 
presence of section 89 of the Act in question, the jurisdiction 
of the High Court was barred to entertain the petition of 
Ch. Rehmat Ullah, under section 491 of Code of Criminal 
Procedure.
(1) Mohi-ud-Din v. Govt.of East Pakistan, P.L.D. 1965 Dacca
514 (D.l)
(2) Rehmat Ullah v. Crown, P.L.D.1951 Bughdad-ul-Jadid 64
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It was held, "The power of the High Court under section 
491 of Criminal Procedure Code is abridged to a certain extent 
in the presence of Section 89 of the Bahawalput State Public 
Safety Act, 1944 but is not taken away in its entirety.
The High Court is therefore, competent to call upon the Crown, 
under its residuary power, to produce all relevant papers 
before the Court.11 The Crown failed to prove that the 
detention of the petitioner was in conformity with the law 
and the detention was held illegal.
2. In Hamesh Gulfs case,^1  ^ the petitioner Hamesh Gul and 
his brother questioned the legality of the order of the 
Deputy Commissioner, Peshwar, purporting to have been made 
by him under Section 12, of the Frontier Crimes Regulation III 
of 1901, by a petition under section 491 of Criminal Procedure 
Code. The order deprived Hamesh Gul and his brother of his 
liberty for a period of seven years.
The Learned Advocate General, at the very outset, argued 
that the Court could not go behind the orders passed by the 
Deputy Commissioner under Frontier Crimes Regulation because 
of two reasons namely
(a) the jurisdiction to do so is expressly barred by 
section 60 of Frontier Crimes Regulation and
(1) Hamesh Gul v. Crown, P.L.D. 1955 Peeh. 1.
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(b) the detenu was convicted and sentenced to a certain 
term of imprisonment by a tribunal of competent 
jurisdiction, against which the detenu had the 
remedy to apply for revision to the Commissioner 
under section 49 and 50 of Frontier Crimes 
Regulation-
On the question whether the High Court could act in the 
matter of issuing habeas corpus under section 491 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, it was held that,
”In the case of the persons whose liberty has been taken away 
by the executive authorities, the High Court have got to be 
liberal, firstly because the executive authorities in some 
cases, quite honestly, have a tendency to transgress the law 
and secondly, because either there is no remedy provided to 
the condemned person under the law under which he is dealt 
with or the remedy is not so effective. In such cases, if 
the High Court finds that a fundamental right has been 
infringed, or the authority concerned has not followed the 
procedure laid down in the law, or the forms of law have not 
been satisfied or strictly complied with, or the authority 
has permitted itself to be influenced by considerations 
foreign, extraneous and repugnant to the relevant law, they will 
step in and put the wrong done by the executive authority right.”
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It was pointed out that their Lordships of the Federal
(1)Court had held v that, “imprisonment under the Frontier 
Crimes Regulation is ordered under the executive or 
administrative order and is not an imprisonment by a court 
of law.11
The order of the Deputy Commissioner was held to be mala
fide and without jurisdiction and bad in law. The
petitioners were set at liberty.
(2 )
3. In Grhulam Qadirfs case , the petitioner was a 
prisoner, who had been released by mistake before he had 
served his sentence and was rearrested, after the time for 
serving his sentence had elapsed; it was held that,
“There is nothing in any law which provides for the rearrest 
of a prisoner, who has inadvertently been released, with 
object of compelling him to complete the unexpired portion 
of his sentence after the expiry of the date on which he 
should normally have been released.n
The rearrest was held to be illegal; the petitioner was set 
at liberty, as he could not be expected to suffer, as a 
result of an error made by the jail authorities.
(1) Samundar v. The Crown, P.L.D. 1954, F.C.228
(2) G-hulam Qadir v. Crown, P.L.D. 1954 Baluchistan 42.
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4. In Anwar Babrifs c a s e ^ ,  a petition was filed on 
behalf of Khan Abdus Satter Khan Niazi for release from 
illegal and improper detention under Bengal State Prisoners 
Regulation 1818. In this case, opposing the petition, it 
was contended by the Assistant Advocate General that the 
jurisdiction of the High Court was barred by sub-section (3) 
of section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure which reads as 
f ollows
*Nothing in this section applies to persons detained 
under the Bengal State Prisoners Regulation 1818 *... 1 
It was observed that, 11 We did not accept such contention to 
be raised in view of the volume of authority which exists in 
favour of the view that, in order to exclude the jurisdiction 
of the Court by reason of such provisions, it must be shown
that the order was made under the Act or Regulation.
(2 )Emperor v. Vimalabai Desphandev ' provides one illustration. 
The Privy Council pointed out that, "If the orders made by the 
Government were invalid, they were not made in exercise of 
powers conferred by or under the Act. "It is not enough 
that a warrant should purport to have been issued under the 
Regulation, in order to exclude the jurisdiction of High
(1) Muhammad Anwar Babri v. Crown, P.L.D.1955 Lah.585 D.B.
(2) A.I.R. 1946 P.C.123
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Court. It must be truly a warrant, which is authorised by 
the Regulation. Section 3 was not a bar to the High Court's 
ascertaining whether detention was, in fact, ordered under the 
Bengal Regulation." "Whether a detention was or was not 
under the Regulation is a matter of substance and is not 
concluded by the circumstances that the Regulation is 
mentioned in the warrant."
The warrant in this case was not a warrant under the 
Regulation; the detention was held illegal and the detenu 
was set at liberty.
5- In Anwar's c a s e ^ \  lal Khan was served with an order 
under Section 5 of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public 
Order Ordinance, I960, to remain within the revenue limits of 
village Bhatial, Police Station Sadar Jhelum for a period of 
six months. A petition was moved by one of his friends,
M. Anwar; it alleged that the order against lal Khan 
amounted to one of detention and prayed for order of habeas 
corpus. It was held that, "what should be deemed to be 
detention for the purposes of the Section 491 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code has not been defined either in the section 
itself or the code and it would be for the Court to determine
(l) Muhammad Anwar v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.l.D. 1963
lah. 109.
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what restraint on liberty of a person would amount to 
detention, for ending which the power of the Court could be 
exercised under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code.*1 
In the instant case such restrictions on the movements amounts 
to the person being in custody of the Government and hence 
under detention for the purpose of the section 491 of 
Criminal Procedure Code- The Government in this case failed 
to comply with the requirements of the ordinance, in that it 
did not inform the person of the ground of his detention; 
hence the order was held to be without lawful authority and 
of no legal effect.
Cases where prayer under Section 491 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code was refused.
1. In A .jab Khan's case^^, it was held that,
"The Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the habeas 
corpus petition arising out of proceedings under Section 40, 
of Frontier Crimes Regulation, unless it is established from 
the record that the Deputy Commissioner had no power to 
initiate the proceedings under section 40 of Frontier 
Crimes Regulation. It is a well established principle of law
(1) Ajab Khan v. State, P.L.D.1963 Pesh.224 D.B.
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that, in a petition under section 491 of Criminal Procedure 
Code, the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner can be 
successfully assailed, only when it is shown that Deputy 
Commissioner had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings, and, 
once it is shown that he had such jurisdiction, our 
jurisdiction to call in question such proceedings come to 
an end.” In support of this view the court relied on what 
Cornelius Chief Justice had said,^^
ftIn these circumstances, it should be obvious that for 
the Superior Courts to interfere, whether by approval or 
otherwise, with the operation of the system in any case, 
once the case is competently drawn into system, would be a 
violation of the legislative intention. All action, in the 
writ jurisdiction, should be confined to action in limine, 
that is to say, in assertion of the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary Courts and in vindication of the law, to scrutinise 
the process by which the case, if there be one, has been or 
sought to be, diverted into the ambit of the jirga system.
If the legal requisites are satisfied, there is the last 
contact which the superior courts can retain with case, 
viz; by making such a declaration. All other processes
(1) Muhammad Akram v. The State, P.D.D. 1963 S.C.373*
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taken in the disposal of the case within the jirga system 
are outside the purview of the Courts, in any of their 
jurisdiction."
In this case the Deputy Commissioner^ order was held to be 
with jurisdiction to issue the orders and the habeas corpus 
petition was dismissed.
2. In Umar1 s case^^ the petitioner was ordered under 
Section 5 of the Punjab Safety Act, to reside and remain 
within the corporation limits of Lahore city. The sole 
question for determination was whether an application in the 
nature of a habeas corpus as contemplated by section 491 of 
Criminal Procedure Code lies in respect of the order. It 
was held,
"Section 491 (l)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which 
provides a remedy for illegal detention, cannot be invoked 
in cases of restriction orders under Section 5 of the Punjab 
Public Safety Act, 1949> in as much as there can be no question 
of setting such a person at liberty and also section 33 of the 
Punjab Public Safety Act explicitly provides, "No proceeding 
or order taken or made under the Act shall be called in 
question in any Court." The petition was dismissed.
(1) Maulvi Mohammad Umar v. Crown, P.L.D. 1955 Lah.179*
41 [
3. In Ear tar Singh1 b c a s e ^  it was held that,
MWhere a person has been convicted and sentenced by the
Court martial, whether there is evidence to sustain a
conviction is a question of law and the members of a
Court martial are the sole judge of both law and fact.
The High Court, under section 491 of Criminal Procedure
Code, cannot interfere, if they make a mistake of law and
convicting on no real evidence would be a pure mistake of
law. It would be different, if the Court martial convicts
an accused person without hearing any evidence. The High
Court can then hold that the detention of such a man was
illegal, because the proceeding of the Court martial would
be irregular on the face of them.1
(2 )4. In Qadir1s casev ' the habeas corpus petition was filed 
under section 491 of Criminal Procedure Code, challenging the 
propriety and legality of the arrest and detention of three 
accused persons. It was observed by the court that,
"The detention at the first instance was illegal, but it was 
subsequently legalised by a competent court. As such, the 
petition becomes infructuous and calls for no order.11
(1) Kartar Singh v. Imperator, A.I,R.1946 Lah.103 (D.B.)
(2) Qadir v. The State, P.L.D.1958 Pesh. 38 D.B.
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Cl")5* In Bismilla1 s case , action under section 40 of 
Frontier Crimes Regulation by the Deputy Commissioner was 
challenged by a petition under section 491 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code. It was held that,
"The Deputy Commissioner is the sole judge to decide whether
there is any case made out by the prosecution to bind a
certain person down under section 40 of Frontier Crimes
Regulation. The High Court cannot interfere, even if the
Deputy Commissioner has made a mistake, either of law or
fact, in arriving at any particular decision. Assuming
for the sake of argument that this court had jurisdiction,
section 60 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation has taken it
away.11 The point involved in this case was discussed at
(2 )some length by their lordships of this court in a casev 7 
where they observed, "We have no power to go into the 
question whether the order referring the case of the 
petitioner for trial to a jirga is justified on the facte 
of the case or not. Section 60, Frontier Crime 
Regulation, provides that, except as provided in the
(1) S. Bismilla Shah v. N.W.F.P. Govt., P.L.D.1950
Pesh. 52.
(2) Khanim Ullah v. Crown, 1947 Peshwar law Journal 19.
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Regulation, no decision, decree or ord;er given, passed 
or made, or act done, under Chapter III, IV, or VI shall 
be called in question, or set aside by any Civil or 
Criminal Court* The order in question was passed under 
Chapter III and it cannot be called in question in any 
criminal court, except as provided by the Regulation, 
unless it can be shown that it was without jurisdiction*
As we have held that the Deputy Commissioner had 
jurisdiction to pass the order in question, it cannot be 
called in question in this court. The Commissioner 
alone has the power under Section 49, Frontier Crimes 
Regulation to revise such orders. In these circumstances 
we cannot hold that the detention of the petitioner is 
illegal. No action is therefore, called for under 
section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code* The petition 
shall therefore be dismissed.11
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Comparison between Constitutional and 
Statutory Habeas Corpus
Article 98 (2)(b)(i) is not a reproduction of 
section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but enacts 
in other words clause (a) and (b) of sub-section (i) of 
section 491 of that Code. This is a Constitutional 
provision and has to be liberally construed. It is 
intended to preserve the liberty of the subject and is a 
safeguard against unlawful or improper manner of detention. 
It should be so construed as to advance the remedy and 
supress the mischief, in accordance with well recognised 
principles of c o n s t r u c t i o n . T h e  constitutional 
provision is of higher authority and is not subject to the 
restriction imposed by sub-section (3) of section 491 of 
Or. P. C. in respect of persons detained under the Bengal 
State Prisoners Regulation, 1818, or the Bombay Regulation 
XXV of 1827, or the State Prisoners Act, 1850, or the 
State Prisoners Act, 1856; nor do the provisions of any 
other special law, e.g. West Pakistan Maintenance of 
Public Order Ordinance, I960 authorising detention and
(1) Nasim Patima v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.L.D.1967
Lah.103 P.B.
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restricting the High Courts power, control this special 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . T h e  constitutional provision does not 
say, as section 491(1)(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
does, that if the High Court be not satisfied that the 
person concerned is being held under lawful authority or 
in a lawful manner, it may order him to be set at liberty. 
But that such an order may be made cannot be doubted.
The provision confers on the High Courts a jurisdiction 
which corresponds broadly to that possessed by the High 
Court in England to issue the prerogative writ of habeas 
corpus ad subjiciendum to safeguard the liberty of the 
subject.
(1) Muhammad Ali v. Muhammad Bashir, P.B.D.1962 Xah.230
(2) Munir, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, (1967) P.. 376.
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Article 2 of Constitution of Pakistan, 1962.
1* To enjoy the protection of law and to be treated
in accordance with law, and only in accordance with
law, is the inalienable right of every citizen,
wherever he may be, and of every other person for
the time being within Pakistan.
2. In particular -
(a) no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, 
reputation or property of any person shall be 
taken except in accordance with law;
(b) no person shall be prevented from, or be hindered 
in, doing that which is not prohibited by law; 
and
(c) no person shall be compelled to do that which the 
law does not require him to do.
• • ♦ • • •  • •
Article 2 furnishes a basis for review of all executive 
actions under Article 98. Apart from the declaration of 
fundamental rights, it confers on the citizen and on every 
other person who is for the time being in Pakistan a right 
to be treated in accordance with law in matters involving 
his life, liberty, body, reputation or property and it also 
guarantees that no person shall be prevented or hindered
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from doing what is not prohibited by law and nobody can 
compel him to do what he is not required to do by law.
Article 2 is original, as its equivalent is not to be 
found in the American, Indian or 1956 Constitution.
According to M. Munir (formerly Chief Justice of 
Pakistan), if the Article creates any right, it is obvious 
that their infringement and contravention may be complained 
against. But it is difficult to see how the aid of the 
Article can be invoked in a case, where no public or private 
right is involved. V/hat the Article declares is that any 
public functionary or person, taking any action affecting 
the life, liberty, property or reputation of a person, or 
affecting his profession, trade or business, must rely on 
some law to justify his action. Thus, a hangman must be 
equipped with legal authority to hang, a jailer or a 
whipper with a legal warrant to imprison or whip, an. officer 
or other person seizing another person’s property with a 
legal warrant to seize or confiscate, and a person who 
interferes with another person’s right to carry on his 
trade, profession or business, with legal power to regulate 
or stop such activity. Similarly a person requiring
(1) Munir, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, (Ed.1967) P.. 78.
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another person to do something, must show that the law 
gives him the authority to compel the person to do the 
particular act. To put the rule in other words, every 
public functionary or person must show legal authority for 
his interference with the right of another person.
It has been held^^ that,
Many invasion upon the rights of citizens by anybody, no 
matter whether by a private individual or by a public 
official or body, must be justified with reference to some 
law of the country.”
The aforesaid principle is embodied in Article 2.
This Article, in words of Murshed, C.J. ^ ^(of East Pakistan 
High Court) ”is a codification of the ever-growing and 
elastic concept of *due course of law,* as conceived in the 
American Constitution, and is now embedded in our Constitution, 
as a doctrine which cannot be altered by the ordinary 
machineries of legislation.11 Article 2 may sound like the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution, which are usually referred to as the fdue 
process clauses* but its scope is not as wide as of those
(1) Muhammad Hussain v. General Manager, E.B.Railway,
P.P.P. 1961 Pasrva 730-
(2) Haji Ghulam Zamin v. Khondhar, P.P.P. 1965 Pacca 156.
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Amendments. The concept of !due process1 is not precise.
The phrase sometimes even refers to all those principles of
law and natural justice which the American Supreme Court has
considered applicable to the facts and circumstances of each
case in order to preserve wthe blessing of liberty.
Originally *due process1 was a procedural concept, but the
Supreme Court extended it to substantive laws by insisting
that the statute must include fJust procedure.1 The result
is that the Court can read the requirements of fdue process1
into statutes, even if Congress prescribes a different
(2 )procedure. 7 On the other hand, Article 2 does not contain 
the phrase fdue process of law1 but 11 in accordance with 
law.M^ ^  That is to say, an individual has full protection 
against arbitrary executive action, unless and until the 
Legislature passes a law prescribing the extent to which
(1) (Chambers v. Florida, (1940) 309 U.S.227 
(Wolf v. Colorado, (1949) 338 U.S.25.
(fi) C.Herman Pritchett, The American Constitution (1959) P-554
(3) There is a common belief among some lawyers that the
phrase Mdue process of law" was intentionally omitted on
the advice of the visiting Judge of the Supreme Court of
America, who advised that the phrase 1 due process of Law11
could be a great headache for the judges and the State.
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and the procedure by which a person may be deprived of his 
life-, liberty, or property. This does not mean that the 
executive can equip itself with any power it thinks necessary, 
by inducing the legislature to pass a law granting it. The 
law-making power of the State is pre-conditioned by the 
Constitutional requirement that no law can be made which 
takes away or abridges any of the "fundamental rights.
Article 2, read with the provisions of fundamental 
rights1, therefore, requires th^judiciary to see that no 
public functionary interferes with the rights of the people, 
except on condition that his action is supported by the 
authority of a law, which is not in any way repugnant to 
the Constitutional rights.
Where a statute itself is unconstitutional, action taken
under its authority must be vacated, but even if the statute
is ex-facie valid, any executive action under it may be
questioned on the ground that it contravenes any of the
(2 )fundamental rights,v 7 because the essential characteristic 
of these rights is that they impose limitation on all public 
authorities, executive, legislature and judicial, prohibiting
(1) Article 6 (2) Constitution of Pakistan 1962.
(2) East and West Steamship Co. v. Pakistan, P.L.P. 1958 S.C.14
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them from interfering with their exercise. But the
Executive may be empowered to depart from normal judicial
(2 )procedure, in special circumstances.v 7
(3 )Article 2 was invoked in the case of Haji Ghulam Zaminv,y 
before the Full Bench of the East Pakistan High Court. It 
was held that, "It furnishes a citizen with a constitutional 
guarantee that he will not be called upon to do something 
or to refrain from doing anything without a valid provision 
of law to that effect. This means that there is a 
constitutional protection in praesenti; or, in other words, 
whenever an order is made which invades upon the rights of 
citizen or requires him to do something, there must be, in 
existence, contemporaneously, a law which would authorize 
such a course. If there is no such contemporary law in 
existence, the order would fall there and would become 
tainted with illegality as it would come within the mischief
of a guaranteed constitutional protection...... the law or
legislation as contemplated by Article 2 must, of necessity, 
mean a contemporaneous law. To hold otherwise would be 
tantamount to rendering Article 2 nugatory and ineffective.
(1) Province of East Pakistan v. Mehdi Ali Khan, P. P. P. 1959
S.C.387
(2) Bazal Ahmad Ayyubi v. W. Pakistan,
P.1.P.1957 Iah. 388
(3) Haji Ghulam 2iamin v. Khondkar & others, P.L.P. 1965
Pacca 156.
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The said Article is not a mere rope of sands.
Article patently gives a constitutional protection, that is 
a protection in praesenti : Can there he doubt that the
term 'law1, as mentioned in Article 2: means a co-existent 
law? The invasion, and the law which is supposed to justify 
it, must be co-related and co-existent. They must go 
together contemporaneously. The guarantee that has been 
given by the Constitution cannot be washed away by an 
ingenuous legislative device, which can wipe out an illegal 
invasion of today by an artful enactment of tomorrow, 
pretending to act retrospectively, without any constitutional 
change to that effect.n
It was further held that, "A Constitutional right 
cannot be taken away by a legislative ‘fiction, 1 without a 
constitutional amendment, which would permit such a course. 
There is a world of difference between a legislative immunity 
and a constitutional guarantee. The Constitution, by its 
very nature, creates the distinction. A Constitutional 
immunity cannot be wiped out by such a simple method. The 
hand of a constitutional clock is incapable of manipulation 
by a simple legislative contrivance, as opposed to 
constitutional amendment. Article 2 of our constitution 
is nothing but a Constitutional protection.M
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The word "law1* which is repeatedly used in Article 2
is not defined by it. If of course includes, hut does not
seem to be confined to, statute or enacted law. Personal
law and customs, to the extent they are recognized by
statute and international law, are laws as the word seems to
have been used here in its general sense.^
(2 )In Ha.ji Ghulam Zaminfs case, 7 it was contended that 
the expression "law11 in Article 2 and other Articles of the 
Constitution, connotes comprehensible and intelligible laws. 
The question was, however, left open by their Dordships.
In Muhammad Yusuf’s case 7, where the argument was that the 
Displaced Persons laws Amendment Ordinance, 1965, is devoid 
of effect in relation to all orders made before the 
promulgation of the Ordinance, inasmuch as the effect of 
Article 2 of the Constitution was that no person can be 
treated in respect, inter alia, of property, otherwise than 
in accordance with the law in force at the time of such 
treatment; in other words, in accordance with 
contemporaneous law.
(1) Munir, Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
Page 78.
(2) P.D.D. 1965 Dacca 156.
(5) Muhammad Yusuf v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner,
P.D.D.1968 S.C.101
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It was held, **to give the fullest effect to this 
argument would operate as a prohibition against the making 
of laws with retrospective effect in respect of all matters 
that are specified in Article 2. We do not conceive that 
the Article was intended to produce so wide an effect in 
relation to the well established practice of retrospective 
or retro-active legislation. It is difficult to construe 
Article 2 as conveying a fundamental right on every citizen 
of Pakistan and every person for the time being within 
Pakistan against the making of laws by the established 
legislature, which expressly operates retrospectively or 
retro-actively against his interest.**
Although, as the Supreme Court has held, there is no guard 
against making the retrospective legislation in regard to 
all matters specified in Article 2, there is protection 
against retrospective substantive penal legislation in 
Right 4.
The violation of the rights of people given to them by
Article 2 are safeguarded by Article 98 of theConstitution
which empowers the High Courts to make appropriate orders
(1)for that purpose. ' Reading Article 2 with Article 98 of
(l) S.M. Yousuf v. Collector of Customs, P.L.P.1968 Kar.599*
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the Constitution, one is led to the conclusion that a party 
who stands th gain a benefit or advantage by the observance 
of law can consider himself to be an aggrieved party, if the 
law is not observed or he is deprived of that benefit or 
advantage.
(2 )In Begum Agha Shorish Kashmiri fs case f, their 
lordships of the Supreme Court, referring to the word 'law1 
used in the Article 2 said, "law is here not confined to 
statute law alone but is used in its generic sense as 
connoting all that is treated as law in this country, 
including even the judicial principles laid down from time 
to time by the Superior Courts, It means 'according to 
the accepted forms of legal process' and postulates a strict 
performance of all the functions and duties laid down by law. 
It may wellbe, as has been suggested in some quarters, that 
in this sense it is as comprehensive as the American "due 
process" clause in new garb. It is in this sense that an 
action, which is mala fide or colourable, is not regarded as 
action in accordance with law. Similarly, action taken 
upon extraneous or irrelevant considerations is also not 
'action in accordance with law. * Action taken upon no
(1) Mohd. Ashraf v. Board of Revenue, P.L.I). 1968 Iah.1155-
(2) Govt, of W.Pakistan v. Begum Agha Shorish Kashmiri,
P.1.3). 1969 S.C.14
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ground at all or without proper application of the mind of 
the detaining authority would also not qualify as ’action 
in accordance with law1 and would, therefore, have to he 
struck down as being action taken in an unlawful manner.1
In Malik M r  Hasan’s case^^, it was held that,
’’The Article provides that no person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty, body, reputation or property without due 
process of law. It further declares that any public 
functionary or person taking an action affecting the life, 
liberty, body, property or reputation of a person or 
affecting his profession, trade or business, must rely on 
some law to justify his action. In other words, every 
public functionary or person must show legal authority 
for interference with the right of another person. Thus 
a direction or order by a public functionary would be 
invalid, if it does not have the backing of a valid 
c ontemporaneous law. ”
It was also held that even the actions of a Martial 
law authority, however high he may be, if it had not the
(1) Malik Mir Hasan v. The State, P.L.I). 1969 Iah.786
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backing of a Constitutional provision, was not immune 
from being struck down by the Courts of the Country,
In Ghaus Bakhsh's case^^ where the Commissioner, 
under the Provisions of West Pakistan Criminal law 
(Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968, confirmed a 
sentence, before the expiry of the period of appeal, 
it was held that, "the petitioner's right of 
challenging his detention under Article 2 is available 
to him.”
(1) Ghaus Bakhsh Bizanjo v. The State, P.L.B.1969*
Kar. 527.
CHAPTER X
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CONCLUSION
The law of Preventive Detention, empowers the 
Executive, subject to observance of a certain procedure, to 
detain a person on its subjective satisfaction without trial 
on specified grounds, for a limited time which can be 
prolonged, according to the provisions of the statute under 
which a man is detained. The object of such detention is 
not to punish the man for having done something but to prevent 
him committing an act, which may be prejudicial to defence, 
security of the State or the maintenance of public order and 
peace, or to prevent the individual from acting in a 
particular way to achieve a particular object. Preventive
detention is not punitive but precautionary. No offence is 
proved nor any charge foimulated and the justification is 
suspicion or reasonable probability and not criminal
(2 )conviction, which only can be warranted by legal evidence. 7 
The justification for such action is that, during a 
period of instability, the government has no time to wait
(1) Farid Ahmad v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.L.L. £965* Lah.135
(2) Goplan1s Case. A.I.E.1950 S.C.27
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for the verdict of a Court, which may, in certain cases, go 
against the wishes of the executive. As the basis of 
detention is an apprehension, based on the detenu’s past 
conduct or information as to the action, which he may take 
in future and therefore it is not possible to lay down any 
objective standards to come to this conclusion. To do so 
may create difficulties in the maintenance of law and order.
If in such cases, the Executive must investigate and prove 
evidence to satisfy judicial standards, it may become 
difficult for it to take action which otherwise is necessary 
to prevent prejudicial action on the part of the suspected 
person. It may happen that, before it succeeds in 
collecting the necessary evidence, the person concerned may 
succeed in his object. v 7 In war time no body has questioned 
or criticised the existence cr the need of such legislation.
In England, during the First War, Parliament had to pass The 
Defence of the Realm Consolidation Regulation, 1914, to meet 
emergency; under this statute a number of Regulations were 
made, including Regulation 14-B, which permitted the Secretary 
of State to subject any person "to such obligations and 
restrictions as hereinafter mentioned in view of his hostile 
origin or associations."
(1) Farid Ahmad v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.1.D.1965 Lah.135
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While dealing with the merit of a case under Regulation 14-B,
Scrutton L.J. observed in his judgment,
"The courts were always anxious to protect the liberty 
of the subject. They did so both in the interest of the 
subject himself and in the interest of the State, In time 
of war, there must be some modification in the interests of 
the State, It has been said that a war could not be 
conducted on the principles of the Sermon on the Mount, It
might also be said that a war could not be carried on 
according to the principles of Magna Carta." The Second
World War again necessitated the passing of the Emergency 
Powers (Defence) Act of 1939 > which gave powers to the 
executive to make regulations for the purposes of public 
safety, defence of the realm, maintenance of public order, 
the efficient prosecution of the war, the maintenance of 
supplies and services essential to the life of the community, 
the apprehension, trial and punishment of persons offending 
against the Regulations and detention of persons "whose 
detention appears to the Secretary of State to be expedient 
in the interest of public safety for the defence of the realm," 
The Regulation which directly dealt with preventive
(1) Ronnfeldt v. Phillips, (1918) 35 T.l.R. Page 47-
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detention was 18-B, and came up for consideration in 
Livers id ge fs case^"^. It was observed by Lord fl&cmillan,
"In time of emergency, when the life of the whole nation is
at stake, it nay well be that a Regulation for the defence 
of the realm may quite properly have a meaning which, because 
of its drastic invasion of the liberty of the subject, the 
Courts would be slow to attribute to a peace time measure.... 
The liberty which we so justly extol is itself the gift of 
the law and, as I\(hgna Carta recognises, may by the law be
forfeited or abridged. At a time when it is undoubted law
of the land that a citizen may, by conscription or requisition, 
be compelled to give up his life and all that he possesses, 
for his country’s cause, it may well be no matter of surprise 
that there should be confided to the Secretary of State a 
discretionary power of enforcing the relatively mild 
precaution of detention." During war, as just seen, the 
need and justification for preventive legislation has been 
upheld in a democratic country like Britain.
After the Second World War, the provision for preventive 
detention in case of emergency was introduced by the 
Internal Security Act, 1950, in the United States of America.
(1) Liversidge v. Anderson, 1942 A.C.206
The reason was that Americans were not happy with the 
arrangement they had made to meet the emergencies during war. 
This law was intended to meet emergencies in future.
The question arises why does Pakistan need such legislation 
during peace time?
The need for such preventive legislation is that the 
peace and stability of our country is permanently threatened 
by anti-social elements. Within twenty-two years of its 
existence, the constitution has been twice abrogated and each 
time Martial law has been declared. When Pakistan came into 
existence as an independent State, the initial problems with 
which we were faced have already been pointed out in Chapter 
on 11 Justification for Preventive Detention,” and I only want 
to point out what happened during the last days of Ayub Khan's 
reign, when the people took the law into their owi hands to 
overthrow Ayubfs Government and restore democracy in the 
country.
At the end of 1967 and the beginning of 1968, some 
agitations were started by the political parties. The 
first objective of these parties was to return to universal 
suffrage, instead of the system of basic democracy, 
introduced by President Ayub Khan in 1962. The way the 
parties and their supporters launched their protest will be
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clear from the following description of the events which 
afterwards led to the imposition of martial law in the 
country. Pakistan underwent a period of political and 
economic crisis. Ayub Khan offered to talk to the opposition, 
in an attempt to solve the political crisis. The parties 
rejected this offer and said that there was nothing to talk 
about; the people wanted the end of the existing system.^
In support of these demands, long' processions were organised 
and they indulged in violence. It is estimated, according 
to The Daily Telegraph d&ted 3rd February, that at least 
thirty people were killed. After some time the parties in 
opposition agreed to meet the President on condition that the 
Emergency Regulations, imposed in 1965 at the time of 
Indo-Pakistan conflict, were lifted. Mr. Z.A.Bhutto, who 
was at that time under detention, intervened dramatically by 
saying that he would fast until death, unless the emergency 
was lifted.^
On the 9th February, the largest anti-government rally 
was held by 100,000 persons, including a large number of 
students and others; their slogans were "Down with Ayub,"
(1) The Times, (London), February 3, 1969
(2) Ibid ...  February 7, 1969
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"We will face bullets for full democracy." Effigies of
Ayub Khan and his book ‘Friends, not Masters1 were burnt.
Angry mobs burnt down the houses belonging to Ayub Khan's
supporters. On the following day demonstrations also
occurred in Peshwar, as a part of general agitation against
the rule of Ayub Khan. Militant students, joined by
hooligans, threw bricks at the home of Vice-Chancellor of
Peshwar University and marched into the city, smashing sign
boards and traffic signals.
On 12th February, the police fought a four hours battle
with the students in Lahore, who attempted to march on the
Governor's residence, where President Ayub Khan was staying
on his way to the capital. Shouting "Death to Ayub" and
"Give us Democracy," about 5,000 students attempted to break
through the strong police cordons and barbed wire cordons
(2 )surrounding Government House.v 7
On the 14th of February five people were killed in West 
Pakistan in an outbreak of violence during a twelve hours 
national protest against the regime. There were bitter 
clashes in Lahore, Karachi, Peshwar, Rawalpindi and Hyderabad,
(1) The Times, (London), February 10, 1969
(2) Ibid ., February 13, 1969
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where the army was called in to reinforce the police, when 
the mob attacked railway property and attempted to b u m  down 
government storehouses. In Xahore the situation was so tense 
and so close to mob rule, that it was apparent that neither 
the government nor the opposition had much control over the 
mob. Next day serious rioting and disorder started in Dacca; 
mobs attacked and set fire to the State Guest House of the 
President. This was followed by the imposition of a twelve 
hours curfew. On 17th February, the emergency proclamation 
was revoked and a few hours later there were clashes between 
the mob and the police in Karachi. This month ended in
clashes between the demonstrators and Police and the 
destruction of national property.
During the month of L&rch the final phase of unrest in 
Pakistan began and looting, arson and killing spread 
throughout Pakistan. Vital services were brought to a 
standstill by the strikes of doctors, postal workers and 
ten thousand dockers in Karachi and in Xyallpur attempts were 
made to b u m  the Kohinoor Textile Mill in a campaign against 
industrialists. It was feared by the diplomats and other 
observers that the Pakistan was heading towards the point
(1) The Times (London), 14, 15 and 18th February, 1969-
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of no return. After the middle of Ifeirch, there was so much
lawlessness, that the police became powerless and had to leave
the city of Dacca to mob rule. In Dacca a curfew had to be
imposed, after the mob had burnt down a big rice mill and the
entire residential area. A reign of terror gripped East
Pakistan, with the setting up of "people’s courts," meting out
instant death sentences to scores of alleged wrongdoers before
applauding mobs of peasants. On ferch 19, the Pakistan
Government conceded that mob rule had taken over and ordered
tough measures to deal with the mounting unrest. Instructions
were issued to the administration to take urgent preventive
fl)and punitive measures to quell disorder' ' but these proved 
fruitless. Without going into details of the political 
reasons for this violence, it is quite clear that the 
opposition parties and their supporters rejected constitutional 
means to bring about the change in the country. The opposition 
may argue that there was no room for constitutional means 
during the rule of Ayub Khan, but history will say that the 
course adopted was not the proper course open to the people 
to secure a change of government. The way the people 
demonstrated their grievances suggests that even preventive
(1) Ibid 7, 19, 20th March, 1969.
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detention cannot cope with such a situation and only martial 
law can restore peace in the country.
The sort of agitation we have in our country, the people 
in the West may never have the chance to see. Not all the 
politicians or political parties can be entrusted to take over 
the administration of the country. Those who remain in the 
opposition will inevitably try to secure their ends by 
violence. To check violence, which leads to the breakdown 
of civil administration, some sort of legislation is necessary 
and law of preventive detention in such circumstances has 
proved to be useful.
We are not the only country in the world to have such 
legislation during peace time; countries like Greece, Turkey, 
Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria., Rumania, Albania, China, 
Burma, Singapore, Malaysia, India, Ceylon, South Korea,
North Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Egypt, Iraq^ , 
Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Somalia, Ghana, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Uganda,
Tanzania, Ifolawi, Guinea, Ethiopia, South Africa, Rhodesia, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Paraguay, 
Mexico have it.
The term ’preventive detention1 is also to be found in
Article 13 of the Italian Constitution, which gives a 
detailed specification of the right to personal liberty. 
Preventive detention is also an integral part of the 
criminal law in democratic states like Prance and Belgium. 
Under Section 4 of Offences against the State (Amendment) Act 
of the Irish Republic, any person may be arrested and detained 
who, in the opinion of Minister of State, is engaged in 
activities prejudicial to the preservation of public peace and 
order or the security of the State.
As a matter of fact such legislation has been retained in 
our statute books as a matter of painful necessity.
The Constitution, while giving Fundamental Rights to the 
Citizen, has also conferred power on the Government to make 
laws relating to preventive detention. Just as fundamental 
right cannot be taken away by subsequent subordinate 
legislation, this right, I think, cannot be also takwn away, 
except by amendment of the Constitution. The safeguards as 
to arrest and detention, which are available to the person 
arrested under the ordinary law, are not available to the 
person preventively detained; in other words he is denied 
the right to be produced before the nearest magistrate within 
twenty-four hours of his arrest or to engage lawyer of his 
own choice to defend his case. But he is provided with
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certain other safeguards which are that, if the period of 
detention exceeds three months, his case must he referred to 
Advisory Bo&rd, to report on the sufficiency of the cause for 
detention beyond three months; if the period of detention is
less than three months he loses this right. He has a right
to be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds on which 
the order of detention has been made, and he has an opportunity
of making a representation against the order of d etention.
The courts, being aware of the fact that preventive detention 
is an encroachment on the liberty of the subject, have been 
always insistent that these meagre safeguards should be 
strictly complied with before a person can be detained. It 
has been observed "The provision of a statute, which imposes 
restrictions on the personal liberty of a subject, must be 
strictly complied with, before an order of detention without 
trial in a regular court of law, can be upheld by the courts. 
The liberty of the subject is too precious an asset to be 
interfered with, unless an order of detention is passed 
strictly in accordance with the provisions of the detention 
law, however formal in character they may appear to be, and 
all the statutory obligations enjoined on the detaining 
authority must be carried out to the letter.
(1) Siraj-ud-Din v. The State, P.L.D.1957 (W.P) Iah.962
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Whenever a case has been brought before the court, the 
courts have always set aside the detention order, whenever 
there has been any sort of irregularity in the procedure.
The constitution of the Advisory Board was held to be 
improper^^ when the officer appointed by Government had 
been concerned in the making of the order of detention. His 
participation in the proceedings of the board were held to be 
a violation of natural justice. The fact that the Advisory 
Board is there to look into cases of detention does not mean 
that the detenu loses his right to the other remedies which 
are available to him as a citizen under Article 98. The 
opinion of board does not make the detention legal, if 
otherwise it can be proved to be illegal. When the 
detention of a pprson cannot be justified in law, there is 
no reason why the detenu should not be able to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the High Cburt immediately for the 
restoration of his liberty. In all cases where a person is 
detained, and he alleges that his detention is in violation 
of the safeguards provided in the constitution or that it 
does not fall within the statutory requirements of the law 
under which the detention is ordered, he can invoke the
(1) Rehmat Hlahi v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.L.D.1965 (W.P)
Xah. 112
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jurisdiction of High Court under Article 98 of the
Constitution and ask to be released forthwith.' 7
The detenu is entitled to the grounds on which the
order of detention is made. "Grounds" has been interpreted
as the conclusions, based on facts, leading to the order
(2 )made by the detaining authority.' 7 It is the constitutional
right of the detenu to obtain all the grounds on which the
order of detention against him has been made and none of them
('5 )can be withheld from him by the Government.' 7 Mere 
reproduction or the words of the section under which action 
has been taken are held not to be the grounds^ It is the
right of the detenu to obtain all the grounds on which the
authority makes its order of detention. Additional grounds 
cannot be given after the grounds have been furnished to the 
detenu; the grounds cannot be subsequently amplified or 
clarified. Though new grounds cannot be added, there is 
nothing to bar the communication of particulars or facts 
relating to the grounds already supplied, by one or more
(1) feulvi Farid Ahmad v. Govt.of West Pakistan, P.L.P.1965
(W.P.) Lah.135
(2) Harasimhamurty v. State, A.I.R.1951 Orissa 251
(3) Ghulam Muhammad Khan v. The State, P.L.D.1957 Xah.4-97
(4) State of Bombay v. Atmaram, A.I.E.1951 S.C.157
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subsequent communications, provided the "earliest" opportunity
of making representation is not denied to the detenu.
Describing the contents of the second communication to the
detenu as "supplementary grounds" does not necessarily make
them additional or new grounds. One has to look at the
contents to find out whether they are new grounds or not.
When they only furnish details of the grounds furnished to
the detenu previously, they cannot be treated as new grounds.
Further the fact that the details were communicated later does
not necessarily show that they were not within the knowledge
of the authorities, when they sent the first communication of
(2 )the grounds.v 7 The grounds must be exact and precise and
sufficient particulars regarding grounds must be given to
(3)enable the detenu to make his representation.w 7 Although 
there is no express provision in Right No.2 that particulars 
of grounds of detention must be given to the person detained, 
the furnishing of particulars may be necessary in order to 
enable the detenu to make an effective representation.
Though the Constitution does not lay down any obligation
(1) Ibid
(2) Tarapada v. State of W.Bengal, A.I.R.1951 S.C.174
(3) Mrs. Rowshan Bijaya Shaukat Khan v. Grovt.of East
Pakistan, P.L.D.1965 Dacca 241.
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to give ’particulars or details* and has left it to the
discretion of the detaining authority to disclose or withhold
facts, it cannot he held that a mere recital of the clauses of
the statute, without giving any particulars or details, would
suffice, for, without particulars, it may not he possible to
make a representation, which is the very object of communicating
grounds. It is true that the detenu is not entitled to
know the evidence, nor the source of information, but he must,
”as a matter of right,1 be furnished with the grounds for his
detention and sufficient details to enable him to make out a
case, if he can, for the consideration of the detaining 
(2 )authority. v y The mere statenent that the detenu had been
carrying on ’subversive propaganda1 conveys no precise
information to the detenu, so as to enable him to make a
(3)proper representationv ' Similarly, an allegation of 
’secret or underground antivity,’ without particulars as to 
the nature of such activities, is vague, for ’secret activity’ 
does not necessarily mean that it is an activity subversive of 
public order. The particulars must be served within a
(1) State of Bombay v. Atmaram, A.I.R. 1951 S.C.157
(2) Durgadas v. Rex, A.I.E.1949 All.148, 151.
(3) In re Krishanaji, A.I.R. 1948 Bomb.360
(4) Nek Mohammad v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1949 Pat. 1.
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reasonable time, for, without particulars, the detenu will
not be in a position to enforce his constitutional right to
make an effective representation. The courts have always
insisted that the procedural safeguards are strictly complied
with and the executive must fulfil the formalities. If the
grounds supplied to the detenu are vague, that is, they are
incapable of being understood with sufficient certainly, the
courts will set the detenu at liberty. ^
It 'may so happen that the executive authority wants to
detain a particular person but has not got any valid grounds
and it just inserts as grounds for the order of detention,
grounds which are either irrelevant, that is not relevant to
the objects specified in tte law or the detenu may be served
with several grounds, some of which are either irrelevant or
non-existent; the court has held in such cases that the
(2 )detention is invalid, v * even if there were other relevant 
grounds, because it can never be certain to what extent the 
irrelevant or defective grounds operated on the mind of the 
detaining authority or whether the detention order would have 
been made if only the valid reasons had been before him.
(1) Mrs. Eowshan Bijaya Shaukat v. Govt.of Bast Pakistan, 
Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.E.1952 S.C.350
(2) Behmat Ilahi v.Govt.of Pakistan, P.L.D.1965 lah.112
DwarKa Das v. State of J and K., A.I.E.1957 B.C.164
453
In such a case the court is bound to quash the order, unless 
it can be predicated that the defective ground was of an 
unsubstantial or inconsequential nature. Where the 
detention order stated that detention was necessary to prevent 
the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the 
maintenance of supplies and services, essential to the 
community, and it was alleged that the petitioner was 
smuggling essential goods, such as shaffon cloth, zari and 
mercury and it was found that shaffon cloth and zari had not 
been declared *essential goods1, the order was quashed.
There is no doubt that the grounds are to read together, but 
the detenu, who is denied legal aid, cannot be expected to 
interpret irrelevant grounds in the light of another ground, 
as a lawyer would have done, in accordance with the rules of 
interpretation of documents.
The reasons for holding a detention order invalid, when
the grounds are non-existent or irrelevant, were explained by
(2 )the Supreme Court of India in the following words' 7
"Where power is vested in a statutory authority to 
deprive the liberty of a subject on its subjective satisfaction
(1) hwarka has v. State of J and K, A.I.R.1957 S.C.164
(2) Ibid
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with reference to specified matters, if that satisfaction is 
stated to be based on a number of grounds or for a variety of 
reasons, all taken together, and if some of them are found to 
be non-existent or irrelevant, the very exercise of that power 
is bad. That is so, because the matter, being one for the 
subjective satisfaction, it must be properly based on all the 
reasons on which it purports to be based. If some of them 
are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the Court cannot 
predicate what the subjective satisfaction of the said 
authority would have been, on the exclusion of these grounds 
or reasons. To uphold the validity of such an order, in 
spite of the invalidity of some of the reasons or grounds, 
would be to substitute the objective standards of the Court 
for the subjective satisfaction of the statutory authority.
In applying these principles, however, the Court must be 
satisfied that the vague or irrelevant grounds are such as, 
if excluded, might reasonably have affected the subjective 
satisfaction of the qppropriate authority. It is not merely 
because some grounds or reasons of a comparatively unessential 
nature are defective that such an order based on subjective 
satisfaction can be held to be invalid. The Court, while 
anxious to safeguard the personal liberty of the individual, 
will not lightly interfere with such orders."
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(Che declaration of the grounds may enable the detenu to 
demonstrate mala fides on the part of the detaining authority; 
if the grounds are not fully furnished to the detenu he may 
argue that this indicates mala fides of the detaining 
authority, who has denied him rights to which he is entitled. 
The order of detention is mala fide, if it is made for a 
collateral or ulterior purpose, i.e., a purpose other than 
what the legislature had in view, while passing the law of 
preventive detention. Detention orders were set aside as 
mala fide, where the grounds for detention stated were 
exhibition of posters allegedly containing material 
prejudicial to public order. But in fact, the contents of 
the posters were no more than an election manifesto on behalf 
of combined opposition parties against a candidate of the 
ruling party and were not, as such, likely to incite the 
general public to commit acts of violence or breaches of 
peace; the grounds for detention were not relatable to the 
statutory purpose of detention.
A plea of mala fides cannot succeed on mere vague 
allegations. There should be some specific allegations of 
mala fides. The mere fact that the detention order followed
(1) Abuzar v. Province of West Pakistan, P.1.B.1966 (W.P)
Ear. 260.
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the release of the detenu on bail in a separate c riminal case
is not sufficient to hold such order to be mala fide* Thus
(1)in Kira^s casev ' the detenu was already in jail in 
connection with a separate criminal case* On the day on 
which he was to be released on bail by order of the High Court, 
the detenu was served with a detention order under Section 3 of 
The West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance 9 I960* 
It was urged tbat, since the detention order followed the 
release of the detenu on bail, the order was mala fide*
It was held, that it was not possible on this single 
circumstance alone to hold that the order was mala fide* 
Possibly the detention order was made to deprive the detenu 
of the liberty restored to him by the bail order of the High 
Court, but it was equally possible that the detaining 
authority had an honest conviction that the petitioner was not 
a person to be allowed free movement and action in the context 
of the situation then prevailing, without detriment to the 
maintenance of law and order. In the absence of any proof 
that the action of the detaining authority was motivated by 
malicious intent and purpose, which the petitioner must prove 
as a fact, the Court was unable to attribute any malice to the 
detaining authority.
(1) Miraj Mohd v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.L.E.1966 (W.P.)
Ear. 283
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It is legitimate for a detaining authority to base his 
satisfaction that the detenu is likely to act in a prejudicial 
manner on the past activities of the detenu* But the past 
activities must he related to the situation existing at the 
moment when the detaining authority makes the order* If the 
detaining authority9 on proper material9 is satisfied that 
such relation exists, it will be difficult for the court to 
hold the detention illegal^ on the ground of mala fides. 
Recourse to preventive detention, where the ordinary law would 
be sufficient to meet the needs of the case, may lend colour 
to the conclusion that the order is mala fide* It cannot be 
stated as a rule of law that, when a person is accused of an 
offence, the only course open to the authorities is to 
prosecute him under the ordinary law and that he cannot be 
detained. The right to prosecute a person under the ordinary 
law and the right of the executive to detain a person are not 
exclusive but are independent of each other. There is no rule 
of law that, unless a choice of one of the two alternatives, 
that is prosecution or detention, is made at the earliest 
moment, the order of detention must be held invalid. The 
proper approach is to consider the facts of each case and then
(1) Mahbub Anam v. Govt, of East Pakistan, P*1.D.1959 Dacca 774
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consider whether the order of detention is mala fide or not*
No doubt there will be cases in which there will be a clash 
between the different rights, if both detention and prosecution 
are made at the same time* Cases can be imagined in which 
the activities of a person might be of a most dangerous type 
and yet there may not be enough evidence to secure a 
conviction or witnesses may not be forthcoming. In a case 
like this and others, it might not be possible tb take action 
under the ordinary law and the detention of person may be 
considered essential. But on the other hand when a man is 
already under arrest under the ordinary law, and an order is 
passed for his detention, such order is at least undesirable 
even though it may not be wanting in good faith* ^  The onus 
of proving mala fides is upon the detenu and the trend of the 
recent decision shows that the burden is heavy.
It is true that an executive authority must exercise its 
authority honestly and without malice and it is the duty of the 
Courts to see that a fraudulent exercise of such power or 
colourable exercise of it, to gain ulterior object, is stifled. 
But the question of mala fide exercise of power is one of fact 
in each case and the onus is on the detenu to show that the
(1) Ifeihbub Anam v. Govt, of East Pakistan, P.L.D.1959 Dacca 774
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order of detention is, in faot, a fraudulent exercise of power 
vested in the Government and he can sustain that hurden only 
if he can successfully rebut the presumption of bona fides on 
the part of the Government. ^
The power of preventive detention is based on the 
”satisfaction* of the detaining authority that it is necessary 
to detain a specific person, because he is likely to act in a 
manner prejudicial to the public safety, the maintenance of 
public order or the security of the State* The satisfaction 
of the Government or the detaining authority, its nature and 
the right of the detenu to challenge it before the Court are 
questions of fundamental importance and many legal battles 
have been fought over the satisfaction clause, contained in 
the various statutes and ordinances. The satisfaction of the 
detaining authority may be based upon the past activities of 
the detenu, if such activities, in the opinion of the 
detaining authority, give rise to the apprehension of 
prejudicial conduct on his part in the future or his past 
objectionable activities have a relation to the existing 
situation. The satisfaction contemplated by the various 
Acts, must be that of the particular authority empowered by
(1) Miraj Mohd v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.L.B.1966 (W.P)
Ear. 283
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law to pass the order of detention; the empowered authority 
cannot act as the satisfaction of another official of 
Government.
The satisfaction must he that of the detaining authority
and not of the Court; it must he honest, bona fide, not
unreal, sham or mala fide. It must he reasonable satisfaction,
not arbitrary or irrational. In a case under The West
Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, I960, it was
observedv 7 that, *It is for the detaining authority to judge
and put its own interpretation on the suspected prejudicial
acts of an intended detenu for its own subjective satisfaction
and it does not fall within the province of the Courts to probe
into that satisfaction or analyse the substance and quantum of
the evidence on which that satisfaction is based.* In Abid
(2 )Mirza^ casev , a case under the same ordinance, it was held 
that the satisfaction contemplated by the Ordinance is the 
satisfaction of the authority, which passes the order under 
Section 5* At the same time it cannot be disputed that, 
before such an order is passed, the authority has to apply 
its mind to all the material, which is relevant and to which
(1) Miraj Muhammad v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.L.D.1966 Kar.
282
(2) Abid Ali Mirza v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P. 1.3). 1967
Kar. 408.
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its attention must be drawn. It must be remembered that, 
under Section 5, the Government had to be satisfied that, 
with a view to preventing the petitioner from acting in a 
manner prejudicial to public safety, it was necessary to 
pass an order. That being the requirement of law, the 
Government has to have all the necessary material placed 
before it, which it would have to examine and apply its mind 
to. T2> sum up, it is clear that the satisfaction that is 
expected is that of the authorised official, entrusted with 
the duty of maintaining peace and order.
The higher courts of Pakistan deserve great credit in 
that they have always shown their determination to keep a 
proper balance between the needs of law and order on the one 
hand and the liberties of the subject on the other hand.
As a guardian of the Constitution and chief interpreter of 
the law, whenever any constitutional problem has arisen, the 
courts have taken into consideration the circumstances 
prevalent in the country. Thus in The Federation of 
Pakistan v. Ifeulvi Tamiz ud DinfB case^1 ,^ a case which is of 
historical importance, it was the Federal Court of Pakistan, 
which came to the rescue of the Government of Pakistan and
(1) P.Xi.D. 1955 F.C.240
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saved the nation from disaster. Consequently Government 
might have thought that whenever it is in trouble and there 
is any question as to the interpretation of the constitution, 
the decision will be in favour of the Government. But this 
presumption proved to be false when Pazlul Qaderfs c a s e ^  
came up before the Supreme Court of Pakistan and it was held 
that, MThere can be no estoppel on a question of law and 
therefore what is opposed to the Constitution cannot be made 
valid and constitutional by invoking the doctrine of estoppel;* 
the legislation in question was held to be invalid and the 
decision was an embarrassment to the President of Pakistan.
The Supreme Court of Pakistan, being aware of the needs of 
the country and independent of executive influence or control, 
has always kept its prestige by playing a fair role in 
judicial matters.
Our Courts have never looked at the preventive 
legislation with favour and have been critical of such 
legislation whenever they thought it necessary. As was 
observed by Yaqub Ali, ”if the unfettered authority of
the Government to detain a person in preventive custody
(1) Pazlul Quader Chowdhry v. Muhammad Abdul Haq, P.L.D.1963
S.C.486.
(2) Rehmat Elahi v. Govt.of Pakistan, P.L.D.1965 (W.P)
Lah. 112:.
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infringes on the concept of liberty enshrined in Article 2 
of the Constitution and the fundamental Rights contained in 
Chapter I, the remedy is to bring the law on the subject into 
conformity with the will of the people and their good sense 
but not by the will of C o u r t . A s  the court cannot change 
this law, the courts have always upheld the procedural 
safeguards available to the detenu and have exercised their 
discretion in favour of tbs right of detenu, when possible.
Until recently, whenever a case of preventive detention 
has been brought before the Court, the courts followed the 
ruling laid down in Liversidge* s c a s e ^  that the satisfaction 
of the detaining authority is not subject to judicial review. 
The courts might have rejected this as a war time ruling but 
they did not do so. But Article 2 of the Constitution of 
1962 created the opportunity for the courts to consider the 
whole question of the nsatisfaction11 of the government.
In Ghulam Jilani^ ease,^^ the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan considered the question of judicial review of 
detention orders under the Defence of Pakistan Rules. The 
Supreme Court, (per Cornelius C.J.,) held that, Ma mere
(1) Liversidge v.Anderson, 1942 A.C.206
(2) l&lik Ghulam Jilani v. The Govt, of West Pakistan,
P.L.D.1967 S.C.373.
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declaration of executive ”satisfaction* is not sufficient to 
justify detention. The existence of reasonable grounds, 
though not expressly required by the relevant rule, is 
essential.1’ The court also held that, ”It was the function 
of the judiciary to ascertain the existence of reasonable 
grounds.” In arriving at this decision, the court found 
support in Article 2 of the 1962 Constitution, which requires 
every citizen to be treated in accordance with law and in 
Article 98, which the court construed as conferring power 
on a superior court to examine every exercise of executive 
power in ascertaining its lawful authority.”
Obviously this decision was embarrassing to the 
executive, so the executive amended the Defence of Pakistan 
rules, with intent to render the satisfaction of the 
executive authority immune from judicial review. Thus 
Clause (x) of the sub-section (20 of section 3 ) of the 
Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, 1965 was amended by Ordinance 
Number 2 of 1968, with the specific object of excluding the 
power of the High Court to examine either the sufficiency or 
the reasonableness of the grounds of detention under the said 
ordinance. In two cases, which came up after the amendment, 
the Supreme Court of Pakistan reaffirmed the rule laid down 
in Chulam Jilani’s case and it was held that, in this view of
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the matter, the amendment to clause (x) of section 3(2) of 
Defence of Pakistan Ordinance had been "an exercise in 
futility." The amendment had in no way affected the reason 
given by the court in Ghulam Jilani's c a s e . ^
It is the Constitutional right of the detenu that he 
should be informed of the grounds of his detention as soon as 
may be, so that he can avail himself of his constitutional 
right to make a representation against the order. The phrase 
"as soon as may be" means as soon as feasible in the 
circumstances of each case. If the grounds are not 
communicated as soon as may be, there would be an infringement 
of his Fundamental Right, guaranteed by the Constitution and 
his detention would become illegal. The phrase "as soon as 
may be" has been explained as follows "This (expression) 
allows the authorities reasonable time to formulate the grounds 
on the materials in their possession. The time element is 
necessarily left indeterminate, because activities of 
individuals tending to bring about a certain result may be 
spread over a long or short period, a larger or smaller area, 
or may be in connection with a few or numerous individuals.
The time required to formulate the proper grounds of
(1) Abdul Baqi Baluch v. Govt.of Pakistan, P.l.D.ib968 S.C.313
Govt, of West Pakistan v. Begum Agha Shorish Kashmari,
P.L.B.69 S.C.14.
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detention, on information received, is bound to vary in
/n }
individual cases*1’ This ruling allows the executive to
take such time as is necessary to consider the activities of 
a person, spread over the country and to collect the necessary 
material to formulate the grounds, but this must not be 
abused. When the executive wishes to detain a person, it 
must have all the grounds before it, and these grounds must 
be furnished to the detenu along with the order of detention, 
although there may be exceptions in rare cases.
The Lahore High Court has aptly said that wthe words fas 
soon as may be* must be taken as indicating the intention of 
the law-maker that the grounds must be served without any 
avoidable delay, keeping in view the circumstances of the 
case.* Their Lordships went on to say that the question 
whether this has been done is clearly a matter open to 
judicial review. The phrase ”as soon as may ben must, in 
the vast majority of cases, mean simultaneously with or soon 
after the order is made. If there is any delay, it must be 
justified to the satisfaction of the Court. And if sufficient 
cause is not shown for not communicating the grounds as soon 
as possible, then the detention order in question must be
(1) State of Bombay v. Atmaram, A.I.E.1951 B.C.157
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declared to be without lawful authority, on account of its 
failure to comply with an essential requirement of the law 
under which it is issued. In the instant case there was a 
delay of thirty-five days in serving the grounds of detention, 
allegedly on account of the preoccupation of the officer 
concerned with other matters. It was held that this is 
hardly a satisfactory explanation, when the authorities are 
dealing with the liberty of the subject.^ The detention 
was, of course, held illegal. In an earlier case, a time 
limit was fixed for service of grounds after the order of 
detention, and it was held that the grounds must be served 
with the least possible delay and twenty-four hours should 
normally be the time within which the grounds should be 
served. The period of twenty-four hours was fixed, because 
otherwise the detenu1s right of making a representation 
would be rendered illusory. But in a case where a
reasonably satisfactory explanation was given for delay, the 
court condoned a delay of two months.
The purpose of requiring the detenu to be furnished with
(1) Muhammad Aslam Malik v. Province of West Pakistan,
P.L.D.1968 lah. 1324
(2) Ghulam Ullah Khan v. District fc&gistrate, Campbellpur,
P.L.D.1967 Peshwar 195.
(3) Khhbub Anam v. Govt, of East Pakistan, P.L.D.1959 Dacca 774
468
grounds and particulars is to enable him to make a 
representation against the order of detention. The right to 
grounds is of no value, if the affected person is not given a 
right of redress, if the grounds do not justify his detention. 
The representation allowed is against the order of detention, 
as based bn the grounds furnished. This right of 
representation is valuable, as it is the only method 
available to a person detained to convince the authority that 
his detention is unmerited. The right to make a 
representation does not involve a right to a judicial trial 
or judicial enquiry by an independent tribunal. This was the 
view of the majority in Gopalan *s case^^ but Fazal Ali, J., 
expressed the opinion that the right to make a representation 
must carry with it the right to have the representation 
properly considered by an impartial person. According to 
the learned judge, there must, therefore, be some machinery 
for properly examining cases of detenus and determining 
whether they have been detained without reason.
The right is not confined to the physical opportunity 
of using paper and pen. The purpose of the representation 
is to answer the charges contained in the grounds, so the
(1) A.I.E. 1950 S.0.27
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information conveyed to the detained person must be sufficient 
to attain that object. The court is entitled to examine the 
statement of grounds and particulars given to the accused from 
this point of view and to see whether the statement is 
sufficient to enable the detenu to make a representation.
The regrettable practice of the executive furnishing 
insufficient details to the detenu to enable him to make a 
representation against his detention has been deprecated by 
their Lordships of the Supreme Court time and again. There 
is no provision in the Constitution for the detenu to be 
given an oral hearing or to engage a lawyer and to be 
represented. The representation is however to be made to 
the Provincial Government in case a person is detained under 
the Provincial Statute and to the Central Government in case 
the person is detained under a Central Statute, or if the 
statute so provides to the officer who made the detention 
orders.
The executive has power to withhold from the detenu 
facts which it thinks to be against the public interest to 
disclose. *In almost every case of detention, the 
detaining authority, when questioned by the Court about the 
reasons for detention, mechanically repeats the formula of 
•public safety and maintenance of public order1 and displays
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a positive disinclination to the natter being probed further. 
While such disinclination is understandable, where high affairs 
of State are concerned, there is no reason why, in ordinary 
cases, as for instance where a man is arrested for defying 
law and order, intending to lead a banned procession, 
fomenting labour discontent or communal hatred or for 
otherwise endangering the public peace, the authority 
ordering the arrest should not take the Court and the public 
into its confidence by giving a broad hint about the reasons 
for the action taken. In such cases the Court does not 
desire to go into details or to ask for disclosure of the 
material, on which the authority ordering the arrest formed 
his opinion, except to the extent that such information is 
relevant to the question whether the action taken wab bona 
fide.w^  When facts are withheld by the executive, the 
suspicion arises that the detaining authority knows full well 
the weakness of his case, so, apart from deceiving the Court 
under the plea of this privilege, it not only irritates the 
court but brings Government into disrepute. It is suggested 
that, except where really high confidential matters of state 
are involved, the executive should voluntarily come forward and 
give reasons for its action to rebut the suspicion of bad faith.
(1) Inayat Ullah Khan Jfeshriqi v. Crown, P.L.D.1952 toh. 331*
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A right without a remedy for enforcing it is of little 
value* A mere declaration of the right and the safeguards 
would he a formality, if there were no effective means of 
enforcing it. Article 2 declares that every citizen, 
wherever he may be and every other person for the time being 
in Pakistan, has the inalienable right to enjoy the protection 
of law and to be treated in accordance with law; no action 
detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation or property 
of any person shall be taken, except in accordance with law; 
no person shall be prevented from or be hindered in doing 
what is not prohibited by law and no person shall be 
compelled to do that which the law does not require him to 
do* When this right is infringed by a private individual, 
the person aggrieved must seek the appropriate remedy 
provided by the ordinary law. But when it is infringed by 
an official or public authority, a remedy may be sought in the 
High Court by a writ petition. Article 98 confers 
jurisdiction on the High Courts to issue orders in the nature 
of mandamus, habeas corpus, certorari, prohibition and quo 
warranto. The writ which is appropriate, where the person 
is deprived of his liberty, is the writ of habeas corpus. 
Generally the writ of habeas corpus is issued in cases of 
illegal and improper detention in public or private custody
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but the writ is applicable as a remedy in all cases of
wrongful deprivation of personal liberty. It is a
prerogative process for securing the liberty of the subject,
by affording effective means of immediate release from
unlawful detention, whether in prison or in private custody.
Although the writ of habeas corpus is a writ of right, it is
not a writ of course. There are authorities to support the
view that, even if a fit case has been made out showing
ex facie a want of jurisdiction in the authority making an
order of committment, yet if it appears to the court that it
is purely technical defect or the conviction is otherwise
valid, the Court will not interfere. ^  The writ is only
issued when reasonable cause is shown. The writ of habeas
corpus is of remedial nature and is not used as an instrument
(3 )
of punishment. y The object of the writ is not to punish 
previous illegality, but to release from previous illegal 
detention. Habeas Corpus is essentially a writ of
inquiry, and upon matters in which the state is itself 
concerned, in aid of right and liberty, though private
(1) Rao Mahroz Akhtar v. Dist.Magistrate, P.L.D.1957 Xah.676
(2) Abdul Hannan v. Govt, of Hast Pakistan, P.L.D. 1959 Dacca
279
(3) Bamardo v. Ford Gossage, 1892 A.C.326
(4) R v. Home Secretary, Ex parte 0*Brien, (1923) 39
T.&.R.487
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rights may be involved. It by no manner of means follows that 
the prayer of the petitioner will be granted, because the writ 
has been ordered to issue* The writ simply brings the 
parties before the Court for the ascertainment of the facts of 
the case. The Court is clothed with the power, with a sound 
discretion to grant or refuse relief. ^  In Ghulam Jilani^ 
c a s e ^ ,  the Supreme Court held that, "Power is expressly 
given by Article 98 to the Superior Court to probe into the 
exercise of public power by executive authority, how high- 
soever, to determine whether they have acted with lawful 
authority. The judicial power is reduced to a nullity, if 
laws are so worded or interpreted that the executive 
authority may make what statutory rules they please 
thereunder and may use this freedom to make themselves the 
final judges of their own "satisfaction" for imposing 
restraints on the enjoyment of the fundamental rights of 
citizens. Article 2 of the Constitution would be deprived 
of all its content through this process and courts would 
cease to be guardians of the nationfs liberties.
(1) Nasim Fatima v. Govt, of West Pakistan,
P.L.D. 1967 Lah. 103 (F.B)
(2) Malik Ghulam Jilani v. The Govt, of West Pakistan,
P.L.D. 1967 S.C.373.
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The right of a person to a petition for habeas corpus 
is a high prerogative right and is a constitutional remedy 
for all matters of illegal confinement. In all cases where 
a person is detained and he alleges that his detention is 
unconstitutional and in violation of the safeguards provided 
in the Constitution, or that it does not fall within the 
statutory requirements of law under which the detention is 
ordered, he can invoke the jurisdiction of High Court under 
Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan and ask to be 
released forthwith. ^  Though normally the right to a writ 
under Article 98 is only available in the absence of an 
adequate alternative remedy when the liberty of a person is 
involved, the question of adequate remedy does not come into 
play, in particular in cases of habeas corpus. ^  In a 
petition for habeas corpus, it is not necessazy that the 
detenu himself should apply; the petition can be moved even 
by a friend of the person detained illegally. Although 
under our Constitution there is no scope for successive 
application for habeas corpus, an application for habeas 
corpus on fresh grounds can never be barred.
(1) Farid Ahmad v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.L.B.1965 Lah.135
(2) Abdul Sabur v. The District Magistrate, P.L.B.1969
Peeh.167
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The rejection of a former petition of this nature will 
not in every case operate as res judicata or have finality.
If the Court has determined that on the day of making the 
order, the person in custody is being lawfully detained, a 
subsequent petition directed against his continued detention 
on a date subsequent to the order of the Court, need not 
involve a review of the earlier order of the Court, nor 
violate the principle of finality of the earlier judgment of 
the Court. If the detention is shown to be either unlawful 
or in an unlawful manner, it is the duty of the Court to 
release the person in detention and it is no answer to the 
petition that an earlier petition has been dismissed. The 
purpose of the Constitution will be defeated, if a second 
application is not entertained on the technical ground that 
a former petition has been dismissed.
A technicality cannot stand in the way of releasing a 
person, who is being detained without lawful authority or in 
unlawful manner. If the question is to be decided on general 
principles of public policy, then obviously the Courts must 
lean in favour of granting the relief rather than refusing it, 
unless there is a prohibition in the rules or statute, but 
there is no prohibition on successive application in any rule 
or statute. The wording of the Constitutional provision
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enables a challenge to an order of detention and the Court
is authorised to satisfy itself that the person in custody
is not detained without lawful authority. This duty the
Court must perform. The Court is not relieved of this duty,
because a certain ground, or a question of law or fact or a
certain reasoning, which could have shown by the order of
detention to be unlawful, was not raised or taken before the
fl)
Court in an earlier petition. v 7
Orders and proceedings in violation of the principles of
natural justice are liable to be quashed in the exercise of
the jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution. In 
an emergency it might be necessary for the authorities to take 
immediate action, when grave danger to the public safety or 
maintenance of public order or security of the state is 
involved; in such cases the rules of natural justice may be 
relaxed, provided they are subsequently observed. Under 
Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court 
also has a power to issue orders in the nature of Habeas 
Corpus. Article 98 (2)(b)(i) is not a reproduction of 
Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code but the 
Constitutional provision is of higher authority and is not
(1) Uasim Fatima v. Govt, of West Pakistan, P.1.1.1967
Xah.103 (F.B.)
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subject to the restriction imposed by sub-section (3) of 
Section 491 of Criminal Procedure Code in respect of persons 
detained under the Bengal State Prisoners Regulation, 1818, 
or the Bombay Regulation XXV of 1827 or The State Prisoners 
Act, 1850, or the State Prisoners Act, 1858; nor do the 
provision of any other special law like the West Pakistan 
Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1980, authorising 
detention and restricting the High Courtfs power, control 
this jurisdiction.^
The necessity for such legislation arises when personal 
liberty is abused by individuals who endanger the life and 
safety of peace loving citizens. President Nyerere 
emphasised that, nWhile the vast mass of the people give full 
and active support to their country and its government, a hand­
ful of individuals can still put our nation into jeopardy and 
reduce to ashes the effort of millions.n The need for such 
legislation arises from the fact that the evidence in 
possession of the authorities will not be sufficient to
support a charge or to secure the conviction of such persons
(2 )
by legal proof.v ' The question may arise whether this
(1) Muhammad Ali v. Muhammad Bashir, P.I.E.1962 Lah.230
(2) Liversidge v. Anderson, 1942 A.C. 206 (218)
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special legislation is necessary when there are so many 
other enacted laws to ensure peace and order in the Country.
Democracy in our country needs to be guarded more 
carefully than in the West, where the countries have a long 
history of established democratic principles. Those who know 
the conditions prevelant in our country will agree that a 
relatively small number of political agitators can create 
a large amount of unrest and endanger the security of the 
country, and the maintenance of public peace and order.
There are certain provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code 
and Pakistan Penal Code, the object of which is the prevention 
and not the punishment of the offences. These provisions 
are insufficient to meet the needs of the country to maintain 
law and order. The reason is that the ordinary criminal 
laws, with their historic safeguards, designed to produce a 
fair trial before conviction, are inadequate and cannot be 
made adequate to meet the emergencies with which the Pakistan 
Government is faced. To borrow the words of Professor Alan 
Gledhill, "Preventive Detention is an administrative 
necessity and likely to cause less human misery than might 
result from likely alternative measures to deal with persons 
who cannot be successfully prosecuted for their activities, 
though they are a menace to public security and order.
(1) Alan Gledhill, Fundamental Rights in India 1955 p. 126
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The law of preventive detention has been much 
criticised by judges, lawyers and the politicians. The 
judges denounce the idea of preventive detention in noimal 
times. Kfethajan J. said, "Preventive detention laws are 
repugnant to democratic institutions and they cannot be 
found to exist in any of the democratic countries of the 
world." Kania, C.J. observed that, "It may be noticed that 
neither the American nor the Japanese constitution contain 
provisions permitting Preventive Detention .... Preventive 
detention in normal times i.e; without the existence of an 
emergency like war, is recognised as a normal topic of 
legislation under our constitution." Mukherjea J. commented 
that, "No country in the world that I am aware of has made 
this (Preventive detention) an integral part of their 
constitution as has been done in India .... This is undoubtedly 
unfortunate •.. which cannot but be regarded as a most 
unwholesome encroachment upon the liberties of the people."
The Bar Council of Pakistan has always criticised it and in a 
resolution passed at its 19th Session, resolved that, "In 
times of peace, there should be no preventive detention without 
trial, as such detention deflects from the concept of the rule 
of law, to which Pakistan and this council firmly adhere
(1) Gopalan v. State of Bfodras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C.27
(2) Resolution of the Pakistan Bar Council held in
Chittagong on Sept. 26-29 (69)*
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Commenting on the report published by Amnesty International 
(U.K.), the Times^^ in the editorial wrote, "the Governments 
that detain them plead the security of the state, some with 
more justification than others. Most of these detentions are 
disgraceful, certainly disqualifying the countries concerned 
from being called democracies. It is a sad comment on new 
nations that, with around 130 in all, no more than a score 
pass the first test of political freedom."
The criticism of preventive detention may be classified 
under three heads, first preventive legislation itself, 
second the constitutional recognisation given to it and 
lastly the procedure attached to it.
It is clear that we are not the only country to have this 
sort of legislation during the peace time; there are other 
countries in this category. What I think worries the legal 
conscience is not the legislation itself but the constitutional 
status given to it and the procedure. The constitution can of 
course be amended, if the will of the people is there. The 
amendment clause is there to meet this need. As regards the 
procedure, this really should be changed, to bring it as far 
as possible in line with the established principles of rule 
of law, of course recognising that Government, which has to
(1) The Times (London) December 24, 1968.
deal with persons determined to undermine 'the safety, the 
security and the defence of the State. The power of 
detention without trial should be limited to a period of 
three months only and if the period exceeds three months, 
it should be with the consent of the Advisory Board and the 
maximum period of detention should under no circumstances 
be more than one year.
Another fundamental question, which disturbs the 
opposition, is the abuse of the power of preventive 
detention vested in the Government. The claim of the 
opposition is that it is not for the security of the State 
that the Government wants to §,rm itself with such legislation, 
but to continue in power, by keeping active members of the 
opposition behind bars on some pretext or other. On this 
point, it is submitted that whatever may be done, there will 
always be a chance of this power being abused, whether 
intentionally or innocently. It is only the courts, which 
can rescue the innocent victim of misuse of power by 
insisting that the various safeguards provided in the 
Constitution are complied with.
There is no firm indication of when we will get rid of 
this black spot in our Constitution, the reason being that 
there are so many political parties in Pakistan;
(1) There are at least twelve political parties now in
Pakistan.
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they have no common platform and the political leaders have 
made Pakistan a battlefield of conflicting ideas and 
ambitions. So long as this situation continues, preventive 
detention will remain, as it is essential to save the country 
from politicians who abuse their position and power.
The numerous political parties not only cause trouble to the 
State and the peace loving citizens, but they create trouble 
for themselves, by making accusations and counter accusations 
and they do nothing for the benefit of the nation as a whole. 
It can only be prayed that one day these parties will unite 
into two or three parties and will be in a position to 
consider with cold minds how preventive detention legislation 
can be dispensed with.
The peoplefs frustrations are economic and arise largely 
from the unequal distribution of wealth. Selfish leaders, 
by suggesting political solutions for economic problems, have 
been curiously successful in diverting the attention of the 
people from the main issues and problems. To keep themselves 
popular among illiterate people and to retain leadership, they 
have fomented regional prejudice and sponsored agitation to 
achieve their ends by unconstitutional means. The need for 
Preventive Detention will remain, until the leaders and the 
people adopt democratic ways of demonstrating their grievances.
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To sum up, the citizens of Pakistan were not merely 
promised personal liberty but concrete rights have been 
conferred on them, subject to reasonable restrictions in 
the interest of the security, the defence of Pakistan and 
the maintenance of public order and peace. The 
restrictions on the liberty of the person gave birth to 
the law of preventive detention, with certain safeguards 
embodied in the Constitution. These constitutional 
safeguards become paper safeguard, if the courts do not 
enforce them.
Notwithstanding the limited jurisdiction given to the 
courts and the wide discretion given to the executive, 
the court can effectively intervene to ensure that the 
authority acts honestly, follows the set legal procedure 
and makes available to the detenu the procedural 
safeguards. The courts have not hesitated to release 
a detenu on a writ of habeas corpus in the event of any 
improper exercise or abuse of legal prooedure and 
discretion. So long as this black spot remains in our 
Constitution, it is only the Courts that can influence 
the liberalisation of preventive legislation in favour 
of detenu.
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Finally it is suggested that
(1^  Preventive detention should be enforced 
only in imminent and real necessity,
(2 ) a liberal construction should be given 
to preventive detention legislation in favour of detenu,
(3) the discretion of the executive to detain 
a person without trial should be limited to a period of 
three months without the consent of the Advisory Board, 
except during a national emergency like war,
(4) there should be no detention beyond three 
months without the consent of Advisory Board and the 
maximum period of detention should not exceed one year 
in any event during peace time,
(5) the number of the members of the Advisory 
Board should not be less than three in any circumstances; 
two should be persons qualified to be appointed as 
judges of the superior courts,
(6) grounds of detention should be disclosed 
in full, unless there is emergency like war or high 
official secrets of the state are involved.
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